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Abstract 
This thesis describes and analyses the emergence of Chinese Muslim cultural identities 
in post·New Order Indonesia. I investigate how and under what conditions, Chinese 
Muslims construct and negotiate their ethnicity and religiosity, both individually and 
collectively, in their public and everyday lives, though l do no treat them as a bounded 
ethno·religious group. Recently, Chinese Muslim cultures in Indonesia have been 
objectified in symbols (e.g. Chinese·style mosques), embodied in organisations (e.g. 
Indonesian Chinese Muslim Association, PITI), represented in popular media (e.g. 
Chinese preachers), and performed in rituals (e.g. celebration of Chinese New Year). 
Chinese Muslim leaders promote their unique identities in contemporary Indonesia 
through rearticulation of their histories and cultivation of ties to Muslims in China. Their 
motivations for projecting these images include the fostering of ethnic intermingling 
(pembauran) and the facilitating of religious preaching (dakwah). Yet, there is often a 
distinction between their public performances and everyday practices, as their open 
displays of Chinese culture and Islamic piety may not always be replicated in the home. 
Also, the intentional mixing of Chineseness and Islam does not reflect all aspects of the 
multilayered and multifaceted identities of Chinese Muslims. 
Despite the relatively small number of Chinese Muslims, studying their identities helps 
us to better understand the 'Islamic resurgence' and 'Chinese euphoria' in Indonesia 
today. H also gives us insights into the possibilities and limitations of ethnic and 
religious cosmopolitanism. First, the rise of Chinese Muslim cultures ret1ects the 
acceptance of Chinese culture in Indonesian society, and the tolerance of Islam towards 
different cultural expressions. Second, although encompassed by ethnic stereotypes and 
religious conservatism, Chinese Muslim cultures embrace a limited kind of inclusive 
Chineseness and cosmopolitan Islam, in which the assertion of Chinese identity and 
Islamic religiosity does not necessarily imply racial segregation and religious exclusion. 
Third, Chinese Muslim cultures reconcile the perceived incompatibility between Islam 
and Chineseness, as well as open up more space for identity contestation, but do not 
necessarily pluralise Islamic discourses. Paradoxically, while there is an increasing 
acceptance of cultural and religious diversity among many Muslim leaders, there is also 
a rising intolerance of religious intermingling and intra-religious differences within some 
sections of Indonesian Muslim society. Last of all, I use the notion of flexible piety to 
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examine tluid Islamic religiosity, and the concept of multiple identifications to reveal the 
shifting ethnicity among Chinese Muslim converts according to their living contexts. 
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List of Glossary and Abbreviations 
abangan 
adat 
agama 
aqidah 
Ahmadiyah 
AKKBB 
Al-Arqam 
angpao 
asimilasi 
aurat 
azan 
bah.as a 
bahasa gaal 
bedug 
nominal or less observant Muslims 
customary practice or laws 
religion 
articles of faith, religious belief, theology 
a controversial minority Muslim sect, which was deemed 
'deviant' by some Muslims and partially banned in Indonesia 
Aliansi Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan Beragama dan 
Berkeyakinan (National Alliance for Freedom of Religion and 
Faith), a coalition that promotes religious freedom and 
sympathises with Ahmadiyah 
a Islamic religious movement, originating in Malaysia 
red envelope with money, a present during Chinese New Year 
assimilation 
the parts of the body that should be covered in public according 
to Islamic principles 
call to prayer 
language 
social talk, the slang used by Indonesian youth 
a drum for call to prayer 
Bhinneka Tunggal lka Unity in Diversity; the official national motto of Indonesia 
barongsai 
bid'ah 
bupati 
budaya 
ca leg 
Ceng Beng 
Cina 
Chinese lion dance 
'improper' innovations 
district head 
culture 
calon legislatif(Iegislative candidates) 
Grave-sweeping day, a festival for ethnic Chinese to pay respect 
to their ancestors by visiting the cemetery 
official term for Chinese in New Order lndonesia, considered as 
insulting by many Chinese Indonesians 
preacher, agent of the call to faith 
invitation to faith, religious preaching, Islamic outreach 
recital of prayers 
dai 
dakwah 
doa 
DPD Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (Council of Regional Representatives) 
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DPR 
DPRD 
Dulur Tuwa 
ESQ 
fatwa 
fengshui 
fiqh 
FKUB 
FPI 
FOR GAPP 
game/an 
GANDI 
gereja 
GOLKAR 
Hadith 
Haji 
hajj 
Hokkien 
halal 
halal-bihalal 
ha ram 
hidayah 
HM! 
HTI 
IAIN 
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (People's Representative Council, the 
national parliament) 
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Regional People's 
Representative Council) 
elder sibling; title of a song 
Emotional-Spiritual Quotient 
religious opinion given by Islamic scholars and authorities 
Chinese geomantic omen 
Islamic jurisprudence 
Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama (Inter-religious Harmony 
Forum) 
Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders' Front) 
Forum Gerakan Anti Pronografi dan Pornoaksi (Forum for the 
Anti Pornography and Porno-action Movement) 
a Javanese musical ensemble ernploying mainly gong-chimes 
Gerakan Perjuagan Anti Diskriminasi Indonesia (Indonesian 
Anti-Discrimination Movement) 
church 
Golongan Karya; the state political party during the New Order, 
and one of the major post- New Order parties 
account of the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad 
transmitted through a chain of narrators 
title for Muslim who has completed the hajj 
the annual pilgrimage to Mecca 
a Chinese dialect originated from the Fujian province in China 
lawful or 'permitted' according to Islamic principles 
a gathering for mutual forgiveness to celebrate !du! Fitri 
unlawful or 'prohibited' according to Islamic principles 
God's guidance 
Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Islamic Tertiary Student 
Association) 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (Indonesian Liberation Party); the 
Indonesian branch of the transnational lslamist group, Hizbut 
Tahrir 
Ins ti tut Agama Islam Negeri (State Islamic Institute) 
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ibadah 
ICBC 
ICM! 
ldul Adha 
ldul Fitri 
ijtihad 
ikhwan 
imanz 
Islamism/ lslamist 
lmlek 
INTI 
jemaah 
JI 
JT 
JTM 
jihad 
JIL 
JIMM 
juz 
juzamma 
IKDI 
jilbab 
ju bah 
kabah 
kabupaten 
kafir 
religious observance, religious duties 
Indonesia China Business Council 
lkatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Association 
of Muslim Intellectuals) 
religious festival celebrated during the hajj to commemorate 
Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son to God 
religious festival marking the end of the fasting month 
independent judgement based on recognised sources of lslam, on 
a legal or theological question 
brother, comrade 
'model'; the religious leader of a Muslim community, often the 
leader of prayers in a mosque 
lslamic movements that view Islam as a political ideology 
Hokkien term for Chinese New Year 
Perhimpunan Tionghoa Indonesia (Chinese Indonesian 
Association) 
community of followers, congregation 
Jemaah lslamiyah, a militant group in Southeast Asia 
Jemaah Tabligh (Tablighi Jamaat) 
Jaringan Tionghoa Muda (Chinese Youth Network) 
'to strive', 'to fight'; meaning can range from the struggle to 
create a just society to the participation in holy war 
Jaringan Islam Liberal (Liberal Islamic Network) 
Jaringan Intelektual Muhammadiyah Muda (Muhammadiyah 
Young Intellectual Network) 
section of the Qur' an 
most commonly referred or memorised sections of the Qur'an 
lkatan Keluarga Dayak Islam (The Union of Dayak Muslim 
Families) 
head covering, headscarf 
long and loose dress, which hides the whole body shape 
cubicle shrine in the Great Mosque of Mecca, representing the 
direction to which Muslims turn in praying 
district 
'non-believer' (in Islam) 
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kantor kecamatan 
kantor kelurahan 
kapitan 
sub-district office 
village office 
the leader of Chinese, Arabs and other ethnic groups under Dutch 
colonial rule 
kejawen mystical beliefs emphasising Javanese ethical and spiritual values 
kerudung a loose headscarf, which loosely covers the hair and neck 
KH Kiai Haji (see kiai, Haji) 
khitanan circumcision for Muslims 
ki a Javanese title of respect for learned person 
kiai 'noble', title for a religious scholar or leader 
klenteng Chinese temple 
koko Hokkien term for older brother 
koko shirt a collarless shirt, commonly worn by male Indonesian Muslims 
Komnas Perempuan Komisi N'ational Anti Kekerasan Terhadap Perempuan (National 
KomnasHAM 
KO MT AK 
Komunitas 
kota 
KTP 
KUA 
Lampi on 
Laskar Jihad 
LBH 
le bar an 
LIPIA 
LKiS 
majelis taklim 
maksiat 
Masalah Cina 
Commission on Violence against Women) 
Komisi National Hak Asasi Manusia (National Commission on 
Human Rights) 
Komunitas Tionghoa Anti Korupsi (Chinese Community for Anti 
Corruption) 
Community; name for a magazine published by East Java PIT! 
municipality, city 
kartu tanda penduduk (identity card) 
Kantor Urusan Agarna (Religious Affairs Office) 
Chinese lantern; name for a Chinese nasyid group 
Holy War Fighters; a paramilitary force in Indonesia 
Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (Legal Aid Institute) 
Indonesian term for Idul Fitri, the celebration of the end of the 
fasting month 
Lembaga !!mu Pengetahuan Islam and Arab (Institute for Islamic 
and Arabic Studies) 
Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial (The Institute for Islamic and 
Social Studies) 
Islamic study forums 
immoral act, vice 
'The Chinese Problem' 
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masjid 
MAT AKIN 
Maulid 
mbah 
mimbar 
MONAS 
mualaf 
mubaligh 
Muhammadiyah 
MUI 
MU STIKA 
MSQ 
nasyid 
New Order 
NGO 
non-pribumi 
NU 
nyai 
PAN 
Pancasila 
patkwa 
PBB 
PD 
PDl-P 
PIB 
peci 
pembauran 
pengajian 
pendopo 
Peranakan 
mosque 
Majelis Tinggi Agama Khonghucu Indonesia (The Supreme 
Council for Confucian Religion in Indonesia) 
Celebration of the Birthday of Prophet Muhammad 
Javanese title for respectful person 
a pulpit used by a Muslim preacher to deliver a sermon 
Monumen Nasional (National Monument) 
one who interested in learning Islam; recent Muslim convert 
preacher 
a modernist Muslim organisation 
Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesia Council of Ulama) 
Muslim Tionghoa dan Keluarga (Chinese Muslim and Families) 
Management-Spiritual Quotient 
Islamic music 
Suharto regime, 1966-1998 
non-government organisation 
non-indigenous, commonly understood as ethnic Chinese 
Nahdlatul Ulama; a traditionalist Muslim organisation 
respectful term of address to older or learned women; wife or 
daughter of kiai 
Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party) 
the five guiding principles of the Indonesian state (belief in God, 
humanitarianism, nationalism, democracy and social justice) 
Chinese eight-sided diagram, symbolising luck and prosperity 
Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent and Star Party) 
Partai Demokrat (Democratic Party) 
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia- Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic 
Party of Struggle) 
Partai Perjuangan Indonesia Barn (Party of Struggle for New 
Indonesia) 
rimless cap, commonly worn by male Indonesian Muslims 
intermingling, blending 
Islamic study session 
a Javanese-style hall or veranda 
locally born or mixed blood; acculturated Chinese Indonesians 
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Persis 
pesantren 
PINT! 
PIT! 
PKB 
PKJ 
PKS 
PPIM 
PPP 
pre man 
pribumi 
pribumisasi 
PSMTI 
qi gong 
Qur'an 
RAH IMA 
rakaat 
Ramadan 
reformasi 
Sal<if 
Salafi 
Salafist/ Salafism 
santri 
SARA 
saresehan 
Persatuan Islam (Islamic Association) 
Islamic boarding school 
Perempuan PINTI (Women's Division of INTI) 
Persatuan Islam Tionghoa Indonesia (Indonesian Chinese 
Muslim Association) 
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party) 
Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party) 
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party) 
Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat (Centre for the Study of 
Islam and Society) 
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party) 
thug, gangster 
son of the soil; indigenous Indonesian 
indigenisation 
Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa Indonesia (Indonesian 
Chinese Clan Association) 
Chinese breathing exercise 
God's word revealed to the Prophet Muhmammad and the 
supreme source of Islam 
a Muslim NGO promoting rights of women in Islam 
prostrations during prayer 
Islamic fasting month 
reformation 
the 'pious ancestors' (the Prophet Muhammad, his companions 
and their followers of the first three generations) 
Muslim who seek to emulate practices of pious ancestors (Sala!) 
reform movements that seek to restore the 'true' faith, hostile to 
'improper' traditionalist Muslims practise and 'corrupted' 
modern Western influences; attitudes and approaehes associated 
with those movements 
student at traditional Muslim school, pious Muslim 
Suku, Agama, Ras, Amar Golongan (issues related to ethnicity, 
religion, race and inter-group relations) 
discussion, meeting 
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Sarekat Islam 
SDI 
sesat 
slwlat 
shalawar 
sharia 
silaturahim 
sinerron 
slametan 
SNB 
STEl 
Sufi 
Sufism 
sujud syukur 
syahadat 
syiar 
syirik 
lahlilan 
takbiran 
taklid 
tangzhitang 
taraweh 
tauhid 
Tionghoa 
TYIII 
Torok 
tradisi 
Tuhan 
UGM 
UI 
Islamic Union; the successor of Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic 
Trade Union) 
Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Trade Union) 
deviant, misguided 
ritual prayers performed five times daily 
prayers for the God 
Islamic law; the Islamic way of life 
friendship, good relationship 
soap operas 
communal feast to observe occasions of ritual importance 
Solidaritas Nusa Bangsa (Solidarity for Nation) 
Sekolah Tinggi Ekonomi Islam (College of Islamic Economy) 
one who follows Islamic mysticism 
Islamic mysticism 
a prayer to express gratitude to God 
the profession of Islamic faith: 'There is no God but Allah and 
Muhammad is God's messenger' 
preaching 
idolatry, polytheism 
the reciting of Qur'anic verses to mark life crises, in particular 
the death of family members and respected figures 
recitation of 'God is great'; night of the last day of fasting month 
strict following of traditional Islamic interpretations 
traditional Chinese male clothing 
non-obligatory evening prayers during fasting month 
the doctrine of the unity of God 
Hokkien term for Chinese 
Taman Mini Indonesia lndah (Beautiful Indonesia Miniature 
Park) 
pure blood; Chinese Indonesians who practise Chinese culture 
and can speak Mandarin or any Chinese dialect 
tradition 
God 
Universitas Gadjah Mada (The lJniversity of Gadjilh Mada) 
Universitas Indonesia (The University of Indorn::sia) 
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UIN 
ulama 
um mah 
um rah 
ustaz 
ustazah 
vihara 
Walisongo 
wali kola 
WALUBI 
wayang kulit 
wisata religi 
WNI 
yayasan 
YHMCHI 
Universitas Islam Negeri (State Islamic University) 
Islamic scholars 
the Islamic community 
the lesser pilgrimage to Mecca 
religious teacher 
female religious teacher 
Buddhist temple 
the nine saints popularly credited for spreading Islam in Java 
mayor 
Perwakilan Umat Buddha Indonesia (The Indonesian Buddhist 
Council Association) 
shadow puppet show 
religious tourist site 
Warga Negara Indonesia (Indonesian Citizen), but commonly 
refers to ethnic Chinese minority 
foundation 
Yayasan Haji Muhammad Cheng Hoo Indonesia (Muhammad 
Cheng Hoo Foundation) 
Yayasan Karim Oei Karim Oei Foundation 
zakar almsgiving, one of the five pillars of Islam 
ziarah visiting sacred places, such as tombs of Muslim saints, for prayer 
and worship 
zikir Islamic mystical chanting 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: The Emergence of Chinese Muslim Cultural Identities 
Prologue: Crossing Boundaries 
The politics of ethnicity and religion have always concerned me since I was an 
undergraduate. During Malaysia's reformasi (reformation) period in 1998, I was 
involved in various causes, advocating a more democratic and just society. Llke other 
reform-minded Malaysians, I faced not only the repression of state-controlled media and 
authoritarian laws, but also the challenges of racialised and religious politics. While 
supporting the efforts of Chinese educational groups to demand equal rights, I was rather 
uncomfortable with their essentialist notions of Chineseness. While admiring the courage 
of Muslim activists to fight against injustice, I was rather apprehensive about some of 
their conservative attitudes. While there was growing cooperation between Chinese and 
Muslim activists, the boundaries between them remained. I found myself having to 
bridge 'inter and intra' religious and ethnic divides, as well as confront questions such as: 
How does one fight ethnic discrimination, v.rithout falling into racialised discourses 
promoted by ruling parties? How can Islam play a role in mobilising Muslims to call for 
clean government, without underscoring intolerant religious attitudes? How can the 
assertion of ethnic and religious identities empower minorities, without increasing social 
exclusivity? In other words, what are the possibilities and challenges for ethnic and 
religious cosmopolitanism in multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies? Such questions 
have always intrigued me and in some ways led me to this PhD research. 
In 2002, when 1 was a journalist in a Mandarin-language daily, I met a Chinese Muslim 
leader at an inter-faith dialogue. That encounter led to a feature report and later an MPhil 
thesis about Chinese Muslim identities in Malaysia. One chapter was about Chinese 
Muslim efforts to build Chinese-style mosques. Generally speaking in Malaysia, the 
state-controlled and ethnicised Islamic bureaucracy, which equates Malays with Muslims, 
discouraged Chinese-style mosque proposals, if not outright rejected them. In 2005, 1 
came across an article about the Surabaya Cheng Hoo Mosque, a Chinese-style mosque 
in Indonesia. Why are Chinese-style mosques possible in Indonesia but not Malaysia? 
Influenced by negative media reporting about Indonesia, from 'anti-Chinese' riots to 
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terrorist attacks, many Malaysians, including myself at that time, were unaware of the 
many positive developments in Indonesia, such as abolishing the distinction between 
pribumi (native) and non-pribumi (non-native) citizens, and the flourishing progressive 
Islamic discourses. All these differences raised my curiosity and triggered the idea of 
comparative research project on Chinese Muslims in Malaysia and Indonesia. Although 
this study is primarily about Indonesia, I will nonetheless make some references to 
Malaysia. 
As I will illustrate later, my informants, Chinese Muslims in Indonesia, are constantly 
crossing boundaries. I too, by doing this study, found myself crossing various boundaries, 
including national, ethnic and religious ones. I set foot in Indonesia for the first time in 
2007 and spent a year doing research in a place where the culture and politics seemed 
familiar, yet different, to me. A non-Muslim, I spent most of my time wiih Muslims, 
attending mosque activities and following religious discussions. I encountered converts 
with diverse religiosities, from puritanical salafis to 'unobservant' beer-drinking 
Muslims. A Chinese-speaking person, I found myself with fewer opportunities to speak 
Mandarin and most of the time, conversed in Indonesian. All these experiences prompted 
me to appreciate the diversity between and within various ethnic and religious groups, as 
well as the criss-crossing and mixing of different cultures. 
Stabilising the Unstable: Whither Chinese Muslim Cultural Identities'! 
'Prophet Muhammad urges Muslims to seek knowledge even as far as China. Since 
many ethnic Chinese reside in Indonesia, Indonesian Muslims are lucky enough that we 
can learn from them without travelling to mainland China' (Field note, 16 October 2008). 
Tan Mei Hwa, a popular female Chinese Muslim preacher, delivered this message to her 
audience of mostly Javanese Muslims during a halal-bihalal (a meeting for mutual 
forgiveness) in Surabaya in 2008. Dressed in stylish Islamic dress, she also claimed that 
some of the Walisongo (Muslims saints popularly credited with bringing Islam to Java), 
were of Chinese descent. She said this to reassure her audience of her credentials as a 
Chinese preacher, and to promote a better relationship between Chinese and non-Chinese 
Indonesians.1 Also in 2008, at a breaking of the fast function during Ramadan, another 
1 ln this thesis, most of the time, I u.se the terms ·Chinese Indonesians' and 'ethnic Chinese in Indonesia' 
interchangeably for those Indonesians of a Chinese descent Jt is also irnportant to distinguish the usage of 
'Chinese Muslims' and '\iuslims in China' fn this thesis, l will use 'Chinese f\.1us1ims· for those who are 
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Chinese preacher, Syaukanie Ong, wearing red traditional Chinese dress, spoke in front 
of Muslims crowded into the compound of the Muhammad Cheng Hoo Mosque, a 
Chinese-style mosque in Surabaya. 2 These two events combine Chinese cultural 
symbols and Islamic messages, as well as bring together Chinese preachers and Muslim 
audiences, to challenge the widely held perception by both Chinese and Muslim 
Indonesians that 'Chineseness' and Islam are incompatible. 
During the New Order period, Chinese Indonesians who converted to Islam had always 
been assumed to have lost their Chineseness, and assimilated themselves into various 
local ethnic majorities.3 Today, there are increasing numbers of Chinese Muslims who 
are publicly perfonning their Chinese ethnicity along with Islamic religiosity, 
exemplified by the popularity of Chinese preachers, the establishment of Chinese-style 
mosques, the celebrations of Chinese New Year in mosques, and the engagement of 
Chinese converts in various Islamic activist movements. Chinese Muslim leaders-cum-
businessmen and preachers are the main forces behind this manifestation of ethno-
religious identity. They do so for at least two different, but not necessarily contradictory, 
reasons: the first is ethnic empowerment and the second is religious preaching. Let me 
make five inter-related points regarding the resurgence of Chinese Muslim cultural 
identities. Here, I only provide a few brief snapshots, and will discuss these 
developments in more detail later in this thesis. 
First, the emergence of Chinese :'viuslim cultural identities is a reflection of the post-
1998 cultural diversity in Indonesia. It demonstrates the return of Chinese cultural 
symbols in Indonesian public spaces, and underscores the tolerance of Indonesian Islam 
towards different cultural expressions. The appreciation of Chinese Muslim cultures, to a 
certain extent, shows the commitment of the Indonesian government, civil society and 
iVtu&Hms and happen to be ethnically Chinese in lndonesia, V.'hilc '!vluslirns in China' to refer ro Muslims reside 
in ~1ainland China who are mostiy ethnic Hui. For ;:iore disc1,;sslon of Jvluslims in China and the complc:.x 
meanings of 'Hui', fee Gladney (1991) and Gillette (2000). 
2 Cheng Ho is a Hokkien pronunciation for Zheng He (as pronounced in Mandarin), Given that most Chinese in 
Java are Hokkien, (]1eng Ho is more commonly used to refer to the pron1inenr Chinese Muslim ad1nJral. (~heng 
Ho is often speit with one 'o'. tTowever~ ihe mosque in Surabaya is called 'Masjid i\1uhammact Cheng rloo' 
(\rtuhammad Cheng Hoo Mosque), \.Vhich spelt with two ·o'. In this thesis, i use 'Cheng Ho' to refer to the 
Chinese ~1usllrn figure, while 'Cheng Hoo Mosque' refers to !he Chirtese~style n1osquc in Surabaya, 
3 The differcntmtion bet\veen Chin.::se fndonesiaos and the local ;notive' population has been always illustrated 
by tt;e terrris the 'prib11n1i' (literally n1eaning 'sons of the soil'), used to refer to n.on~(:hinese natives, and '11011-
pribumi', used mainly to refer to ethnic Chinese, Although the two terms have been officially abolished foJ101;vJng 
the instnllatlon ::lf the Presidential Instruction No.26/1998, both Chinese and non-Chinese alike still often 
ccilloquially t:se the lerms today. In this thesis, I avoid csing these terms no! only because of political correctness, 
but ols0 of my beHef 1hat all people born in lndoneskt are equally ·natives;. l wii! use 'non-Chinese" und 
son1etimes 'local ethnic majority' to refer 10 Indonesians who are not Chinese. I \ViU alsu use the specific ethnic 
labels, such as 'Javanese' and "Arab Indonesians' if i refer to thjs ethnicity lo pHrticular. ·The term 'pribtuni' and 
'non·prib111ni' are only used if i refer ill Hterature and conversations that use suzh terminologies. 
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ordinary people to foster and celebrate ethnic and religious pluralism. Among Chinese 
Muslim leaders, there is also a shift from the dominant discourse of 'assimilation of 
Chinese Indonesians through Islam' (asimilasi lewat Islam) during the New Order period 
to 'preaching Islam through Chinese cultural approaches' (dakwah pendekatan budaya) 
in the past decade. 
Second, there is a distinction between the public performance and everyday living 
identities of Chinese Muslim leaders and preachers. As I will illustrate in chapter 4, 
some Chinese preachers consciously use Chinese cultural symbols, such as traditional 
clothing and names to attract audiences. Yet, many of these preachers have no Chinese 
language ability and do not practise Chinese culture in their daily life. Similarly, some 
Chinese businessmen, dressed in Muslim attire, frequently attend the Friday prayers in 
the Surabaya Cheng Hoo Mosque, yet this does not necessarily mean they also observe 
Islam at home. In other words, they present their Chineseness and Islamic religiosity in 
public, but do not necessarily practise such identities in private. 
Third, the manifestation of Chinese Muslim cultural identities does not symbolise an 
existing ethno·rcligious reality, but rather brings a new reality into being. It does not 
reflect the heterogeneity of cultural interactions and religious practices of many ordinary 
Chinese Muslims. While some Chinese preachers parade their Chineseness, there are 
Chinese Muslims who reject being labelled 'Chinese Muslim' and claim to be 
'biologically Chinese, culturally Javanese'. While some Chinese Muslim leaders 
celebrate Chinese New Year in mosques, there are also a few Chinese Muslims who 
insist that Chinese New Year celebrations are haram (prohibited according to Islamic 
law). Most Chinese Muslims are in between these two ends of the spectrum. Also, their 
ethnic identifications are always shifting, while their flexible religiosities are a 
negotiation between religious doctrines and everyday living conditions. 
Fourth, in general, Chinese :\luslim culture is well received by many local Muslims, as 
most followers of Chinese preachers and congregation members at Chinese·style 
mosques are non-Chinese Muslims. Although not breaking down ethnic stereotypes, 
such phenomena help in creating a better image of Chinese Indonesians among the 
broader Indonesian population. I would argue that, to a certain extent, the popularity of 
Chinese preachers and Chinese-style mosques is a commendable example of the 
celebration of inclusive Chinese cultural expression in Indonesia today, in which 
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Chineseness is no longer a sign of exclusivity, but a common heritage shared by all 
Indonesians, and a symbolic commodity in the 'pop Islam' industry. 
Fifth, despite objections from some ultra-puritan Muslims, many Muslims leaders 
endorse the expression of Chinese Muslim cultural identities, seeing it as a form of 
dakwah and a reassertion of plural Islamic traditions in Indonesia. For instance, although 
not contributing to a critical understanding of Islam, Chinese preachers creatively colour 
Islamic appearances and subtly promote the universality of Islam. Also, both the 
inclusive architectural design and socio-religious activities in the Surabaya Cheng Hoo 
Mosque show that the assertion of Islamic identity among Chinese converts does not 
affect their relations with non-Muslims. As I will discuss in chapter 3, the mosque is 
arguably is a local cosmopolitan space allowing Muslim and non-Muslims from different 
ethnic groups to interact with each other. 
The five arguments laid out above are all related to the research focus of my thesis, 
which is analysing the emergence of Chinese Muslim cultural identities in post-New 
Order Indonesia, without treating Chinese Muslims as a bounded ethno-religious group. 
Departing from previous works on Chinese Muslims that focus on their histories, 
conversions and organisations, this thesis investigates how and under what conditions, 
Chinese Muslims construct and negotiate their ethnicity and religiosity, both individually 
and collectively, both in their public and private life. Using Chinese Muslim identities as 
a case study, this thesis will also examine the possibilities and limitations of ethnic and 
religious cosmopolitanism in contemporary Indonesia. I hope this study contributes to 
the academic debate on ethnicity, religiosity and cultural interactions. 
Islamic Resurgence, Chinese Euphoria and Chinese Muslims in Indonesia 
Before discussing Chinese Muslim identities in more detail, it is important to provide 
some brief information on Chinese and Islamic identities in Indonesia. All around the 
world, in the last few decades, there have been various attempts to create various social 
movements based on common identities (Eriksen 2002; Castells 1998). Indeed, we have 
witnessed the rise of religious 'fundamentalisms', the spread of nationalist movements, 
and the redefinitions of claims to race and ethnicity in many parts of the world. 
Indonesia is no exception. The political openness after the fall of Suharto allowed a 
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range of ethnic, religious and cultural groups to express their identities in the public 
domain more freely. For example, the 'resurgence' of nationalist separatist movements, 
such as those in Aceh and Papua; the 'revitalisation' of ethnic identities, such as Chinese 
and Dayak; and the 'rise' of globalised religiosity, such as the Pentecostal-charismatic 
Christianity and transnational lslamism. 
Keys to my research are the phenomena of 'Chinese euphoria' and 'Islamic resurgence', 
which refer to the rising assertion of Chinese and Islamic identities in Indonesia today. 
Indeed, the emergence of Chinese Muslim cultures is an outcome of several interrelated 
processes that occurred in Indonesia and abroad from the 1990s. Such events include the 
China's growing economic and diplomatic power; improving relations between China 
and Indonesia after the Cold war; Indonesia's expanding democratic space; the 
recognition of Chinese cultures after the fall of the New Order regime; the rise and 
diversification of Islamic consumer markets; as well as the divergent progressive and 
conservative tendencies of Indonesian Islam. There has been considerable research done 
in post-New Order Indonesia on both Muslim (e.g. Salim & Azra 2003; Bruinessen 2002; 
Fox 2004; Hefner 2000; Fealy 2008) and Chinese identities (e.g. Budianta 2007; 
Heryanto 2008; Hoon 2008; Purdey 2003; Suryadinata 2001 ). Drawing from these 
studies, I will briefly review four phenomena which link to both Chinese and Muslim 
identities in Indonesia today to locate my research topic in its broader context. 
The first development is democratisation in Indonesia and the emergence of identity 
politics. During the Suharto period, the introduction of the SARA (Suku, Agama, Ras, 
dan Antar-golongan) concept restricted Indonesians from discussing matters related to 
ethnic, religious, racial and inter-group differences in public spaces.4 Both cultural and 
political expression of Chinese and Islamic identities in public life were controlled and 
contained. The New Order regime systematically suppressed any expression of Chinese 
cultural and religious identities; and at the same time, marginalised ethnic Chinese in all 
social, educational and political arenas. Meanwhile, although most Indonesians were 
Muslim, the expression of Islam, especially political Islam, was restricted especially 
during the early periods of Suharto's regime. The collapse of the authoritarian regime in 
1998 dramatically changed political dynamics. Post-Suharto governments revoked the 
official ban on Chinese language, media, religion and culture in public spaces; as well as 
4 
'SARA' is an acronym thal summarises the 'sensiUve' issues of ethnicity (suku), religion (agan1a), race (ras) 
and incer~group (antar golongan) differences. 
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abolishing almost all discriminatory laws towards Chinese Indonesians. At the same time, 
Islam regained its momentum as a cultural resource for political mobilisation. 
Both Chinese and Muslim leaders used the political openness of the post-Suharto period 
to express their identity through political parties and social organisations (see chapter 5). 
Some ethnic Chinese have formed organisations to promote Chinese culture and liberate 
their long-suppressed identity, as well as fight against discrimination. Many Chinese 
Indonesians have also become candidates, some successful in elections, not only. as 
legislators at both local and national levels, but also as bupati (district head) and high-
profile ministers. Meanwhile, some Muslims have formed Islamic parties and NGOs to 
promote different versions of Islamic interpretation, from liberal to radical, from 
progressive to conservative. Although the performance of Islamic parties in electoral 
politics is rather poor, Islam is playing a greater role in Indonesian politics today. Almost 
all major political parties in some way uphold Islamic causes, including some nationalist 
or secular parties which have adopted Islamic agendas in their party organisations and 
slogans (Fealy 2008). Also, in certain regions, local political authorities have 
implemented sharia-inspired by-laws and regulations. 
This resurgence of different forms of identity politics, on the one hand, is celebrated as a 
reflection of political openness in democratising Indonesia and empowerment for 
marginalised groups; on the other hand, it is criticised for escalating ethnic differences 
and increasing religious intolerance. As a few scholars (Budianta 2007; Heryanto 2004; 
Hoon 2009) have pointed out, there are concerns that the exuberant public celebration of 
Chineseness might promote social exclusivity, reinforce ethnic stereotypes, and deepen 
prejudice against ethnic Chinese among the broader Indonesian population. Similarly, 
there are concerns that the affirmation of Islamic piety might generate political tensions, 
intensify religious conservatism, undermine women's rights and threaten local cultural 
traditions (Beatty 1999; Hefner 2005; Robinson 2008). Nevertheless, Kahn (2008) has 
reminded us that there is no necessary contradiction between cosmopolitan sensibilities 
and identity assertions. ls it possible to have inclusive Chineseness and cosmopolitan 
Islam in Indonesia? My research will shed some light on these puzzles. 
The second reality is an increase in identity contestation and different manifestations in 
everyday practices. There is no single Chinese or Islamic identity in Indonesia. Both 
identities are remarkably diverse, spanning a wide array of cultural orientations, religious 
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affiliations, socio-economic classes, political involvement and regional variances (see 
chapter 6 and 7). Conventionally, scholars divide Chinese Indonesians into two main 
groups, the Chinese-cultured Totok (China-born, pure blood) and the acculturated 
Peranakan (local-born, mixed blood). Generally speaking, a Totok refers to those who 
still practise Chinese culture and speak Mandarin or one of the Chinese dialects. By 
contrast, a Peranakan refers to those who cannot speak Chinese and use Indonesian or a 
local language in their daily lives. During the Suharto period, largely as a result of the 
state's assimilation policy, Totok Chinese were rapidly 'peranakanised' (Suryadinata 
1978). After the collapse of the New Order regime, however, there has been a euphoric 
celebration of 'Chineseness' .. including the 'rediscovery' of Chinese identity among 
those who had previously assimilated. Yet, not all Indonesians of Chinese descent were 
keen to reclaim their Chineseness; some preferred to erase the marks of difference (Hoon 
2008). Jn between these two attitudes, the majority of Chinese are relaxed and flexible 
about their ethnicity. Thus, the Totok and Peranakan distinction is insufficient to capture 
the heterogeneity and fluidity of their ethnic identifications and cultural orientations in 
Indonesia today (Thjin 2002). 
Similarly, scholars have used various terminologies to analyse Muslim religiosity in 
Indonesia, such as abangan (nominal) and santri (observant Muslims), modernist and 
traditionalist (Geertz 1960), radical-conservative and progressive-liberal (Anwar 2009), 
scripturalist and substantialist (Liddle 1996), and on the list goes. Such labels allow us to 
examine different Muslim practices and attitudes, but fail to capture the complexity and 
nuances of everyday religiosity. Furthermore, the post-1998 democratisation, together 
with the influences of consumer culture, urbanisation, social mobility and transnational 
flows have made Muslim religiosities more diverse, and the dichotomies mentioned 
above do not allow accurate analysis of reality. Instead, some recent studies have 
proposed that Muslim religiosities are a negotiation between normative and non-
normative Islam; (Beatty 1999); an ambivalent relationship between Islamic resurgents 
and 'ordinary' Muslims (Peletz 1997); or a spontaneous social reality (Alam 2007). 
Indeed, in contemporary Indonesia, the reality of Islam on the ground, as Ricklefs 
(2008:133) concludes, is 'complex, confused and confusing'. On the one hand, there is 
an increase in Islam that is puritan, inflexible, intolerant of other faiths, rejecting local 
culture, politically oriented and even willing to use violence. On the other hand, there is 
an increasing promotion of Islam that is liberal, supportive of multiculturalism, valuing 
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local culture, politically disinterested and peaceful in approach. In between these two 
extremes are multiple combinations and permutations (Ricklefs 2008). The divergence of 
these two tendencies can be seen in the MONAS incident in June 2008, in which 
members of FPI (Front Pembela Islam, Islamic Defenders' Front) attacked members of 
the National Alliance for Freedom of Religion and Faith (AKKBB, Aliansi Kebangsaan 
Untuk Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan) who rallied in opposition to a partial 
government ban of Ahmadiyah. FPI urged the Indonesian government to crack down 
Ahmadiyah activities, which they considered as 'deviant' sect, while AKKBB supported 
the religious freedom of Ahmadiyah followers. 
The third trend is the growing of popular culture and identity consumption. There has 
been a rise in consumerism and new media in Indonesia over the last decade, leading to 
both the strategic adoption of cultural elements in the marketing of commodities and the 
prevalence of cultural consumption, especially among the urban middle classes. 
Chineseness and Islam are arguably the two most commodified and visible identities in 
Indonesian markets today. For Chinese, Chinese,Janguage news and drama programs are 
screened on TV, and transnational Chinese popular culture is well received. During 
Chinese New Year, lion dance performances and red lantern decorations are commonly 
found in most of the major shopping centres to attract consumers (Budianta 2007; Hoon 
2009). In some places, Chinese cultural sites are repackaged as tourist attractions, such 
as Cheng Ho Temple (Sam Poo Kong) in Semarang and 'Chinatown' (Pecinan) in 
Surabaya. Remarkably, 'Chineseness' is not only consumed or practised by the ethnic 
Chinese, but also by many non-Chinese Indonesians. 
For Muslims, Islamic media, banking, insurance, tourism, entertainment and fashion are 
blossoming among middle class Muslims (Fealy 2008; Heryanto 2010). These trends 
demonstrate that the rising religiosity does not necessarily contradict the growing 
consumer culture, but can compliment it. Indeed, the popularity of ;1.1uslim celebrity 
preachers, Islamic-themed movies and Islamic-packaged financial products, show the 
increasing levels of commercialisation of Islam, and at the same time, also the 
'lslamisation' of the market. Interestingly, 'Islamic markets' are not limited to Muslims 
and many non-Muslims are also the consumers of 'Islamic products'. For instance, the 
popular Islamic-themed movie, 'Verses of Love' (Ayat-ayat Cinta), is not only watched 
by Muslim audiences, but also viewed by some non-Muslims. What is the relationship 
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between cultural consumption and identity practice? Does cultural consumption 
contribute to greater pluralism? I will further engage with such questions in chapter 4. 
And the last phenomenon is transnational flows and local dynamics. Both Chinese and 
Muslim identities have transnational dimensions, respectively connected to the 'Chinese 
diaspora' (in Malaysia, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and so on) and 'Islamic ummah' (in 
Malaysia, Middle East and so on), as well as regional variations (Chinese in Jakarta vis-
a-vis Chinese in Medan, Muslim in Surabaya vis-a-vis Muslim in Aceh, for example). 
The interplay of global flows, particularly the rise of China and global lslamism; and 
local politics, such as the expanded democracy and regional autonomy in the post- New 
Order era, shapes contexts as well as integral forces in the dynamics of their identity 
formations. Besides spatial configurations, the rearticulation of histories is also crucial in 
the reclaiming of identities in Indonesia today, as I will illustrate in chapter 2. 
Globalised Islam, as Roy (2004) has argued, is often hostile to the preservation of local 
cultural tradition. Meanwhile transnational Muslim politics has been always in favour of 
ummah (Islamic community) and linked to the Middle East (Mandaville 2001). In 
Indonesia, there are contestations between Muslims who are in favour of 'purification· or 
'Arabisation' of Islam (Ghoshal 2010; Rahim 2006), and Muslims who support 
'indigenisation' (Wahid 2007) or the 'Jndonesianness' (Madjid 1987) of Islam. The 
former tends to embrace a 'generic transnational Islamic identity' (Bubalo & Fealy 2005: 
viii), reject local customs and adopt Arabic-influenced expressions of Islam. The latter 
aims to challenge the 'purification' of Islam, advocate religious pluralism and promote 
'vernacular' Islam that is grounded in local contexts (Rahmat 2003). The discussion of 
Chinese-style mosques in chapter 3 adds another scenario: the transnational connection 
with Muslims in China and the manifestation of Chineseness through such linkages. 
The discussion above shows there arc identical features for expressions and negotiations 
of both Chinese and Muslim identities in contemporary Indonesia. As the post-New 
Order Indonesian state has lesser control on identity matters, various social movements, 
transnational flows, media representation, market forces and local politics, along with 
social experiences and persona! choices, play more important roles in the formation and 
contestation of Chinese and Muslim identities. Informed by these larger contexts, I 
believe that, Chinese Muslims in Indonesia, despite their small population, are worth 
studying, as a microcosm which helps us better understand the dynamics of 'Islamic 
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resurgence' and 'Chinese euphoria'. In addition, Chinese Muslims have a few unique 
qualities that make their identities deserve close examination and could offer us different 
analytical perspectives. First, Chinese Muslims are not locally bounded ethno-religious 
group (such as Javanese Muslims, Acehnese Muslims) but dispersed minorities in 
Indonesia. Second, they are mostly converts. Third, they are a religious minority among 
Chinese Indonesians. Last, but not least, Chinese Muslims are in some ways, constituting 
a 'contact zone' (Pratt 1991), where Chinese cultures, Indonesian local customs and 
Islamic practices interact and mix. Therefore .. the study of their identity adoptions 
provides us with vital clues of ethnic interaction and religious hybridisation in 
contemporary societies. 
Studying Chinese Muslims: Research Gaps, Propositions and Questions 
Having reviewed both Chinese and Islamic identities, now I return to my research focus: 
Chinese Muslims. In this section, I will first briefly summarise the literature on Chinese 
Muslims, and explain my own research contribution. Then, 1 will conceptualise Chinese 
Muslims into four categories to clarify my research propositions: Chinese Mnslims as a 
double minority, as a contact zone, as a complex reality and as an analytical category. 
Towards the end, I reiterate the questions, scope and significance of my research. 
Chinese Muslims in Previous Research 
There are very few scholarly works on Chinese Muslims in Indonesia, especially 
regarding their identity contestations in the post-New Order period. Chinese Muslims 
have been studied previously nnder three major themes: (1) Chinese Muslim histories in 
Indonesia; (2) Islam and assimilation; and (3) Islam and conversions. 
For the first category, there are several books and articles which examine the Chinese 
Mllslims' historical existence in Indonesia, especially in Java from as early as the IS" 
and 16" centuries, and their role in Islamic propagation. Among them are: Al-Qurtuby 
(2003); Ali (2007); Budiman (1979); de Graaf and Pigeaud (1984); Kong (2000); 
Lombard & Salmon (2001); Muljana (2005); Tan (2009) and Zhuang (2011). The two 
most contentious issues are: first, how significant was the role of the Admiral Cheng Ho 
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and his followers in preaching Islam; and second, how many of the Walisongo (nine 
saints), who spread Islam across Java, are of Chinese descent. Most of these works, 
especially Al-Qurtuby and Tan use various contentious historical documents and oral 
evidence to argue for Chinese Muslims being important in the dissemination of Islam in 
Java. However, Lombard & Salmon, Ali and Zhuang paint a more complex picture of 
Chinese Muslim histories. I will discuss further the debate of Chinese Muslim histories 
in the following chapter. 
The second category, Islam and assimilation, is mostly composed of sociological studies 
of Chinese Muslims and their social blending, especially during New Order Indonesia. 
Prominent authors on these topics include: Jacobsen (2005); Jahja (1985, 1988a, 1999); 
Riyanto (1997); The (1986, 1990, 1993) and Tan (2008). Jahja has consistently promoted 
the conversion to Islam and thus total assimilation among Chinese Indonesians, as a way 
to escape social discrimination. However, The, Tan and Jacobsen investigate the 
limitations of this conversion movement and its implications. The (1986) also suggests 
that Islamic conversion should not be driven by religious interest and the best way to 
reduce prejudice towards ethnic Chinese is reducing the economic gaps in Indonesia. 
Meanwhile by stating that some Chinese Muslim shop owners were not spared from 
being looted during the 1998 violence, Tan indirectly questions the workability of 
Jahya's assimilationist approach. A more detailed discussion of the idea of assimilation 
will be presented in the next chapter. 
The third category, !slam and conversion, is mostly composed of religious studies which 
focus on the conversion experience of Chinese Muslims and the difficulties faced by 
them after entering the faith. Most of the writings are unpublished theses written by 
graduate students in Islamic universities or institutes, such as Siregar (1972); lbnudaud 
(1979); Rubaidi (1999) and Elizabeth (2003). These studies discuss the various 
conversion factors of Chinese Muslims and their religious experience, as well as 
problems they encountered, such as rejection by their family and difficulties in practising 
Islamic teachings in their daily lives. In chapter 7, 1 will invesiigate Islamic conversions 
and religiosity of Chinese Muslims based on my research findings. 
My research on Chinese Muslims differs from these three categories of scholarship, in 
two main ways: the period of the study and the analytical perspective. I will focus on the 
identity negotiation of Chinese Muslims in the post-New Order period. There have been 
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few writings on Chinese Muslims in crmtemporary Indonesia. Some of them are rather 
brief articles, such as Marijan (2008) which discussed the role of Chinese Muslims in 
Surabaya, and Suryadinata (2008a) which described the conditions of Chinese Muslims 
throughout different historical periods. Others are rich with empirical data, but lack in-
depth analysis, such as Perdana (2008) which considered the role of P!Tl Yogyakarta in 
promoting social integration, and Ong (2007) which discussed the practice of Chinese 
traditions among converts. 
Closer to my research theme, Chiou (2007, 2010), Muzakki (2009a, 2010) and Dickson 
(2008, 2009) have discussed the construction of Chinese Muslim identity in post-1998 
Indonesia. Their papers mostly centre on the Indonesian Chinese Muslim Association 
(PIT!, Persatuan Islam Tionghoa Indonesia) and the Cheng Hoo Mosque in Surabaya. 
Chiou focuses on the transnational connection of the mosque to China and Chinese 
Muslim leaderships; Muzakki emphasises its local configuration and the Chinese 
Muslim leaders' efforts to fight discrimination through their religious affinity: while 
Dickson suggests the mosque as a manifestation of' Islamic Chineseness'. 
In general, I do not disagree with the findings and analysis of these authors, yet I believe 
they focused mainly on the leaders of Chinese Muslim organisations and neglected the 
voices of ordinary Chinese Muslims. The above studies tend to see Chinese Muslim as a 
rather stabile ethno-religious group, thus fail to explore the motivations, contestations 
and contradictions that lay behind the emergence of Chinese Muslim cultural identities. 
They also do not capture and explain the distinction between public manifestation and 
private enactment, the disjuncture between symbolic unity and everyday diversity of 
Chinese Muslim identities. Furthermore, previous studies paid little attention to other 
aspects of identity formation, such as media representation, market consumption, cultural 
practices, religious rituals and everyday living strategies. My thesis will fill these gaps, 
by providing a more nuanced understanding and sophisticated analysis. I will also 
examine how various market forces, local politics, transnational flows, religious 
movements along with social experience and personal choice, have shaped the 
negotiation of Chinese Muslim identities. By doing !his, I seek to critically engage with 
both the scholarly discussions of Islam and Chinese identities in Indonesia, as well as the 
theoretical debates about identity formation and cultural interaction. 
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Chinese Muslims as a Double Minority 
All Indonesians have to register themselves as following one of the six official religions 
- Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism · on their 
identity cards (KTP) in order to receive government services.5 In 2000, census data 
from the Central Bureau of Statistics reports that 88 percent of Indonesians classify 
themselves as Muslim, 5.9 percent as Protestant, 3.1 percent as Catholic, 1.8 percent as 
Hindu and 0.2 percent as 'other' (Suryadinata, Arifin & Ananta 2003).6 
There are more than 1000 ethnic and sub-ethnic groups coded in the 2000 Indonesian 
census, in which the Javanese (41.7 percent) and Sundanese (15.41 percent) are two of 
the largest ethnic groups. According to the census, there are only about 2 million, or 1 
percent of the population who are ethnic Chinese, but this figure is problematic because 
of under-reporting. The assimilation policies of the Suharto government and the fear of 
identifying as Chinese after the traumatic events of May 1998 meant that many 
Indonesians of Chinese descents identified themselves as belonging to other ethnic 
groups in the 2000 census (Suryadinata 2003). According to Mackie (2005), it is more 
realistic to assume the population of Chinese is about 5-6 million (2-3 percent), even 
though this figure may not be much more than a 'well-informed guess'. 
There is no specific information in the census on the breakdown of religious adherents 
for each ethnic group. However, calculated from the raw data, Anania, Arifin & Bakhtiar 
(2008) estimated the distribution of religious followers among Chinese, Arab and Indian 
Jndonesians.7 According to their calculations, more than half Chinese Indonesians are 
Buddhists (53.82 percent), followed by 35.09 percent Christians, 5.41 percent Muslims, 
1.77 percent Hindu, and 3.91 percent others.8 While this figure reflects the common 
perception that the majority Chinese are non-Muslims, I do not find the number for 
Chinese Muslims convincing. The percentage of Chinese Muslims is over-estimated, and 
;: Confucianism was di:>recogn!sed by the Suharto regime from 1979, and currently restored as a recognised 
religion by President Susilo Bambang l'udhoyono in 2006 (Pausacker 2007). For more detail on the 
development of Confucianism in Indonesia, see Coppel (2002) and Suryadinata (1998). 
6 Tlle "Muslim' figure in the census included those who follov-.r "unrecognised' beliefs, such as Javanese 
mj'sticism, or those "vho are nominally Muslim. Meanwhile given that Confucianism \\<-as not recognised when 
the census was taken, most c:onfucians would identify themselves as Buddhist or mayhe Christian in the census. 
7 I would suggest that we should have a careful reading of the census numbers regarding ethnic and re-ligious 
affil!a!ions, given the consideration of ethnic and religious identification when someone is interviewed for official 
purposes.1 am referring to these numbers only to gjve a general idea of the minority posit;on of Chinese Muslims 
in lndonesla. 
8 According to Ananta, Arifn & Hakhtiar (2008), there were 87,066 Aral:'> Indonesians, forming 0.043 percent of 
the Indonesian population, >lot surprisir.:gly, they estin1ate 98.27 percent of ;\rab Indonesians are Muslims. Jt is 
also assumed that n1ost ncn-Cbinese Indonesians, especially Javanese and Sundanese are Muslirr1s. 
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some of my informants share my opinion. According to a Chinese Muslim leader, Junus 
Jahya, there are about 30,000 to 50,000 Chinese Muslims across Indonesia (Jahya 
2005).9 This means Chinese Muslims make up only 0.5-1.0 percent of the total Chinese 
population and a very tiny proportion of the total Muslim population in Indonesia. 10 
Therefore, Chinese Muslims can be seen as a double minority: a minority within Chinese 
Indonesians, as well as a minority within Muslim Indonesians. However, by converting 
to Islam, a Chinese could also escape his or her as a member of an ethnic minority and 
becoming as a part of a religious majority in Indonesia. 
Chinese Muslims as a Contact Zone 
Chinese Muslims can be seen as constituting a 'contact zone' (Pratt 1991) for social 
interaction, cultural mixing and identity contestation, between and within three sources 
of identity: Indonesian, Chinese and Muslim. As I will discuss in chapter 2, the relations 
between Indonesian, Chinese and Islamic identities went through different dynamics at 
different historical periods: from a hybrid Sino-Javanese Muslim culture in the 15'" and 
16" centuries to its decline during the Dutch colonial period, from organising Chinese 
Muslim associations in the early independence period to the notion of 'assimilation 
through Islamic conversion' during the '.\'ew Order regime; and recently the re-
emergence of Chinese Muslim cultural expression. Generally speaking, in post-1998 
Indonesia, by mixing Chinese cultural symbols and Islamic messages, there are various 
attempts to reconcile the perceived incompatibility between Islam and Chinese identity. 
Nevertheless, in reality, there are various outcomes of intersections between Chinese 
ethnicity and Islamic religiosity. At least, four categories of Chinese Muslims can be 
identified, based on their attitudes towards Chinese traditions and Islamic practices. The 
first category is those who are observant Muslims yet have culturally assimilated into the 
local ethnic majorities. This includes many Chinese Muslim activists and religious 
teachers. The second category is those who are practising Muslims and 'perform' their 
9 This figure is highly contcsled for at least two reasons. First, since many Chinese Muslims intermarried with 
non"Chinese and assimilated into the !oca! ethnic ma.Jority, E.ome of them would not regard then1sclves as Chinese. 
Second, scme of them convert for practical reasons, such as tc marry and for business consideration, thu::; they do 
nJt necessarily practice lsla1n and involve lhemselvcs in the Chinese Muslim circles, 
in Based on my perscnat observation during field\vork, i specL:late abou1 2-3% of (:htnt!se Indonesians are 
Muslln1s. Yet1 glven that ethnic and religious identities are co1nplex and cannot be easily quantified, instead of 
being obsessed wlth nu1nbers, my research foe-uses on the cultural politics of Chinese Muslim identities. 
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Chineseness in public, perhaps best represented by a number of popular Chinese 
preachers. The third category is those who are nominal Muslims and do not practise 
Chinese culture. This includes many Chinese Muslims who work in government 
departments and universities. The last category is those who are nominal Muslims yet 
observe Chinese culture, as exemplified by some Chinese Muslim businessmen. 
The above-mentioned classifications indicate the heterogeneity of Chinese Muslim 
attitudes and behaviours, yet fail to address questions such as: Since both Islam and 
Chinese are plural realities with multiple meanings, which strain of Islam do they follow 
and which aspect of Chinese cultures do they practise? Given that identity positioning 
can be strategic and flexible, can Chinese Muslims downplay or emphasise their Chinese 
and Islamic identities depending on conditions? Do their public manifestations of 
identity reflect their everyday practices? Therefore, my analysis will go beyond this 
typology to investigate the multifarious processes and divergent results of the encounters 
between and within Islam and Chinese identities among Chinese Muslims. 
Chinese Muslims as a Complex Reality 
The term 'Chinese Muslim' generally refers to a Muslim of Chinese descent in Indonesia. 
Yet, this definition is problematic and contestable depending on who uses it and why. I 
would like to suggest that there are at least three different levels of definition: official, 
organisational and individual. The 'official' Chinese Muslims refers to Indonesians who 
identify themselves as a 'Chinese' in the census and as a 'Muslim' on their identity cards. 
The 'organisational' Chinese Muslim refers to their collective identities represented by 
various Chinese Muslim associations. The 'individual' Chinese Muslims refers to those 
who self-identify or are identified by others as 'Chinese Muslim' in everyday life. 
Chinese Muslims as a subject to study are also problematic due to three major historical-
generational differences: 'the lost Chinese Muslims', 'second-generation Chinese 
Muslims' and 'new converts'. 'The lost Chinese Muslims' refer to Chinese Muslims in 
Indonesia back to the 15th century, as well as Chinese who converted to Islam since then. 
Their subsequently generations are difficult to trace since most of them have been 
assimilated. 'Second-generation Chinese Muslim' refers to those who are the next 
generation of Chinese Muslim families, meaning either both parents are Chinese 
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Muslims or intermarriage between Chinese Muslims and non-Chinese, including those 
who no longer self-identify as Chinese. Meanwhile, 'new converts' refer to Chinese who 
are not born as Muslim, but converted later in life. Most Chinese Muslims today are 
converts, and are referred to as 'mualaf' in Indonesia." There are various reasons for 
conversion, including political strategy, business consideration, religious interest and 
intermarriage. Conversion factors, together with religious experiences, economic statuses, 
social networks and localities influence the identity negotiation of different Chinese 
converts, within the broader historical and political contexts (see chapter 7). 
Some Chinese converts, especially those who have married non-Chinese Muslims, 
would not regard themselves as Chinese anymore. Similarly, those who convert for 
practical reasons, such as for political and economic purposes, might not practise Islam 
despite stating 'Muslim' on their identity cards. Although focusing on first-generation 
Chinese converts and self-identified Chinese Muslims, who are easier to access, my 
study will also cover some second-generation and 'non-self-identified' Chinese Muslims 
to examine their identity dynamics. In this thesis, 1 use 'Chinese Muslim' in an inclusive 
way to refer to any Muslim, who has Chinese descent in Indonesia, regardless of their 
cultural orientation or religious understanding. Meanwhile, I use 'Chinese Muslim 
cultural identity' or 'Chinese Muslim culture' to refer to their identity expressions that 
combine both Islamic religiosity and Chinese ethnicity. 
Chinese 1it11slims as an Analytical Category 
Chinese Muslims, who are engaging with two sets of competing identities in Indonesia, 
are extremely diverse. Thus, there is a dilemma here: how can we understand and make 
sense of these multifarious identities? ls there a distinctive Chinese Muslim culture in 
Indonesia? To answer these questions, l follow the approach of Brubaker (2004) that the 
study of ethnicity, race and nationalism should go beyond 'groupism', a tendency to 
reify 'ethnic groups' as 'internally homogenous, externally bounded groups, even unitary 
collective actors with common purposes' (Brubaker 2004:8). He advocates studying the 
way ethnicity works in social and political life without treating 'ethnic groups' as 
-----·--------
11 
'Mua!af is an Arabic term \vhich literally refers to those who are interested in !earaing Islatn. This term is used 
in !ridonesla tc refer to Muslim co:tverts. !n Malaysia, so'.11e converts have rejected the use of such a term as It 
in1plies !he convert has little knowledge of Islam, -..:vhi!e others propose that they are 'reverts' ins!ead of ·converts'. 
There is less controversy about the use of this term in lr.donesia, 
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substantial entities, or even taking such groups as units of analysis at alL I borrow 
Brubaker's concept of 'ethnicity without group' to analyse Chinese Muslims, by 
analysing their complex identities without treating them as a bounded community. This 
analytical approach allows me to examine both ·the demarcation of Chinese Muslim 
cultural identity by community organisations and leaders, as well as the contestation of 
everyday identities among ordinary Chinese Muslims. 
In this thesis, I treat Chinese Muslim cultural identities in Indonesia today as 'culture 
beyond group'. On the one hand, we cannot deny the emergence of Chinese Muslim 
cultures, as exemplified by the Chinese-style mosques and the popularity of Chinese 
preachers; on the other hand, Chinese Muslims are not a unified ethno-religious group. 
Furthermore, Chinese Muslim cultures do not necessarily bind to Chinese Muslim 
individuals. Indeed, Chinese Muslim cultures could be shared by non-Chinese. For 
example, most of those who pray at Chinese-style mosques and listen to Chinese 
preachers are non-Chinese Muslims. At the same time, not all Muslims who have 
Chinese descent endorse and practise Chinese Muslim cultures. 
In other words, this research does not reify Chinese Muslims as a fixed ethno-religious 
community, but as an 'analytical category' to examine their multifaceted ethnicity and 
religiosity. 13y doing so, my study is not only affirming that there are divergent 
identifications among Chinese Muslims, but also to a certain extent, pinpointing the 
'instability' of such ethno-religious grouping without discrediting the emergence of 
Chinese Muslim cultural identities in contemporary Indonesia. This way of 
conceptualising Chinese Muslim identities might suggest the cosmopolitan possibilities 
of their cultural expressions. To some extent, the celebration of Chinese Muslim cultural 
identities without reifying them as a stable entity allows us to acknowledge identity 
expression that is voluntary and inclusive, in which a Muslim who has Chinese descent 
can say no to 'Chineseness', while a non-Chinese Muslim can embrace Chinese culture 
if he or she wants to do so. 
Chinese Muslims in this Research 
Focusing on the post-J\'ew Order period, this thesis analyses the changing expressions 
and diverse practices of Chinese Muslim identities in Indonesia. There are two main 
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questions that guide this research. First, how, under what conditions and for what 
reasons, does the construction and negotiation of Chinese Muslim identities take place? 
Second, does the emergence of Chinese Muslim cultural identities contribute to greater 
ethnic and religious pluralism in Indonesia? 
To answer the first question, I combine both the political economy of identity formation 
and the cultural politics of identity negotiation to study the multilayered and multifarious 
nature of Chinese Muslim identities, by asking questions such as 'who constructs or 
imagines such identities? Why were they constructed or imagined, and why did such 
constructions take the form that they did?' (Kahn 2006:3). I will look into how and why 
their identities are constrained by political situations, constructed by community 
organisations, represented in public media and negotiated in everyday life, by exploring 
six sites of identity contestation: historical memories, mosgue architecture, preaching 
strategies, social participation, cultural celebration and religious practices. 
To deal with the second question, I engage with the debate on the possibilities of 
'vernacular cosmopolitanism' (Werbner 2006, 2008), suggesting there is not necessarily 
a contradiction between cosmopolitan vision and identity claims. I will investigate how 
Chinese Muslims engage with and contribute to the political discourses and cultural 
representations of Islam and Chineseness, as well as explore the interaction, mixing and 
contestation between the two sources of identity. By examining the responses and 
impacts of Chinese Muslim cultural identities, I review the possibilities of inclusive 
Chineseness and cosmopolitan Islam, whether the reassertion of Chinese ethnicity and 
Islamic religiosity enhance or obstruct cultural freedom and religious pluralism. 
l do not claim this thesis as a detailed historiography, or a comprehensive ethnography of 
Chinese Muslims, although aspects of both are important parts of my analysis. As 
already noted., this thesis focuses on both public representation and everyday negotiation 
of Chinese Muslims identities. Some aspects of Chinese Muslims' lives are beyond the 
scope of this research, such as their conversion to Islam and religious education, their 
challenges in observing Islam, their intermarriage practices and the experience of 
Chinese Muslims outside urban centres in Java. I will incorporate those issues in my 
discussion when relevant, but they are not an integral part of this thesis. Despite these 
limitations, I believe this thesis helps us to better understand both the resurgence of 
Chinese and Islamic identities; as well as the dynamics of cultural mixing, religious 
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pluralism and ethnic diversity in Indonesia. My research also seeks to engage with and 
contribute to the broader academic debates of identity formation and cultural interaction 
in contemporary societies, as well as of the possibilities of ethnic and religious 
cosmopolitanism in a globalising world. 
Debating Identity Formation, Cultural Diversity and Religious Cosmopolitanism 
Most current studies of identity formation do not follow a narrow range of theoretical 
and methodological approaches, but prefer interdisciplinary and multi-dimensional styles 
of inquiry (Brubaker 2009). Informed by recent debates from various academic 
disciplines, especially anthropology, sociology, history, cultural studies and political 
science, this research can be conceived as a theoretically informed case study and as an 
empirically grounded analysis of Chinese Muslim identities in Indonesia. Historical and 
political perspectives help me to contextualise my findings; ethnographic studies guide 
me to investigate everyday identities; while cultural analyses allow me to examine the 
complexity of identity representation; and each of them compliments on the others. 
There are three main theoretical propositions that direct my research analysis. First, I do 
not see 'Chinese Muslim' as a fixed ethno-religious group, but rather view both 
Chineseness and Islamic religiosity as 'open signifier[s] and seek to celebrate their 
complex representations' (Gilroy 1993:32). Second, l combine both the political 
economy of identity formation and cultural politics of identity contestation w investigate 
under what conditions and how Chinese Muslims negotiate their identities. Third, I am 
inspired by the notion of 'vernacular cosmopolitanism' (Werbner 2006), that there is not 
necessarily a contradiction between identity assertion and cosmopolitan sensibility. By 
analysing the intersections between and within Islam and Chineseness, 1 explore the 
possibilities of inclusive Chineseness and cosmopolitan Islam in Indonesia. 
Before further discussion, I would like to make three clarifications here. Firstly, given 
that there is a large body of debate related to identity formation, I do not intend to 
provide an all-encompassing review of these, but will instead focus on examining certain 
concepts that will guide my analysis. Secondly, a more detailed discussion of some 
aspects of identities will be incorporated in other chapters. Thirdly, I am aware that some 
terminologies I use, such as 'hybridity', 'cosmopolitan' and 'lranslocal' are highly 
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contested and there are ongoing debates on how such terms should be used. In this thesis, 
despite acknowledging such complexities and specificities, I use these terms in a broader 
sense and in a more inclusive way. Instead of abstract theorising, I critically engage with 
these terms when analysing my findings and hope this academic exercise could 
contribute to a more grounded understanding and reflexive theorising of such concepts. 
Contexts, Sites and Forces of Identity Formation 
Since 'identity' has been criticised for becoming an 'over-used' and 'ill-defined' concept 
(Brubaker 2004), I would like to begin this discussion by making a couple of 
clarifications about the use of this term. Given that this research covers both ethnicity 
and religiosity, 'identity' is strategically deployed to capture both sets of identities: 
Chinese and Islamic. Following Karner (2007:4), my framework for understanding 
identity revolves around three interrelated perspectives: 'first, identity as a set of 
structures that simultaneously constrain and enable social action'; 'second, identity as a 
cognitive way of interpreting, or making sense of, the world'; and 'third, identity as a 
biographically grounded, emotionally charged way of living, experiencing, perceiving 
and remembering (everyday) life situations'. 
Conventional discourses on identity may be characterised as essentialist, assuming 
identity is guaranteed in nature, rooted in deep historical and emotional bonds, given, 
uniform and fixed. More recent and critical accounts, however, have tended to adopt an 
anti-essentialist position, and to emphasise the socially constructed status of identities. 
Identities are therefore, seen as invented, imagined, contested, performative, fluid, 
multiple, flexible and strategic (Anderson 1991; Bhabha 1996b; Butler 1990; Hall 1987; 
Ong 1993; Storey 2003). As Hall (1996b:4) reminds us, identities are the product of 
institutional sites and historical development, constructed within the play of power and 
exclusion, characterised by change and transformation. Thus, instead of being treated as 
'natural' and 'essentialist', identities should be reconceptualised as a continual process 
of 'identification' (Hall 1987:130). Since identities are constituted within, not outside 
representations, instead of reflecting 'who we are' or 'where we come from', identities 
better describe 'how we might become', 'how we have been represented' and 'how we 
might represent ourselves' (Hall 1996b:4). This process enables us to recognise and 
appreciate the importance of 'routes' rather than 'roots' in identity formation. 
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l'\evertheless, essentialist invocations of racial and religious identities remain common in 
both public and everyday discourses throughout the world. No matter how convinced we 
are, theoretically, that identities are constructed and invented, on the ground, identities 
are generally expressed and politically mobilised because they feel natural and essential 
(Ang 2000). Since the 1990s, following the end of the cold war, there have been an 
increasing number of identity movements aimed at restoring rooted traditions, religious 
fervour and commitment to ethnic or national identities (Eriksen 2002). Defenders of 
identity politics suggest it can empower the weak and minorities, while critics say it may 
generate political tension, eliminate internal differences and divert class struggles. 
Indeed, the growing role of identities in contemporary societies in some ways shows that 
construction theory fails to grapple with the real and present-day reasons why essentialist 
identities continue to be invoked (Calhoun 1994). Some studies suggest recasting both 
positions (essentialist and constructionist), to see them as complementary rather than 
mutually exclusive. For example, Haraway (1991) suggests that we deconstruct the 
opposition between essentialism and constructionism that reinforce a nature-culture 
division, and explore a field of possible strategies and combined approaches for 
confronting issues of identity. Meanwhile, Werbner (1997b:229) advocates a critical 
differentiation between essentialism as 'objectification', a positive type of collective 
self-identification, and essentialism as 'reification', which distorts and silences 
difference. Although rejecting essentialism, Spivak (1990) states that it is impossible to 
be completely non-essentialist and coined the term 'strategic essentialism' which refers 
to a sort of temporary solidarity for the purpose of social movement to reclaim power 
based on a certain collective identity. 
Perhaps, political economy analysis can complement the limitations of social 
construction theory, hy linking 'the question of how identities are constructed' to 'the 
inquiry of why identities are constructed'. Termed the 'political economy of meaning', 
Roff (1987) proposes linking of 'symbolic or cultural analysis of what is said and done' 
with 'analysis of the material and other conditions in which the saying and doing occur' 
to understand how Muslims 'discourse' about their lives. In the study of South Africa, 
MacDonald (2004) uses the term 'the political economy of identity politics' to analyse 
the different usage of racial nationalism: mobilizing resistance for ethnic equality under 
apartheid, but legitimizing political patronage for wealth accumulation in the post-
apartheid period. In other words, no identity is, per se, progressive or regressive outside 
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its social context. Therefore, the critics of identity politics should take into account the 
political conditions in which such identity claims take place; while the promoters of 
identity movements should recognise the multiple meanings of such identities. 
Yet, the relationship between political economy (focus on structural constraint) and 
cultural politics (focus on social interaction) is dialectic, whereby personal strategies for 
constructing identities are constrained by larger social contexts, but the latter are also 
primarily the products of individual thought and action. In resonance with Bourdieu's 
influential work (1990) on intertwining relations between structure and agency, 1 agree 
with the idea that identity formation is the outcome of the strategic action of individuals 
operating within a constraining, but not determining, social context Similarly, Song 
(2003) has argued that while significant constraints surround the exercising of ethnic 
options, there are always ways in which individuals and groups contest and assen 
particular meanings and representations associated with their ethnic identities. 
Thus, identity studies should go beyond 'identity' per se and be situated in the 'sites' 
where 'identity' works. Cornell and Hartman (1998) outline six construction sites of 
identity: politics, labour markets, residential space, social institutions, cultures and daily 
experience. Meanwhile, Brubaker (2004:27) proposes that we frame our analysis not in 
terms of 'ethnic group', but rather in terms of 'practical categories, situated actions, 
cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, commonsense knowledge, organisational routines 
and resources, discursive frames, institutionalised forms, political projects, contingent 
events and variable groupness'. Also, identity development is a two-way process 
between 'authority-defined' and 'everyday-defined' (Shamsul 1996), or between 'the 
narrative of the self' and 'the narrative of the self by significant others' (Storey 2003). 
According to Hall (1996a), identities are negotiable and contestable, since it is about 
questions of using the resources of history, language and culture in the process of 
becoming rather than heing. Moreover, identities are produced through representation, 
which involve the use of language, signs and images (Hall 1997); constructed through 
the remembering of the past (Halbwachs 1980); circulated through cultural consumption 
(Storey 1999); invented through reappropriation of traditions (Hobsbawn 1983); and 
imagined through mass media (Anderson 1991). Therefore, the exploration of the 'site of 
memories' (Nora 1989), popular culture, festivity and mass media, is important to study 
identity formation. 
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Furthermore, cultural fragmentation and modernist homogenisation, as well as local 
variations and global uniformity, are not two opposing tendencies, but two constitutive 
trends in identity formation. Friedman (1994) argues that the interplay between local and 
global processes, between consumption and cultural strategies, is part of one attempt to 
discover the logics involved in identity construction. In other words, identity formation 
is not only situated within boundaries of a territorial space, but also configured across 
and in-between such spaces (Gupta & .Ferguson 1992). To examine such dynamic 
processes, Appadurai (1996) proposes five dimensions of global cultural flows: 
ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, financescape and ideoscapes. 
The identity expression in a global culture of consumerism can be seen as a form of 
'lifestyle nationalism' in which identity presentation is not linked to belonging and ethics, 
but appearances and emblems (Ditchev 2006), or 'symbolic ethnicity', in which 'ethnics 
do not need either ethnic cultures or organisations; instead, they resort to the use of 
ethnic symbols' (Gans1979:1). Yet, the manifestation of cultural symbols is not just an 
empty signifier, since identity is also a performative discourse and action (Bourdieu 
1991; Butler 1990), in which by performing ethnic symbols, people can 'contribute to 
producing what they apparently describe or designate' (Bourdieu 1991: 220) or reinvent 
themselves through 'acting' in public life (Butler 1990). As Bourdieu (1991) proposes, 
through objectified representation in things and acts, self-interest strategies of symbolic 
manipulation can influence both the self identification and the perception by others. 
Identity is not only a social construction, but also an everyday life experience. Given that 
everyday life is an arena where the self performs in a number of different ways, 
individuals can shift their identification depending on the situation. Distinctions such as 
'front stage-backstage' (Goffman 1959) and 'detached-embedded identity' (Tilly 2002) 
have been used to study the distinction between one's public and private identities. 
Similarly, Ong and Nonini (1997:3-4) examine the flexibility of Chinese identities, 
arguing that 'Chineseness' is no longer 'a property or essence of a person calculated by 
that person's having more or fewer 'Chinese values' or norms', instead it should be 
understood as 'the multiplicity of ways in which 'being Chinese' is an inscribed relation 
of persons and groups associated with global capitalism and its modernities [as well as 
local politics and everyday negotiation]'. At the same time, there are also growing efforts 
to study Muslim religiosities by combining analysis of sacred texts, social contexts, 
religious institutions and everyday practices (Asad 1986; Alam 2007; Marranci 2008; 
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Peletz 1997). This thesis is not a theological study of Islam; instead it focuses on 
examining Muslim religiosity of Chinese converts: how they learn, experience and 
observe Islam; how they deal with their Islamic identities in public and everyday life. 
In short, as with other kinds of identities, Chinese Muslims in Indonesia, are an 
incremental and dialogic construction of lived identities (Ang 2000), which oscillate 
between self-constructed narratives and those constructed by significant others; between 
public performance and private enactment; between structural constraint and personal 
negotiation; between collective construction and individual identification; between social 
discourses and everyday practices; between global imaginations and local variances; 
between being and becoming. 
Cultural Hybridity and Vernacular Cosmopolitanism 
Recently, embodying 'middle-path alternatives between ethnocentric nationalism and 
particularistic multiculturalism' (Vertovec & Cohen 2002:1), the notion of 
cosmopolitanism, despite being highly contested, has been deployed by many scholars to 
examine, the,orise and sometimes promote the ideal of living together among people 
from different ethnicities and religions in this globalising world. Cosmopolitanism can 
refer to both social conditions and ethical projects (Bayat 2008). The first one signifies 
the diversity and interactions of cultures and lifestyles. The second one denotes a vision 
to challenge ethnic communalism, cultural superiority and religious exclusivity. 12 
Cosmopolitan vision is different from the 'multiculturalist' or 'pluralist' paradigm of 
cultural diversity. Although multiculturalism calls for the equal existence of different 
cultures, it is still preoccupied with ethnic and religious boundaries; whereas 
cosmopolitanism promotes intense interaction, mixing and sharing, that tend to blur 
communal boundaries, generating hybrid identities and 'impure' cultural practices 
(Bayat 2008; Hollinger 1995). In the past, cosmopolitanism has always been associated 
with the notion of universalism, identical to mobility and confined to elite groups; yet 
recent scholarship, under the genre of 'new cosmopolitanism' or 'vernacular 
cosmopolitanism' have challenged such perceptions, arguing that cosmopolitanism can 
be grounded in specific culture, rooted in a certain locality and shared by ordinary people. 
12 For contemporary debates of cosmopo!itanis1n, see Vcrtovec & Cohen (2002) and Cheah & Rcbbins ( i998), 
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The term 'vernacular cosmopolitanism', possibly first coined by Bhabha (1996a:l95), to 
refer to 'cosmopolitan community envisaged in a marginality', is now 'an apparent 
oxymoron that seems to join contradictory notions of local specificity and universal 
enlightenment' (Werbner 2008:14). Other terms that share similar concepts include: 
working-class cosmopolitanism (Werbner 1999), cosmopolitan patriotism (Appiah 1998), 
rooted cosmopolitanism (Cohen 1992) and cosmopolitan ethnicity (Werbner 2002).13 
Speaking of grounded cosmopolitanism, Kahn (2008:268) suggests that not only is there 
no necessary contradiction between cosmopolitan sensibilities and cultural particularism, 
but that in fact many cosmopolitan practices may always be grounded in the experiences 
of particular cultural group. Likewise, Appiah (1998) uses 'cosmopolitan patriotism', 
proposing that cosmopolitanism always begins from membership in morally and 
emotionally significant communities, such as families and ethnic groups; while 
advocating notions of tolerance, the transcendence of ethnic differences, as well as moral 
responsibility for others. Similarly, Bayat (2008:5) terms 'everyday cosmopolitanism' to 
describe 'the ways in which the ordinary members of different ethno-religious and 
cultural groupings mix, mingle, intensely interact, and share in values and practices'. 
Cosmopolitanism is always linked to cultural hybridity, and perceived as contradicting 
the search for authenticity. While many scholars have celebrated the potential of cultural 
hybridity in developing cosmopolitan attitudes and transforming binary positions into 
new synthesises, such tendencies are not without criticism. As Kahn (2006:166) points 
out, 'essentialism does not always imply exclusion. Neither does cultural hybridity 
guarantee genuine cosmopolitanism'. Nonetheless, Kahn (2008:269) reminds us that 
grounded cosmopolitanism of certain cultural forms is not only about their tolerance of 
cultural difference, but also their 'openness to other' and 'Willingness to transform their 
own culture'. In other words, cosmopolitan practices are 'both grounded and 
particularistic in origin, but universalising and culture-transforming in aspiration and 
effect' (Kahn 2008:271 ). Such sophisticated theoretical propositions, as I would suggest, 
enable us to have a more nuanced perspective in exploring cosmopolitan possibilities, as 
well as limitations, inherent in existing processes of identity formation and cultural 
interaction: How and under what circumstances, do the contestation and reconciliation 
between identity claims and cosmopolitan visions take place? Who supports/ undermines 
'vernacular cosmopolitanism' and why do they do so? 
n Fnr a discussion of various 'vernacular cosmopoiitanisrri' in contemporary S..'1cieties, see \.Verbner {2008). 
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'Hybridily', an analogy of biology, is one of the key concepts in contemporary cultural 
criticism and has been celebrated as the antidote to essentialist notions of identity. The 
term entails cultural mixing and the emergence of ambiguous identities, which reject 
rigid boundaries. 14 Theoretically speaking, essentialism and hybridity are two opposing 
concepts: one emphasizing continuity, collective identities, territoriality and boundaries; 
with the other highlighting change, individual strategies, de-territorialisation and 
openness. However, in practice, social realities are less tidy than this contrast may 
indicate because identity formation can at the same time embrace both openness and 
closure, both 'rootedness' and change, both the mixing of culture and the search for 
authenticity (Eriksen 2002: 153). As Knauft (1996) suggests, we should have dialogic 
understanding between cultural essentialism and relativism, although seem contradictory, 
they can be viewed as complementary to one another. 
According to Friedman (1994:208; 2000:83), all cultures are in fact, in various ways, 
hybrid; therefore any analysis which tries to understand hybridity as the convergence of 
'distinct' cultures is engaging in a form of 'confused essentialism'. In other words, for 
assertions of cultural 'hybridity', one might have to assume that an 'authentic' form has 
to be posited first. The same applies to religious 'syncretism' which presupposes 
conceptual distinction between 'pure' and 'impure' practices (Asad 1993; Yeah 2009).' 5 
Therefore, Rosaldo (1995: xv) suggests we understand hybridity as 'ongoing conditions 
of all human cultures, which contain no zones of purity because they undergo continuous 
processes of transculturation (two-way borrowing and lending between culture)'. Given 
that all cultures are hybrid in practice, it is important for us to explain how and why the 
nOlions of cultural purity are still prevalent. Instead of seeing hybridity as an outcome, I 
would suggest that it is more insightful to analyse cultural and religious hybridisation as 
contested processes between cultural understandings, religious interpretations, social 
contexts and everyday practices. 
Also, the distinction between tmconscious 'organic hybridity' and conscious 'intentional 
hybridity" is crucial for us to distinguish hybridity as everyday practice and symbolic 
strategy (Bakhtin 1981 ). As Werbner (1997a:4-5) differentiates, 'organic hybridity' is a 
feature of historical evolution of all cultures through unconscious exchanges and 
everyday adaptation; while 'intentional hybridity' is a conscious effort to create a double 
14 For a scholarly debate of cultural hybridlty, see \Verbner & 1\1odood (1997) a11d Brah & Coombes (2000), 
15 For a discussion of religious syncretism and everyday religiosity in Asia, see Goh (2009), 
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consciousness, a 'collision between differing points of views on the world' (Bakhtin 
1981, cited in Werbner 1997a:5). In other words, organic or everyday hybridity leads 
towards fusion and blurs the cultural boundaries; while intentional hybridity tends to 
draw a new cultural border zone that is 'double-voiced' in which it generates 'a 
conversation between mixed but competing voices whose result is not fusion but 
ongoing mutual illumination of their differences' (Kaup and Rosenthal 2002:xxii). 
To contextualise my discussion, I will illustrate how some scholars have deployed 
analytical concepts discussed above to examine Islamic religiosity and Chinese ethnidty 
in Indonesia. As an alternative to navigate between outright secularism, bland 
traditionalism and literalist interpretations of Islam, Kersten (2009) discusses how some 
Muslim intellectuals create hybrid Islamic discourses to develop cosmopolitan attitudes. 
In particular, she examines the adaptation of Islam to the specific Indonesian settings, 
which called 'Indonesianness' (keindonesiaan) by Madjid (1987) or 'indigenisation' 
(pribumisasi) by Wahid (2007). According to Kersten (2009), both Nurcholish Madjid 
(prominent Muslim thinker) and Abdurrahman Wahid (former NU leader) are 
cosmopolitan Muslim intellectuals who not only promote Islamic teachings that are 
pluralist and tolerant to local cultures, but also form alliances with non-Muslims. 
However, such progressive ideas are not uncontested and have been the subject of 
attacks by some 'counter cosmopolitans' (Appiah 2006, Robinson 2008:124; for similar 
discussion of 'civil' and 'uncivil' Islam, see Hefner 2000, 2003, 2005).16 Such 'counter-
cosmopolitan' Muslims include groups who are scriptural in religious interpretation, 
conservative in social attitude and sometimes radical in action. They are hostile towards 
non-Muslims, as well as 'impure' and 'deviant' Muslim practices. Meanwhile, Kahn 
(2008) explores the possibilities and limitations of cosmopolitanism among revivalist 
Muslims in Malaysia. On the one hand, revivalist Islam might have positive implications 
for its advocacy of social justice and its opposition to racial politics. On the other hand, it 
might be a suppressive force, which limits artistic, intellectual, personal, religious and 
sexual freedoms (Kahn 2008:265-266). 
Studying the complexity of Chinese identities in post-1998 Indonesia, Hoon (2006, 2008) 
suggests hybridity, a concept that values cross-cultural mixing and borrowing, as an 
u., During my fieldwork, l mc1 many Chinese Muslims who praised Abdurrahman Wahid for his tolen,nt attitude 
towards Chinese Indonesians, Yet, i a!so encour:tered a couple of informants, who claimed he was a 'Western 
agent' and not a 'true' !\.1uslim. 
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alternative to both the discourse of assimilation projected by the New Order regime, and 
the essentialised version of Chineseness promoted by Chinese cultural gatekeeper. Hoon 
(2008) also notices that although the everyday living realities of many Chinese 
Indonesians are more or less hybrid, the ethnic boundary between Chinese and non-
Chinese in Indonesia is still maintained due to 'racial, class, religious and educational 
factors'. While he unmistakably criticises the identity assertions of some Chinese leaders 
for re-enforcing ethnic stereotypes, he does not explore the potential inclusivity of such 
identity practices. On another note, Jacobsen (2007) urges us to reframe Chinese 
entrepreneurship in Southeast A~ia from diasporic networking to grounded 
cosmopolitanism, in which their business exercise is mostly influenced by local political 
and social circumstances, and their connections with China do not undermine their 
national belongings. Although Jacobsen (2007) clearly illustrates that such entrepreneur 
practice is grounded in locality, he does not explain the cosmopolitan side of it. 
In an interview discussing his latest book on the Chinese-Indonesian journalist Kwee 
Thiam Tjing, Benedict Anderson suggests that 'the contrast between cosmopolitanism 
and nationalism is a mistake; as they are actually conjoined' (Foo 2009:21). Anderson 
also describes the cultural negotiations demonstrated in Kwee's multilingual writings as 
'cosmopolitanism from below': the idea of being cosmopolitan without needing to travel. 
Such cultural intermingling and cosmopolitan practices, according to Anderson, are not 
peculiar to Kwee, but shared by many colonial and post-colonial subjects in different 
localities, especially among the minorities. Indeed, cosmopolitan practice is not a new 
phenomenon in Indonesia. For instance, Lombard and Salmon (2001) view the cultural 
interactions of Chinese and local Muslims in the 15'" and 1611' century Java, exemplified 
in mosque architecture, as a form of 'cosmopolitan sacred union', combining positive 
contributions of Islamic ideology and Chinese techniques. 
I would like to conclude my discussion here with a few points. Firstly, cultural diversity 
is a site of political struggle (Knauft 1996), and so to speak of the possibilities of 
cosmopolitanism, we have to place identity practices in their historical and political 
se!tings. Secondly, instead of dichotomies, l view boundary making and crossing, 
essentialism and hybridity, authenticity and syncretism, particularism and 
cosmopolitanism as dialectics: they are not necessarily contradicting, but sometimes are 
two sides of the same coin. Third, concepts such as hybridity and cosmopolitanism as 1 
have indicated above are highly contested. In this thesis, most of the time, I use such 
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terms in a broader sense. :For example, hybrid is deployed to imply cultural mixing, 
while cosmopolitanism is used to indicate openness to difference. 'While 1 use the term 
'hybrid' to describe certain Chinese Muslim cultural idioms, I do not mean that there is 
an 'authentic' Chineseness and a 'pure' Islamic religiosity, since both Chinese cultures 
and Islamic traditions in Indonesia and elsewhere are more or less hybrid. I also 
distinguish the intentional hybridity of Chinese Muslim cultural expression from their 
everyday hybridity: the former implies the conscious mixing of both Chinese and Islamic 
elements to manifest a unique identity, while the latter refers to the unconscious mixing 
and crossing of cultures in everyday life. And finally, identity expressions and practices 
can be empowering and repressing, inclusive and exclusive, cosmopolitan and 'counter 
cosmopolitan'. Hence, this thesis will examine to what extent, Chinese Muslim cultural 
identities in contemporary Indonesia embrace inclusive Chlneseness and promote 
cosmopolitan Islam. 
Research Methodology and .Fieldwork Reflections 
This thesis encompasses historical research, ethnographic fieldwork, as well as discourse 
analysis of media reports (such as newspapers and the internet) and cultural signifiers 
(such as mosque architecture, clothing and naming), to investigate Chinese Muslim 
identities. Not only does this research cross various disciplinary boundaries, it also 
traverses a range of boundaries, including national, ethnic and religious borders. In this 
section, I will describe my research sites, timeframes and methods, then share some 
challenges I faced and reflections I made on my fieldwork. 
Research Sites, Timeframes and Methods 
In total, I spent about thirteen months in Indonesia for this research. In early 2007, I 
spent a month in Java for a pre-fieldwork trip to collect preliminary research materials 
and establish contacts. Then, I spent another year (2008-2009) in Indonesia, including 7 
months in Jakarta, 4 months in Surabaya in Surabaya, and about a week respectively in 
Madura, Central Java, and Palembang, South Sumatra. Jakarta and Surabaya were my 
main fieldwork sites, while a short trip to Palembang gave me some idea of Chinese 
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Muslims outside the Java. 17 1 am aware that my selection of locations might be criticised 
for being 'Java-centric', however, the voices of Chinese Muslims from other parts of 
Indonesia are not totally excluded, given that almost one-third of my informants in 
Jakarta were originally from other cities outside of Java, such as Medan, Bangka, 
Makassar and Pontianak. 
As mentioned earlier, Chinese Muslims are dispersed minorities and do not form a 
locally bounded ethno-religious community. My fieldwork, therefore, did not centre on a 
single locality. Yet, I was aware of the risk of conducting multi-sited ethnography for its 
lack of in-depth investigation. Thus, my decision to focus on two major cities with a few 
short visits to other places was an eclectic one, to overcome the limitations of both multi-
sited fieldwork and geographically bounded ethnography. 18 My lengthy periods in 
Jakarta and Surabaya gave me enough time to have deeper engagement with my 
informants and gather detailed accounts from the field. While my short trips to other 
places, such as Palembang allowed me to explore the mobility, interconnectivity and 
dynamics of Chinese Muslims in different localities. This solution in some ways enabled 
me to 'compare people, places and problems in a sensible and reasonable way' and 
helped to avoid thinness and superfidalily (Welz 1998:188). 
My fieldwork research consists of semi-structured formal interviews, spontaneous 
informal conversation, and participant observation. I have good contacts in three major 
Chinese Muslim associations: P!TI, the Karim Oei Foundation (Yayasan Karim Oei) and 
the Chinese Muslims and Families (MUSTIKA, Muslim Tionghoa dan Keluarga); as 
well as with many Chinese Muslim individuals. Their generosity allowed me to attend 
various events of Chinese Muslims, including religious talks, Islamic study sessions 
(pengajian), Friday prayer sessions, conversion ceremonies, breaking of the fast, cultural 
celebrations, political events, social gatherings, conferences, and many other activities. 
All those engagements not only allowed me to get closer to my informants, btit also 
helped me observe their everyday identity negotiation and examine whether 'what they 
17 Jakarta and Surabaya are chosen as the main fieldv..'ork sites, given that both of them are big cities fn lr.donesia 
wi!h relatively high Chinese populations. Jakarta is not only the capital city where major political ar.d ccon0:ny 
decisions n1ade, but also a hub for Chinese from different parts of Indonesia and ~1us!irr1s from different religious 
affillations. Surabaya is an irnportant site to study Chinese tvfusllrri identities, because PIT! Surabaya is the !nost 
active branch in Indoncsin and the fiTSl Chinese-style mosque. in postM!\lew 0Tder period 1,,vas built there. 
)'ogyakarta is chosen because it ls a stronghold for Muhamrr:adiyuh, as co1npared to Surabaya, the base for 
Nahdlatul Ulama, Meanwhile, I visited Palembang because a Chjnese~style mosque \Vas b:ii!t ihere and it was the 
first one outside of Java after the collapse of Suharto's regime. 
ii< For debates on multi-sited fieldworks, see Marcus ( 1995); Welz (1998) and Hanne1·z (2003). 
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said' is consistent with 'what they did'. 19 Among aspects of their identities that I 
observed were attire, languages, their adopted names and religious practices. 
I conducted 95 recorded semi-structured interviews (not including informal chatting), 
about one-third of them were with women. I expanded my sources from Chinese Muslim 
associations to broader Islamic organisations, Chinese associations, universities and 
personal contacts. My interviewees went beyond Chinese Muslim leaders who were 
mainly businessmen to include ordinary Chinese Muslims who were non-organisation 
based, and from various backgrounds (both men and women, of difference ages, 
generations, occupations and socio-economic statuses) to gain more balanced views and 
to allow different voices to be heard.2" In addition, I talked to some non-Muslim Chinese 
and non-Chinese Muslims to gain their opinions towards Chinese Muslims. 
My interviews ranged from 30 minutes to three hours (the average being one hour). The 
interview questions included: Islamic conversion and religion education; personal 
biographies and identifications; marriage and intercultural practices; their Chinese 
cultural understandings and practices; Islamic understanding.5 and observances; and 
experiences as Chinese Muslims. 21 However, there was a lot of flexibility in the 
interview process, depending on the information I would like to get from certain 
interviewees and the topics they were interested in. It was also not uncommon for me to 
talk to the same informant for more than one time. Most of the interviews were 
conducted in lndonesian,22 sometimes Mandarin,23 and occasionally English. 
Besides making observations and conducting interviews, I also collected various primary 
and secondary source documents during fieldwork. I have visited a few research 
institutes and universities to access unpublished theses and academic writings related to 
my research. With the help of the staff in Chinese Muslim organisations, 1 managed to 
collect some of their historical documents, minutes of meetings, bulletins, brochures, 
i! In Jakarta, l attended Lautze tv1osque every Friday for its afternoon prayer sessions and Sunday for its Islamic 
study sessions; vlsited PITI office on Saturday for its Islamic study sessions; and joined actlvities organised by 
~1USTIKA in varJous locations. In Surabaya, l based my fieldwork in Cheng Hoo Mosque, attending both their 
social and religious activities. The firs! month of my fieldwork in Surabaya coincided wi!h Ran1adan, the fasting 
month for Muslims, allowing me to join !he breaking of fast evenls almost everyday in the rnosque. [n addition, l 
occasionally attended various activities_, seminars and discussions of Chinese and Muslim Indonesians. 
20 See Appendix l for the llst of my informants and thetr details. 
~ 1 See Appendix 2 for interview guidelines. 
::t 1\s a Malaysian, I took some time to pick up lndonesian terms and spoke Indonesian with a slfghtly different 
accent Most of the ti1ne1 I did not have major language and communication problems, 
~' Many young Chinese [ndonesians do not speak Chinese. Therefore, those \vbo I interviewed in Mandarin and 
sometirnes in Hakka dialects were mainly older Chinese rv1usli1ns. 
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media reports and video recordings. I also looked into the conversion narratives of 
Chinese Muslim, both in printed magazines and online media. In this age of information 
technology, many Chinese Muslim organisations and preachers also have their websites, 
biogs or facebooks, providing me with a lot of interesting material for analysis.24 
Fieldwork Challenges and Reflections 
Some fieldwork experiences deserve mention because they might had an impact on my 
findings. The first and the most challenging question was how to identify Chinese 
Muslims in Indonesia, and how to gain access to Chinese Muslims who did not want 
their identities revealed. This further lead to another dilemma: how to avoid cultural 
'essemialisation' when searching for Chinese Muslim informants? Eriksen (2002) 
reminds researchers that ethnicity is not only created by the people we study but also by 
ourselves as observers. He says, 'if a researcher looks for ethnicity, he or she will find it 
·possibly at the cost of missing out on other kinds of relationship which are also 'there" 
(Eriksen 2002:161). Therefore, to study ethnicity without inadvertently contributing to 
its reproduction, we should not overlook contexts 'which are not ethnic'. Informed by 
such a proposition, I remind myself not to impose the label of 'Chinese Muslim' on my 
informants, rather allow them to reveal their diverse subjectivities and identifications. 
As already noted, some Indonesians of Chinese descent do not consider themselves as 
Chinese after converting to Islam. Some were officially Muslim but did not practise 
Islam, thus they preferred to keep a low profile. 25 During my fieldwork, I also 
encountered a few informants, who were hesitant to talk to me because they thought they 
were not 'Chinese Muslim', worrying that they were not 'good Muslims' or 'authentic 
Chinese' .26 To solve this problem, I explained to them that my research was not only 
concerned with their identities per se, but also their life stories and social experiences. 
More importantly, I did not take their Chineseness and Islamic religiosity for granted. 
14 See hibliography for a list Of'Vlebsites related to Chfr1ese ~1usli1ns in lridonesia. 
z.~ According-!o my conversation vvHh Nanta, '.vho researched female Chinese Muslims, many of her lnforrrrnnts 
talked to her because they were friends and knew each other before. They were reluctant to meet other researchers, 
either because they wanted to conceal their Chineseness; or they did not want their religiosity to Je scrutinised. 
21
' Let me cite a few reasons why some 'Chinese ~1uslirns' were hesitant to talk to me 'Jam Just a small figure 
;u1li also I am not a good iv1usli1n', 'lam a new convert a11d do not know many things about lslam yet', 'Although 
l look Chinese, I rnn culturally Javanese, are you sure you •,vant to interview me?', 'lam not really a Chinese. tv1y 
fa!her is a Chinese and rny mother is a Javanese. l grew up as a Javanese. I do not qualify as a Chinese f\.1uslim'. 
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For example, at the end of the interview, a few of them told me that they did not see 
themselves as 'Chinese Muslim' despite having Chinese descent or appearance. 
Despite the limitations mentioned above, most people I met were helpful and cooperative. 
It was not uncommon for some converts to approach me to be interviewed, so that their 
stories could be heard, some also see this as a way of preaching Islam. Except some 
businessmen, many Chinese Muslims eagerly shared their conversion experiences and 
religious opinions. While a few interviewees preferred to remain anonymous, many did 
not mind if I used their real names. Some informants, who were initially willing to use 
their real names, mentioned that they did not want to be quoted on a certain controversial 
statement they had made. Therefore, this thesis uses both real names and pseudonyms.27 
To maintain the integrity of this study, I use real names to refer to my informants as long 
as they permitted me to do so and especially if they were public figures, such as 
organisation leaders, businessmen, politicians and preachers. I use pseudonyms when an 
informant preferred to remain unknown and to protect my informants from possible 
repercussions from their ·sensitive' statements.28 
Another potential influence on my fieldwork was my own identities. As a non-Muslim 
Chinese from Malaysia, I was both an 'outsider' to them because of my different 
nationality and religion, and an 'insider' because of sharing same ethnicity.29 As a non-
!ndonesian, 1 needed some time to get familiar with Indonesian languages, and to gain 
trust from my informants. Yet, as a non-local, I also had a certain advantage compared to 
Indonesian researchers. Some informants felt more 'secure' to share their opinions with 
me on 'sensitive' issues, such as their negative perceptions of non-Chinese, their 
experiences of discrimination, their 'un-lslamic' practices and criticisms of Indonesian 
authorities. 
With few exceptions,30 as a non-Muslim,31 my attendance in Chinese Muslim circles was 
27 in all but chapter 7, most of the n~mes i use in this thesis are real. 
23 Exainples of 'sensitive' staterrients are Chinese lvfuslims \.Vho said they eat pork at home, gamble at casinos or 
are involve in certain radical religious group. 
2
'' As a male researcher, I have h::;th advantages and disadvantages to access (ema!e informants. Some female 
converts, especiaJly tl1ose who are religiously conservative, were reserved about talking to me. WhJle other 
female respondenrs accepted my invitation to interview warmly, treating me as their 'younger brother' or 'son'. 
Jii These ex<.,"Cptions include, a Chinese convert who was worried I was a spy from the Australian government, and 
another informant who ~uestioned my research aims, by saying, 'You are here everyday and ask us a lot of 
questions. But are you really interest~d in Islam or are you just treating us as your research objects. then you will 
forget us and Islam after you have finished your thesis?' 
:it I have been often asked by rny informants about n1y re!lgious status, and most of tiine, J said I was a Buddhist 
or a Confucian,, although I do not observe those religions. 
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well received.32 Many tried to convert me to Islam, both verbally and by example, bolh 
directly and indirectly, yet they were not insistent or impolite.33 There were at least three 
forms of dakwah (preaching) that l encountered: 'direct invitation', 'indirect persuasion' 
and 'non-verbal preaching'. 'Direct invitation' included those who inviting me to 
observe Islamic practices, such as fasting and praying, or to recite syahadat, a testimony 
of Islamic conversion. Instead of 'direct invitation', many Chinese Muslims adopted 
'indirect persuasion', by promoting positive images of Islam, sharing their benefits of 
being a Muslim, and comparing Islam with their previous religions. Their dakwah went 
beyond verbal expression, but also through their generosity, offering me various forms 
of assistance. As one of my informants told me, 'It is a form of dakwah. By acting as a 
good Muslim and showing our friendliness to non-)vfoslim, we hope you will get the 
hidayah (God's guidance), or at least, you will have better perception of lslam'.34 In 
short, being a non-Muslim, to some extent, facilitated rather than obstructed my research. 
ln addition, my Chinese background and ability to speak Mandarin enabled me to form 
close connections with some Chinese Muslims and to gather information not available to 
non-Chinese researchers. Speaking to me in Mandarin, a couple of informants revealed 
their 'rear motives for Islamic conversions and their 'un-lslamic' practices, such as 
eating pork at home. Other informams shared their experience of being a minority and 
how they coped with it Yet, my Chinese ethnicity also sometimes influenced how my 
informants responded to me, and how they acted in my presence. Some of them 
intentionally emphasised their Chinese identity to me as a form of dakwah, to show that 
Islam and Chineseness was not incompatible. For example, a female convert asked me to 
address her in her Chinese name, while others called her in her Indonesian name. 
Acknowledging the influence of my identity during fieldwork does not make this study 
less convincing; instead it is in some ways, consistent with my proposition that Chinese 
Muslim identities are not fixed but situational. 
----~--·---------
32 1 was net o:::iJy \Velcomed to their religious activities, sorne informnnts also bought rne lunch, invited n1e to their 
borne for dinner, took n1e for sightseeing and even tried to n1atch make rne. 
q Iv1ost of the time, f did not reject their invitation to Islam, but ke-p~ smilie1g or replied \vit;i '[nryaallah' (God 
\vi!ling) or 'fnasih t11ngg11 hidayah' (waiting for the God 1s gulda:-ice), -There were also a few occasions in Vv'hich I 
pretended to be a Muslim convert. One of those occasions \Vas when f visited a convicted Bali bomber, An1fozfs 
fa1nily at Lamongan with Anton l'vledan, a Chinese M..1slim preacheL 
;i,.i. Be::-:ides such 'Islamic' encounters, J a!so \\-'ent !hrough saint: 'un-islamic' experience in the field. For example, 
f interviewed a Chinese };]'Jsli:n girl in a pub; a Muslim busincssnu1n offered me \Vine; a female convert invited 
me to gamble; and a Muslin: man I visit Dolly, a red-light district in Surabaya. 
51 
Chapter Outline 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. This introduction has located the study of Chinese 
Muslim identities in a broader social context, as well as presented my research questions 
and core arguments along with theoretical debates and methodological considerations. 
The following chapters (chapter 2 to 7) analyse the construction and negotiations of 
Chinese Muslim identities, from six different but interrelated aspects, namely, historical 
memories, mosque architecture, preaching strategies, social participation, cultural 
celebration and everyday religiosity. 
Chapter 2 is a temporal journey. It begins with a brief historical survey of the 
continuities and changes of Chinese Muslim identities throughout different periods. It 
further discusses the rearticulation of their historical memories in Indonesia today: who 
imagines the histories, which parts of histories are rearticulated, how the histories have 
been represented and for what reasons. I argue that, by promoting the role of Cheng Ho 
in spreading Islam and claiming that some of the Walisongo have Chinese descent, 
Chinese Muslims seek to redefine their minority position, to preach Islam to non-
Muslims, and to improve the image of Chinese Indonesians. 
Built around a discussion of Cheng Hoo Mosques, chapter 3 explores the spatial 
formation of Chinese Muslim identities. I suggest that Chinese-style mosques are a form 
of negotiation between transnational imaginations and local dynamics to manifest a 
unique Chinese Muslim identity. I also argue the Chinese Muslim leaders' efforts in 
mixing Islam and Chineseness, do not reflect the heterogeneous identity adoption of 
many ordinary Chinese Muslims. By demonstrating the inclusive architectural design 
and social activities of Cheng Hoo Mosque, I describe it as a local cosmopolitan space 
allowing Muslims and non-Muslims from various ethnic groups to get together. 
Chapter 4 describes and analyses the popularity of Chinese Muslim preachers. By 
illustrating the public performance of Chinese preachers, I distinguish between 
'essentialistic Chineseness' as a preaching strategy and 'everyday Chineseness' as a 
living identity. In addition, the popularity of Chinese preachers reflects the paradox of 
identity consumption, that the diversity of styles is not always accompanied by a 
plurality of discourses. As I will describe, while Chinese preachers help to promote a 
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positive image of ethnic Chinese and diversify cultural expression of Islam, it does not 
necessarily break down ethnic stereotypes and pluralise the substance of religion. 
In Chapter 5, I examine the identity politics of Chinese Muslims in democratising 
Indonesia. Firstly, I review the strategic solidarity and internal dynamics of Chinese 
Muslim organisations, such as PIT! and Karim Oei Foundation. Secondly, I explore 
Chinese Muslims' social and religious participation beyond such organisations. Thirdly, 
I examine the engagement of Chinese Muslims in electoral politics. Despite attempts to 
stabilise Chinese Muslims as a distinctive group. I argue that there are competing 
identity mobilisations amongst them for different reasons, including Islamic preaching, 
ethnic empowerment and personal political or economic interests. 
Through the celebration of Chinese New Year (lmlek) in mosques, chapter 6 studies how 
Chinese Muslims accommodate cultural elements in Islamic preaching, a practice they 
call 'dakwah pendekaran budaya' (preaching through cultural approaches). Such an 
event is not without controversy, as it raises debates about whether lmlek is halal or 
haram (permitted or prohibited according to Islamic law). I therefore examine how and 
under what conditions Muslim leaders make their fatwa (religious opinion), and how 
Chinese ::Vfuslims respond to such debates. I propose that religious hybridisation is a 
contested process, between the interaction of religious texts, social contexts and 
everyday practices. 
Focusing on naming practices, female veiling experiences and life stories, Chapter 7 
examines both the political economies of religious conversion and shifting ethnicity, as 
well as the cultural politics of flexible piety and multiple identifications. I investigate the 
multiple ways of being 'Chinese Muslim' and reveal a range of subjectivities, self-
expression and identity negotiations in their everyday lives. 1 also unfold multiple, 
selective and sometimes, inconsistent Islamic piety among converts according to their 
various living conditions and religious understanding. This affirms that Muslim 
religiosities do not only rely on their interpretation of Islam, but also from the contingent 
political, social and economic circumstances of their understanding of Islamic teachings. 
This thesis concludes by summarising the main features of Chinese Muslim identities in 
Indonesia and their broader implications. I recapitulate a few paradoxes of their identities: 
the distinction between public performance and living practice, the disjuncture between 
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intentional hybridity and everyday hybridity, and the relation between identity assertion 
and cosmopolitan sensibilities. Pulling together main arguments from each chapter, and 
locating them in a broader context, I examine the possibilities and limitations of 
cosmopolitan Islam and inclusive Chineseness in Indonesia. In the end, I propose a few 
comparative researches for deeper understanding and further theorisation about the 
intersections between religiosity and ethnicity in contemporary societies. 
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Chapter2 
Remembering the Past for the Present: 
Rearticulating Chinese JHuslim Histories 
'Sunan .ilunpel, Sunan Drajad, Sunan Muria, and Sunan Bonang are Chinese 
Muslims, including myself. Therefore, we as Chinese Muslims should not ashamed 
to be called Chinese, since our ancestors spread Islam in Java and Sumatra, 
followed by most residents.' 1 
Former Indonesian President and past i\\J Chairman, Abdurrahman Wahid or Gus Dur, 
reiterated that he himself had Chinese ancestry, in an international seminar entitled 
Cheng Ho, Walisongo dan Muslim Tionghoa Indonesia Di Masa Lalu, Kini dan Esok 
(Cheng Ho, Walisongo and Chinese Muslims in Indonesia: Past, Present and Future), 
which was held in Surabaya on 26-27 April 2008, by Cheng Hoo Foundation (YHMCHl, 
Yayasan Haji Muhammad Cheng Hoo Indonesia). 2 
Gus Dur's statement on his Chinese heritage has been quoted by some Chinese Muslim 
leaders to show that their identity is not a new phenomenon. By promoting Cheng Ho's 
Islamic identity and Walisongo's Chineseness, Chinese Muslim leaders want to 
emphasise the Chinese Muslims' contribution to preaching Islam and their role rn 
bridging ethnic differences in Indonesia. Many non-Muslim Chinese leaders and non-
1 This phrase is quoted from a report . 'Cheng Ho dan Walisongo dalam Sejarah Bangsa Diseminarkan' in 
Komunitas, edl1Jon 40, April 2008, The original Indonesian text is ~ 'Suna11 Ampel, Sunan Drajad, Suoa Mllria, 
dan Sunan Bonang adalah Muslhn l'ionghoa, tern1asuk saya sendirL !\1aka kita sehagai kaum Tionghoa tidak 
boleh main dikatakan ·rionghoa. Karena nenek moyang kitalnh yang menyebark;:in agama Islam di tanah Jawo 
dan Sumatera yang dlanut mayorltas penduduknya.' I rnyself also wit:Jess 1he spe,ech of Gusdur during !he 
i:.eminar in Surabaya. In various locations, Gus Dur has openly slated that he had Chinese heritage. Abdurrahman 
Vi ah id claimed that he is a descendant of Tan Kirn Han or Sheik :\bdul al~Shini Qadir, a C!~inese Muslin: who 
has helped Raden Patah seize power from the Majapahit kingdom and founded the Islamic Kingdom of Demak 
(Al-Qurtuby 2003:125). Hrn;vever, Gus l)ur downplays his Chinese descent when intcrviewe-d by me personally. 
Instead of cb:dm!ng he has Chinese blood, hf..' told me that 1nost Indonesians, including himself has 1nixed blood 
(interview, 1\bdurrahmJn Wahid, 10 January 2009). In other occasions, Gusdur also said he has Arabic, as \Veli as 
Enropean descents. 
: Admiral Cheng Ho (1371-1433), or Zheng ~le, was also known as Sarr.Po ir. Indonesia. He ls a Hui ~1uslirn 
r.1ariner, explorer, diplomat and fleet admiral, who made the expeditions (1405~1433) to Southeast Asia. South 
Asia and Eas1 Africa during the Ming Dynasty. For f11rther information ahout Cheng Ho and his expedl!ions to 
Soctheast Asia, see 'Admiral Zheng _He & Soctheast Asia' (Suryadinata 2005), 'Zf\eng He and the 'freasure Fleet 
1405-1433' (Rozarlo 2005), 'Cheng Ho and Jslam in Southea5t A5ia' {Tan 2009) and '~uslim Tionghca Cheng 
Ho: Mister! Perjalanan Muhibah di Nusantara· (Kong 2000), Meanwhile, Walisongo, referred to the nine saints 
¥.'ho are mythologised as the first persons to spread Jsl<:m in Java. ·se:nbilan WaH & Siti Jenar', by Ajidanna 
(2003) is an interesting photographic ar.d historical book about the nine saints. The nine saints are Raden Patah, 
Sunan Ngampel Denta, Sunan Girli Suoan I3onang, Sunan Kudus, Sunan Ka!ijuga, Suna Gur.ung Jati, Sunar: 
~1uria and Sunan Drajat. 
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Chinese Muslims also endorse these claims. The formers do so to emphasise the 
participation of ethnic Chinese in the Indonesian nation, while the latter do so to reassure 
the inclusivity and plurality of Indonesian Islam. 
This chapter consists of two main parts·- 'Chinese Muslims as historical construct' and 
'the historical rearticulation of Chinese Muslims'. The first part provides a historical 
survey of Chinese Muslims, while the second examines how they represent their 
histories in contemporary Indonesia. To comextualise the formation of Chinese Muslim 
identities in a longer timeframe, I begin this chapter with a brief historical account of the 
change and continuity of their identities throughout different periods in Indonesia. There 
have been many writings on Chinese Muslim histories and their roles in disseminating 
Islam (Ali 2007; Al-Qurtuby 2003; de Graaf & Pigeaud 1984; Kong 2000; Lombard & 
Salmon 2001; Muljana 2005; and Tanggok 2006). Therefore, instead of discussing the 
histories in detail, this chapter will focus on exploring the construction of historical 
memory of Chinese Muslims in today Indonesia - who imagines the histories, which part 
of histories are rearticulated, how the histories have been represented and for what 
reasons. 
As I will argue, such selected remembering of history is not to resurrect a 'pure' past, but 
to give meaning to the present. Indeed, identities are always imagined through 
remembering (Halbwachs 1980), which memory can be potentially political - 'the power 
to manage the past to order the present' (Storey 2003:85). Therefore, although 
describing the efforts of Chinese Muslim leaders in promoting their version of historical 
memory, I do not necessarily regard their claims as historically accurate.3 The frequent 
interaction between Chineseness and Islam in the past is undeniable, as exemplified by 
the Chinese influences in some old mosques in Indonesia, yet the contribution of 
Chinese Muslims in spreading Islam has always been contested, if not disputed.4 
3 Although rnost of !he historical writings I refer to Jn this chapter support the Chinese role in lslamisation, il does 
not mean that I totally endorse their claims. There is less disputes that Cheng Ho is a Muslim, bu! his contribution 
to h;!arnlsation in Indonesia is highly contested. Although there is more TC'-'Vgnition that son1e Walisongo might 
had Chinese heritage, how many and to what extent is debatabie. }fo\vevet, I will not go into these debates, 
Instead of searching fer hlstorlcal troth, this chapter is tOL-us on how histories are constructCd for present purposes. 
4 [l is generally agreed by many scholars that Isian1 came to h1donesia through ,l\rabs and Indian Muslims, but 
there is no consensus arnong historians about the contribution of Chinese Muslin1s due to the lack of convincing 
evidence. For discussion of the ooming of Islam to Indonesia, see Ricklefs (1979, 1981). 
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History, Identity and Politics 
Studies of identity formation need to be historically contextualised, given that culture 
identities come from somewhere, and have histories. According to Hall (1993:394), 
cultural identities are subject to the continuous 'play' of history, culture and power, as 
they undergo constant transformation and are far from being eternally fixed in some 
essentialised past. Furthermore, the remembering of the past can be political and 
selective, since the past can be reinterpreted for political purposes (Boyarin 1994) and 
the memories can be revised to suit current identities (Gillis 1994). Indeed, as argued by 
Friedman (1994: 118), making history is a way of producing identity as it produces a 
relation that has supposedly occurred in the past and the present state of affairs. 
Halbwachs (1980) further argued that remembering is always a practice of reconstruction, 
in which what significant is not the 'facts· .• but how the 'facts' are interpreted to make 
meaning in the present. Such historical narratives are always embodied in mnemonic 
artifacts, forms of commemorations, museums, textbooks and so on, what historian 
Pierra Nora (1989:7) calls 'sites of memory'. Similarly, Storey (2003:84) coined the 
term 'memory industries' to refer to cultural industries concerned with articulating the 
past - not limited to heritage sites, but also mass media and popular culture. As he 
pointed out, 'the memory industries produce representation ('cultural memories') with 
which we are invited to think, feel and recognise the past' (Storey 2003:83). 
As with other identities, Chineseness in Indonesia is also a product of history, as it is 
often shaped by government policies and past traumatic events. Budianta (2007:172) 
pointed out that, 'to write that history - be it in a critical, alternative way - is to 
participate in the creation of Chineseness. One can confront it .. challenge it, redefine it, 
but it will always haunt.' Using Appadurai's concept of 'imagined nostalgia' (1996:77), 
Dawis (2009) showed how some Chinese Indonesians experience their sense of 
belonging, which was suppressed by the New Order regime; and imagine some sort of 
cultural connection to the 'mythic homeland' - mainland China, to which they have 
never been, through the consumption of transnational Chinese films. After the downfall 
of Suharto in l 998, some Chinese leaders have strived by various means to reclaim their 
displaced Chineseness, such as through the building of Chinese Indonesian Cultural Park 
in the 'Beautiful Indonesia Miniatnre Park' (TMII, Taman Mini Indonesian lndah). 
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In this chapter, I will describe and analyse how Chinese Muslim leaders rearticulate their 
histories for present purposes through various 'sites of memory' (mosques, libraries and 
so on), popular culture (songs, drama serials, preaching etc), mass media (newspapers, 
publications and other outlets) and seminars. Such efforts show their creativity in 
engaging history for their present interests, albeit sometimes at the expense of historical 
fact Jn other words, on the one hand, such rearticulation of history could empower the 
minority through selective memory; yet on the other hand, it might simplify their 
complex past Before examining such memory construction in post-New Order Indonesia, 
I begin this chapter with a brief historical contour of Chinese Muslim identities. 
Chinese Muslims as an Historical Construct 
Chinese Muslim identities have had different dynamics through different periods of 
history. In this section, l will discuss five transformations - from a hybrid Sino-Javanese 
Muslim cuiture in the 15'h and 16'h centuries to its decline during the Dutch colonial 
period, from organising Chinese Muslim associations during the early independence 
period to the erasing of Chineseness under the New Order regime; and recently the re-
emergence of Chinese Muslim cultural expression in post-1999 Indonesia. This survey 
might not capture all the complexities of Chinese Muslim histories, yet is important to 
locate the recent manifestation of their identities in a broader view and to understand that 
encounters between the Chinese and Muslims in Indonesia have long historical roots. 
The Pre-Colonial Period: Chinese Muslims as Hybrid Culture 
Chinese Muslims are not new to Indonesia. There is some evidence of Chinese Muslims 
existence in Java from as early as the 15'h century; and their engagemenls in Islamic 
preaching from that time (Al-Qurtuby 2003; Ali 2007). According to historians Lombard 
and Salmon (2001), the interaction of Chinese and local culture at that time was reflected 
in the mosque architecture. Termed as 'Peranakan Muslim subculture', they see such 
interaction as a form of cosmopolitan 'sacred union', which combined positive 
contributions of Islamic ideology and Chinese techniques. 
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There are a few historical texts which have mentioned the existence of Chinese Muslims 
in Indonesia before the Dutch colonial period. A Chinese Muslim, Ma Huan, who 
accompanied Admiral Cheng Ho on his series of expeditions to the South Seas (1405-
1433), reported in his book, Ying-yai Sheng-Ian: The Overall Survey of the Ocean's 
Shores (1433) (Ma 1970), that there were already ethnic Chinese in Java at that time and 
some of them were Muslims. Yet, the report did not mention about the preaching of 
Islam by Cheng Ho at that time. l'\evertheless, using local histories and other sources, 
Budiman (1979), Kong (2005) and Tan (2009) argued that Cheng Ho and his followers 
had either directly or indirectly disseminated Islam in Java. 
Also, a controversial text, The Malay Annals of Semarang and Cerbon, is often cited lo 
support the role of Chinese Muslims spreading Islam in Java. The Annals was first edited 
by M.0 Parlindungan as an appendix to his book on Sumatran legends, Tuanku Rao 
(Parlindungan 2007). The title of this appendix 1s Peranan orang-orang 
TionghoalL>lam/Hanafi di dalam Perkembangan Agama Islam di Pulau Jawa, 1411-
1564 [The Role Played by Hanafi Muslim Chinese in the Flourishing of Islam in Java]. 
This text was reproduced, translated into English and commented upon in a book by de 
Graaf and Pigeaud (1984). M.C Ricklefs who edited the book, although recognising the 
efforts of both authors, questioned the authenticity of the Malay Annals.5 
By referring to the Malay Annals, and other local historical texts, such as Babad Tanah 
Jawi and Serar Kanda, Slamet ~'11uljana, a Javanese historian, in his controversial book, 
entitled Rimtuhnya Kerajaan Hindu-Jawa dan Timbulnya Negara-negara Islam di 
Nusantara [The Decline of Hindu-Javanese Kingdom and The Rise of Islamic State in 
Archipelago] also suggested that Chinese Muslims were important in the establishment 
of Islamic kingdoms in Java, and some of the Muslim saints in Java, Walisongo, were of 
Chinese origin (Muljana 2007). His controversial book, published in 1968, was 
withdrawn from circulation in 1971 by Indonesian authorities, but was recently 
republished by The Institute for Islamic and Social Studies (LKiS, Lemhaga Kajian 
Islam dan Sosial) in 2005. Another controversial Javanese text, called Serat 
Dermagandul, also considered some of the Walisongo to be of Chinese Origin (Ali 
5 
,'\ccording to Parlindt1ngao, he received the text of the An:ia!s from a Dutchman, Poortmar .. Poonman ciaimed 
that the annal;; were found in the ternples in Sen1arang and Cirebon. l-lowever, serious efkirts by Dutch scholars 
to identify this person, have come to ;iothing, Therefore, Ricklefs wonders whether this Poortrnan n1lght not be 
just a creature or Parlindunga;i's imagination, or perhaps an elaborate \Vhimsy. Some historians, like Denys 
L;mbard and Sarlono Kartodirjo also doubt the existence of these dccurnents in the two ternp!es in Semarang and 
Cirebon, and therefore rejected the idea that most of the saints were Chinese Pera11aka11 (Ali 2007). Meanv1hi!e, 
according to Berg (1989), most of the saints were of Arab :tfadrami desc~-:lt 
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2007)6. Although the reliability of these local records should be scrutinised as to whether 
they are 'historical fact' or 'legend', Leo (2005:91) proposed that they should not be 
ignored since they are part of the collective memory of the people, which are important 
in providing clues to the relationship between Chinese and Muslims in the past. 
Al-Qurtuby (2003) in his book, ilrus Cina-Islam Java [Chinese-Islam-Javanese Flows] 
has attempted to gather more sources to support the case for the contribution of Chinese 
Muslims in lslamisation. According to him, the existence of Chinese Muslims in the 
early propagation of Islam is proven by Western scholars, Chinese sources, local 
Javanese texts and oral traditions as discussed above, but also by the strong Chinese 
influence on the architectural designs of old mosques and tombs in Java, such as the 
tombs of Sunan Giri in Gresik, the design of Cirebon palace and the architecture of 
Demak mosque in Central .lava (Al-Qurtuby 2003). Two related examples in Jakarta are 
Angke Mosque and Kebon Jeruk Mosque. Angke Mosque has some Chinese ornaments 
on its gate and ropes like that of a Chinese temple; while there is a Muslim tombstone in 
Kebon Jeruk Mosque that has Chinese and Arabic scripts. 
Supported by these historical sources and religious sites, Al-Qurtuby (2003) argued that 
there was a 'Sino-Javanese Muslim culture' across Java, as a result of the interaction 
between Cheng Ho and other Chinese Muslims with local Javanese. Also, Kong (2000) 
has noted that some Chinese religious sites might have linkages to Admiral Cheng Ho, 
such the Ancol Temple in Jakarta and Sam Po Kong (Cheng Ho Temple, also known as 
Gedung Batu) in Semarang. Some even suggest that such temples once functioned as 
mosques (Tanggok 2006). In addition, Tan (2009) describes cultural contacts between 
China and Indonesia, as well as the development of Islam in China during the 13'h to 15•h 
century to support his claim about the close relations hetween Cheng Ho's expedition 
and Islam in Southeast Asia. In my opinion, all these sources have convincingly 
suggested that there is a close interaction between Chineseness and Islam in Indonesia, 
especially Java in the past, yet still fall short of proving the significant role of Chinese 
Muslims in the preaching of Islam at that time. In other words, such sources, to a certain 
extent, might have exaggerated the Chinese influence on the development of Islam in 
Java. 
6 According to Ali (2007),. the question of v.rhether or not some or most of the nine saints in Java were of being 
Chinese origin is a controversial one, thus such daic1s need to be further suppo_rtcd by more evidence before 
accepted as 'historical facts', What has been less controversial, however, is the argument that one saintj Raden 
Falah, !he founder of Dernak Kingdom was a son of a Javanese Prabu Brawljaya and a Chinese wife (,:\li 
2007:19). 
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According to The (1993}, before the arrival of the Dutch, there were also many Chinese 
who converted to Islam as a way of integrating themselves into Javanese society, by 
marrying locals and adopting Javanese names so as to be able to move up the social and 
political ladder. It is also not uncommon for them to assimilate into the local majority 
group. However, with political developments accompanying Dutch colonialism, this 
form of cultural interaction between Chinese and Muslims went into decline. Therefore, 
future generations of Chinese Muslims are difficult to trace since most of them 
eventually assimilated, and there was a breakdown of the 'Sino-Javanese· Muslim 
culture. There were many factors causing this changing situation, including - a) the 
increased power of Dutch colonial regime, b) the changing politics in China, c) the more 
orthodox turn of Islam, and d) the increasingly arrival of Chinese women and the rise of 
Chinese nationalism. The breakdown of 'Sino-Javanese' Muslim culture meant that the 
ethnic Chinese were then mostly non-Muslim and were perceived by some indigenous 
Indonesians as significant 'others' and unassimilated 'foreigners'. 
The Dutch Colonial Period: The Decline of Sino-Javanese Afuslim Culture 
The divide and rule policies of the Dutch led to the drawing of stricter boundaries 
between Chinese and native Indonesians, as well as, reducing the number of conversions 
of ethnic Chinese to Islam. Benedict Anderson argued that it was the Dutch colonial 
policy which artificially created a 'Chinese minority' in the then Netherlands East Indies 
(noted in Ang 200lb:3). In tern1s of civil status, the Dutch created three racial categories, 
each with different legal rights and privileges: the Europeans were at the top, Foreign 
Orientals (mainly Chinese, but also Arabs and Indians) were in the middle and Natives 
were at the bottom. This special status gave the ethnic Chinese the impression that the 
social status of the 'indigenous' Indonesian was inferior. Since Islam was commonly 
associated with the 'indigenous' Indonesians, many ethnic Chinese considered 
converting to Islam would downgrade their social status (Skinner 1996). At the same 
time, Dutch policies preferred to keep the ethnic Chinese from intermingling with locals 
and converting to Islam. As a result of these policies, the ethnic Chinese became an 
intermediary class who were mainly involved in economic activities and resided in 
certain districts. At the same time, 'indigenous' Indonesians increasingly held negative 
perceptions towards Chinese Indonesia, such as being exclusive from majority 
Indonesians and exploiting Indonesian resources. 
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Despite the Dutch policy, there were still some ethnic Chinese who converted to Islam, 
mainly for security and economic considerations. After the mass killings of Chinese by 
Dutch troops and local soldiers in Jakarta in 1740, many converted to Islam to avoid 
becoming victims. Others converted for economic reasons, so that they would be 
considered 'natives' and thus be liable to lower taxes. This led the Dutch take further 
action to prevent religious conversion of ethnic Chinese, as it had produced large losses 
for the colonial administration (Lombard and Salmon, 2003:22). For example, in 1745, 
Chinese converts were prohibited from assimilating with local Muslims and obliged to 
pay higher taxes. The Dutch colony also worried that close interaction of ethnic Chinese 
and the locals could destabilise the reign of the Dutch colonial power. In order to 
segregate converts from local Muslims, the Dutch appointed a special kapitan to lead 
Chinese Muslims and built a mosque, 7 Krukut Mosque specifically for converts 
(Lombard and Salmon, 2003:23).8 
During my fieldwork, many Chinese Muslim leaders blamed Dutch colonial rule for 
fewer Chinese converting to Islam. Some of them saw the Dutch colonial era as the 
darkest period in the history of Chinese Indonesians in general and Chinese Muslims in 
particular (Interview, Syarif Tanujaya, 9 Jun 2008). Therefore, for them, it is important 
to emphasise the history of Chinese Muslims before the arrival of Dutch as a means of 
repositioning themselves in contemporary Indonesia and of preaching Islam to ethnic 
Chinese. 1 will discuss in more detail, how Chinese Muslims rearticulate their historic 
memories in the second part of this chapter. It is also important to note that there are 
other reasons contributing to the decrease in Chinese conversions to Islam, such as the 
increasing orthodoxy of Islam and the rise of Chinese nationalism after the 19'; century 
(Jacobsen 2005). The growing assertive form of Islam which requires Muslims to 
observe their religion more rigidly, such as not eating pork and abandoning deity 
worship might have further discouraged Chinese Indonesians from becoming Muslims, 
The relationship between ethnic Chinese and local Muslims also worsened after the Java 
War (1825-1830) and the attacks of Sarekat Islam (1912). During the height of the Java 
War, Diponegoro, a Javanese leader took an uncompromising attitude toward ethnic 
Chinese. He was said to have promulgated an edict ordering the Chinese in certain 
districts to convert or face the death penalty (Lombard and Salmon, 2001: 197). He also 
7 Kapitan, refer to the leader of Chinese, Arabs and other ethnic groups under {)utch colonial rule, 
"For details about Dutch's attitudes towards Chinese Muslims, see Lombard and Salmon (2003:22-23) 
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required an immediate circumcision for 'those declaring to be Muslim. While in 1905, 
Sarekat Dagang Islam (SDI, Islamic Trade Union) was founded by some native Muslim 
businessmen to protect their business interests against better-established Chinese 
merchants. In 1912, SDI reorganised under the name of Sarekat Islam (SI). In the same 
year, it launched a boycott of Chinese dealers that turned into riots against Chinese in 
few days later, around Surakana and Central Java (Shiraishi 1990; Azra 1994)9 Such 
events reinforced negative stereotypes among Indonesians. For many Chinese 
Indonesians, Islam was perceived as incompatible with Chineseness and even 'anti-
Chinese'. Meanwhile, for Muslim Indonesians, the Chinese were associated with the 
social exclusivity and economic dominance. The New Order regime manipulated these 
stereotypes and they still persist in Indonesian society today. 
From the 1900s to Independence: Grouping Chinese Muslims 
Despite the tensions mentioned earlier, Islamic conversion among Chinese Indonesians 
did not stop and some Chinese Muslims became involved in various local anti-colonial 
and religious movements (Ali 2007). In the early 1930s, there was increasing of Islamic 
proselytising by Chinese Muslims to convert non-Muslim Chinese (Lombard and 
Salmon, 2001). In Sulawesi, Ong Kie Ho founded the Islamic Party (Partai Islam) and 
was later deported to Java in 1932. Despite the arrest of Ong Kie Ho, the movement 
continued in Makassar, where in around 1933 the Indonesian Muslim Chinese Party 
(Partai Tionghoa Islam Indonesia) was established, which aimed to increase the status of 
ethnic Chinese through Islamic conversion. Meanwhile in Medan, a Chinese Muslim 
Association (PIT, Persatuan Islam Tionghoa) was established by Yap A Siong or Haji 
Abdussomad, with a few companions in 1936. Through such organisations, they tried to 
express both their Islamic and Chinese identity at the same time. 
After Indonesia gained independence, the Chinese Muslim Association, PIT moved its 
headquarters from Medan to Jakarta, under the leadership of Abdul Karim Oei Tjeng 
Hien. ln 1961, PIT merged with Bengkulu-based Muslim Chinese Association (PTI, 
\!Despite these tensions, drawing fro;TJ various sources, rvfuhammad AJi (2007) suggested that !here is a frdr 
nuinber of Chinese Muslims involved in local anti-colonial wars and natlona!ist move1ncnts, indudircg Johan 
rv1uharr.mad Chai, a Chinese I\1uslirn who signed The Youlh Oath (Sun1pnh Pemuda) in 1928. Discussing the 
religiosity of a fc\V Chinese Mus!irns, Muhar;1ad Ali (2007) also suggested thi'lt, by the c:Jr!y 2t/" century, tbere 
had been different religious orientations among then1, rangir.g from syncretlc, onhodox to potitica! Islam. Such 
diversity in religiosity indkates that Chinese tv1usli"1s have integrated into local cultures in various ways, 
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Persatuan Tionghoa Islam) led by Kho Goan Tjin, which became the Indonesian Chinese 
Muslim Association (PIT!, Persatuan Islam Tionghoa Indonesia). PIT! aimed to convert 
Chinese to Islam, as well as promote be!ler relations between Chinese and Muslim 
Indonesians. During its earlier period, almost all of the Pll1 board members were ethnic 
Chinese and there was a momentum expressing Chinese Muslim identity. However, the 
change in Indonesian politics after 1965 forced PIT! to downplay its Chinese identity. 
Abdul Karim Oei (1905-1982), the co-founder and the leader of PIT! was one of the 
most significant and prominent Chinese Muslims during this period. He was also a 
successful Chinese Muslim businessman, politician and preacher. Born in Padang as a 
Christian, he converted to Islam in 1931, aged 26. From that time, he was actively 
involved in Muslim circles and developed close relationships with local Muslims. He 
had also formed a close relationship with Indonesian President Sukarno and Muslim 
leader Buya Hamka. He was described by J unus Jahya as a role model for Chinese 
Muslims in Indonesia because he had '3 in 1 quality' (Jahja 2005), which is 'Indonesian 
Nationalist, Faithful Muslim and Successful Entrepreneur' (Nasionalist Indonesia, 
Muslim Taat dan Pengusaha Sukses). He was once a branch leader of Muhammadiyah, 
the head of its economic council (1964-1973) and a member of the Masyumi Party 
Council (1957 -60). He was also a Masyumi member for the House of Representatives 
representing ethnic Chinese (1956-1959). w 
During Sukarno's presidency, the Indonesian cabinet had several Chinese Muslims as 
high-ranking ministers, such a.~ Lee Kial Teng/ Ali Mohammad who was minister of 
health from 1953 to 1955, Tan Kiem Liong/ Haji Mohammad Hassan who was minister 
of finance in 1964 (Suryadinata 1995), and even Mao Tse Fung I Tengku Nurdin who 
was the district head (bupati) in East Aceh (Lombard and Salmon, 2001 ). The political 
roles of ethnic Chinese in general and Chinese Muslims in particular decreased after the 
establishment of the ;:.;ew Order Regime in 1966. 
The New Order Period: Assimilation and Chinese Muslims as Transitional Identities 
The momentum of expressing Chinese Muslim identities during the early independence 
period came to a halt when Suharto assumed power in 1966. The allegations that Chinese 
rn For more details about Abdul Karim Oel, see his autobiography (Oei l 982) and Suryadinata ( 1993). 
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Indonesians were linked to the People's Republic of China and their involvement in the 
September 1965 abortive coup determined the fate of Chinese in New Order Indonesia. 
'Chineseness' was perceived by Suharto regime as a 'domestic' issue, known as the 
'Chinese Problem' or ',ll;fasalah Cina'. Chinese Indonesians were accused of 
undermining the nation's solidarity, due to their perceived economic domination and 
social exclusivity. In order to 'solve' the 'problem', the regime systematically repressed 
any expression of Chinese ethnic, cultural and religious identities; and at the same time, 
marginalised ethnic Chinese in all social, educational and political arenas. Thus, except 
for economic activities, Chinese Indonesians had limited space for cultural expression 
and political involvement. Chinese schools, newspapers, organisations were all banned 
and ethnic Chinese were forced to adopt 'Indonesian' names (Suryadinata 1997). Yet, in 
contradiction, discrimination against the Chinese continued to exist in most all aspects of 
public live, while some businessmen enjoyed economic privileges through their 
connections to the Suharto regime. Such policies, as argued by Hoon (2008), were to 
maintain Chinese Indonesians as ethnic 'others' as compared to the 'indigenous' citizens, 
and further reinforced perceptions that Chinese Indonesians are socially exclusive and 
economically better-off. 
The New Order government also actively promoted religious affiliation in order to 
prevent the re-emetgence of communism. Every Indonesian was required to declare a 
religious belief, choosing one of the six religions recognised by the regime. In 1965, 
Confucianism was officially recognised as a religion together with Islam, Catholicism, 
Protestantism, Buddhism and Hinduism, but in 1979, the Ministry of Religion declared 
Confucianism not a religion.11 In order to escape accusations of being communist or 
exclusivist, many ethnic Chinese converted to religions that were also observed by 
majority Indonesians. Most became Christians, but some also became Muslims. 
Conversion to Islam was seen by some assimilation advocates as the finishing touch to 
assimilation (pembauran secara tumas), in which Chinese could liberate themselves 
from the status of non-indigenous and escape social discrimination (The 1990). 
-----------------
11 President Abdurrahrnan Wahid (Gus Dur} in 2000 1 abrogated Suharto's 1967 Presidential lnstruclion, which 
banned open celebration of Chinese religlo:1, belief and customary practices, ln 2006, under the government of 
Susi!o Bambang Yudhc-yonc\ Confccianisrr, was again officially recognised as one of the formal religions of 
Indonesb (Pausacker 2007). For more detail on the development of Confucitrnism in Indonesia, see CoppeJ 
(2002) and Suryadinata (1998). 
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At the same time, the Suharto regime endorsed a military-backed 'Assimilation 
Program' ('Program Pembauran'), 12 which suggested the idea of the eventual 
disappearance of the ethnic Chinese as a cultural community and the absorption into 
local cultural groups. Such 'assimilationist' policies also had an impact on the 
Indonesian Chinese Muslim Association, PITI. After 1965, there was a change in the 
structure and membership of the board. In order to get broader official support, many 
military leaders were included as advisors for PIT! and the composition of its board 
became more ethnically mixed. Among the new board members were Letjen H. 
Sudirman, a counsellor and Buya Hamka, an advisor. In order to be able to preach Islam 
to ethnic Chinese who still read and speak Mandarin, PIT! requested permission from the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs on April 1972 to print the Qur' an and publish a dakwah 
magazine in Chinese. This request was denied by the then Minister then H.A. Mukti Ali, 
due to the government's assimilation policy which held that the use of Chinese language 
strengthens ethnic separateness. 
Later, in the same year, the Prosecutor General prohibited the use of 'Tionghoa' in the 
name of the PIT!, as it could be an indication of 'exclusivity'. Ten days later, the 
organisation changed its name to Pembina Iman Tauhid Islam (Islamic Faith Cultivator 
Association, the abbreviation remained PIT!). Some Chinese Muslims I met have 
described New Order Period as the dark period of PIT!, in which its leadership was 
controlled by Indonesian military leaders and the preaching of Islam by using Chinese 
cultural elements was not allowed (Interview, Muliawan, 11 August 2008). Chinese 
elements in Indonesian Islam were also being abandoned by the Ministry of Religion 
which rejected the proposition that the Chinese contributed to the lslamisation of 
Indonesia (Taylor 2005). One of the best examples is the ban of Slamet Muljana's book 
in 1971 which suggested most of the Walisongo were of Chinese descent. 
In this period, some Chinese leaders suggested conversion to Islam as a solution to the 
prejudice against Chinese Indonesians since the majority of Indonesians were Muslims. 
12 
'Pembauran' is a contested term. lt can imply different meanings. In general, it means mixing or blending, but 
during the New Order, it implied assimilation of ethnic Chinese into local communities. However, the 
'pembauran' program in the Suharto period is contradictory: on the one hand, it aims to erase Chineseness; but 
on the other hand, it remains official discrimination of ethilic Chinese, including Peranakan who have more or 
Jess assimilated. In post-New Order Indonesia, 'pembaHran' is sometimes still used by some Chinese Muslims, 
but in different way, as one of my informants says, one can 'nzembaur' or blending well with local community 
without losing his or her Chinese cultural identity. In other words, "pembauran" used by Chinese Muslim leaders 
today have similar connotations to the 'integration' concept, which demands the Chinese to be accepted as an 
ethnic group under the nationalist principles of 'Unity in Diversity'. For further discussion of assimilation and 
integration debates among Chinese lndonesians, see Purdey (2003). 
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Junus Jahya became the leader of the movement to convert ethnic Chinese to Islam and 
suggested it was the best and only way to resolve the 'Chinese Problem'., as by 
embracing the religion of the majority of the population, the difference between ethnic 
Chinese and indigenous Indonesians would disappear (Riyanto 1997; Tan 1998). Junus 
Jahya, was born as Lauw Chtian Tho, in 1927 in Jakarta. He has always been a promoter 
of assimilation, even as a student when he studied economics in The Netherlands. There 
in 1952, he initiated the abolition of an ethnic Chinese organisation, called Chung Hua 
Hui, as he saw it as an exclusive organisation. When he returned to Indonesia, he 
actively engaged with the assimilation movement. In 1979, he converted to Islam and a 
year later married a Sundanese woman. Besides leading several convert organisations, he 
was also a memher of Muhammadiyah, a board member of MUI (Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia, Indonesia Council of Ulama) and an advisory member of ICM! (Ikatan 
Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, Indonesian Association of Muslim lntellectuals).13 As 
quoted by Suryadinata (1979:170), Junus Jahaya once said, 
'By embracing Islam, young ethnic Chinese experienced that immediately they 
are fully accepted as fellow Muslims and compatriots by the people at large who 
are 90 percent Muslim. All kinds of hostility and controversy as an inheritance of 
the past disappear. They are heartily welcomed now and totally integrated within 
the community. So they have at last a permanent 'place in the sun'. This is 
exactly what ethnic Chinese are so looking and longing for. '1 4 
Although promoting full assimilation, Junus Jahya's stand towards his Chinese identity 
after being a Muslim was both contradictory and strategic: the more he wanted to escape 
his Chineseness, the more he was trapped by the notion of Chineseness defined by the 
New Order regime. He first stopped using his Chinese name after conversion, yet still 
saw himself as 'a Muslim, an Indonesian, and of Chinese descent'. Later, he proposed 
that the Muslim community of Chinese descent in Indonesia would ultimately become 
just a 'Muslim community' and not 'a separate Chinese community with a mosque' (The 
1986:67). Thus the label of 'Chinese Muslims' was problematic since they were assumed 
to lose their 'Chineseness' in the end. Jn other words, the Chinese Muslim identity was 
n For a compilation of Jahya's articles and comrnents on his idea~ see Riyanto (1997). 
14 The concept of assin1Hation fell from favour in po:;t~St:.hano Indonesia. yet Junus Jahya defended islan1ic 
conversion is one of the best options for Chinese Indonesians to escape ethnic prejudice. ln an interview, he told 
n1c that, 'I did r.ot ask all Chinese to convert to h:!nm, bu! I provide an aHernative way for us to survive, 
especiaHy during the New flrder period. By sharing religious affinity with the majority indigenous lndonesians, it 
shO\'lS that not ail of us arc exclusive: (ln:ervle,v, Junus Jahya, 25 December 2008), 
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only 'transitional' as a step on the way to full assimilation into 'indigenous Indonesians'. 
However, as I will discuss later, he established Lautze Mosque in 1994 to show that 
there are Chinese Indonesians who are Muslims. 
There is no doubt from his writings, that the 1980s and the early 1990s were the most 
active years for his involvement in religious conversion and assimilation advocacy. He 
had edited and 'WTitten a number of books to promote his ideas, including Dakwah dan 
Asimilasi [Preaching and Assimilation} (1979), Kisah-kisah Saudara Baru [Stories of 
New Converts] (1988b), and WNI Beragama Islam [WNl Muslims] (1991). Through 
various foundations, such as Yayasan Ukhuwah lslamiyah (The Foundation of Muslim 
Brotherhood), he converted many ethnic Chinese, especially those who were educated, 
middle class and younger. Some of the prominent Chinese converts are academic 
Muhamad Budyata, female badminton national player Verawati Fajrin and businessman 
Y usof Hamka. Junus Jahya believes that the number of Chinese Muslims is gradually 
increasing and, compared to before, there are more converts from middle and upper 
classes. In 2005, he estimated that there were about 50,000 Chinese Muslims, including 
some 50 Chinese preachers and several hundred converts who have undertaken the 
pilgrimage to Mecca (Jahja 2005). 
However, in reality, the response of ethnic Chinese towards Islamic conversion was 
tepid. Many Chinese Indonesians hesitated to convert to lslam due to various social, 
historical and religious reasons. It was not uncommon for Chinese parents to tell their 
children, 'You can convert to any religion, but not Islam'. For those who converted to 
Islam, they often face ohjections from their family members, and sometimes rejections 
from their Chinese colleagues and friends. As discussed earlier, since the Dutch colonial 
period, Chinese Indonesians began to have a negative perceptions of Islam and some of 
these suspicions still persist today, such as 'lslam is religion for native people', 'Islam is 
a backward and low status religion', 'Islam is a violent and anti-Chinese religion', 'Islam 
is a conservative and rigid religion', 'Islam is incompatible \\ith Chinese culture', 'Islam 
allows polygamy' and so on. Junus Jahya was aware of these difficulties in his preaching 
of Islam and he once wrote that 'In the view of many Chinese Indonesians, Muslims are 
hypocrites, untrustworthy, can have many wives and are anti-Chinese' (Jahja, 1993:9). 
As l will further discuss in other chapters, many Chinese Muslim leaders and preachers 
seek to challenge these negative perceptions of Islam in different ways. 
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Although the notion of assimilation through Islamic conversion was dominant during 
this period, not all Chinese converted to Islam for that reason. Conversion reasons are far 
more diverse, including intermarriage, business, influence of friends and also religious 
interest. Some of them have converted to Islam for security reasons. They became 
Muslims because they wanted to be safe from tensions caused by the hostility of some 
local Muslims towards ethnic Chinese. For example, some Ch.inese converted to Islam, 
after the anti-Chinese riots in Surakarta which spread through several towns in 1980 (Ali 
2007). After the implementation of the 1974 Marriage L'lw that prohibited the inter-
religious marriage, some Chinese Indonesians also converted to Islam in order to marry 
Muslim Indonesians. For them, conversion to Islam thus became a precondition for 
intermarriage rather than a voluntary action. I will further discuss the diverse conversion 
motives of Chinese Indonesians in chapter 7. 
Apart from Junus Jahya, there were other prominent Chinese .'.\1uslims during the New 
Order period. One of them is Masagung or Tjio Wie Tay, the founder of the large 
publishing company Gunung Agung. He converted from Hinduism to Islam in 1981. He 
then established the Clear Path Foundation (Y ayasan Jalan Terang) aimed at financing 
the construction of mosques, a hospital and a museum for the Walisongo. Later, he also 
founded Yayasan Masagung (Masagung Foundation) that offered religious activities for 
converts. 15 Rubaidi (1999) contrasted the different religious thoughts and preaching 
strategies between Junus Jahja and Masagung. He argued that Junus Jahja's religious 
viewpoint is closer to a 'scripturalist' Muslim, 16 as he is a member of Muhammadiyah 
and his ambition to convert non-Muslim Chinese to Islam is similar to the dakwah 
movement on campus which aims to lslamise Indonesian society. In contrast, 
Masagung's religious viewpoint is closer to a 'substantialist' Muslim, as he practised 
Sufistic religious spirituality and preached Islam through everyday life practice (dakwah 
bi al-Hal) and publications. However, in my opinion, Junus Jahya is not a 'scripturalist' 
Muslim. Different from the dakwah movement on campus, his promotion of Islamic 
conversion amongst Chinese aimed to place them in a better position, rather than 
cultivating Islamic piety. Hasan Widjaya, who supported his notion of assimilation 
through Islam, viewed Jahya's attempt to combine both Islam and Indonesian 
15 For details about Masagung, see ''Hajl Masagung J)a!an1 Kenangnn'· (Yayasan ldnyu, 1990a; l990b} 
1
" As noted in Rubaidi (1999:103), he borro1,ved such typology oflndonesian lslamlc thought from Liddie (1996). 
;Scriptua!ist' Muslims refer to those who read the rellgiou,-, texts llteraily and tend to be 'sharia-minded', 
Mean\vhtle, 'SubstantiaJist' Muslln1s refer to those v;ho engage with contextualised interpretations of ihe hcly 
books and tend to reject the idea of 'islarnic sta!e'. As I will discuss in chapter 7, such dichotomy is rather 
simpli fled and doe-s r,ol reflect the con1plex rehgiosHy of n1any Muslim lndonesians, especially the converts, 
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nationalism as a form of "patriotic Islamisation" (Widjaya 1989). During my fieldwork, 
one of my informants even told me that Junus Jahya did not encourage female Chinese 
converts to wear Islamic clothing. This shows that despite his close relationship with 
Muhammadiyah and ICMI, Jahya's religious viewpoint is far from being 'scripturalist'. 
Chinese Muslim leaders, Bambang Sujanto in Surabaya and Budi Setyagraha in 
Yogyakarta, also offer interesting comparisons to Junus Jahya. Both of them have 
different views on 'pembauran'. While they agree that conversion to Islam could 
promote better relationships between ethnic Chinese and local Muslims, they reject the 
idea of 'total assimilation' as one can 'membaur' or mix well with local community 
without losing his or her Chinese cultural identity (Interview, Bambang Sujanto, 27 
November 2008; Budi Setyagraha, 12 February 2009). II is interesting to note that even 
Junus Jahya himself has slightly modified his stand on assimilation later. In 1991, he 
founded Karim Oei Foundation to facilitate rapprochement between Chinese and Muslim, 
and attract new converts. Lautze Mosque which is painted in red and decorated with 
Chinese calligraphy was established in 1994. According to Junus Jahya, it was decided 
to use this Chinese name for the mosque on purpose to make clear that 'there are ethnic 
Chinese who are Muslims' (noted in Tan 2008:82). He justified the establishment of the 
mosque that focused on preaching among ethnic Chinese, by saying that most converts 
prefer to go along and learn Islam together with their fellow converts first, but in the end, 
most of them will mix well with the majority Muslims (.Tahya 1999). 
The establishment of Lautze Mosque would not be successful without the support of 
ICM! and other Muslim organisations, such as NU and Muhammadiyah. Furthermore, 
after the end of the Cold War and the decline of communism, the last decade of the New 
Order administration softened its stand towards Chinese cultural expression. At the end 
of the Suharto presidency, Mohammad (Bob) Hassan, a Chinese Muslim businessman, 
was chosen as the Minister of Industry and Trade. He is in fact, the only ethnic Chinese 
in any New Order cabinet. The collapse of New Order regime in 1998, again opened a 
new chapter for Chinese Muslims in Indonesia. 
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The Post-New Order Period: Resurgence of Chinese 1\fuslim Culture 
From the 13-15 May 1998, at the climax of Refonnasi movement that was spurred by the 
economic crisis of 1997, Jakarta exploded in a fury of looting, burning and rape, directed 
mostly at the business and residential areas where ethnic Chinese were concentrated, The 
consequences of the May 1998 'anti-Chinese' riots made many Chinese Indonesians 
convinced that the Suharto's assimilation project had failed. 17 With regard to Chinese 
Muslims, some of whom were convinced that being Muslims, they would be treated 
fully as part of the Indonesian ethnic majority, the impact of events was remarkable. 
Many people put up signs on front of their shops reading 'Milik Pribumi' (Native 
property), 'MilikMuslim' (Muslim property) to avoid their property from being looted or 
burned. Yet, some Chinese Muslims store owners said that they were not spared, even 
though they mentioned that they were MLtslims. Apparently, there were then still asked 
whether they were 'pribumi' or 'non-pribumi' Muslim. According to Tan (2008: 88), 
.Junus Jahya was shocked when he heard that some Chinese Muslims were among the 
victims of the riots. 
\Vhile in Surabaya, a few Chinese Muslim leaders told me that PIT! had played an 
important role in minimising the riots in the capital city of East Java. They said their 
close relations with local Muslim organisations and military officers had helped to keep 
Surabaya rather peaceful compared to Jakarta (Interview, Abdul Chalim, 3 October 2008; 
Bambang Sujanto, 27 November 2008). They rejected the idea of 'total assimilation 
through Islamic conversion' and argued that they could only effectively bridge the divide 
between local Muslims and ethnic Chinese, by maintaining their Chinese ethnicity with 
their Islamic identity. By sharing their ethnicity with the Chinese minority and religion 
with the Muslim majority, they see themselves as 'cultural mediators' and 'bridge 
builders', as 1 will further discuss in chapter 5. In general, the approach of assimilation 
has been contested, if not rejected by many Chinese Muslims today. Many of them feel 
that they can retain their Chinese cultural practice.s as long as those practices are not 
incompatible with Islamic teachings. In other words, by converting to Islam, ethnic 
Chinese can be 'more Indonesian, but no less Chinese'. 
17 For detailed analysis of the r'v1ay 1998 ·ant!MChinese' riot~, see Purdey (2006). Sorne has been argued that such 
ricts were systematically instigated by the regln1c to divert n1ass' anger away fro1n Suharto and his cronies tc the 
Chinese (He-t)anto 1999), For Cfitical accounts of changing Chinese identities after the event, see Hoon (2008). 
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This shifting meaning of being a 'Chinese Muslim' has been further triggered by the 
ehanging attitude of successive governments towards Chinese ethnicity. In order to 
distance themselves from old authoritarian ideology and to show their commitments to 
reform agenda, post- New Order governments adopted the policy of multiculturalism, 
and amended almost all of the discriminatory policies against the Chinese. Chinese 
Indonesians today enjoy the freedom to express their cultural and religious identities, as 
well as participate in various political and social organisations. This resurgence of 
Chinese identity also needs to be put in the wider context of the recent economic rise and 
diplomatic power of China and its ramifications for the ethnic Chinese in South East 
Asia, as well as the better relationship between China and Indonesia after the end of 
Cold War. Furthermore, in democratising Indonesia, mainstream Muslim organisations, 
such as NU and Muhammadiyah also cultivate better relations with Chinese Indonesians 
to show their commitments to pluralism and to win over support from Chinese 
Indonesians, both financially and politically. The 'moderation race' of Muslim groups, 
especially after 9/11 and Bali Bombings, also led many Muslim leaders to endorse the 
expression of Chinese Muslim culture identity to reemphasise the tolerance and 
inclusivity ofindonesian Islam. 
In these contexts, the commemoration of Cheng Ho's histories, the establishment of 
Chinese-style mosques and the celebrations of Chinese New Year in mosques were all 
made possible in contemporary Indonesia. In parallel with the emergence of both Islamic 
and Chinese NGOs, PIT! also gained momentum and revived its activities. In addition, 
as a result of modernisation and globalisation, we also witness the rising of 'market 
Islam' and 'print Islam', alongside 'political Islam', among Indonesian Muslims today. 
Media, market and consumption began to have a bigger role in the construction of 
Islamic identities, and the same also applies to Chinese identities. Meanwhile, there has 
been growing conversion to Islam amongst middle and upper class Chinese for religious 
and other reasons rather than political considerations. The popularity of Chinese Muslim 
preachers and Chinese nasyid (Islamic music) group in Indonesia today should also be 
read in these wider contexts. 
Such resurgence of the expression of Chinese Muslim cultural identities reminds us of 
the 'Peranakan Muslim subculture' (Lombard and Salmon 2001) during the pre-colonial 
period in Java. Hmvever, whether the expression of Chinese Muslim identity in post-
New Order Indonesia is a revival of hybrid Sino-Javanese Muslim culture, a reverse 
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identity strategy as compared to the New Order period, a form of 'double consciousness' 
(emphasis on both 'Chineseness' and Islam) or 'strategic essentialisation' is open for 
discussion. If 'the Islamisation of Indonesia' or 'the indigenisation of Islam' is a 
continuing debate amongst Muslim Indonesians in general, then 'the Sinification of 
Islam' or 'the Islamisation of Chinese' or 'the lndonesiation of Chinese' is the ongoing 
processes among Chinese Muslims in Indonesia. 
The Rearticulation of Chinese Muslim Histories 
Having reviewed the historical account of Chinese Muslim identities, it is now important 
to look at how and under what conditions, they rearticulate their histories in 
contemporary Indonesia. In the following sections, I will discuss in particular, the 
'memory industries' (Storey 2003:85) which promote Cheng Ho's role in the 
Islamisation and perception of Chinese descent of Walisongo. I begin by exploring the 
representation of Cheng Ho and Walisongo through popular culture, preaching, 
celebration and mosques. It will then be followed by an examination of the discourses of 
Cheng Ho and Walisongo in books and seminars. Such commemorations of Cheng Ho in 
post-1998 Indonesia, as I will discuss, are for various reasons, which include 
reconstructing identity, preaching Islam, promoting religious pluralism, establishing 
business networks and improving ethnic relations. 
Representing Cheng Ho and Walisongo 
'Before the Dutch period, Sam Poo Tay Jin (Cheng Ho) from China had arrived in Java 
for business and preaching Islam, as well as building relations between China and 
Java'.18 This is a part of the lyric from a song, entitled Dufur Tuwa (Elder Sibling), 
written and sung by Mbah Pringis or So Khing Hok,' 9 a Chinese Muslim in Semarang. 
This song, which is recited in Javanese and arranged with traditional Chinese musical 
instruments, is one of the ten songs in Mbah Pringis's album, Tembang Dulur Tu1va 
· rn The original Javanese text is 'Sak durunge jama Landa, Snm Poo Tay Jin saka China rr.endaral ning tanuh Juwa. 
Dagang Inn syiar agama. Njalin tresna China Jawa·, and tran:;laied to I3ahasa Indonesia as 'Sebelum zaman 
Belanda, Sam Pao Tay Jin dari C:hina mendanu di tanah Jawa, berGagang dan syair agama. Menjalin kasih China 
and Ja\.va'. See 'Duiur TU\Va, Tcmbang Persatuan dan Persaudaraan '. 2010. Kontprls, 7 February, 
i•> Mbah Pringis is a nicknmne for tr.is amateur musician and fulltlme fortune teller. Mbah is a Javanese title for 
respectful person, \'l:1ile Pringis means 'grin' to reflect hjs personality to make people laugh, Hls Chinese name is 
So Khing Hok, anG Indonesian ru1me is f.Jaryanto Hadi Sukendro. 
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(Song by Elder Sibling), released in 2007. According to Mbah Pringis, this song is 
written to illustrate the journey of Admiral Cheng Ho from China in spreading Islam in 
Java, which has promoted good relationships between the ethnic Chinese and the 
Javanese. He said, 'Dulur Tuwa (Elder Sibling) in this song refers to Cheng Ho. Through 
this song, I hope the interaction between Chinese and Javanese could return to the era 
before Dutch colonial period. '20 
Mbah Pringis who used to own a printing business, sees himself as a amateur musician 
and guitarist. He is now also a fortune teller, combining both Javanese astrology and 
Chinese fengshui. Most of the songs in his album, such as Juran Sam Poo (Horse of Sam 
Poo), Beduk China (Drum from China) and Warak Ngendhog (Rhinoceros Lays Egg), 
illustrate the everyday events of ethnic Chinese and Javanese, as well as their 
interactions and friendships. Although all the songs have Islamic messages, he said he 
does not intend to convert everyone to Islam, but to promote the spirit of Islam adhered 
to Cheng Ho as a unifying force for multicultural Indonesia. As he told me, 'Your 
religion is yours, my religion is mine. I am not going to convert you to Islam.' (Interview, 
Mbah Pringis, 18 February 2009). In fact, his wife and two of his children are Chinese 
Catholic. Therefore, his album which aims to promote the spirit of togetherness is 
different from the Islamic-themed album by a Chinese Muslim nasyid (Islamic music) 
group, Lampion (Lantern), which focuses on preaching Islam (see chapter 4). 
His album is supported and sponsored by a local non-Muslim Chinese businessman, 
Harjanto Halim, in the hope of reminding both Chinese and Javanese of the existence of 
Chinese Muslims in Indonesia who help to bridge the divide between the two ethnic 
groups. Harjanto, who is also the chairperson for Kopi Semawis (Komunitas Pecinan 
Semarang untuk Pariwisata, Semarang Chinatown Community for Tourism), said he was 
touched by the 'spirit of multiculturalism' of the album that combines Javanese lyrics, 
Islamic messages and Chinese musical instruments (Permana 2007). Mbah Pring's 
'Tembang Dulur Tuwa' was launched in 2007 in Semarang during a Chinese Kew Year 
celebration, Pasar lmlek Semawis and a few hundred complimentary copies of the album 
have been distributed to locals. 
Mbah Pringis's album, Tembang Dulur Tuwa is part of the 'memory industry' in 
contemporary Indonesia striving to retell and recognise the contribution of ethnic 
20 See 'l)u!ur Tuwa, Tembang Persatuan dan Persaudaraan'. 2010.Kompas, 7 February. 
74 
Chinese in spreading Islam. The contribution of Chinese Muslims in ls!amisation was 
once a taboo subject, discussion of it emerged again in various media in post-1998 
Indonesia. Chinese Muslim preachers, such as Tan Mei Hwa, also always highlight the 
role of Cheng Ho in spreading Islam, and emphasise that some of the revered Walisongo 
in Java were of Chinese descent. During a preaching in Surabaya in 2008, she says, 
'Among those who first brought Islam to Java is Admiral Cheng Ho. Cheng Ho 
was requested to go back to China, yet some of his followers stayed in Java. One 
of them is Bun Sui Ho. Both of his son and grandson, Sunan Bonang and Sunan 
Ampel are respected Walisongo who spread Islam across Java. Sunan Bonang's 
original name is Bun An, but Javanese pronounce it as Bonang. This is a historical 
fact that can't be denied.' (Field note, 16 October 2008) 
Although not all of her mostly Javanese Muslim audiences accept fully such arguments, 
they do not hesitate to applaud her. She then urged audiences, not to hold negative 
perceptions of Chinese Indonesians in general and converts in particular, as an indirect 
way of establishing her credentials as a Chinese preacher. Meanwhile, another Chinese 
Muslim preacher, Syaukanie Ong believes that referring to Cheng Ho and Walisongo in 
preaching is a form of dakwah to non-Muslim Chinese, to show that 'Islam and 
Chineseness are not incompatible' and 'Islam is not anti-Chinese and foreign religion' 
(Interview, Syaukanie Ong, 19 J';ovember 2008). 
Apart from songs and preaching, Cheng Ho is also remembered through the building of 
mosques and libraries by Chinese Muslim leaders and businessmen. At least, two 
mosques have been built in Chinese architectural design and named after Cheng Ho, 
respectively in Surabaya and Palembang, two cities that Cheng Ho visited during his 
voyage. Meanwhile, a Cheng Ho library has been built in the compound of Indonesian 
Chinese Cultural Park in 'Beautiful Indonesia Miniature Park' (TMll, Taman Mini 
Indonesia lndah), Jakarta, in order to remember the contribution of Cheng Ho and to 
promote his spirit of togetherness. J os Soetomo, a Chinese Muslim businessman who 
sponsored the library said, 
'The voyage of Cheng Ho to Indonesia was not for colonising or conquering, but 
for peace, togetherness, and progress. He came here for business and preaching 
Islam. He promoted better relations between Chinese and Muslims, as well as 
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respected his followers of voyage who were mostly non-Muslims. Indonesians 
should learn from his spirit that emphasise peaee and kindness, which are also 
recommended by Islamic teachings' (Interview, Jos Soetomo, 24 October 2008). 
The remembering of Cheng Ho goes beyond Chinese Muslims, as non-Muslim Chinese 
and non-Chinese Muslims also participate in the 'memory industries' of Cheng Ho. This 
is best exemplified in the commemoration of the 600'h anniversary in 2005 of Cheng 
Ho's visit to Semarang in 2005, which is organised by the temple committee of Sam Poo 
Kong (Cheng Ho Temple), with the support of the Central Java's regional government. 
The anniversary was billed as a 'contribution to inter-racial life and harmony' of 
Indonesia. According to Hooker (2005:7), this celebration is an example of how 
Semarang draws on the legends and symbolism surrounding a 15'" century Chinese 
Muslim admiral to fashion its own 21" century image as a lively centre of regional 
commerce, as well as an example of religious and ethnic tolerance. A serial drama, 
'Laksamana Cheng Ho' (Admiral Cheng Ho), has also been made and screened Metro 
TV in 2008. Interestingly, the role of Cheng Ho in the drama is played by a non-Chinese 
Muslim, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, who is a former Justice Minister and Chairman of the 
lslamist party, Crescent and Star Party (PBB, Partai Bulan Bintang). 
ln addition, a Javanese Muslim comedian in Surabaya, Muhammad Cheng Ho Djadi 
Galajapo even adopts 'Cheng Ho' as his 'Islamic' name after he performed pilgrimage in 
Mecca. He said, 'There are many Chinese Indonesians who adopt Javanese names, but 
very few Javanese use Chinese names. Therefore, I decided to adopt the Chinese Muslim 
name to show my commitment on 'pembattran' (blending). This is a true blending. 
Javanese uses Chinese names and Chinese uses Javanese names.' (Muhammad & 
Nabonenar 2008:88). There might be also economic considerations lay behind the 
celebration of Cheng Ho. During my interview with a Chinese Muslim businesswoman 
in Jakarta in 2008 (Interview, Sias Saputra, 9 April 2008), I had a chance to talk to a 
Javanese television producer. He was approaching Chinese Muslims to sponsor his 
production of a documentary film for Idul Fitri television broadcasting, which narrated 
the histories and contributions of Chinese Muslims in Indonesia. He told me that it was 
the best topic to get sponsorship from Chinese Muslims and even non-Muslim Chinese 
businessman to support the production of an Islamic-theme television program. 
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To summarise, such representations of Cheng Ho have been 'reproduced' to rearticulate 
the contribution of ethnic Chinese in Indonesian lslamisation, as a way of constructing 
Chinese Muslim cultural identities, to improve the image of C1iinese Indonesians among 
non-Chinese and to preach Islam among Chinese Indonesians. Next, I will discuss how 
Cheng Ho and Walisongo have been portrayed through books and seminars. 
Discourses of Cheng Ho and Walisongo 
'Not many people are aware that, according to historical note, eight of the mne 
saints that spread Islam in Indonesia are ethnic Chinese and their original Chinese 
names are: Sunan Ampel alias Bong Swie Ho; Sunan Drajat alias Bong Tak Keng, 
Sunan Bonang alias Bong Tak Ang; Sunan Ka!ijaga alias Gan Si Cang; Sunan 
Gunung Jati alias Du Anbo ·Toh A Bo; Sunan Kudus alias Zha Dexu · Ja Tik Su; 
Sunan Giri was the grandson of Bong Swie Ho; Sunan Muria Maulana Malik 
Ibrahim alias Chen Yinghua or Tan Eng Hoat' (INTI, 2007:15). 
A short article in the Suara Baru (New Voice), a bi-monthly magazme of Chinese 
Indonesian Association (INTI, Perhimpunan Indonesia Tionghoa), which entitled 8 dari 
9 Walisongo adalah Tionghoa? (Eight from the nine saints are Chinese?), suggested that 
most of the Muslim saints in Java were of Chinese descent. In 2009, Suara Baru also 
featured a special edition highlighting the contributions of Chinese Muslims in Indonesia 
(INTI 2009). This promotion of the Chinese role in Indonesian lslamisation can be seen 
as a part of the effort of Chinese organisations and leaders to emphasise the participation, 
if not the contribution of Chinese Indonesians to the Indonesian nation. 
Although there has been no hostile reaction or government intervention in questioning 
such claims, which would have happened during the New Order period, their arguments 
are not without controversy and have generated discussions online. Many have criticised 
such claims as exaggerating the Chinese influence and lacking of convincing evidence.2' 
Meanwhile, some Muslims also question the motivation for over-emphasising Chinese 
31 For sorne online disci.:ssions of the 'Chinese heritage' of the nine l\1uslin1 snints in Indonesia, see 
<http://a \Vichengho. multiply .com/journal/item/4/Wal i _ Songo ___ 8 _Wal i_ ad al ah_ keturunan _ 1'ionghoa_ Cina?>; 
<http:J/grot:.ps. yahoo.com/gro'-1p/budaya _ tionghuaf message/1 'l 192>; <hHp://sunatu ilah.co1n/tul isan-artikcl/apa-
benar~ \val i-:;oogc-orang~cina. html>. 1\ccessed on 11 August 2010. 
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identity. During my fieldwork, referring to former Indonesian president Abdurrahman 
Wahid, one of the Muslim staff in a PIT! office told me, 
'I do not understand why people like him want to claim that he has Chinese descent, 
even though he has been assimilated. Why can't we just say that we are Indonesians? 
Maybe I have Chinese blood, but it should not be raised as an issue. If there should 
not be a difference between pribumi and non-pribumi, why we should emphasize 
the difference between Chinese and non-Chinese?' (Field note, 26 November 2008) 
Indeed, to a certain extent, what she said reflected the paradox of reclaiming 
'Chineseness' in Indonesia today - the resurgence of 'Chineseness' today is a reaction to 
the suppression of Chinese cultural expression of the past; yet the more some Chinese 
Indonesians intend to reclaim their displacement during New Order period, the more 
they are trapped by the racial discourse of the regime that they opposed. 
Despite these controversies, driven by various motivations, be it ethnic, religious, 
economic or personal interests, many Chinese Muslim leaders today enthusiastically 
involve in the 'memory industries' of Cheng Ho. Based on the controversial texts, such 
as The Malay Annals of Semarang and Cerboi1, they reproduce narratives that link 
Cheng Ho to Walisongo and Islamisation in Indonesia. However, in general, such 
narratives have been seen as 'legends', rather than 'historical facts'. As the secretary of 
PIT!, Willy Pangestu told me, such narratives are not yet written in Indonesian historical 
textbooks. Therefore, it is important for PIT! to publish books and organise seminars to 
"mensosialisasikan" (socialise) the Chinese Muslims' influence in Islamic propagation 
among a wider population of Indonesians (Interview, Willy Pangestu, 6 November 2008). 
In 2008, Muslim leaders and Chinese scholars, both from China (mainly Beijing and 
Yunnan) and Indonesia were invited to speak and participated in a conference, entitled -
Cheng Ho, Walisongo dan Muslim Tionghoa Indonesia Di Masa Lalu, Kini dan Esok 
(Cheng Ho, Walisongo and Chinese Muslim in Indonesia: Past, Present and Future), 
which was held in Surabaya, by Cheng Hoo Foundation and PIT!, East Java. The 
keynote speaker of the conference is Abdurrahman Wahid or Gus Dur. His attendance 
was greeted with 'Hidup Gus Dur' (Long Live Gus Dur) and whenever he mentioned 
about the role of Chinese Muslims in Indonesian Islamisation, there was applause from 
the floor (Field note, 26 April 2008). Other invited prominent speakers included Lin 
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Song, a Muslim scholar from mainland China; Kong Yuan Zhi, a Chinese specialist on 
Cheng Ho from Beijing University; Leo Suryadinata, a lndonesianist based in Singapore, 
specialising on Chinese Indonesians; Tan Ta Sen, Director of Cheng Ho Museum in 
Malaysia; Azyumardi Azra, a Muslim scholar from the Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic 
University (absent); Djoko Suryo, a historian from the University of Gadjah Mada, and 
Kacung Marij an, a social scientist from the Airlangga University, This conference was 
also supported and attended by local government officers, members from Islamic 
organisations, such as NU and Muhammadiyah, as well as leaders from local Chinese 
organisations. 
Through the commemoration of Cheng Ho and Walisongo, the conference aimed to 
celebrate Chinese participation, if not contribution to disseminating Islam in Indonesia, 
Many speakers in the conference emphasised, either directly or indirectly, the role of 
Cheng Ho in propagating Islam or the Chinese background of Walisongo. Through these 
selective memories of the past and connections to mainland China, Chinese Muslim 
leaders want to prove that Chinese Muslim identity is not a new phenomenon, but a 
continuity of long historical processes in Indonesia, By acknowledging the contribution 
of the Chinese Muslim in promoting ethnic interactions, they try to place themselves in a 
better position in contemporary Indonesia, from a marginalised minority to an 
intermediate community between Chinese and Muslim Indonesians, 
Some Chinese Muslim leaders also suggested such celebration of Cheng Ho has political 
meaning, as it could help to reduce the 'anti-Chinese' sentiment and prevent inter-ethnic 
conflict. Referring to Arab Indonesians, one Chinese Muslim leader argued that, 
'Ethnic Arabs are also foreigners, rich and exclusive, but the indigenous people do 
not hold the same prejudice for them, because ethnic Arabs claim that they have a 
significant role in spreading Islam in Indonesia. Using this parallel, Chinese 
Muslims should uphold their ethnic heritage and inform indigenous Indonesians 
that ethnic Chinese have a role in the process of lslamisation too, We should 
promote the contribution of Cheng Ho. We should emphasise that part of the 
Walisongo have Chinese blood. We should tell them that Islam came to China 
earlier than it did to Indonesia. By promoting Chinese contribution in lslamisation, 
indigenous people will a have belier perception of ethnic Chinese, including non-
Muslim Chinese.' (Interview, Bambang Sujanto, 27 Novermber 2008) 
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Many non-Muslim Chinese Indonesians endorse such proposition. Given that majority of 
the Indonesians are Muslims, some of them suggested that by emphasising that 'Chinese 
is one group of the Indonesian Muslim ancestors', it will help to improve Chinese 
Indonesians' image among local Muslims. To some extent, the promotion of Cheng Ho 
by Chinese Indonesians is more or less driven by their traumatic past. By spreading 
Cheng Ho's message of peaceful co-existence, they hope 'anti-Chinese' riots would 
never happen again. A non-Muslim Chinese retired journalist explained why he 
supported the efforts of Bambang Sujanto, 
'I have witnessed a few anti-Chinese violent incidents in Indonesia. There are 
always attempts to separate Chinese .Indonesians from the pribumi to create 
disunity. I think we need a role model to bridge the difference. Such model has to 
be accepted not only by Chinese, but also local Muslims. I think Cheng Ho is the 
best option. By emphasising his Islamic piety and his peaceful approach, local 
Muslims might be less hostile towards us.' (Field note, 22 November 2009) 
Also in 2008, The China Islamic Association, Indonesia Marketing Organisation (IMA) 
and NU co-organised a seminar, entitled Seminar Internasional Budaya Islam 
Nusantara-Tiongkok (International Seminar on Islamic Cultures in Indonesia and China) 
in Surabaya and Jakarta. According to the chair of organising committee, M. Paiman, the 
seminar aimed to understand the Islamic cultures in Indonesia and China, as well as 
improve the relationship between both countries. Meanwhile, NU stated that this seminar 
is important to acknowledge the richness and diversity of Indonesian Islamic cultures. In 
his speech, Y. W. Junardy, the President of Indonesia Marketing Association, emphasised 
that both Indonesia and China have large Muslim populations, thus there is great 
potential for mutual cooperation and development between both countries in the 
economic, social and cultural spheres. The speakers in the seminar include Amir Zhang 
Guanglin and Esa Gao Zhanfu from the China Islamic Institute of mainland China, and, 
lkhsan Tanggok and Komaruddin Hidayat from Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic 
University in Jakarta. Among the topics presented is Islam Masuk Ke Indonesia Juga 
Dibawa oleh Orang China Dari Negeri China (The Role of Chinese Communities to the 
Spread of Islam in Indonesia) by Ikhsan Tanggok (Field note, 28 May 2008). 
80 
As this seminar is sponsored by the Indonesian Marketing Association (IMA), it is 
reasonable to speculate about the economic considerations that lay behind it. Indeed 
Junardy, the president of IMA, openly stated in his speech that cultural sharing is crucial 
in generating better economic co-operation. Therefore, by promoting the Islamic cultural 
connections between China and Indonesia, it provides cultural niches for better 
economic relations between both countries. Chinese Muslims have a strategic position in 
this situation and some of them use it for their business interests. Furthermore, by 
endorsing such events organised by Chinese businessmen, NU and its leaders might be 
given funding for their activities, mosques and boarding schools. In a private 
conversation, a Chinese Muslim businessman told me that, he has provided business 
training for NU members, funded a couple of Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) and 
collected donations from Chinese businessmen to build mosques. In return, NlJ leaders 
provide him with business networks and religious credibility in the Muslim community 
(Field note, 27 Novermber 2008). 
Beyond seminars and conferences, after 1998, a few books have also been published or 
republished, interestingly mostly written in Bahasa Indonesia by non-Chinese Muslims, 
to acknowledge the contribution of Chinese Muslims in Indonesian lslamisation. The 
most provocative one is Arus Cina-lslam-Jawa: Bongkar Sejarah atas Peranan 
Tionghoa dalam Penyebaran Agama Islam di Nusantara Abad XV & XVI [Chinese-
lslam-Java Flow: Reveal the History of the Chinese Role in Spreading Islam in 
Archipelago during 15'h and 16'h Century] by Sumanto Al-Qurtuby, who is an activist in 
NU's Institute for Human Resources Studies (Lakspesdam NU) and Liberal !slam 
Network (JlL, Jaringan Islam Liberal). Without discrediting the contribution of Arabs 
and Indian Muslims, Al-Qurtuby, is the strongest advocate of the theory that the ethnic 
Chinese played an important role in the spread of Islam in Indonesia, and especially to 
Java. As I mentioned earlier, in his book, he strengthens his argument using four types of 
historical sources: Western records; Chinese sources; local Javanese written texts and 
oral traditions; and an examination of the historical monuments found in Java (Al-
Qurtuby 2003). To further promote his thesis, he has proposed a documentary film, 
which entitled Jejak Budaya Tionghoa & Islam Nusantara [Trail of Chinese Culture and 
Archipelago Islam] (Al-Qurtuby 2005). 
Responding to his critics who claim that he has undermined the fact that Islam came 
from the Middie East or India, Al-Qurtuby argues that his promotion of Chinese 
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contribution does not dismiss such influences, but strives to illustrate the another side of 
Islamic histories previously covered up by the New Order regime. He said, "I do not 
reject the contribution of Arab Muslims in Indonesian lslamisation. What I reject is the 
opinion that it is only the Arab and Middle Eastern Muslims who have played such 
roles." (Matraji 2007) 'Arus Cina-Islam-Java' was published in 2003 with the 
cooperation of INTI. The chairman of INTI then, Eddie Lembong, a non-Muslim 
Chinese businessman, recommended and supported the publication of the book, because 
he echoed the view of Al-Qurtuby that 'by showing the contribution ethnic Chinese had 
on Islamisation, it can strengthen the emotional interaction and spiritual solidarity 
between Javanese Muslims and ethnic Chinese, because Chinese have been always seen 
as identical to Buddhism and Confucianism' (Al-Qurtuby 2003:22). The book also 
contained a preface written by prominent Muslim scholar, Nurcholish Madjid, in which 
he stated the hope that the book can help to reduce the social stigma towards ethnic 
Chinese in Indonesia. 
Also, Slamet Muljana's book which was banned during the New Order period was 
republished by LKiS in 2005. This controversial book argued that Chinese Muslims 
played an important role in the fall of Hinduism and the rise of the Islamic Kingdom in 
Java. According to the book's editorial foreword, the reprint aims to emphasise that 
Islamisation processes in Java are not only based on an 'authentic' and 'puritan' form of 
Islam from the Arabs, but also various kinds of hybrid and plural Islam (Muljana 2005:v-
vii). Apart from the Dutch colonial policy which broke down the harmonious interaction 
between Chinese and Javanese, the foreword suggested that the ideology of Islamic 
authenticity which is often 'Arab-centric' has also contributed to 'memiskinkan' (the 
impoverishment of) the richness and diversity of Islamic experiences in Indonesia. 
It is important to note that JIL, the organisation which Al-Qurtuby is involved in, is a 
Muslim network that promotes the liberal interpretations of religious texts; while LKiS is 
a publishing house active in translating work on indigenised understandings of Islam 
(Muzakki 2009b ). Their promotions of Chinese participation in Indonesian Islam fits 
well with their agendas to advocate liberal and indigenised Islam, as a response to the 
rising 'Arabisation' or 'purification' of Islamic expression in Indonesia. As another NU 
activist suggests, the manifestation of Chinese Muslim cultural identities 1s an 
endorsement of the 'vernacular Islam' that is flexible and accommodative to ethnic 
traditions, and an antidote to the 'puritan Islam' that is 'keras' (stern) and hostile to non-
Islamic cultures (Interview, Rubaidi, 15 November 2008). In the last few years, there 
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have been a few publications that emphasised the indigenised histories of Indonesian 
Islam, such as Islam Pesisir [Coastal Islam J (Syam 2006), Islam Pribumi: Mendialogkan 
Agama, i\Jembaca Realitas (Indigenous Islam: Dialoguing Religion, Reading Realities] 
(Rahmat 2003), Sembilan Wali & Siti Jenar [Nine Saints & Siti Jenar] (Ajidarma 2008), 
and Menjadi Indonesia: 13 Abad Eksistensi Islam di Bumi Nusantara [Becoming 
Indonesia: 13 Centuries Existence of Islam in Archipelago] (Hidayat & Gaus 2006). In 
short, for some Muslim leaders and scholars, their support for rearticulating Chinese 
Muslim histories is to reassure the localised nature, inclusivity and plurality of 
Indonesian Islam. 
In addition, some books which were written in English or Chinese languages were also 
translated into Bahasa Indonesia and made available in Indonesian bookshops recently, 
such as Laksamana Cheng Ho dan Asia Tenggara (Cheng Ho Admiral and Southeast 
Asia] (Suryadinata, 2007) and Muslim Tionghoa Cheng Ho: Misteri Perjalanan 
Muhibah di Nusantara [Chinese Muslim Cheng Ho: Mystery of Goodwill Journey in 
Archipelago J (Kong, 2005). Beyond academic publications, there are also some 
historical fiction and comics which illustrate the journey of Cheng Ho to Indonesia 
(Kwartanada 2009). In 2008, there was also an exhibition, entitled 'Chinese Muslims in 
Indonesia' held in Surabaya, showcasing the photographs of Chinese Muslims' life and 
histories, taken by Zhuang Wubin, a Singaporean photographer and writer. 
From the discussion above, the remembering of Cheng Ho have diverse meanings for 
different Chinese Muslims, non-Muslim Chinese and Muslims in Indonesia today. 
Among them, 'Cheng Ho fever' is most prevalent among Chinese Muslims, in which 
some of them see Cheng Ho as a role model for their identity in Indonesia. The 
commemoration of Cheng Ho is also needed to put in a wider international context of the 
rise of China's economic and diplomatic power, in which Cheng Ho has been 
strategically promoted by the Chinese government to reassure other nations that its rise 
will be a peaceful one and not a threat In addition, Cheng Ho has also been promoted by 
both leaders and scholars in Indonesia and China to symbolise the good relationship 
between both countries, which was dated back to 151h century. In the Indonesian context, 
the endorsement of the Cheng Ho's commemoration is an important gesture showing the 
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post" New Order government's commitment to multiculturalism and tolerance toward 
ethnic minorities, as well as to attract investment from mainland China.22 
Remembering Past for Present; Imagining There for Here 
Having illustrated the re"articulation of Chinese Muslim histories in detail, here I will 
conclude with a broader discussion of their historical memory and identity formation. 
According to the Palembang Al"lslam Muhammad Cheng Hoo brochure (PITI 
Palembang 2009), the naming of the mosque after Cheng Ho is a way of 'straightening 
the history' (pelurusan sejarah), in order to commemorate the Chinese admiral who 
visited Palembang during 15" century and has contributed to the spread of Islam in 
Sumatra. \Vhile the religiosity of Cheng Ho as a pious Muslim and his visiting in many 
parts of Indonesia has been less disputed, his exact contribution to lslamisation is 
questionable, given that most of his activities were political and diplomacy, and not all 
of his followers were Muslims. In this sense, the remembering of Cheng Ho and his role 
in preaching Islam is less about 'straightening the history', but more about 'rearticulating 
the history' to place Chinese Muslims in a better position in contemporary Indonesia. 
In this remembering of the past, Chinese Muslim leaders have mostly focused on the 
journey of Cheng Ho and the Chinese ethnicity of Wa!isongo to emphasise the close 
relationship between Muslims and Chinese before the Dutch colonial period. At the same 
time, Dutch colonial power has been criticised as the main reason for the break down of 
such interaction, while the New Order Regime was seen as a dark period for the 
expression of Chinese Muslim identity. These historical memories are not only selective, 
but also imaginary, given that mostly Chinese Muslims today are new converts and have 
no direct biological linkage to the Chinese Muslims of the past. Furthermore, during the 
pre-colonial period, many Chinese Muslims might have intermarried with non"Chinese 
and chosen to assimilate into the local Muslim majority, thus did not see themselves as 
'Chinese'. It can be seen as a form of 'imagined nostalgia' (Appadurai 2000:77), in 
which various forms of representation and discourse were used to creates shared 
experience of loss and longing for things not directly connected to them. 
Identity construction of Chinese Muslims is not only limited to the imagination of the 
12 Beyond lndonesia, the remembering of Cheng Ho is also -prevalent in Inainland China and Malaysia, the former 
is to promote peaceful resurgence of China's diplomatic power, V.'hile the latter is to syTnbolise harrnonious 
relations between China and Malaysia. 
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past, but also sometimes to the imagination of 'homeland', through their cultivation of 
iies to Hui Muslims in China. However, as I will discuss in next chapter, their strategic 
transnational linkages are not forms of desire for return to China, but part of their efforts 
to empower their social position in Indonesia. In contemporary settings, such linkages 
with mainland China among Chinese Indonesians are also perceived by the government 
as possible economic opportunities, instead of political .threats to Indonesia. 
Rearticulated Histories: Essentialising or Empowering? 
As Storey (2003:84) suggests, 'our identities may seem grounded in the past, but they 
are also about becoming who we want to be or being who we think we should be in 
particular contexts'. Therefore, although memory plays an important role in identity 
formation, 'the profound interaction between memory and identity formation does not 
necessarily depend on the truth, but what is remembered' (Storey 2003:83). Indeed, 
historical memories of Chinese Muslims are not necessarily veridical reports of past 
events, but are omcomes of their interpretations of the past. Through various 'sites of 
memory' and 'memory industries', Chinese Muslim leaders are not only 'consuming' the 
past, but also 'producing' historical memories to give meaning to the present. By 
promoting the role of Cheng Ho in spreading Islam and claiming that parts of Walisongo 
have Chinese descent, Chinese Muslims reconstruct their identity through an imagined 
past to redefine their minority position, to preach Islam to non-Muslims, and to improve 
the image of Chinese Indonesians. 
This rearticulation of the past has to be put in a wider context in post-Suharto Indonesia, 
as there are various efforts to rearticulate and 'straighten' (meluruskan) the histories by 
different groups whom voices were suppressed during New Order period. Various 
historical facts and figures have been approached with more or less questionable agendas, 
hopes and expectations. While some Muslims are arguing the role oL'.'v!uslim activists in 
Indonesian nationalist movement in early 201h century was important, some Chinese 
leaders are proposing that ethnic Chinese figures, such as John Lie, a high-ranking navy 
commander during the Indonesian National Revolution, as one of the 'national heroes' 
(pahlawan nasional) of Indonesia. At the same time, a Chinese organisation, PSMTI is 
building a Chinese Indonesian Cullural Park (Taman Budaya Tionghoa Indonesia) at the 
Beautiful Indonesia Miniature Park (TMll, Taman Mini Indonesia lndah) to position the 
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ethnic Chinese as one of the many legitimatised ethnic groups in the Indonesian 
archipelago (Kitamura 2007). 
After 35 years of restricted expression and disrupted identity, Chinese Indonesians are in 
the process of searching for their identity and one way of doing that is by approaching 
their histories and historical figures. These efforts give voice to formerly suppressed 
Chinese ethnicity and manifest their contribution in Indonesian nation-building, yet they 
might essentialise their complex histories and solidify their fluid identities. Also, their 
rearticulation of histories is not without contestation. For example, which Chinese 
Indonesians should be nominated as 'national hero'? Does the hero see himself as ethnic 
Chinese or it is merely a labelling of identity by others? Which Chineseness should be 
represented in the cultural park? Does the representation reflect the diversity of Chinese 
Indonesian cultures? These same questions can be directed to the Chinese Muslim 
leaders who claim that parts of the Walisongo have Chinese descent. If the nine saints 
really have Chinese heritage, do they perceive themselves as 'Chinese Muslim', as most 
of them has mixed parentage? If most Chinese Muslims during the pre-colonial period 
chosen to assimilate with local ethnic groups, is it fair to label them as 'ethnic Chinese'? 
To a certain extent, these representations of the identities are caught by the state 
essentialising of the content of Chineseness during the New Order Period, as they are 
reclaiming what have been considered 'Chinese elements' and thus needed to be erased 
by the regime. In other words, to a certain extent, 'the more ethnic Chinese want to 
escape from the displacement by Suharto regime, the more they sustained their own 
'racialisation" (Tsai 2009). 
However, I argue that the rearticulation of histories among Chinese Muslims in 
particular and ethnic Chinese in general in post-1998 Indonesia, is a self strategic 
essentialising which should be differentiated from the identity essentialisation and 
control by the state. This self essentialising could be culturally and politically 
empowering. Furthermore, this essentialisation is rather voluntary, symbolic and 
situational; and does not silence differences within the group. Chinese Muslims from all 
walks of life could choose how they want to interpret the past, and whether they want to 
'revive', maintain or escape Chineseness. In the following chapters, 1 will discuss the 
contested plurality and complicated dynamics of their identities in Indonesia today. 
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Chapter3 
Inclusive Chineseness, Cosmopolitan Islam and Translocal Imagination: 
Chinese-style Mosques 
As Khan (2008:52) has pointed out, 'the mosque is Islam's most emblematic building, as 
well as an expression of collective identity' n Through Chinese-style mosques, Chinese 
Muslim leaders in Indonesia declare that there can be a Chinese way of being Muslim 
and that converting to Islam does not mean giving up Chinese cultural traditions. After 
the collapse of the Suharto regime, at least five Chinese-style mosques have been built 
across Indonesia, reflecting the return of Chinese cultural symbols into public spaces, as 
well as the reassertion of tolerance of Indonesian Islam. Such mosques always adopt the 
architecture of mosques in mainland China, yet are reconfigured within local contexts in 
Indonesia. Thus, it can be seen as a form of negotiation between transnational 
imagination and local configuration to create a unique 'Indonesian Chinese Muslim' 
cultural expression. Jn the study of Cheng Hoo Mosque, Surabaya, Chiou (2007) focused 
on the transnational imagination of the mosque, while Muzakki (2009a, 2010) 
emphasised its local configuration, and Dickson (2008) argued the mosque was a 
manifestation of 'Islamic Chineseness' in post- New Order Indonesia. 
In this chapter, by using the concept of space, identity and politics, I will discuss both the 
symbolic and operational dimensions of Chinese,style mosques in Indonesia, with 
special focus on the Cheng Hoo mosques in Surabaya and Palembang, and then argue 
that such mosques are a form of ethno-religious expression, and a local cosmopolitan 
space. For symbolic function, Chinese-style mosques can be seen as a place for 
representation of distinctive Chinese Muslim identity in Indonesia. It is an effort to 
construct a unique image of Chinese :v!uslims by combining both Chinese and Islamic 
elements. This is arguably a form of intentional hybridity that emphasises symbolic unity 
--------------
2J There is conslderab!e research on how the mosques throughout the 'Norld reflect or shape the development of 
Islamic expressions and 1vluslim identities. Mosqu.;;s and their architectural styles, can be seer. as legitirnis<Jtion of 
the political power through reference to !slan1J;;; syrnbois (Holod & Khan 1997), as political conrcstation between 
lslarnis! and secularist in Tl:rkey (Simsek; Po!van & Tayfun 2006), as identity expression by t~e f\..1uslim minoriry 
in Britain (Naylor & Ryan 2002), as indicator of relationship between local and n1igrant tviuslims in Hong Kong 
(Ho 2002), as syn1bol of 'Arabisatiori' of some Hui commu;iities in rr.ain!and China (Gil!ete 2000), as well as the 
political control and cultural ex:;;rcsslon of local Islarn in lndoncsia (O'Neill 1992). 
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and promotes a fixed image of Chinese Muslims in Indonesia.24 Given that Chinese 
Muslims are dispersed across the archipelago, the effort to replicate Cheng Hoo Mosque, 
Surabaya in other cities in Indonesia helps to forge a translocal imagination of Chinese 
Muslim cultural identity in contemporary Indonesia. This is a rather new translocal 
ethno-religious phenomenon,25 in contrast to other ethno-local Islamic traditions (e.g. 
Java Islam, Bugis Islam) in Indonesia. 
For operational function, Chinese-style mosques are spaees for contestation of multiple 
Chinese Muslim identities in Indonesia. In the mosque, Chinese Muslims from all walks 
of life negotiate themselves between not only Islam and Chinese identities, but also 
diversified Islamic and Chinese traditions. This is arguably a form of everyday 
hybridisation that emphasises the organic diversity and implies fluid identities among 
Chinese Muslims. Both inclusive architectural designs and socio-religious activities 
show the Cheng Hoo Mosque as both a sacred and social space shared by all ethnic and 
religious groups. For example, during a Ramadan night in 2008, while :\1uslims {both 
Chinese and non-Chinese) were performing their evening taraweh (non-obligatory 
evening prayers during fasting month) prayers in the mosque, non-Muslims {mostly 
Chinese) were practising qigong (Chinese breathing exercise) at the corridor of the 
PITI's office in the mosque compound. To a certain extent, the mosque can be seen as a 
local cosmopolitan space where diverse cultures converge and mingle. 
Space, Identity and Politics 
To understand architecture, Knobler (1980) states that there are three principle functions 
which any building serves: the operational, the environmental and the symbolic function. 
A building's operational function relates to the purpose it is supposed to serve: residence, 
education or commerce, for example, Its environmental function refers to the 
24 
.As I have discussed in chapter i, l use 'hybridlty~ to des<.1ibe and analyse cultural mixing in a broader sense. I 
use 'intentional hybridity' and 'organic hybridity' to distinguish hybr!dity as symbolic strategic and as everyday 
practice. Organic hybrfdity refers to unconscious exchanges and everyday adaptation of cultures, meanvlhile 
intentional hybridity is a conscious effort to create a double consciousness of one's identity (\Verbner 1997, 
Bakhtin 1981), For further discussion, see chapter 1. 
;i.s I am aware that in many works, 'translocn!' usual!~ has ·1ransnaiiona!' connotation, which refers to the 
linkages, connections and i1naginations between places, beyond nation states. However, for analytical purposes, 
in this chapter_, 1 use such terms to imply diffcretH spatial relations. ''fransnational' refers io the connection wlth 
places outside of Indonesian state, such as mainland Cblna and tv1iddle East Mearr;.vhilej 'translocar refers to 
linkage between places withln lndonesian archipelago, such as Palembang in South Sumatra, Salatiga in Central 
Java and Pontianak in West Kail[nantan. 
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psychological response of the human occupants to the environment created by the 
building. The symbolic function, relates to what the building 'says' and 'declares·, hence 
'a building may indicate wealth, power, modernity, tradition, ambition, or repose' 
(Knobler 1980:219). The architectural place is not just any physical volume, as it did not 
occur in nature, but was built, that is, they was humanly conceived, designed and 
constructed. Hence, the architecture has social and political meanings - it 'says' 
something about those who inspired, built, arranged and used it (Goodsell, 1988:8). 
Distinguishing place and space, de Certeau (1988) contrasts place as the embodied 
experience of particular locales, and space as the practised place. Social space is a 
creation of movement and reflection, as well as a site for identity construction, 
contestation and representation. As stressed by Hetherington (1998:17), identity 
formation as a process of identification is a spatially situated process. Spaces serve the 
purpose of providing a distinctive place in which social structures and cultural identities 
are shaped, negotiated or challenged by the community and individual. This chapter is 
inspired by these two assumptions about spaces, politics and identities. First, is that all 
social and spatial formations emerge through contestation; they involve relations of 
power~ they have a 'politics'. There is a 'politics' to architecture and the 'cultures' that 
produce it. Second, social space is not merely an outcome of existing cultural and 
political processes. Rather, it plays an active role it performs something ·- in ongoing 
social transformation and identity construction. 
Seeing mosques as both architectural place and social space, this chapter examines the 
symbolic and operational functions of Chinese-style mosques in Indonesia, as well as 
investigating the spatial relations of such mosques. As argued by Appadurai (1996) and 
Gupta & Ferguson (1992), identity formation in contemporary society is not only 
situated within boundaries of a territorial space, but also configured across and in-
between spaces. It is both informed by the interaction between locally specific practices 
of selfbood and the dynamics of global positioning (Friedman 1994). Studying the 
Pakistani Muslims in Manchester, Werbner (2002) examines the complex and 
interconnected relations between transnational flows and local forces; and suggests that 
there are multiple transnational orientations within such local communities. In this 
chapter, I explore the spatial dynamics of Chinese Muslim identity practices through 
three dimensions. First, is the transnational connection to Muslims in mainland China 
and in the Middle East. Second, is the translocal linkage of Chinese Muslims from 
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different parts in Indonesia. Third, is the local adaption of their identities. To a certain 
extent, through Chinese-style mosques, Chinese Muslim leaders have creatively 
expressed and claimed their connections to the 'diasporic Chinese', 'Islamic ummah' and 
Indonesian society, to manifest a unique representation of Chinese Muslim cultural 
identity in contemporary Indonesia. 
Changing Mosque Architecture 
The word 'mosque' is derived from the Arabic masjid, meaning literally 'place of 
prostrations'. It serves both as a house of worship and as a symbol of Islam. Mosque 
architecture can take various forms, taking into account local building materials, 
climactic factors and craft skills, as well as major political and historical events, in which 
the mosque serves as an important visible representation of Muslim identity and values 
(Frishman and Khan, 2002:14). The shape of old mosques in Indonesia and Malaysia has 
different forms to the mosques in the rest of the world. Most of the old mosques, such as 
those in Demak, Banten and Kudus do not have domes and minarets, but tiered roofs and 
often equipped with a bedug (large drum inside the mosque to summon to prayer). These 
mosques were mostly built before colonial period and were highly influenced by local 
cultures (Malay/ Javanese/ Chinese) and religions (Buddhism/ Hinduism), rather than the 
architectural styles in the Middle East (Nasir 2004; Henken 2003). 
The first dome-shaped mosque in Indonesia dates from 1881, introduced by Dutch 
colonial government. I! is the Baiturrahman Mosque of Banda Aceh. Over time, domes 
and minarets became the dominant features of mosques. After independence, such 
mosques were regarded as a marker of progress and modernity, as shown by the lstiqlal 
Mosque in Jakarta, built between 1961and1978. Rising modernist and puritan Islam; as 
well as the funding from the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia, also led to the 
emergence of 'pan-Islamic models' of mosques in Indonesia. At the same time, in order 
to promote the rather 'secular' state ideology, Pancasila,26 and to suppress political 
Islam, the New Order regime promoted the establishment of traditional tiered-roof 
mosques through Pancasila Muslim Charity Foundation (Yayasan Amal Bakti Muslim 
Pancasila) which was established in 1982 (O'Neill 1992). Instead of the traditional 
u 'The five guidi:Jg principle.s of the Jndonesian state are belief iri God, humanitarianism, nationalism, de1nocracy 
and social justice, 
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crescent and star, the ornament on the roof is a reproduction of the word 'Allah' in 
Arabic script within a five-sided frame, a visual expression of the supremacy of the 
Pancasila ideology. 
After the fall of Suharto in 1998, domes and minarets regained their popularity. This 
change can be seen in the fate of the Bandung Great Mosque. In the 1950s, it received a 
dome which was then replaced in 1970 with a traditional roof. Between February 2001 
and June 2003, the mosque once again underwent a transformation. The renovated 
mosque now has two small domes and one large one, and two 810-metre high minarets 
(Dijk 2009). Although Middle-Eastern inspired mosque architecture is prevalent, other 
competing architectures are not absent in Indonesia. One of the contrasting forms is the 
multipurpose and hybrid-design mosques, such as the Grand Mosque of Central Java in 
Semarang, which was completed in 2006 (Wiryomartono 2009). It is not only a building 
for worship, but also a place for cultural, business and leisure activities. In terms of 
architecture, it is eclectic, adopting various styles, forms and decorative motifs, 
attempting to blend indigenous Javanese, European and Middle Eastern building 
traditions. Another interesting phenomenon in post-1998 Indonesia is the establishment 
of Chinese-style mosques, which I will discuss later. These diverse mosque architectures, 
to some extent, reflect the plurality of Islamic practices, as well the ongoing debates 
about the 'Arabisation', modernisation and localisation of Indonesian Islam. 
Chinese-influenced Mosques 
Although Chinese-style mosques are commonly seen as a new phenomenon, Chinese 
involvement in building mosques and Chinese influence on mosque design in Indonesia 
has existed for a long time. For example, there is Chinese influence on the architecture of 
old mosques and tombs in Java, such as the tombs of Sunan Giri in Gresik, the design of 
the Cirebon palaces and the architecture of Demak mosque in Central Java (Lombard & 
Salmon 2001; Al-Qurtuby 2003). Some mosques are also designed and built by Chinese 
Muslims, such as Kebun Jeruk :vlosque in Jakarta and Sumenep Mosque in Madura. Yet 
over the times, many of these mosques lost their Chinese features and managed by non-
Chinese Muslims. There are also some who argue that some of the Chinese temples in 
Indonesia today were originally mosques built by Chinese Muslims in the 15'0 and 16'0 
centuries, such as Ancol Temple in Jakarta, Sampokong Temple in Semarang and Mbah 
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Ratu Temple in Surabaya (Tanggok 2006). Another possible influence of Chinese 
culture in Indonesian mosques is the usage of /Jedug, a big drum to call for prayers.27 
These Chinese influences on Indonesian mosques declined since the Dutch colonial rule, 
in which Chineseness and Islam has heen seen as incompatible and sometimes 
conflicting. During the height of New Order Period, conversion to Islam was seen as a 
way of total assimilation and the influence of Chinese culture on Islam was a taboo. 
Only during the late New Order period, did Chinese Muslims begin to find a niche for 
their expression of identities. With the support of various Muslim organisations, Lautze 
Mosque was established by Karim Oei Foundation in Jakarta in 1994. Lautze Mosque is 
named after the street where the mosque is located. Lautze was a Chinese philosopher 
who taught Taoism, and had been seen by some Indonesian Muslims as a Chinese 
'prophet' (along with Confucius). The aim of the Lautze Mosque was to promote Islam 
among Chinese Indonesians. 
As the mosque was originally a shop and residence-turned-prayer house, the Chinese 
influence on Lautze Mosque is rather modest and implicit, reflected in its red-colour 
entrance door and walls inside in the mosque, as well as in multiple Chinese-style Arabic 
calligraphy artworks hanging on the wall. Mosque La~tze II in Bandung resembled the 
design of his predecessor. The first explicit and indeed trend-setting Chinese-designed 
mosque was the Cheng Hoo Mosque in Surabaya and followed by another one in 
Palembang, both I will discuss in the following sections. It can be argued that the 
changing history of Chinese influence on mosques reflects the status of Chinese cultural 
expression, as well as the interaction between Chinese and Muslims in Indonesia. 
Symbolic Unity: Identity Manifestation through the Cheng Hoo Mosque 
Through Cheng Hoo Mosque in Surabaya, some Chinese Muslim leaders strategically 
use the political openness of the post-Kew Order period to celebrate and promote their 
distinct identity. Cheng Hoo Mosque was established by East Java PITI through its 
27 h is important to note that the influence of Chinese culture on islarr1 during sucb historical periods always 
blends with the local Javanese and ether traditions. Alsoi over time, many of these old 1nosgues have somehow 
lost their Chinese features. For example, the Kebun Jeruk Mosque in central Jakarta which was built by a Chinese 
Muslim in 1972 has now becorne a base for Jemaah Tabligh activities. There is a tomb in the mosque with 
Chinese and Arabic scripts, and Chinese ornaments, but it \.Vas ignor.:d and t'Overed by grasses. I was denied entry 
inlo the compound of the tou1b by the managen1ent of the rnosque when I tried to visit it ln 2008. 
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Muhammad Cheng Hoo Foundation (YHMCHI, Yayasan Haji Muhammad Cheng Hoo 
Indonesia). Its construction began in 2001 and completed a year later. It was formally 
opened in 2003 by the Minister of Religion then, Said Agil Husain AI-Munawar. The 
mosque architecture has been inspired by the Niu Jie (Ox Street) Mosque in Beijing, 
which has more than a thousand years of history. The modification of architectural 
design had been done by Aziz Johan, a member of PIT! from Bojonegoro, East Java, and 
supported by a technical team, consisting of Chinese Muslim leaders in PlTI. 
Willy Pangestu, one of the Chinese Muslim leaders in the mosque design team said: 'We 
wanted to build a mosque that can vividly show Chinese character. We studied a few 
mosques in mainland China and we decided to use the historical Niu Jie Mosque in 
Beijing as our blueprint' (Interview, Willy Pangestu, 6 November 2008). The ternple-
like design provoked some disagreement among Chinese Muslims in PIT!. As Willy told 
me, some worried such a design might violate Islamic teachings, alienate local Muslims 
and promote exclusivity. There were also some concerns that the contribution of non-
Muslims to the mosque might be not halal (permitted under Islamic law). However, with 
the endorsement of Muslim organisations and local government, he managed to convince 
those opposed that the Chinese-style mosques are not only acceptable under Islam, but 
also desirable as a manifestation of cultural pluralism and religious tolerance in Surabaya, 
Indeed, since its establishment, Surabaya Cheng Hoo Mosque, Surabaya, has been 
regularly featured in various media, visited by many prominent Muslims and listed as a 
site for religious tourism, 
Arguably, there are at least, two different, yet not contradictory motivations, behind the 
establishment of the Chinese-style mosque: the first is ethnic empowerment (mostly 
promoted by businessmen and intellectuals) and the second is religious preaching 
(mostly promoted by religious teachers and preachers). For ethnic empowerment, Cheng 
Hoo mosque acknowledges the contribution of ethnic Chinese in the spread of Islam, in 
the hope that 'anti-Chinese' semiments among Muslims will be reduced. This notion is 
supported by some non-Muslim Chinese businessmen, as most of the funds for building 
the mosque came from them. Challenging the dominant discourse of 'assimilation 
through Islam' during the New Order period, they built a Chinese-style mosque to 
promote the idea of 'blending through !slam', that being a Muslim makes ethnic Chinese 
closer to non-Chinese Indonesians who are majority Muslims, but not at the expense of 
losing their Chinese cultural identity. Although there are some Chinese-influenced old 
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mosques and prominent local Chinese Muslim figures in Indonesia, PITI did not draw on 
them in building their Surabaya mosque, but adopted mosque architecture from China 
and named the mosque after a famous Muslim admiral from mainland China, Cheng Ho. 
According to Bambang Sujanto, the chairperson of the Cheng Hoo Foundation and a 
successful businessman, naming the mosque 'Cheng Hoo' is to commemorate the 
contributions of the legendary admiral in disseminating Islam and improving inter-ethnic 
relationship. Bambang, who probably first initiated the idea of Cheng Hoo Mosque said: 
'The idea of 'assimilation through Islam' did not work. During the 1998 riots, 
some shops owned by Chinese Muslims in Jakarta were looted. No matter how 
Islamic and Indonesian you are, you are still seen as Chinese because of your 
physical appearance. We can only maximise our potential to promote a better 
image of Chinese Indonesians by maintaining our cultural identity along with 
Islamic piety. We have to show that ethnic Chinese also play a role in spreading 
Islam both in the past and present, so that the indigenous people will respect us. 
The Chinese-style mosque is a good attempt in doing so, and so far, we have 
received good responses.' (Interview, Bambang Sujanto, 27 November 2008) 
Meanwhile, many Chinese Muslim preachers and religious teachers supported the 
establishment of the Chinese-style mosque but for different reasons. They believed that 
the strategic use of Chinese cultural symbols could show Islam as a universal religion 
and not a religion for 'indigenous' Indonesians only. One of the Chinese Muslim 
preachers, Syaukanie Ong, said, 
'Some Chinese are not interested in Islam because they are afraid they will lose 
their Chinese heritage after conversion to Islam. Chinese-style mosques help to 
eliminate this misperception, as it shows that Chinese culture is not incompatible 
with Islamic teachings. Furthermore, some new Chinese converts might feel 
insecure to visit other mosques, but find a Chinese-style mosque a more 
comfortable place for them to learn Islam.' (Interview, Syaukanie Ong, 19 
November 2008) 
Jn fact. most of the Indonesian Islamic organisations, including NU and Muhammadiyah, 
endorse the establishment of Chinese-style mosques as a form to dakwah (preaching) to 
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Chinese Indonesians. As stated by former chairperson of NU East Java, Ali Maschan, 
'the construction of Chinese-style mosques will help the development of the dakwah 
movement in Indonesia, especially among ethnic Chinese, who will potentially convert 
to Islam. Even though they do not convert to Islam, at least, the mosque will reduce their 
prejudice toward Islam.' (Interview, Ali Maschan, 27 November 2008) 
Mixing Chineseness and Islam 
In this section, through a discussion of Cheng Hoo Mosque's architectural design, 1 
argue that the mosque is both representational and aspirational, as it 'says' and 'declares' 
something, which in some ways, indicates social interactions, ethnic identities and 
religious discourses in Indonesia. The architectural design of Cheng Hoo Mosque 'says' 
that Islam and 'Chineseness' can get along together, 'declares' that one can be an 
authentic Chinese and truly Indonesian, as well as 'promote' inclusive and tolerant Islam. 
Indeed, Cheng Hoo mosque, a mixing of Chinese, Islamic and also local Javanese 
cultures, is a clear statement that Chinese, Islamic and Indonesian identities are 
compatible. According to the mosque handbook (YHMCHI 2008), its outlook resembles 
the architecture of klenteng (Chinese temple) and is intended to display the Chineseness 
of Chinese Muslims in Indonesia, as well as 'to remind Chinese their Buddhist 
forefathers". Different from Chinese temples, the roof of the pagoda-like building is 
carved with the word 'Allah'. Decorations, such as animal-like ornaments were omitted 
because they might be seen as un-lslamic by puritan Muslims. The building is dominated 
by three colours: red, green and yellow (see Appendix 3). The green refers to the Islamic 
tradition; while the dominant red to Chinese cultural traditions, symbolising the spirits of 
luck, fortune and prosperity. To emphasise inclusiveness, the handbook about the 
mosque is published in 4 languages: Indonesian, English, Chinese and Arabic. 
The main hall of the mosque is large 11X9 meters with an eight-sided roof (par-bva). 
The length of 11 meters symbolises the measurement of kabah (cubicle shrine in Great 
Mosque of Mecca), demonstrating the commitment to Islamic faith. The length of 9 
meters represents the number of Walisongo (nine Muslim saints in Java), showing an 
appreciation of local Javanese traditions. Meanwhile, the design of eight-sided roof (par-
kwa) not only characterises the philosophy of luck and prosperity shared by the ethnic 
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Chinese, but also indicates Islam as a religion of peace.28 The usage of pat-kwa design 
suggests that the acceptance of Islamic and Javanese tradition does not necessarily mean 
the fading of Chinese cultural identity (see Appendix 4). 
Through the interior design of Cheng Hoo Mosque, Chinese Muslim leaders would like 
to send a message that the Mosque belongs to all Muslim groups and is a site of 
interaction between diverse Muslim organisations, especially Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and 
Muhammadiyah. By installing bedug (a drum for summoning to prayer) and podium (a 
pulpit used by an imam or preacher to deliver a sermon) in the mosque, they appropriate 
both the traditions of NU and Muhammadiyah to show that the mosque is a prayer hall 
for all Muslims regardless of their religious affiliations. A bedug was placed on the side 
of the mosque, which is common for NU followers, as well as Muslims in China. 
Meanwhile, the podium is specially designed to suit Muhammadiyah practices, as its' 
front is closed rather than open. Not only being inclusive of diverse Islamic groups, 
Cheng Hoo mosque also tries to show that Islam is tolerant of other religions, especially 
Christianity. In the front of the main building, there is a space which is used by the imam 
to lead prayers and deliver sermons. According to the handbook of the mosque 
(YHMCHI 2008), such part of the mosque was constructed like a church's door 
(resembling Romanesque arch), which means Islam acknowledges Jesus Christ as one of 
God's messengers, as well as striving for peace and respecting other religions. 
On the right side of the Mosque, there is a relief of Muhammad Cheng Ho and his fleet, 
which illustrates his journey from China to Indonesia in the 15'h and 16'" century. The 
commemoration of Cheng Ho through the relief and the naming of the mosque have 
different meanings for different audiences. For Chinese Muslims, it delivers a message 
that being a Chinese Muslim has long precedent, as 600 years ago, there was a Chinese 
admiral who was a pious Muslim. For non-Chinese Muslims, it promotes the 
contribution of Cheng Ho to the spread of Islam in Indonesia. For non-Muslim Chinese, 
it proves that heing a Muslim does not mean he or she has to discard one's 'Chineseness'. 
,,, Relating the eight-sided roof to the peacefulness of Islam, the handbook about Cheng Hoo Mosque (YHMCHl 
2008:12) te!is the fctlowing s\ory 'During the fligh1 of Mohammad S:\\V from h-1ecca to t-.1edlna, he had been 
chased by the infidels of Quraish and hid in the Tsur cave. When he tried to enter the (.:ave, he saw spider Vleb in 
eight forms. Even Mohammad had been tortured by the infidels, he tried not lo :iarm the spider V.'eb, then he 
prayed to Allah to protect and keep him in safe due to the infidels .. J3y the will of Allah SWT, Mohammad could 
enter rhe Tsur cave without breaking the spider web, W'hen the situation was saved, he came out off the Tsur cave 
and continued his journey to spread God's revelation among Muslims at :\iedfna. During his hiding at Tsur cave, 
Allah gave protection to pass through the spider web in peace way without breaking and dist"Jrbing anirna.l's life, 
This is to show that Islam, which had been inspired by A.Hah to tv1ohammed, is a [pem,:e-lovingj religion'" 
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The strategic architectural design of the Cheng Hoo mosque does not symbolise an 
existing ethno-religious reality but rather seeks to bring a new reality into being. As I 
will discuss in chapter 7, Chinese Muslim identities in contemporary Indonesia are fluid 
and different individuals have different attitudes towards their religious practice and 
cultural orientation. Through the mosque, some Chinese Muslim leaders try to promote a 
distinctive Chinese Muslim identity through the co-existence of Islamic and Chinese 
identity. Indeed, the materiality and tangibility of the mosque makes Chinese Muslim 
cultural identity unequivocally 'real' and therefore essential in their identity construction. 
As the founder of the mosque, Bambang Sujanto said, 
'The population of Chinese Muslims is small, diverse and scattered. As happened 
in the past, our identity will easily disappear or be assimilated into the Muslim 
majority. Thus, we need a physical space a mosque that can project and uphold 
our identity. The structure of mosque could stand for long time, and sustain our 
uniqueness over a few generations. Converting to Islam does not mean giving up 
our Chinese cultural identity. There can be a Chinese way of being Muslim'. 
(Interview, Bambang Sujanto, 27 November 2008) 
Not only the architectural design, the intentional mixing of Chinese, Islam and local 
cultural elements are also reflected in the activities of the mosque (sec Appendix 5). As I 
observed during the halal-bihalal (mutual forgiving event) and 5th anniversary 
celebration of Cheng Hoo Mosque in October 2008, the strategic intercultural mixing 
can be seen from the food, entertainment program, prayers and invited guest. The event 
began with dinner that serves both halal Chinese and Indonesian cuisines. Various 
entertainment programs, including Chinese traditional music performance, and 
traditional dances from Java and Southern Kalimantan were then staged. The celebration 
was hosted by Priyo, a presenter from JTV, a local television station, mostly in 
Indonesian language and sprinkled with some Javanese. The doa (prayer) for the event 
was recited by Gunawan Hidayat, a Chinese Muslim religious teacher, and then 
translated in both Indonesian and Mandarin. Interestingly, the Indonesian translation was 
read by Wang Zhan, a Hui Muslim student from China who studied at the State Islamic 
Institute (IAIN. Institut Agama Islam Negeri) Surabaya; while the Mandarin translation 
was read by Dion Sultan, a Javanese Muslim who did his undergraduate study in 
mainland China. Among the prominent invited guests of the celebration were former 
governor of East Java Muhammad Noer, leading Chinese entrepreneur Alim Markus, 
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chairperson of Surabaya Chinese Association (Paguyuban Tionghoa Surabaya) Lln Ou 
Yen, and many local religious scholars. The chairperson of '.'l'U then, Hasyim Muzadi 
was supposed to give a religious talk, but he could not make it and was replaced by 
Muiziddin, a Chinese preacher. All these show the deliberate efforts of Chinese Muslim 
leaders to promote cultural diversity and religious inclusivity. Next, I 'Will investigate the 
spatial dynamics of Cheng Hoo Mosque. 
Transnational Connections and Local Configurations of the Cheng Hoo Mosque 
The monthly magazine of the East Java PIT!, Komunitas (Commumity), creatively 
displays both the images of Niu Jie Mosque in Beijing and Cheng Hoo Mosque in 
Surabaya, on the cover of its edition during ldul Fitri 2008. Through the Cheng Hoo 
Mosque, Chinese Muslim leaders in Surabaya draw on both the architectural design of 
old mosques in China and the religious symbols of two major local Muslim 
organisations, NU and Muhammadiyah, to produce a distinctive image of Chinese 
Muslim identity in Indonesia today. This practice of identity through mosque is both a 
process of consumption and self-production, as well as an outcome of interplay between 
transnational imagination and local configurations. 
Chinese Muslims in Indonesia are mostly converts and ethnically different from Hui 
Muslim in China, thus there are no direct historical relations between them.29 Although 
there might have been some Hui Muslims in Java during 15'" and 16'h century, most of 
them had been assimilated. Most recent migrants are majority non-Muslim Han and 
almost all Chinese Muslim leaders in PIT! are converted Han. Furthermore, in terms of 
mosque styles, there is a tendency to 'Arabisation' among Hui Muslims in Xi An, China, 
as shown by the shifting style of mosque architecture - some new mosques built by Hui 
communities now adopt Arabic style, while the traditional Chinese style had been 
questioned as not sufficiently 'Islamic' (Gillette 2000). Despite the difference between 
Hui and Han, and the diversity and changing of Hui lslamic expression in China, many 
PIT! leaders still construct their own Islamic tradition through imagined linkage with 
Muslims in China by promoting the history of Cheng Ho and building a Chinese-style 
29 1'he difference bet\veen tlul and Han is problematic and contested, as discussed in Gillette (2000). Hui is no! a 
homogenous group and has different meanings in different historical periods, Their identities are also expressed 
diversely in different local contexts in ChJna, For further discussion of the complexity of Hui, see Gladney {1991), 
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mosque, because Islam in China is seen as more culturally authentic and historically 
rooted, compared to Chinese Muslims in Indonesia. 
By referencing Muslim tradition in China which they think has longer histories than 
Islam in Indonesia, Chinese Muslims in Indonesia claim their religious credentials and 
reappropriate their cultural identities, as being Muslim and Chinese at the same time is 
not improper and not new. As stated by one of the mosque design team members, the 
adoption of mosque architecture in China is 'a means of showing that Islam is one of the 
ancient religions in mainland China. Islam is not a new religion for ethnic Chinese as 
perceived by many Chinese and Muslim Indonesians.' (Interview, Willy Pangestu, 6 
November 2008) To some extent, the Hui Muslim culture in China is their Islamic 
'imaginary homeland' (Rushdie 1992), in which they find inspiration for identity 
formation in their 'living homeland', Indonesia. 
Some Chinese Muslim leaders, especially those in the Muhammad Cheng Hoo 
Foundation are also keen to develop transnational Chinese Muslim networks, by paying 
visits to Hui Muslim communities in China and inviting Hui Muslim leaders to visit 
Indonesia. For many of them, the cultivation of ties with Muslims in China do not 
undermine their national belonging, but allow them to promote better relationships 
between ethnic Chinese and non-Chinese in Indonesia through their cooperation with 
local Muslim organisations. For example, in 2008, with the support of the Surabaya 
Chinese Association, the Cheng Hoo Foundation organised a trip for local NU and 
Muhammadiyah "v1uslim leaders to visit Muslim organisations and observe Muslim life 
in mainland China. Among the places they visited in mainland China are Huai Sheng 
Mosque in Guangdong, the hometown of Cheng Ho and a garden named after him in 
Yunnan, as well as Beijing University and Niu Jie Mosque in Beijing (Tjahjono 2008). 
Bambang Sujanto who led the trip, believed the trip would not only deepen the 
understanding of Muslim leaders of Islam in China, but also improve the perception of 
local Muslims towards ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. He said, 
'By witnessing Muslim life in China themselves, the religious leaders will 
acknowledge that Islam has long existed in China and that Islamic practices are 
still alive today. We hope they will share this information with their followers in 
religious classes or talk. This will improve the perception of ordinary local 
99 
Muslims towards Chinese Indonesians. We are not all non-believers. We are not 
just 'economic animals'. (Interview, Bambang Sujanto, 27 November 2008) 
It is quite clear that for many Chinese Muslim leaders in Indonesia, the strategic 
transnational connection with Muslims in mainland China is not a form of desire for 
return or attachment to mainland China, but an effort to manifest their identity and to 
redefine their minority position. The transnational linkage does not imply disloyalty or 
lack of patriotism, and sometimes, it helps promotes better relations between Indonesia 
and China, as well as between local Muslims and ethnic Chinese. This transnational 
linkage is driven by local purposes and is not for shaping politics on mainland China. 
Thus, it is not a form of 'long-distance nationalism' (Anderson, 1992). To a certain 
extent, the transnational imagination of Chinese Muslims is similar to the diasporic 
action of Pakistani Muslims in Britain (Werbner 2002: 130), in which 'buying in' to a 
diaspora today includes buying into local citizenship and fighting for citizenship rights. 
It is important to note that the transnational linkages of Chinese Muslims in Indonesia 
are not only limited to Muslims in China, but also Muslims in other part of the world, 
such as those in Palestine, as well as various transnational Islamic movements, such as 
the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (see chapter 7). 
Furthermore, their transnational imaginations and linkages have been locally configured 
through Chinese Muslims' connection with media networks, government officers, 
military leaders, religious groups and Chinese organisations. PIT! especially has 
established a good relationship with both NU and Muhammadiyah in Surabaya. The 
provincial leaders of both Islamic organisations are named as advisers for Cheng Hoo 
Mosques. In advance of the construction of the mosque, PITI leaders asked NU and MU 
leaders to endorse the mosque design. Despite some objections from the more hardline 
Muslim groups, both NU and Muhammadiyah leaders supported the design.30 NU and 
Muhammadiyah leaders and preachers have been frequently invited to give sermons 
during Friday prayers and Islamic study sessions in the mosque. One reason why the first 
Chinese-style mosque was built in Surabaya is because East Java is the stronghold of NU, 
which generally has more flexible attitudes towards various cultural expressions of Islam. 
In terms of language, Indonesian is the main functional language in the mosque. Most of 
the preaching, religious study sessions and meetings are conducted in Indonesian. At the 
Yi Ciiven that the Qur'anic text does not mention and regulate mosque architecture, tt1ere are less controversies or 
religious debates about the Chinese style nK;sque) as co;npared lo the celebration of Chinese New Year, as I will 
disc·uss in chapter 5. 
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same time, Javanese, Mandarin and Hokkien are also spoken during interpersonal 
conversations. 
The establishment of Cheng Hoo Mosque wiII not be a success without support from the 
non-Muslim Chinese too. Given that the mosque is situated in a majority non-.'vfuslim 
neighbourhood, PITI consulted local residents and gained their support for the mosque. 
To ensure non-Muslim Chinese residents are not disturbed, the mosque does not use a 
loud speaker when calling for the morning praying session (azan subuh). Besides, most 
of the donors to the mosque are non-Muslim Chinese, who have contributed about 70 
percent of the total construction fee.31 There is a board in the compound of the mosque 
which lists the names of donators and the amount of their contributions. Besides Chinese 
Muslim businessmen and Muslim leaders (such as former PAN chairman Amien Rais, 
and former East Java Governor Mohammad Noer), many of the donors are non-Muslim 
Chinese businessmen and their companies. Among them are the well-established 
Chinese-owned business groups, such as Salim Group (200 million rupiah), Maspion 
Group (100 million rupiah) and Gudang Garam (100 million rupiah). As some Chinese 
Muslim leaders told me, the non-Muslim Chinese have supported the construction of 
Cheng Hoo Mosque, because they acknowledged the role of PITI in protecting them 
form possible 'anti-Chinese' riots, as well as bridging the divide between Chinese and 
Muslims in Surabaya. Non-Muslim Chinese businessmen also sponsor some activities in 
the mosque, such as, the distribution of goods to orphanages during Ramadan.32 
In short, Chinese Muslim leaders-cum-businessmen, and their well-connected networks 
were crucial in success of Cheng Hoo Y!osque. On one hand, they have business co· 
operations with non-Muslim Chinese businessmen. On the other hand, they have 
established close relation with Muslim organisations, especially NU through religious 
affinity. Their relationship with Nl; goes beyond the religious domain, as some of them 
provide business training to NU members, while others are actively involved in PKB, a 
political party closely linked to NU. Besides a close relationship with local government 
officials and military leaders, PITI also has a good media network, especially through 
Java Pos and several local Chinese newspapers. Activities in Cheng Hoo mosque have 
n According to tile 1nosque handbook ('l:\1HCHI 2008), the first phase of ii:s construction co.st 500 million rupiah, 
coHected through selling trilingual 'Saudara Baru/ Juz A1nma' ("New Convert/ Selected Verses from Qur'ar_ic 
tex!s '.)· Iv1eanwhile the totai construction fee was 3,300 millior:. rupiah and most of it ca.me front public donations. 
32 i also have been ir.forn1ed thai, about 20-30 percent of the construction fee of Masjid Agung 1\l-Akbar, the 
biggest mosque in East Java was cDntributed by non-~1us!ir:J <:hinese. 
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been frequently reported in local newspapers, as well as radio and TV stations. In 
addition, PITI in East Java publish a monthly magazine called Komunitas (Community), 
which contains articles about PITrs recent activities, the activities of other Chinese 
organisations, Muslim life in China, various aspects of Islam and Chinese culture, as 
well as stories about converts, with no lack of business advertisements, most of them are 
placed by Chinese Muslim merchants. 
Cheng Hoo Mosque thus plays a role in promoting good relationships between different 
groups of Indonesian society, including both Chinese and Muslims. In fact, fostering 
these relationships is a central aim of PITL According to Chiou (2007), under the banner 
of Islam, PIT! shares the same religious beliefs as other Indonesian Muslims by which 
they are able to provide social assistance for the local Muslims and create a niche for 
more interaction with local government. Meanwhile, Muzakki (2010) argues that 
Chinese Muslims in PIT! have worked closely with religious organisations, especially 
NU in order to guarantee social security and fight against discrimination. 'Therefore, the 
Cheng Hoo Mosque can be said to exercise both 'bonding' and 'bridging' of social 
capital (Putnam 2000) which respectively refers to the building of cohesion within a 
group and to the building of mutual understanding between groups. On the one hand, it 
contributes to symbolic cohesion among Chinese Muslim as a group. On the other hand, 
it has played a significant role in bridging different groups in Indonesia. 
Translocal Ethno-religious Imaginations of Chinese-style Mosques 
Following the success of the Cheng Hoo Mosque in Surabaya, many Chinese Muslims in 
other parts in Indonesia sought to replicate the Chinese-style mosque and, in some cases, 
adopted the Cheng Hoo name. Many PIT! branches from Sumatra to Sulawesi, from Java 
to Kalimantan, announced their intention to build Chinese-style mosques, though, so far, 
only one in Palembang has been completed. Chinese Muslim individuals such as Anton 
Medan and Iskandar Abdurrahman have also established Chinese-style mosques in 
Bogar and Salatiga respectively in the compounds of their Islamic boarding schools. In 
Pandaan, Pasuruan, East Java, even non-Chinese Muslims have built a mosque, 
resembling the architectural design of the Surabaya Cheng Hoo Mosque, to support 
social blending (pembauran) and promote religious tourism (Muzakki 2009a:201). 
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Mosque Al Islam Muhammad Cheng Hoo in Palembang, which was completed in 
August 2008 is the second Chinese-style mosque in lndonesia named afler Admiral 
Cheng Ho. This mosque was initiated by PITl South Sumatra, after branch's leaders 
visited theirs counterparts in Surabaya and were inspired by the architectural design of 
Cheng Hoo Mosque there. However, instead of mimicking the design of Niu Jie ~1osque 
in Beijing, the Palembang mosque reappropriates the pan-Islamic features of mosque 
architecture with Chinese and Palembang-Malay cultural influences. The mosque shared 
similar aims to its counterpart in Surabaya, include uniting Chinese Muslims, preaching 
Islam, as well as showing that Islam and Chineseness can co-exist harmoniously. The 
naming of the mosque after Cheng Ho was seen as 'setting history straight' (pelurusan 
sejarah), in order to commemorate Jhe Chinese admiral who visited Palembang during 
1511; century and contributed to the spread of Islam in Sumatra (PIT! Palembang, 2009). 
Painted in green and red, this mosque combined Chinese, Palembang and pan-Islamic 
architectural features. It has a dome with a crescent and star, and two minarets whic11 
resemble the design of Chinese pagodas (see Appendix 3). Both minarets have five 
floors and a height of 17 meters symbolising the five daily prayers with 17 rakaat 
(prostrations during prayer), with ornaments in the shape of a goat's horn, which is a 
Palembang features. According to the mosque handout (PITI Palembang, 2009), its 
design reflects the similarities between Chinese and Palembang-Malay cultures. The 
handout also states that the establishment of Palembang Cheng Hoo Mosque is a 
response to the socio-cultural development of Islam among Chinese Muslims, 
resembling the cultural accumulation of Islamic practices among other Muslims in 
Indonesia, such as the combination of Minang culture with Islamic teachings and 
Javanese custom with Islamic traditions. It is indeed an important argument, as it is 
suggesting the imagination of 'Chinese lslam' as another form of ethno-religious identity 
in Indonesia, along side 'Javanese Islam' and 'Minang Islam'. 
Given that Chinese Muslims are dispersed across the archipelago, PITI efforts to 
replicate the Surabaya Cheng Hoo Mosque in Palembang and in other cities shows their 
attempts to forge a 'translocal' Chinese Muslim cultural identity. This is a rather new 
ethno-religious phenomenon, in contrast to Islamic traditions, such as 'Javanese Islam' 
and 'Bugis Islam' which are based on specific geographically bounded locations. 33 As I 
12 It is lTnportilnt to note that such ethno-rcligious traditions are not static, as ff1any of them have underg0:Je 
various changes as result of interactions with other cullures, as well as, influences of various translocal and 
transnatic11al flows. For accounts of the dynamics of Jnvanese lslnm1 see Beatty (1999) and Ricklefs (2008). 
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mentioned before, 1 use 'translocal' in this chapter to refer to the linkages between places 
within the Indonesian archipelago, as contrast to, 'transnational' which means 
connection with places outside of Indonesian state. Given that Chinese Muslims from 
Medan to Makasar are extremely diverse, mosque architecture that adopts Chinese 
features can be seen as a symbolic unifying form for them. In the past and also now, as I 
will discuss in chapter 7, the religious practice of Chinese Muslims in various parts of 
Indonesia are influenced by the localities in which they are situated and many of them 
are eventually culturally absorbed into the local Muslim majority. Therefore, the 
Chinese-style mosques do not reflect an existing ethno-religious reality, but rather are 
constructing a new imagination of translocal Chinese Muslim identity within Indonesia. 
PIT! branches across the Indonesia, from Sumatra (Medan), Java (Semarang, Jakarta), 
Bali (Denpasar), Sulawesi (Makasar) to Kalimantan (Pontianak) intend to establish 
similar Chinese-style mosques, and the realisation of their plan will decide how far this 
translocal imagination can go. 
This 'translocality' of Chinese Muslim identities, on the one hand, challenges 
'ethnolocality' (Boel!storff 2002) that associate ethnicity with locality in Indonesia; on 
the other hand, it connects them to the linkage with their 'imaginary homeland' in China. 
Indonesian nationalism, in large part, allows different ethnic groups which are mostly 
geographically bounded to imagine their claim to the nation, and to recognise each other 
as equal constituents of the nation. For example, one can be both Javanese and 
Indonesian simultaneously. This 'ethnolocality', that draws together ethnicity and 
locality, is best exemplified in 'Beautiful Indonesia Miniature Park' (TMll, Taman Mini 
Indonesia Indah), which consists of different ethnic 'houses', respectively representing 
Javanese tradition in Java, Balinese custom in Bali, Madurese culture in Madura and so 
on. Chinese Indonesians, who do not constitute a specific locality and could not claim 
aboriginality in any part of Indonesia, were denied a representation of their identity in 
the park during the New Order period. 
In post~Suharto Indonesia, a Chinese organisation, PSMTI is building a Chinese 
Indonesian Cultural Park (Taman Budaya Tionghoa Indonesia) at TMII to position 
ethnic Chinese as one of the many legitimatised ethnic groups in Indonesia. Instead of 
manifesting localised Chinese culture, such as Peranakan traditions, the cultural park 
draws heavily on the designs of ancient buildings in mainland China (Kitamura 2007). 
To some extent, PSMTl is caught by the concept of 'ethnolocality', in which they only 
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can claim their aboriginality and geographically bounded identity through linkages with 
their 'imaginary homeland' in mainland China. C'hinese Muslims face the same dilemma. 
In order to build translocal connections among them within Indonesian nation, they have 
to refer to mosque architecture in mainland China to bind them together. However, their 
transnational linkages do not undermine their national belongings, as I have discussed 
earlier. Furthermore, their translocal imaginations are not socially exclusive and always 
locally grounded, as rcllected in the adoption of Palembang culture in the Palembang 
Cheng Hoo Mosque and Javanese tradition in the Surabaya Cheng Hoo Mosque. 
Besides PIT!, individual Chinese Muslims, such as Anton Medan and Iskandar 
Abdurrahman have also engaged in the construction of Chinese Muslim imaginations 
through building Chinese-style mosques. In the compound of his Islamic boarding 
school in Bogor, Anton Medan, a Chinese gangster-turn-preacher built a mosque that 
resembles the architectural design of the Chinese palace in Qing Dynasty, Mosque Tan 
Kok Liang, after his Chinese name (see Appendix 3). Besides the mosque, Anton Medan 
also prepared himself an Islamic grave that resembles the design of a pendopo, a 
Javanese-style hall. Similarly, Iskandar Abdurrahman or Chang I Pao, a mix Chinese-
Javanese parentage Muslim activist, is building an 'Arwana- mosque, which is an 
acronym for Arab, Jawa (Java) and China, as part of his Islamic school in Salatiga. As 
lskandar said, 'the Chinese design of the mosque is not a sign of exclusivity, but to 
promote the multiculturalism of Islam, as well as to manifest the harmonious co-
existence of Islam, Chinese and Javanese cultures in Salatiga.' (Interview, Iskandar 
Abdurrahman, 13 February 2009) 
However, not all Chinese Muslims share enthusiasm for building Chinese-style mosques. 
For example, Syafii Antonio, a prominent Chinese Muslim imellectual, who is active in 
promoting an Islamic economy, avoided a Chinese architectural design for the mosque in 
his Andalusia Islamic Centre near Jakarta, using instead a Moorish design from Spain. 
He said it was his attempt to 'revive' the famously tolerant period of Islamic civilisation. 
He told me that there were already a few Chinese-style mosques in Indonesia, and 
instead of following this trend, he hoped his Islamic centre will be more open for all 
Muslims regardless their ethnicity (Interview, Syafii Antonio, 11 January 2009). 
105 
Operational Diversity: Identity Contestations in the Cheng Hoo Mosque 
In the preceding sections, I discussed Chinese-style mosques as forms of intentional 
hybridity that emphasise symbolic unity and promote translocal imagination of Chinese 
Muslim identity. Despite promoting a fixed image of Chinese Muslims .. I will here argue 
that Chinese-style mosques are also a space for contestation of diverse and multiple 
Chinese Muslim identities, for example, between Chinese-cultured and non-Chinese 
cultured, between first-generation converts and second-generation Muslims, between NU 
and Muhammadiyah followers, between upper and lower class, male and female, leaders 
and ordinary members, merchants and preachers, the sharia-minded and the secular-
oriented. In the mosque, Chinese Muslims from all walks of life negotiate their positions 
between not only Islamic and Chinese identities, but also diversified Islamic and Chinese 
traditions in Indonesia. This is arguably a form of everyday hybridisation that 
emphasises organic diversity and implies fluid identities among Chinese Muslims. Here, 
I will provide a few snapshots of such diversified identities as I have observed in the 
Surabaya Cheng Hoo Mosque during my fieldwork. More details on their shifting 
ethnicity and complex religiosity will be discussed in chapter 7. 
Contestation of Religious Affiliations and Practices 
During ldul Fitri 2008, after morning prayers in the Surabaya Cheng Hoo Mosque, Dr 
Fuad Amsyari, vice chainnan of advisory board for Indonesian Religious Scholar 
Council (MUI, Majelis Ulama Indonesia), gave a sermon in front of a thousand Muslims 
from various ethnic backgrounds. Ironically, although he was speaking in a mosque that 
promotes diversity and tolerance, his sermon emphasised the importance of sharia 
implementation, not only at the personal and family level, but also at the societal and 
state arenas. He also reiterated the 2005 MUI fatwa denouncing secularism, pluralism 
and liberalism. While during the celebration of Maulid 2008 (celebration of the birth of 
Prophet Muhammad), hardliner Habib Rizieq Shihab, leader of Islamic Defenders' Front 
(FPI, Front Pembela Islam) delivered a fiery religious speech in the Palembang Cheng 
Hoo Mosque. This occasional presence of conservative or hardliner preachers in Cheng 
Hoo mosques both reflects the neutrality of the mosque (in term of religious affiliation), 
and the diversity of religious practices in the mosque. 
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Most religious speeches and sermons in the mosque are rather moderate and tolerant, 
however. For example, during ldul Adha 2008, in his sermon, KH Abdurshomad 
Buchori, Chairman of MUI East Java criticised both Islamic fundamentalism and 
terrorism in Indonesia and abroad, During a talk before the breaking of fast in Ramadan, 
Syaukanie Ong, a Chinese preacher, urged the non-Chinese majority crowd to embrace 
cultural diversity and eliminate their negative stereotype of Chinese Indonesians. 
According to the Friday sermon schedule of the Surabaya Cheng Hoo Mosque, the 
invited preachers or religious teachers came from all religious backgrounds, including 
local leaders from NU and Muhammadiyah, lecturers from Islamic institutions and 
public universities, as well as Chinese Muslim preachers, This is a conscious decision of 
the mosque to get along with various Muslim groups in Indonesia. 
The Surabaya Cheng Hoo Mosque is committed to Indonesian state ideology -
Pancasila, and neutral in term of religious and political affiliations (YHMCHI 2007). 
Some Chinese Muslim leaders even claim PIT! played a significant role in bringing NU 
and Muhammadiyah together in the early 1990s when interaction between both major 
religious organisations were rather rare and tense. At a personal level, members in PIT! 
could freely participate in any religious organisations and political parties. Many of them 
remain neutral and do not have specific religious affiliations, and those who do have 
stronger affiliations often opted not to talk about them publicly. Given that Surabaya is 
the stronghold of NU, it is not surprising that many Chinese Muslim leaders and 
businessmen are affiliated to NU, Some of them have close relationships with local kiai 
to establish business networks and to ensure protection, while some favour NU because 
of its more flexible attitude towards religious practices. For middle-ranked leaders, 
religious teachers and ordinary members in PIT!, their religious affiliations are more 
diverse, A few of them are members of Muhammadiyah and other Muslim organisations. 
The differences of religious affiliations among members of the mosque community do 
not generate serious tensions or conflicts. The only major incident that 1 heard of during 
my fieldwork was the replacement of the mosque committee chairman, from a 
Muhammadiyah-inclined to an NU-affiliated ustaz (religious teacher). One of my 
informants told me that the relatively rigid and conservative Muhammadiyah-inclined 
ustaz, Burhadi was not favoured by some Chinese Muslim leaders because he often 
criticised 'un-lslamic' practices, such as people not wearing 'proper' Islamic dress in the 
compound of the mosque. Hariyono Ong, who trained in an NU Islamic boarding school 
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replaced Burhadi in early 2008 and is said to be more flexible in religious practices, 
willing to attend non-Muslim Chinese's funeral ceremonies, for example. 
During my fieldwork, both NU and Muharnmadiyah-affiliated religious teachers active 
in the mosque said they were tolerant of each others' activities (Interview, Hariyono Ong, 
30 September 2008; Lukman Tjoe, 2 November 2008). Hariyono Ong, the imam of the 
mosque, organised Islamic study and chanting (zikir) sessions every 10 days in the 
mosque during the Ramadan. The sessions began with NU-affiliated kiai delivering 
religious messages, followed by Hariyono leading the zikir (Islamic chanting) practice 
before the breaking of the fast. Meanwhile Lukman Tjoe, a Surabaya PITI ustaz, 
organised weekly Islamic study sessions on Sunday morning (pengajian minggu), of 
which most speakers came from Muharnmadiyah. There were also Islamic guidance 
classes for new converts every weekend, facilitated by ustaz Gunawan who did not have 
strong a religious affiliation. Apart from different religious affiliations, a broad spectrum 
of religiosity and Islamic pieties exist within Cheng Hoo Mosque. When the female 
candidate for East Java governor, Khofifah lndah Parawansa led the takbiran (recitation 
of 'God is great') during the last night of Ramadan 2008 in the mosque, some 
conservative-inclined Chinese Muslims condemned her arguing that women were not 
supposed to lead men in rituals. At the opposite ends of the spectrum, there was a 
Chinese Muslim man who said he was still drinking beer and eating pork at home, and a 
Chinese Muslim woman who privately told me that she is a supporter of Abu Bakar 
Basyir, the former leader of terrorist group, Jemaah lslamiyah. 
Generational Differences and Ethnic Identifications 
Here, I will closely explore the dynamics of generations, languages and ethnicity among 
Chinese Muslims, based on some of my fieldwork observations. Some older Chinese 
Muslim businessmen, who often speak to me in Mandarin, told me that they were 
disappointed with most of the young Chinese converts who cannot speak Mandarin or 
any Chinese dialect. They said most of the young Chinese Muslims have lost their 
'roots' and had become 'indigenous' after their conversion, abandoning Chinese cultural 
practices and even forgetting their Chinese surnames. Indeed, age is one of the major 
indicators that shape differences in the mosque community. In general, but not always, 
elder Chinese Muslims who are mostly businessmen and leaders of the Cheng Hoo 
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mosque can speak Mandarin and still practise Chinese culture. Their conversion 1s 
usually politically or economically driven. They are proud of their 'Chineseness' and see 
themselves as middle persons bridging Chinese and non-Chinese. For example, a 
Chinese businessman, told me that he converted to Islam to 'intermingle with the local' 
and he hardly practises any Islamic rituals except Friday prayers in the mosque. 
However, younger Chinese Muslims are both male and female converts, who mostly 
became Muslims for reasons of marriage or religious motivation. Most of them cannot 
speak any Chinese, and know very little about Chinese cultural traditions. They have less 
concern about their Chinese heritage and often see themselves as 'Indonesian', 'Muslim' 
or even 'Javanese', rather that 'Chinese'. They do not see a great need to play a 
'bridging' role as they already mixed well with local Muslims. For those who are more 
religious! y pious, they see their Islamic identity as more important than their ethnicity. 
For example, a young convert told me that he is unhappy with Chinese Muslim leaders 
who put more emphasises on personal business and ethnic integration, than religious 
preaching and education. Meanwhile an officer in the mosque, whose father is a Chinese 
con.vert and mother is a Javanese Muslim, told me that she just sees herself as an 
'Indonesian' and Chinese ethnicity does not mean anything for her. She refused to be 
interviewed as one of my informants, as she did not see herself as a 'Chinese Muslim'. 
There are also some converts who are only conditionally or symbolically Chinese. For 
example, Hariyono Ong, the imam of the mosque, who married a Javanese woman, 
purposely use his Chinese surname during preaching to show the compatibility between 
Chineseness and Islam. Interestingly, there were also some cases in which a few 
Muslims approached me and claimed that he or she is a Chinese or half Chinese, 
although they did not look like an ethnic Chinese or of Chinese descent. Some said they 
were Peranakan Chinese (mixed Chinese), and others claimed they were HITACHI 
(Hitam rapi Cina, literally means 'black but a Chinese'). On the other hand, there are 
also cases where I mistook a non-Chinese Muslim as Chinese due to his or her fair skin. 
Class and Gender 
What are the class dynamics in the Surabaya Cheng Hoo Mosque community? A couple 
of informal conversations with Javanese staff working for the mosque gave me deeper 
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insight into the interaction between class, religiosity and ethnic identification in the 
mosque. To illustrate such dynamic, a Javanese Muslim clerk contrasted two cases of a 
rich Chinese businessman and a middle-income religious teacher. She said, 
'The rich Chinese businessman converted to Islam for economic interest, in order 
to obtain a license to open a factory. He always talked about 'pembauran' 
(blending) to bridge the differences between indigenous and non-indigenous 
Indonesia. In reality, he has only 'membaur' (socialised) with the government 
officials and Muslim elites to establish his business network. He seldom mixed 
with 'small people' like us. By contrast, the modest Chinese ustaz is sincere in his 
conversion. He has never mentioned 'pembauran ·, but he talked to us and treated 
us equally. He is still living in a small 'gang' (lane) where the residents are mostly 
Javanese and mixing well with them. He also organises Islamic study sessions in 
which most followers are indigenous people. It is the real 'pembauran', not just 
talking.' (Field note, 26 November 2008) 
Another Javanese staff member also shared similar opinions. She advised me not to 
interview most of the rich Chinese businessmen and their followers, because they were 
not pious or sincere Muslims. She said many of them seldom followed the Islamic study 
sessions and only participated Friday prayer sessions and other major events attended by 
Muslim elites and covered by the media. She suggested that 1 interview Chinese Muslim 
religious teachers, small shop-owners and other ordinary Chinese Muslims. It is 
important to note that both non-Chinese staff did not 'racialise' their boss-staff 
relationship with Chinese Muslim leaders, but pointed out the difference between classes 
within Chinese Muslims themselves. A couple of poorer Chinese Muslims I met also 
expressed their dissatisfaction towards their richer counterparts. A middle-aged Chinese 
convert from Pontianak who was looking employment claimed that he had been ignored 
by the rich Chinese Muslim leaders who refused to talk to him. He complained that the 
leaders were only keen to help poor local Muslims, hut forgot the plight of the poor 
converts. However, it is unfair to suggest that all Chinese Muslim businessmen and 
leaders were exclusive and not religious, while religious teachers and preachers were 
more integrative and pious. As I observed, there were a few Chinese Muslim 
businessmen practising Islam frequently and mixing well with ordinary Muslims. There 
were also some religious teachers preaching for money instead of for religious purposes. 
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In addition to class, gender also plays an important role in characterising interactions of 
the mosque. Most of the mosque committee members are older businessmen; only a 
couple of them are female. As compared to their male counterparts, fewer female 
Chinese converted to Islam for political and business reasons. Most of them became 
Muslim to marry and others for religious purposes. Despite gender segregation during 
prayers, female and male Muslims in the mosque intermingled with each other quite 
freely. Most Chinese :vluslim females wear Islamic dresses with veiling Uilbab) while 
attending religious functions; yet do not necessarily wear it outside religious circles. In 
addition, more than half of followers of the Islamic study and chanting sessions in the 
mosque were female Muslims, and most of them were non-Chinese. 
The Cheng Hoo Mosque as a Discursive Cosmopolitan Space 
Since its establishment, Surabaya Cheng Hoo Mosque has been frequently featured in 
various media and visited by many prominent figures. What make this mosque stand out? 
l would suggest that the significance of Cheng Hoo Mosque has to be examined in a 
larger Indonesian context from 1998 onwards. After the 'anti-Chinese' riots of 1998, 
post-New Order governments abolished various laws that discriminated against Chinese 
Indonesians to ensure Indonesia as an inclusive nation (Hoon 2008). Post-1998 
Indonesia was also marked by events like the conflicts between Christians and Muslims 
in Maluku, the terrorist attacks in Bali and Jakarta, and more recently the attacks against 
Ahmadiyah followers. At the same time, mainstream Muslim organisations, such as 
Muhammadiyah and NU, despite internal factions, have continued to promote Islamic 
moderation and religious tolerance (Hefuer 2005; Robinson 2008). 
Within such contexts, Cheng Hoo Mosque is welcomed by many Indonesians as a 
symbolic marker of the acceptance of Chinese culture, as well as a clear statement of the 
inclusive face of Indonesian Islam. Thus, it is no surprise that such mosque has gained 
much media attention, in which it can be seen a form of a discursive cosmopolitanism, 
deployed to manifest cul!ural diversity and religious pluralism in contemporary 
lndonesia.34 In other words, the inclusivity of Chinese-style mosques is the antidote to 
34 ;\mong the many ne·.ws article and comments about Cf,eng Hoo :V1osque, are 'Chincse~sty!e iv1osque a sy111bol 
of Indonesian Diversity· (Ari~in 2010); 'Afasjid Cheng Hoo, Sarni Pesan Kedarnaian' (Cheng Hoo ~1osque, 
~1essagc of Peace] (Ghufron 2009); and 'Pagoda df A tap Mas/id Cheng Hoo' [Pagoda on ihe roof of Cheng Ho~) 
Mu>que] (Dariyanlo 2009). 
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the rising puritan and radicalisatioo of Islamic doctrines among some section of 
Indonesian Muslim society. Indeed, as I indicated earlier, to project the cosmopolitan 
image of Islam, Chinese Muslims leaders have quoted Qur'anic texts to show Islam is a 
religion of 'rahmatan lil'alamin' (blessing for all) that emphasise 'hablum minalloohi wa 
hab/um minannaas' (a good relationship with god and among humankind) (YHMCHI 
2008). Here, based on personal interviews and articles, I will discuss Muslim leaders' 
public discourses of the Cheng Hoo Mosque as a mosque that promotes peaceful, 
vernacular and 'touristic' Islam. 
First, it is a peaceful mosque. Syafiq Mughni, East Java Muhammadiyah Chairperson 
does not see any problem with the establishment of a mosque which adopts Chinese 
architectural design, because the Our' an does not have any verses that regulate mosque 
architecture (Interview, Syafiq Mughni, 18 September 2008). He welcomed the Chinese-
style Mosque because it reflects the universality of Islam and helps preaching Islam to 
non-Muslim Chinese. He also suggested that the usage of Cheng Ho for the name of the 
mosque is timely, as Indonesian Islam is facing challenges from terrorism abroad and 
fundamentalism at home. According to him, Indonesian Muslims should have learned 
from the spirit of Cheng Ho which emphasises peace and inclusivity. 
Second, it is a vernacular mosque. For Rubaidi, East Java NU Secretary, the Cheng Hoo 
Mosque is a fine example showing that Islam has no hesitate to adopt ethnic cultural 
symbols, practices and rituals (Interview, Rubaidi, 15 November 2008). As a proponent 
of indigenisation of Islam, he sees the mosque as a form of resistance against the 
'Arabisation' of mosque architecture in Indonesia. Instead of merely adopting pan-
lslamic designs, he supports the diversity of mosque architecture which reflects the 
various local and ethnic manifestations of Islam in Indonesia. He also praised the Cheng 
Hoo Mosque for preaching Islam through cultural approaches and in a tolerant way. 
Third, the Cheng Hoo Mosque is touristic mosque. Since its establishment, the mosque 
has been visited by many prominent national leaders, including Yusuf Kalla, Amien Rais, 
Abdurrahman Wahid and Wiranto, as well as numerous local religious, military, 
business and political elites. The mosque is not only a place of worship, but also a tourist 
spot that attracts many Muslim and non-Muslims visitors from other cities in Indonesia 
and overseas. Many Muslim organisations and Islamic schools organised tours from 
other cities to visit this 'exotic' mosques. Along with the recently built pan-Islamic-
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design Al-Akbar Great Mosque and historical Javanese-style Sunan Ampel Mosque, the 
Cheng Hoo Mosque has been promoted as one of the religious tourist spots (wisata religi) 
by the Surabaya Tourism Board. 35 It has also been given an award from Indonesian 
Museum Record (Museum Rekor Indonesia). 
The Cheng Hoo Mosque as a Living Cosmopolitan Space 
Having reviewed the public discourses of the mosque as a cosmopolitan space, it is now 
important to look also at the sociological reality of its cosmopolitanism. By illustrating a 
few activities in the Surabaya Cheng Hoo Mosque, I argue the mosque in some ways, 
embraces 'everyday cosmopolitanism', in which 'the ordinary members of different 
ethno-religious and cultural grouping mix, mingle, intensely interact, and share in values 
and practices' (Bayat 2008:5). It is a place where Chinese and non-Chinese, Muslims 
and non-Muslims, upper classes and lower classes, males and females converge; as well 
as a space where religious, social and economy activities co-exist. As the former imam 
of the mosque, Burhadi said, 'We wish this mosque be like a supermarket to fulfil the 
aspirations of all people' (Harahap 2007). 
The busiest time of the week is in Friday, when hundreds of men of various ethnic 
backgrounds come to the mosque for afternoon prayers. Sometimes, conversion 
testimonies are held after the prayers. The mosque can only accommodate about 200-300 
people, so every Friday, a temporary shelter is set up to cater for another 1,000 people. 
With the exception of a few Chinese Muslim leaders, almost all Muslims who perform 
Friday prayers at the mosque are non-Chinese who are either working or residing nearby. 
Instead of travelling all the way to Cheng Hoo Mosque, most Chinese Muslims perform 
their prayers at the closest mosque. Indeed, location is more important than mosque 
architecture for them. The busiest time of the year is in the fasting month, when 
hundreds of Muslims, mostly non-Chinese Muslims gather for praying and breaking 
their fast. As some of them told me, they came to the mosque mainly because it is 
situated closely to where they live or work and there is free food, while others visited the 
mosque for its unique appearance. For the evening taraweh prayer, the mosque 
organised two versions, one with 11 rakaat and another one with 23 rakaat to 
accommodate the needs of Muslims from both NU and Muhammadiyah. 
:i< See Surabaya ·rourisrn (2010), http://www.eastjava.com/lourism/surabay8/chcnghoo-mosque.html. 
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In addition, the mosque committee also exercise their inclusivity through collaboration 
with other socio-religious groups. For instance, PITI has organised a mass khitanan 
(circumcision) at the mosque for poor Muslims in Surabaya in cooperation with Al· 
lrsyad, an Arab Muslim organisation. PIT! also extended their cooperation with non-
Muslim organisations, in activities such as donating goods for flood victims, with a 
Buddhist organisation, Tsu Chi. Indeed, charity events are frequently held in the mosque. 
A few Chinese Muslim leaders see themselves as middle persons facilitating the 
distribution of donations from better-off Chinese individuals and organisations to needy 
Muslims, given that some Muslims might worry that the donations may not be halal, and 
some Chinese organisations do not have direct connections with Muslim organisations.36 
In an evening, the noise of a bouncing basketball and the sound of Islamic chanting (zikir) 
run through the mosque compound. Inside the mosque, a few Muslims, mostly non· 
Chinese recite Qur' anic texts, led by a Chinese Muslim ustaz. Outside of the mosque, 
Muslim and non-Muslims youth play basketball. They stop playing for a while during 
the prayer session, so that the Muslims can perform their prayers undisturbed. This 
illustrates that mosque has fulfilled both the religious and social purposes of a mosque 
(Mortada, 2003:87), being a sacred place for worship, and a social space for Muslims 
and non-Muslims to get together. Also parts of the mosque compound are PITI's offices, 
a few multipurpose rooms, a kindergarten, a canteen, an acupuncture clinic and 
badminton courts. Mandarin classes, qigong practice and dancing courses are also held 
in the complex. Like other mosques, the Cheng Hoo Mosque is not Jack of economic 
activities. The mosque committee earns money from renting the sports facilities 
(badminton and basketball courts) and wedding functions had in the mosque. Some 
Chinese Muslims conduct informal business in the mosque, such as selling biscuits, 
slimming products and Islamic insurance. The mosque also operates as a business 
network for Chinese Muslims involved in large-scale industries (banks, factories), as 
well as small and medium-size enterprise (restaurants, grocery shops). 
35 This kind of donation, on the or.e hand, 1nay demonstrate ethnic Chinese's concern i:owards local lndonesians 
who are mostly Muslims; on the other hand, may reimpose the stereotypical dichotomy that Chinese Indonesians 
are ricb and the pribumi are often left behind In the economic sphere, 
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Conclusion 
Simple dichotomies cannot capture the dynamic nature of identity formation in the real 
world. I therefore conclude by discussing three sets of paradoxes in the study of Cheng 
Hoo Mosque: transnational imaginations and local configurations; intentional hybridity 
and everyday hybridity; cultural particularism and grounded cosmopolitanism. First, 
through Cheng Hoo Mosques, some Chinese Muslim leaders construct their Islamic 
tradition by adopting mosque design from China; yet reconfigure it in local contexts. 
Their strategic transnational connection with Mu.slims in China is not a form of desire 
for return to mainland China, but an effort to manifest their identity and empower their 
social position in Indonesia. There are also efforts to build Chinese-style mosques in 
other cities, which might contribute to the emergence of a rather new translocal ethno-
religious imagination within Indonesia. However, these translocal imaginations have 
been always grounded and influenced by local cultures in which Chinese Muslims reside. 
Second, as I have argued, the mosque does not symbolise an existing ethno-religious 
reality but rather brings a new reality into being, by reinventing traditions to promote a 
sense of shared experience that can unify Chinese Muslims. The strategic combination of 
Chinese architectural design and local Islamic traditions can be seen as a form of 
intentional mixing to emphasise the 'Chineseness' of Muslim house of worship. This 
fixity of identity through mosques does not reflect the complexity of cultural interaction 
and identity adoption of Chinese Muslims. The everyday hybridity of Chinese Muslim 
identities can only be observed through their daily involvement and activities in the 
mosque, where they are constantly cross boundaries, not only between Islam and 
Chinese identities, hut also diversified Islamic and Chinese traditions. In other words, the 
mosque is hoth representative place and a contested space, the former promoting the 
symbolic unity of Chinese Muslims, while the latter reflecting the diverse negotiations of 
their identities. 
Third, the establishment of Chinese-style mosques could 'universalise' Islam to 
demonstrate Islam is compatible with Chinese culture, but at the same time, might also 
'essentialise' Chinese in Indonesia to a stereotypical image. Yet this cultural essentialism 
does not always imply exclusion (Kahn 2006:166). Indeed, the Cheng Hoo Mosque is a 
prime example of the celebration of inclusive Chinese cultural expression. Although the 
mosque was built in a Chinese style and managed by Chinese Muslims, it is a multi-
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ethnic religious space allowing both Muslims and non-Muslims from different ethnic 
groups to interact with each other. In fact, most of the followers of the mosque are non-
Chinese Muslims, while many Chinese converts attend mosques close to where they live. 
\Ve may call it 'inclusive Chineseness', in which the practice of Chinese culture is no 
longer a sign of ethnic exclusivity but rather a common heritage shared by all, and one 
can have the freedom to abandon his or her Chineseness without social pressure. 
In addition, by appropriating features from both NU and Muhammadiyah traditions, as 
well as the external design of Chinese temple and internal structure of Romanic church, 
the mosque design shows Islam as a cosmopolitan religion that celebrates differences 
within and between religions. Avoiding the use of loud speakers to broadcast morning 
azan, and the cooperation of activities with Chinese organisations, shows that assertion 
of Islamic identity does not affect the relations between Chinese Muslims and their non-
Muslim counterparts. This shows that Islamic cosmopolitanism is not only found m 
Islamic texts, historical encounters and cultural syncretism with local traditions in 
Indonesia, but also in everyday life strategies of minority groups. Cheng Hoo Mosque 
can be seen as a 'cosmopolitan [space] envisaged in marginality' (Bhabha 1996a: 195) 
whereby minority Chinese Muslims empower themselves by playing a significant role 
promoting ethnic and religious harmony. Its inclusive architectural designs and social 
activities can be seen as a form of 'grounded' vernacular cosmopolitanism, in which 
there is no necessary contradiction between cosmopolitan sensibilities and identity 
assertion, and such cosmopolitan practices are 'rooted' in the experiences of particular 
ethno-religious groups (Kahn 2008; also Appiah 1998; Werbner 2002; Werbner 2006).37 
In short, to a certain extent, Cheng Hoo Mosque is a local, socio-religious space that 
embraces both inclusive Chineseness and cosmopolitan Islam. However, this inclusivity 
does not guarantee the decline of class differences, racial inequality and religious 
conservatism in the mosque. Also, such cosmopolitan practices are not new, but can 
traced back to the interactions between Islam, Chinese and local cultures back to the pre-
colonial and colonial period, as I discussed in the previous chapter. 
17 For more details of 'vernacular cosmopolitanism', see chapter 1. I wHI also discuss further this issue in Jny 
concluding chapter. 
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Chapter4 
Expressing Chineseness, :Marketing Islam: 
Hybrid Performani_-e of Chinese !Vluslim Preachers 
In post-1998 Indonesia, Chinese Muslim preachers have a su1prisingly high profile. 
Preachers such as Anton Medan, Koko Liem and Tan Mei Hwa are popular, not only 
among Chinese converts, but also with non-Chinese Muslim Indonesians. They appear 
regularly on religious television programs and hold public talks that attract large crowds. 
There are two important settings that explain the recent rise in Chinese preachers: the 
return of Chinese culture to the Indonesian public space since the collapse of the New 
Order regime, and the popularity of Muslim celebrity preachers. 
As a result of a rising consumer culture, many successful preachers in contemporary 
Indonesia are also media celebrities, skilled at tailoring their messages and fashioning 
their appearance to a media audience. Chinese preachers appear to have a special 
marketing pull, because of their ethnicity and their status as converts. Their Chiuese 
appearances stand out as exotic trndemarks in the crowded preaching market In addition, 
most Indonesians are born into the Muslim faith, so the personal biographies of converts 
arouse curiosity under any circumstances, but especially when they are Chinese. Some 
Muslims are concerned with what they see as a process of 'Christianisation' in Indonesia, 
and so they view the conversion to Islam of Chinese Indonesians - a community that is 
almost forty per cent Christian - as a welcome phenomeuon, 1 At the same time, many 
Muslims think the spiritual journey toward piety that these converts-turned-preachers 
underwent, provides a positive role model for non-practising Muslims. 
Many Chinese Muslim preachers are aware of their distinctive nature and strategically 
use their differences to establish popularity. Yet, Chinese preachers are not a singular 
entity. Their preaching takes varying forms and they each have different messages, 
reflecting their varying socio-economic backgrounds, cultural outlooks, conversion 
experiences and religious education. Some of them utilise their 'Chineseness' to 
1 
'Chrishanisation' is n term thal generaHy refers both to Christian efforts to ccnvert tv1uslirns and the alleged 
growing influence of Christianity in Muslim-majority Indonesia. Sarne Muslin:; groups use it as a justification for 
mass mobilisation and vigilante anacks. For more discussion of 'Chr!sHar.isation' in Indonesia, see 'JnJo:iesia; 
·Christ!a1Jisation' and Intolerance', a report ln the website of !nten:ationat Crisis Group. Ava.ilnblc fro'll, 
h ltp :! /www. CT is is group. orgf en/region::;/ as i a/ so-:.i th-east -as ia/i ndo n es i a/B 114~ i ndo n es i a -c br is! i an i sati o nwan d · 
intolerance.aspx: [clted 27 Decer.iber 20JO]. 
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distinguish themselves from other preachers; some emphasise the theological difference 
between their former religion (in most cases, Christianity) and Islam; some share their 
experience in transforming themselves from being an 'immoral' person to a good 
Muslim; yet others discuss the 'rationality' of Islam in public life. It might be said that 
Chinese preachers are as diverse as Indonesian Islam itself. 
In this chapter, by highlighting five case studies of popular Chinese Muslim preachers 
and a Chinese nasyid (Islamic music) group, I will examine how Chinese culture and 
Islamic knowledge are 'learned' by the preachers, 'reproduced' in their preaching, and 
then 'consumed' by the audience. And last, by positioning Chineseness and Islam as 
'symbolic commodities' (Bolin 2002; Muzakki 2007), I examine identity consumption, 
ethnic interaction and religious pluralism in contemporary Indonesia. As demonstrated 
by the preaching of Chinese Muslims, I argue that the commodification of identities has 
paradoxical outcomes -· the diversity of appearances is not necessarily followed by a 
plurality of discourses. As I will discuss later, Chinese preachers promote the 
universality of Islam, yet some of their religious messages tend to be conservative; they 
cross the boundaries between Chinese and non-Chinese Indonesians, but reinforce ethnic 
stereotype at the same time. 
Consumption, Performance and Identity 
In recent decades, the increase in consumer culture and the spread of new media have 
made an enormous impact on consumption practices and identity expressions in 
Indonesia and elsewhere. Consumption increasingly serves as a venue of identity 
expression that has both economic and political significance. As argued by Storey (1999), 
cultural consumption provides us with a script for identity performance, and is perhaps 
the most visible way we perform our sense of self. Since we manifest our identities 
through what we consume, 'consumption is therefore also a form of production' (Storey: 
2003:78). Friedman (1994) further suggests that, through examining the practice of 
cultural consumption and production, we can gain some insight into the relations 
between local structures of desire and identity; as well as the political and economic 
contexts that enable or constrain such practices. 
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As Ditchev (2006) suggested, 21st century nationalism is different from its earlier 
incarnations: it is not necessarily linked to solidarity or belonging, but to appearances 
and emblems. Referring to the trends of nationalism in Bulgaria, he coined the term 
'lifestyle nationalism' to refer to the growing expression of national identity, by using 
simple and clear-cut emblems in the age of global consumer culture. In many cases, one 
does not live the idemity, but have it. TI1e same trends can also be observed in the 
expression of ethnic and religious identities in contemporary societies. For example, we 
might use "lifestyle Islam' and 'lifestyle Chineseness' to describe the rising of identity 
consumption in Indonesia today. As reflected in some of the preachers I discuss later, 
Islamic appearance is more important than substance in the preaching market; while 
cultural symbols are more important than language ability in the manifestation of their 
Chinese identities. In other words, identity expression is more or less a performative 
action. Through performance, one can reinvent oneself through 'acting' in public life, a 
process by which one becomes someone, or accurately, become what one chooses to be 
(Butler 1990). Yet, the usage of cultural symbols is not just an empty signifier, as argued 
by Bourdieu (1991), through objectified representation in things and acts; self-interested 
strategies of symbolic performance can influence both self-iden!ification and !he 
perception of others. 
In contemporary consumer societies, cultural symbols and religious appearances have 
emblematic exchange values that can generate financial incentives (Muzakki 2007). In 
Indonesia, in the last decade, there has been a growing Islamic consumerism especially 
among the urban middle class Muslims, as reflected by the mushrooming of various 
religious-themed products and services, such as Islamic popular culture, banking, 
tourism, literature and fashion. At the same time, since the collapse of the New Order 
regime, Chineseness has been absorbed into the market and became a part of urban life 
style (Budianta 2007:174). For example, during Chinese New Year, lion dance 
performances and red lantern decorations are commonly found in most of the major 
shopping centres in big cities to attract consumers. To a certain extent, both Islam and 
Chineseness can be seen as 'symbolic commodities' (Bolin 2002.: Muzakki 2007) that 
attract the attention of consumers and generate profits for vendors. 
Yet, the rise in consumer culture does not necessarily contradict the rise in religious 
piety. Or in other words, the commodification of religion does not undermine, bur 
transforms religious faith and practice. For example, as pointed out by Miller (2004:7), 
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religious leaders might lose traditional power and authority, yet they gain media 
celebrity. Meanwhile, Eickelman and Anderson (2003) suggest that new media such as 
internet and television have expanded the public sphere of Islam as a marketplace of 
ideas, identities and discourse. As elsewhere, the commodification of Islam in Indonesia 
is also producing a spectrum of Islamic expressions that is more diverse and subject to 
rapid change. As Fealy (2008) has pointed out, given that markets need to appeal to the 
widest possible audience by using pluralist messages, Islamic consumerism seems to 
result in greater pluralism and does not undermine the moderate nature of Indonesian 
Islam (Fealy 2008). Similarly, referring to the popularity of the Islamic-themed 
Indonesian film, Ayat-ayat Cinta (The Verses of Love), Heryanto (2010) suggests that 
'pop Islam' is hybrid in substance and style, and offers an attractive image of Indonesian 
Islam, Located in these broader contexts, this chapter examines whether Chinese Muslim 
preachers promote greater diversity ofislamic expression and discourse in Indonesia. 
Converts-turned-Preachers: A New :Force in Indonesian Islamic Markets 
In contemporary Indonesia, Islamic preaching is not only a medium for transmitting 
Islamic knowledge to the public, but also a means of accumulating wealth and improving 
social status (Fealy 2008; Muzakki 2007). Coping with the rise of a consumer culture 
and media industry, the popular dai (Muslim preacher) today not only has to manage 
Islamic knowledge, but also needs to equip him or herself with communication skills and 
media-friendly appearances. In other words, form and appearance, instead of knowledge 
and substance, are part and parcel of the growing Islamic preaching market. 
This phenomenon of Islamic preaching in Indonesia has been well studied (Abaza 2004; 
Hoesterey 2008; Howell 2008; Millie 2008; Muzakki 2007). While there are many 
writings about born-Muslim and born-again Muslim preachers, such as Abdullah 
Gymnastiar (Aa Gym), Arifin Ilham and Jefri Al-Buchori (Uje), the recent popularity of 
converts-turned-preachers has received little scholarly attention. In the past, minority and 
mualaf (new-convert) status of Chinese Muslims might provide obstacles for them to 
become successful preachers, today their smaller numbers and recent Islamic 
conversions are advantages. In the crowded world of celebrity preachers, one needs a 
unique feature or trademark to attract attention. While preachers of Arab Hadrami 
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descent carry an authenticating stamp or origin, Chinese preachers stand out for their 
exceptional and exotic outlooks in non-Chinese dominated preaching markets. 
Drawing upon the success of other preachers, Chinese Muslim preachers are nol 'passive 
consumers' in the Indonesian Islamic market, but creative in carving out a niche by 
performing their Chinese identity and narrating their personal biographies (from converts· 
to pious Muslims) to win adherents. Many Chinese preachers are aware of their unique 
positions: as 'a part of an ethnic minority, but also a part of a majority Muslim ummah'. 
Some of them use their uniqueness to establish their preaching careers. For example, Tan 
Mei Hwa and Koko Lem are two interesting figures, as they use their Chinese names 
(without any Jslamic/ Javanese name attached) in their preaching. Koko Lem also wears 
traditional Chinese clothing when preaching. They use Chinese cultural symbols not 
only to prove that Chineseness and Islam are compatible, but also as an 'authentic selling 
point' that differentiates them from other preachers, who are non-Chinese and mostly 
born Muslim. Knowing that Chinese Muslims are exceptional, and thus deserving more 
attention, their choice of Chinese names and attire in preaching successfully attracts the 
attention of local Muslims who find the stories and experience of converts fascinating. 
As I have mentioned earlier, "Christianisation" amongst Muslims has been a major 
anxiety for some Islamic organisations and leaders, particularly the possibility of non-
practising Muslims converting to Christianity through inter-religious marriages and the 
influence of the Christian education system. Therefore, although most Islamic 
organisations do not have systematic propagation efforts among Chinese Indonesians, 
the conversion of Chinese (especially those who were Christians) has always been 
welcomed as a reversal of the widely held fear. Therefore, the circulation of converts' 
stories always constitutes one part of the preaching agenda, especially towards non-
observant indigenous Muslims. Most of the Islamic magazines, for example, Hidayah 
and al-Kisah, have a section on the experience of new converts. 
For some Muslim activists, the spiritual journey from non-Muslim to pious Muslim can 
be seen as a role model for non-practising 'indigenous' Muslim Indonesians. As 
illustrated by a Javanese Muslim I met during my field research, 
'There are a lot of identity-card Muslims among indigenous Indonesians. They do 
not go to the mosque for Friday prayer. Or fast during Ramadan. Yer, our Chinese 
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converts are different. They choose to become Muslim and learn their religion 
seriously, We should he ashamed, because we are born Muslims and learned 
religion for years, but we do not practise it properly. Therefore, Chinese dai should 
play an important role in the dakwah movement.' 2 (Field note, 10 January 2008) 
Felix Siaw, a young activist in Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), told me that he is 
frequently invited to lead pengajian (Islamic study sessions) organised by Hfl in various 
locations, because many Muslims think that 'if a Muslim convert can be a pious Muslim, 
it will set a good example for the born Muslim'. He says, 'Although my knowledge of 
Islam is probably not as deep as others, many Muslims are more interested in listening to 
me, because I am the only Chinese and a new convert to HTI' (Interview, Felix Siaw, 10 
January 2008). His experience is shared by many other Chinese ustaz (religious teachers) 
and dai (preachers), who stated that their Chineseness and their status as converts have 
contributed to the popularity of their preaching. 
In the following sections, I discuss in detail five high-profile Chinese preachers and a 
nasyid group in contemporary Indonesia. There are two clarifications need to be made in 
advance. First, my use of the term 'marketing' in this chapter is not intended as a value 
judgment of preachers, nor do I seek to downplay the presence of genuine religious or 
cultural motivations among them. Rather my aim is to examine the relationship between 
preaching, marketing and identity, Second, I do not overlook the existence of Chinese 
Muslim preachers in the New Order period, but they were less visible, Many of them 
downplayed their Chineseness, as the public expression of Chinese identity was not 
allowed during the Suharto regime, 
Tan Mei Hwa: Singing, Dancing, Preaching 
Tan Mei Hwa or Ida Astuti, born 1968, is both a preacher and a performer. Her Chinese 
identity and entertaining preaching style have made her one of the most popular 
preachers in Surabaya, East Java, She has speaking engagements nearly every day, not 
only in East Java, but also in other provinces, During Ramadan, she hosted a religious 
program on the biggest local television station in East Java, JTV, She is known as Bu 
2 The expression, identity-card MusHms, or fslam K'rP (Kartu Tanda Penduduk)~ is cornmonly used to refer to 
non-practising ?vtuslims in Indonesia .. .<\!! Indonesian cltizens have to state their religian on an identity card. yel 
not all of those who identity <is Muslims practice Islam in doily life, especially in Java. 
Nyai Tan Mei Hwa, 'nyai' being a prestigious title for a female religious scholar in the 
Javanese tradition. 
Always dressed in fashionable and colourful Muslim attire with jilbab (headscarf), her 
easily digested religious messages and down-to-earth preaching style are welcomed by 
many ordinary Muslims, especially women and girls (see A.ppendix 6). She intersperses 
her message with singing, plenty of jokes and sometimes even dancing. As described by 
a journalist, she conveys her speech in 'Surabaya' style, by using lots of Javanese words 
and speaking in a direct way: interactive, blunt, and entertaining at the same time 
(Roosilawati 2008). She also makes extensive use of 'social talk' (bahasa gaul), the 
slang used by Indonesian youth to interact with her audiences. 
What makes her most striking, however, is her expression of Chineseness. First, 
although.she is not a fluent Mandarin speaker, she often sprinkles a little Mandarin in her 
talk. Second, she always highlights the role of Chinese Muslims in promoting early 
lslamisation in Java. Third, she tries to present a positive image of Chinese Indonesians 
to the Muslim crowd by saying that not all Chinese are rich or exclusive. Fourth, she 
uses her Chinese name, Tan Mei Hwa, in order to differentiate herself from other 
preachers who have Islamic or Indonesian names. As she totd me, 'According to Islamic 
teaching, there is no requirement to adapt certain type of name. Mei Hwa is also my 
Islamic name, because it has good meaning. It means - beautiful flower.' (Interview, Tan 
Mei Hwa, 23 November 2010). Indeed, 'Tan Mei Hwa' in some ways, has been an 
exotic hallmark for her preaching. 
Trained in law, Tan Mei Hwa worked in multilevel marketing before she became a full-
time preacher. Like many Chinese Indonesians around her age in Java, she speaks fluent 
Indonesian and Javanese, yet has only mastered a few Mandarin and Hokkien phrases. 
She converted to Islam when she was 18 due to the influence of her Muslim friends and 
her marriage to a Javanese man from Solo. She learnt about Islam from her Muslim 
friends, her husband and through readings. She never undertook formal Islamic 
education, yet this was not an obstacle for her in the preaching market. Not only a 
successful preacher, she is also the director of Az Zahra, a religious training and 
consultation institute (Lembaga Training, Konsultasi & Maje/is Dzikir) and has an 
interest in developing MSQ Management Spiritual Quotation, mimicking the popular 
Ary Ginanjar's Emotional-Spiritual Quotient (ESQ). ESQ is an Islamic corporate 
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management and motivational service, focussing on improving one's general and 
professional success through spiritual awareness and commitment. 
She says good communication skills, which she has from her former involvement in 
multilevel marketing, are crucial to preaching. Different from other preachers who 
mostly refer to religious texts, she told me that she reads a lot of non-religious books, 
especially books related to management, leadership and philosophy, so she can convey 
Islamic messages connected to everyday practice, such as time management, human 
interaction and work ethics. As she said, 'Islam is a not difficult religion. Islam is a 
practical guide for everyday life.' 
To appeal to broader audiences, Tan Mei Hwa avoids theological debates and 
controversial subjects in her preaching. Although she occasionally employs Arabic 
citations from Islam's normative sources, she emphasises the universal values of Islam 
and how to apply these in everyday life. She rarely talks about her former religion 
(Chinese traditional beliefs) and her conversion experience. She says her preaching is not 
only for Muslims, but also non-Muslims, as she always states 'Islam is religion that is a 
blessing for all (rahmatan lil 'alamin )'. She does not intend to convert other Chinese to 
Islam, because she says religious conversion is a personal choice. Although she has been 
invited to give talks in support of political campaigns during elections, she refuses to 
affiliate with any political party or religious organisation. She says, as a preacher, it is 
important for her to be neutral, so that her messages will be accepted by all Muslims. In 
short, the image of Islam she tries to portray is 'simple, inclusive and fun'. 
Like other celebrity preachers, Tan Mei Hwa is an astute entrepreneur who tailors her 
preaching style and messages to audiences carefully and creatively. I first met her in 
2008 in a fast breaking event during Ramadan in Surabaya. The event was also part of a 
gubernatorial election campaign, with the attendance of the candidate for the deputy 
governor of East Java, Saifullah Yusuf, who was also known as Gus Ipul. Except from 
urging the audience to vote for Gus lpul and his running mate, she did not talk much 
about political issues and focused on other themes such as Islamic solidarity and poverty 
eradication. When 1 asked one of the organisers why Tan Mei Hwa was invited, he 
responded, 'Because she is popular. Her message is simple and her style entertaining. 
She can attract a large audience, especially female.' (Field note, 24 September 2008) 
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Indeed, accompanied by singing, flamboyant gestures and sometimes dancing, she can 
hold her audience's attention for a full hour and a half of preaching. ln the fast breaking 
function, dressed in fashionable pink, besides reciting shalawat (prayers for the God), 
she sang the popular 'SurgaMu ·(Your Heaven), a religious-themed pop-rock song by 
the band UNGU. She asked her audience to sing along and.most of them did. She joked 
too, drawing stories from her ethnicity and personal experience. For example, she said, 'I 
am a Chinese. How come my Javanese is more fluent than my Chinese language?', 
'Although I have slanted eyes, I have a broad viewpoint' (Field note, 24 September 
2008), and so on. She often repeated similar stylised performances in other public talks. 
Yet, she also changes her preaching persona and content according to the audience, 
function and location. When conducting a monthly Islamic study session with Muslim 
women in a Muhammadiyah mosque close to her house, she avoids singing and dancing 
because such activities disapproved by the modernist Muslims. She always begins such 
sessions with a brief talk, followed by interactive Q&A session. She also conducts 
smaller zikir sessions (Islamic mystical chanting) every Sunday at her house and 
occasionally offers training that combines both the skill of business management and 
religious spirituality. 
I described earlier how Tan Mei Hwa uses her Chineseness to attract audiences and here, 
I discuss how she builds up her credentials as a Chinese preacher, by referring to 
religious texts. In another public talk in connection with halal-bihalal (mutual forgiving 
event) in Surabaya in 2008, she urged the crowd, who were mostly non-Chinese 
.\foslims, to acknowledge and respect difference. She began her talk by stating that she 
converted to Islam because she was interested in the concept of' rahmatan Iii 'alamin' in 
Islamic teachings. Later, she recounted a short conversation between two Muslim girls in 
which one had refused to go to a pengajian (Islamic study session) because it was being 
led by a Chinese preacher. She then cited Qur' anic texts and told her audience," 
'I was born as Tan Mei Hwa. Can I choose to not he Chinese? ls it a sin to be 
Chinese? There is no Qur'anic text that obliges someone to be ethnic Chinese or 
not. God creates us in different shapes and colours. Some have slanted eyes, and 
some have broader eyes. Some have darker skin, and some have fairer skin. We are 
"' The Qur'anic verse she quoted is from Chapter A!-l-Iujura!: (49:13). The verse can be translated as 'People, V./e 
created you aH fron1 a sL1g!e man and a single woman, and made you into races and tribes so that you shoultl 
recognize one another. In God's eyes, lhe u1ost honoured of you are cnes most mindful of Him: God is all 
kno\vlng, all aware· (Abdel Ha!een1, 2005). 
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all brother and sisters. We should respect each other' (Field note, 16 October 2008). 
Most of the audience applaud her, as a sign of support. She continued her talk by 
referring to a Hadith (accounts of the words of Prophet Muhammad): 'The Prophet 
Muhammad urges us Muslims to seek knowledge even as far as China. Since there are 
many ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, we are lucky enough that we can learn from them 
without travelling to mainland China' (Field note, 16 October 2008). Such messages 
help promote a better image of Chinese Indonesian and bolster her credentials as a 
Chinese preacher. To show that Chinese preaching is not new, she also links back to 
Cheng Ho and Walisongo. By quoting former NU leader, Abdurrahman Wahid, she 
claims that some of the revered Walisongo, were of Chinese descent. 
However, her preaching is not without controversy. Some Muslims have criticised her 
for being 'just an entertainer' rather than a true preacher. As one of my informants said, 
'She does not have a strong religious education background and the content of her 
speeches is superficial' (Field note, 24 September 2008). Other Muslims also accuse her 
of being materialistic, profiting from selling the word of God (menjualkan ayat), as there 
are rumours that she charges up to five million rupiah for a preaching session. She 
responds by saying that in a practical sense, she could not perform without charging a 
fee. She explains by reminding her critics that she is often invited to perform but 
receives insufficient remuneration to cover her travelling expenses, let alone other costs. 
She denies charging a fixed fee, maintaining the fee is negotiable between her and the 
host depending on the location and the nature of the event. Besides charging a fee, she 
also sets a few requirements for her host, such as the quality of the sound system, the 
size of the auditorium and the seating arrangements, in which females should be seated 
at the front. 
Another controversial aspect of Tan Mei Hwa' s preaching is her singing and dancing. 
Some ultra·conservative Muslims argue that women singing and performing in public is 
not acceptable because the female voice is aurat (a part of the body that must be covered 
and not to be exposed in public). She disagrees and believes that such a 'stern' (keras) 
view is not shared by a majority of Indonesian Muslims. She defends, 'as long as I wear 
Islamic clothing, practise an lslamic lifestyle and spread the message of Islam, what's 
wrong with a female becoming a preacher?' Furthermore, she continues, 'Most of my 
audience is female.' She also explains why she chose to wear a colourful dress when 
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preaching, 'I want to portray Islam as a beautiful religion, and an attractive appearance is 
very important' (Interview, Tan Mei Hwa, 23 November 2008). Yet, this does not mean 
that she has a progressive stand on gender issues. As l observed, in an Islamic study 
session, she once told her female audience that 'women are not suited to become leaders 
because they are emotional' and 'women should put family first and career second' 
(Field note, 23 November 2008). Such statements, however, have to be put into context, 
because she was addressing a more socially conservative crowd in a Muhammadiyah 
mosque. Furthermore, in 2008, she had been invited to speak for the East Java 
gubernatorial election campaigns of Soekarwo and Saifullah Yusuf (both males), of 
whom one of their challengers was female. 4 This might explains why she told her 
audience that 'women are not suited to become leaders' 
Koko Liem: Chinese Package, Islamic Message 
'An ustaz (religious teacher), but he has slanted eyes, yellow skin and always 
wears Chinese attire. He is known as Koko Liem. Originating from a Chinese 
Buddhist family in Dumai, Sumatra, he converted to Islam because he believed 
that the religion has universal and tolerant teachings'. 
This is how a young Chinese preacher, Koko Liem, has been introduced on television in 
Indonesia. Indeed, Chinese name, Chinese appearance and convert background are the 
three main characteristics that make Koko Liem popular among Muslim audiences. Bom 
1979, as Liem Hai Thai, Koko Liem adopted a Muslim name, Muhammad Csman 
Ansori, when he converted to Islam. This is something many converts do. However, he 
prefers to be called Koko Liem when he preaches, because, he says, it is more 'down-to-
ear!h'. It also differentiates him from other preachers. Koko means 'brother' in the 
Hokkien dialect, while Liem is a clan name that is very common among Indonesians of 
Chinese descent. Like Tan Mei Hwa, it is a name that marks him as indisputably Chinese. 
Besides his name, Koko Liem's other preaching trademark is his traditional Chinese 
4 In 2008, there were two pairs of candidates for the second round of 1he East Java gubernatorial election. The 
first duo Soekarwo~ Saiful!ah Yusuf, w-z:s supporred by Dcrnocrat Party (PD) and National Mandate Party (PAN). 
\Vhile the second pair was Kho!'ifah Jndah Parawansa- f\.1udjiono, \Vas supported by Uc.!ted Development Party 
(PPP) and lndonesiar, Democratic Party of Struggle (POJP). Tan Mei Hwa was invited by the Soekarwo team tc 
speak Jn their election carr.pnign. Khofifah is a female leader in NU nnd v1as a minister in Abdurrahman Wahid's 
cabinet 
clothing with a Chinese skullcap. 5 He says he wears this outfit because it looks 
interesting and is different from what other preachers wear. As he told me, 'Preachers 
don't have to wear a jubah with turban, or a baju koko with peci. I am a Chinese 
preacher. That is why I dress in Chinese clothing' 6 (Interview, Koko Liem, 26 April 
2008). He explained that it was a preaching strategy to show that Islam is a universal 
religion and not incompatible with Chinese cultural traditions. To further illustrate the 
close relationship between Islam and Chineseness, he added that baju koko, popular 
Muslim male attire in Indonesia, has its origin in China and modified from traditional 
Chinese costumes. He also pointed out that the Islamic teachings share many similarities 
with Confucian values, such as respect for elders, modesty and cooperation. 
Like Tan Mei Hwa, Koko Liem's use of his Chinese name and clothing is a preaching 
image, and does not reflect his daily cultural practice. He can only speak a little Hokkien, 
but is fluent in Arabic and Indonesian, and is married to a Javanese woman. His minimal 
knowledge of Chinese language and culture left him with fewer ways of presenting his 
Chinese identity in the public. In other words, only through name and appearance, can he 
authenticate his Chineseness to attract media attention. 
Yet, different from Tan Mei Hwa, Koko Liem is well-trained in Islamic studies. As he 
told me, his interest in Islam began when his father once told him that, 'you can convert 
to any religion, but not Islam', giving no reason. At the same time, he was sceptical of 
idol worshipping in the Buddhist temple. Therefore, in order to learn about Islam, he 
took Islamic classes in his primary school, although he was a Buddhist. Since then, he 
has been interested in Islamic teaching, following various religious events and he finally 
converted to Islam when he was 14. His conversion was rejected by his father, which 
made him chose to leave home and move to Java. In Java, he trained in a NU pesantren 
(Islamic boarding school), and then continued his Islamic studies in a teaching institute 
of Our'anic knowledge (PTIO, Institut Perguruan Tinggi llmu Al-Our'an). He is best 
5 The Chinese clothing which Koko Liem always wears is Tangzhuang, or 'fang suit. Tangzhuang refers to the 
Chinese jacket that originated at the end of the Qing Dynasty (:i 644-1911 ). It evolved from Ma.gua, a Manchurian 
clothing, \Vhich was, in turn, adopted by the }{an Chinese during Qing Dynasty, 'foday, tangzliuang is one of the 
main formal dothing for Chinese men in n1any occasions, Ai the 1\sia-Pacific Economic Coopera~io:l summit in 
Shanghai, China in November 2001, !he host presented its silk tangzhuang jacket as the Chinese traditional 
nationill coshnne. Since then, sorne Chinese overseas have also worn the tangzhuang, either as a fashion 
statement or for cultural expression. 
(' Jubah is long flowing robe, identical to Arable garments. MeanwhiJe, peci is rimless cap and baju koko is 
collarless shirt which is one: of the most common clothir.g styles of male fndonesian \.fus!ims. Sorne lndonesians 
have suggested the koko shirt has Chinese roots. According to historian JJ Rizal, such collarless long or short-
sleeve shirts are modified from a tui-khim shirt which v.·ns commonlv \VOrn bv male Chinese in lnd{)nesia until 
the early 2o:n century (Isnaeni 2010), - ~ 
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known for his ability to memorise all the verses in the Qur'an. 
Indeed, his conversion experience, his struggles to learn Islam, his ability to recite 
Qur'anic texts and ccmparing Islam with Buddhism or Chinese traditional beliefs, are 
some of the main themes of his preaching. He said if a Chinese becomes a Muslim and 
understands the religion, he or she will be respected by many local Muslims. Therefore, 
his sharing of his story and religious experience is a form of dakwah, to remind ordinary 
Muslims to observe their religion. He told me that the common response from his 
audiences is, 'He is a convert, but his religious knowledge is greater than ours. He can 
lecture on religion. He can memorise the Qur'an. But what can we do?' (Interview, Koko 
Liem, 26 April 2008). 
Like other celebrity preachers, Koko Liem is 'media-savvy'. Besides his charming 
appearance, he has good communication skills and engages in 'social talk' (bahasa gaul), 
the slang used by Indonesian urban youth, He was one of the finalists on Mimbar Dai, a 
reality show on TPI (Television Pendidikan Indonesia or Indonesian Education 
Television) in which one of the competitors is awarded the title of 'best preacher' .. Since 
then, his preaching career has become more successful. Now, not only does he host 
several religious programs on various Indonesian television channels, he is also involved 
in acting and advertising. He has acted as a 'kiai' (religious scholar) in a religious 
sinerron (serial drama)··· 'Kiamat Sudah Dekat 3' ('The Judgement Day is Coming 3'). 
He is one of the most creative Chinese preachers, whose Islamic business career goes 
beyond public preaching to include umrah and haj pilgrimage travel, a religious SMS 
service, and a religious school for new converts. He has a personal website 
(www.kokoliem.com) featuring reports and video clips of his public preaching 
engagements, as well as stories of new converts, consulting services and Islamic articles. 
He is affiliated with the UJE Centre, owned by a popular celebrity-preacher, Jefri al-
Buchori, best known as lJje. He holds monthly Islamic study sessions for new converts 
and occasionally speaks at the popular 'I like Monday' Islamic study sessions at the lJJE 
Centre. Indeed, Koko Liem's preaching and marketing strategies are generally in line 
with his associate, Jefri al-Buchori, who is a multimedia artist and preacher. 
In his latest SMS religiously themed service, Lampion Hati (A Lantern for the Heart), 
which offers Islamic-based advice, teaching and ring tones to subscribers, Koko Liem 
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combines Chinese cultural symbols with Islamic messages to attract customers (see 
Appendix 6). Against a red background decorated with pictures of Chinese lanterns and 
the silhouette of a mosque, Koko Liem features in a posture of prayer, wearing green 
(the colour of Islam) traditional Chinese clothing. The advertisement for his ·SMS service 
declares his goal to be 'illuminating your heart and faith with Islamic advice' (Terangi 
hati dan imanmu dengan tausiyah-tausiyah lslami). Also provided in his SMS services 
are guidance for new converts, tips for Islamic family harmony and suggestions for 
Islamic match-making. This combination of Chinese cultural symbols and Islamic 
messages gives Koko Liem his uniqueness and makes him especially popular among 
Muslim Indonesians. 
However, his creative preaching does not lead him to a more progressive or liberal 
understanding of religious and social issues. Like other celebrity preachers in Indonesia, 
Koko Liem tends to embrace a socially conservative Islam, albeit with a light touch 
(Howell 2008:59). For example, he has written an article, arguing that Muslim youths 
should not celebrate Valentine's Day, According to his opinion, Valentine's Day is a 
Christian festival and does not fit with Islamic lifestyle because it promotes 'free sex' 
which is banned by Islamic teaching (Koko Liem 2009). 
Irena Handono: From Church Activist to Islamic Preacher 
Not all Chinese preachers present a television-friendly face and use their Chineseness. 
Irena Handono, or Han Hoo Lie, a former student at Atmajaya Catholic University in 
Jakarta, was a church activist and nun before she converted to Islam in 1983 at Al-Falah 
Mosque in Surabaya. Unlike Tan Mei Hwa and Koko Liem, Irena Handono, born 1954, 
does not position herself as a 'Chinese' preacher. Although some of her Muslim 
admirers know about her Chinese identity, her distinguishing feature as a preacher is her 
background as a Catholic nun. 
Despite sharing a similar profile to Tan Mei Hwa, as a Chinese female convert-turned· 
preacher, Irena Handono's preaching style and content is very different. She eschews 
much of the entertainment-focused approach, concentrating instead on smaller-scale 
preaching tours and Islamic activism. She is active in numerous Islamic organisations, 
most of which are conservatively inclined, including Forum for the Anti Pornography 
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and Porno-action Movement (FORGAPP, Forum Gerakan Anti Pornografi dan 
Pornoaksi). She also established Irena Centre to educate Muslims and prevent Muslims 
from apostasy. She is well-known in more conservative circles and a couple of Chinese 
Muslims I met described her as a 'fundamentalist' preacher. 
Whenever she preaches, Irena emphasises her experience of conversion to Islam. She 
makes lengthy and detailed theological comparisons between Christianity and Islam 
which always end up demonstrating Islam's superiority. According to Irena, Islam is the 
only true religion recognised by God, and the Christian concept of the 'trinity' is false. 
She has given a few presentations, themed 'Bongkar Kristian' (Exposing Christian), 
which focused on 'weaknesses' in Christianity. The introduction to her talks says, 'She 
was a Christian preacher, and now turns into an Islamic one. She tries to reveal the 
weaknesses of 01ristian teachings, which 99 percent of Christians do not know because 
they were concealed by priests.' Video-clips of her talks were once uploaded on You tube, 
but now have been withdrawn. She has also written two books - Menyingkap Fitnah dan 
Teror [Unveil the Slander and Terror] and Islam Dihujat [Blasphemed Islam] to 
challenge the western stereotypical negative images of Islam and reveal the constant 
threat of Christian missionaries. To some extent, her dakwah is not focus on converting 
non-Muslims to Islam, but preventing Muslims from converting to Christianity. 
Like other sharia-minded Muslim preachers, she often criticises non-practising Muslims 
for not using the Qur' an to guide every aspect of their lives. She supports the 
implementation of the controversial Anti-Pornography Bill to regulate the morality of 
Muslim Indonesians and proposes stern action to prevent apostasy among Muslims. She 
also attacks prominent Muslims who have promoted pluralistic ideas, such as the well-
known religious scholar Syafii Maarif, who suggested that not only Muslims, but also 
Christians and Jews have a place in heaven. Her controversial preaching material means 
she has rarely been invited to host religious programs on TV. Her messages draw 
criticism from Christians and moderate Muslim leaders. They worry that her effort to rid 
Christianity of 'weaknesses' after having found the 'Islamic truth' will worsen inter-
religious relationships in Indonesia. Some Chinese Muslim leaders also disassociate 
themselves from her and criticise the content of her sermons. For them, conversion is a 
personal choice, and it is not appropriate for a Muslim convert to publicly criticise his or 
her former religion. 
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Yet, hardline Muslim groups especially those worried about the threat of Christian 
missionaries among Muslim Indonesians welcome her talks. Islamic magazines and 
newspapers such as Sabili and Republika, interview Irena frequently. 7 In 2009, in a 
Republika interview, she described her conversion experience and religious journey in 
the following terms: 
'When studying at the Institute of Theological Philosophy, Irena took a 
comparative religion course. After that, she studied Islam. Her lecturer started his 
class by saying, 'If you want to learn about Islam, you just need to look at Muslims 
in Indonesia. Islam is identical with poverty, backwardness, terrorism and all 
negative things.' However, Irena did not agree and asserted, 'We can't simply 
judge a religion by looking at its followers, and this can apply to Christians and 
Catholics, If we refer to the Philippines and Mexico, the robbers, the thieves and 
the poor are mainly Catholics, not Muslims.' ,..One day, Irena asked her lecturer 
for permission to learn Islam from the primary source, the Qur'an. Her lecturer 
allowed her to read the Qur'an, to find the 'weaknesses' of Islam. After reading the 
Qur'anic texts, Irena was convinced that there is only one God and the concept of 
the holy trinity in Christianity is false. She debated the concept of God with her 
lecturer. Finally, she concluded that Jesus is not a God, but only a person who has 
been perceived as a God ... Aithough faced by many challenges after conversion, 
Irena feels her life is more complete with the guidance of the Qur'an ... ' 8 
In short, Chinese ethnicity is not crucial for Irena Handoko's life or preaching career. 
Her conversion experience and the psycho-religious elements of her religious 
transformation have larger impacts on her preaching style and content. To some extent, 
the next example, Syafii Antonio, shares the same trajectory, where religious experience 
is more crucial than ethnicity as a guide to daily life and preaching. To that we now turn. 
1 Most of the interviews have been upioaded en Irena's personal blog, http://irena-handone>.blogspot.com. For 
example, in December 2008, Sabi!i published an interview with Irena Handono, entitled 'Kenapa Pada Dlam' 
('Why keep quiet'), ernphasizing Irena's concern with lhe rise of Christian missionaries in Indonesia and the lack 
of efforts by Muslirr1 leaders to counter such a trend. 
"This intervie\v, entitled 'Irena Handono: Ilidup Kian lndtJh Dengan Islam' ('Life is r.iore beaut if; . .! Vlith Islam') 
is available: on Irena's blog. See, http:/iirena-handono.bJogspoLrorn/2009_02_01_archive.htm! (c\cccssed on 18 
August 2010). 
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SyafiiAntonio: Promoting an Islamic Economy 
Muhammad Syafii Antonio (Nio Gwan Chung), born 1967, is one of the most respected 
Chinese Muslim intellectuals and a leading figure in the promotion of an Islamic 
economy in Indonesia. Since the 1990s, using a Malaysian model, he has been engaged 
in helping to build an Islamic banking system in Indonesia. Today, he is a member of the 
expert committee of Bank Indonesia and the Sharia Advisory Council, Central Bank of 
Malaysia, as well as a sharia consultant for various banks and financial institutions in 
Indonesia. He is also one of the leaders in Yayasan Karim Oei (a Chinese convert 
foundation), as well as a member in the Division of Economy of ICM! and the l'\ational 
Sharia Board of MUI. 
Born into a Confucian family, he first converted to Christianity during primary school 
and later to Islam when he was 17. He emphasised that his conversion was based on 
rational consideration because he had studiously compared religions before determining 
Islam the best. After converting to Islam, he studied Arabic in an NU pesantren and 
attended Muhammadiyah High School at the same time. He continued his undergraduate 
studies in the University of Jordan (Islamic law) and his master degree in the 
International Islamic University, Malaysia (Islamic economy), before completing his 
PhD on Islamic economic and banking systems at the University of Melbourne, Australia. 
Syafii Antonio started to preach in public at very young age when he was still studying 
in an Islamic boarding school. He was asked to replace his religious teacher to talk in a 
pengajian when his teacher fell ill. Since then, his excellent religious knowledge, 
convincing public speaking, his Chinese look and convert status have contributed to his 
growing popularity among Muslim audiences. Not only is he invited to give public 
sermons, he has also hosted religious programs on radio and television. However, his 
dakwah approach changed after he completed his postgraduate studies and is different 
from other Chinese preachers. He is less active in preaching now, and focuses on 
developing an Islamic economy through business, consultation, seminars, education and 
writings. As he said, 'instead of picking up knives and weapons, my jihad is bringing 
Islamic values into the market place' (Interview, Syafii Antonio, 11 January 2009). 
As of 2010, he was the chairman of the Takzia College of Islamic Economy (STE!, 
Sekolah Tinggi Ekonomi Islam Takzia), the founder of the Andalusia Islamic Centre, as 
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well as the author of several books on Islamic economics. He believes that an Islamic 
economy is the solution to the three problems faced by Indonesian Muslims - poverty, 
backwardness and low moral. He suggested that Muslims should not only confine their 
faith to religious rituals and practices, but also engage in banking, business, insurance 
and other economic matters. Therefore, with the slogan of 'shape the future with Islamic 
economics', his college offers courses that combine modern language and business skills 
with Islamic law. 
Through his latest books, Muhammad SAW: The Super Leader, Super Manager (Antonio 
2007) and Sukses Besar dengan lntervensi Allah: The Power of Doa withAsmaul Husna 
for success in Business in Life (Antonio 2008), he promotes the idea that Islamic 
spirituality can inspire economic enhancement and business development, as proved in 
the earlier Islamic texts. According to Syafii Antonio, the Prophet Muhammad was not 
only a religious leader, but also a successful businessman. He argued that even before 
Max Weber wrote 'The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism', Prophet 
Muhammad has discussed the relationship between business activities and religious 
values. Many Muslims have overlooked the economic dimension of the Prophet 
Muhammad's teaching, driving Antonio to write books about Islam and business, For 
Antonio, economic achievement is also a form of dakwah, giving a good image of Islam, 
Referring to his own experience: 
'My parents, like many other Chinese Indonesians held negative perceptions of 
Islam. For them, Islam is associated with backwardness and poverty, That is why 
when I converted to Islam, they rejected me and I had to leave home, However, 
after I finished my doctoral degree and launched a successful career, my family 
members accepted my decision. Now, even my brother is consulting me about 
business skills, Although they have not converted, they have a belier perception of 
Islam.' (Interview, Syafii Antonio, 11 January 2009). 
Syafii Antonio's strong religious education, high academic achievement and remarkable 
business success make him well respected among Chinese Muslims and non-Chinese 
Muslims, He has been approached by several Islamic parties (including PKS, Prosperous 
Justice Party) to contest in the national elections. However, he refuses to affiliate himself 
with any party or religious organisation, saying, 'I don't want to put myself in a box, and 
Islam should not be divided into boxes' (Interview, Syafii Antonio, 11 January 2009). 
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His openness to all religious groups in Indonesia not only reflects his sophisticated 
religious background, but also is an attempt to maximise his efforts in promoting an 
lslami.c economy. For him, an Islamic economy is not exclusively for Muslims, because 
non-Muslims can also invest in an Islamic market or consume Islamic products. 
However, this inclusiveness does not mean he is completely open. As he said, 
'I agree with the MUI fatwa that Muslims should not wish 'Merry Christmas' to 
Christians. This docs not mean I am exclusive or anti-Christian. I have a lot of 
non-Muslim friends. 1 just want to protect my faith. If I say 'Merry Christmas', it 
means 1 accept the birth of Jesus as the son of God or the trinity concept in 
Christianity. This is contradicting with my belied in tauhid (the oneness of God).' 
(Interview, Syafii Antonio, 11 January 2009), 
Married to a woman from Padang, Syafii Antonio does not speak any Chinese or practise 
Chinese culture in his daily life. Focusing on the rationality of Islamic teaching, he 
hardly uses any cultural symbols in his preaching. Instead of a Chinese architectural 
design, he adopted a Moorish style for the mosque in his Andalusia Islamic Centre. 
Some of his friends in Malaysia did not know that he was Chinese, until he put his 
Chinese name in his latest book. He explains, 'Ali Karim (the Chairman of Karim Oei 
Foundation) told me that I should put my Chinese name on my books, not only to show 
that being Muslim and Chinese are not incompatible, but also to acknowledge that my 
Chinese identity has helped me in my religious career' (Interview, Syafii Antonio, 11 
January 2009). 
Like other Chinese preachers, he admits that being a convert is one of the factors 
contributing to his popularity in the early stage. He said that being Chinese is a 'surplus 
marketing point' catching the attention of ordinary Muslims. However, he suggested that 
Chinese Muslim preachers should go beyond that and have more substance, because 
people will get bored listening to the same conversion's stories. According to him, 
Islamic preaching should not only be a 'spiritual meal' for Muslim audiences, but also 
improve socio-economic conditions for Indonesian Muslims. 
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Anton 1l1.edan: From Gangster to Preacher 
Anton Medan, or Tan Kok Liong, born 1957, is a controversial character, not because he 
is Chinese, but because in an earlier life he was a preman, or gangster. Now a popular 
dakwah figure, his involvement in murder, robbery, drugs and illegal gambling led him 
to spend 18 years in prison. He has also been accused of helping create chaos in Jakarta 
in 1998, a charge he strongly denies. After converting to Islam in 1992 and adopting an 
Islamic name, Muhammad Ramadan Effendi, he started his preaching career among 
prisoners and prostitutes, before becoming popular with a wider public and on television. 
His personal transformation from immoral hoodlum to pious preacher is his preaching 
hallmark. 
Since 1996, he has workshops training former prisoners and gangsters to become skilled 
workers with religious knowledge. In 2005, he has also established an Islamic boarding 
school, Pondok Pesantren Terpadu At-Taibin in Bogor that promotes entrepreneurship 
alongside religious education and where Chinese language and business skills are 
compulsory subjects. Occupational training is included in his boarding school, in which 
male students learn woodworking and female students learn tailoring. Some of their 
products are sold and the revenue used to support the operational costs of the school. 
In the same compound of the boarding school, there is a Chinese-style mosque, Masjid 
Tan Kok Liong, which resembles the architectural design of a traditional Chinese palace. 
Anton Medan says this building is part of an effort to preach Islam to Chinese 
Indonesians, and to promote pembauran (blending) between Chinese and non-Chinese 
Indonesians. He does not see a contradiction between being a Muslim and Chinese, and 
claims that he has the strength of both, or as he puts it, 'Akal Cina, Hati Muslim'; 
'Chinese mind', by which he means a business orientation, and 'Muslim heart', denoting 
an emphasis on spirituality and morality. He explains, 'A good Muslim is a Muslim who 
not only can open the holy text, but is also able to conduct business (bukan hanya bisa 
membuka kitab tetapi juga bisa membuka eek)'. 
Contrasting himself from other Chinese preachers, such as Koko Liem, he said, 'l do not 
preach for money. l do not rely on preaching to make ends meet and I am free to say 
anything in my mind.' Indeed, preaching is not the main source of Anton's income, as he 
also runs various business ventures from garment manufacturing, election,materials 
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support, hardware to indoor soccer. For Anton, economic achievement is very important 
for his dakwah. First, with sufficient funds, he can build religious schools and give free 
preaching to marginalised groups, such as prisoners and prostitutes. Second, he can 
prove to non-Muslims that 'the backwardness of Indonesian Muslims is not because of 
Islam' (Interview, Anton Medan, 7 November 2008). 
Despite religious differences, Anton Medan, who speaks fluent Hokkien and a little 
Mandarin, maintains good relationships with many non-Muslim Chinese. He sees 
himself as a bridge between ethnic Chinese and Muslim Indonesians. He occasionally is 
involved in inter-faith activities and helps some non-Muslim Chinese solve their conflict 
with Islamic leaders. Indeed, during my visit to his boarding school, a couple of Chinese 
women from Medan were asking for his help in dealing with some Muslim leaders who 
opposed the building of a Chinese temple in Medan, Sumatra (Field note, 9 January 
2009). Anton Medan also told me that he supports the idea of having a casino in 
Indonesia, with strict conditions that it is only for non-Muslims, for two reasons - to 
reduce illegal gambling, and to boost Indonesian economic growth (instead of going to 
Malaysia or Singapore to gamble). 
However, such viewpoints do not mean he is a Muslim with liberal and critical mindsets. 
Instead, the media has sometimes highlighted Anton Medan's conservative side. For 
example, his visits to the families of convicted Bali bombers Amrozi and Imam amudra 
before the two men were executed for terrorism, were widely reported in the national 
press. I hod the opportunity of following him to Amrozi's family in Lamongan, East Java 
(see Appendix 6). Despite the short stay, he was warmly welcomed by Amrozi's family 
members and friends. He told me that he met Amrozi and Samudra when he preached in 
jails. He said, 'Many Muslim leaders are afraid of visiting their families. But as Muslims, 
what is wrong with sending condolences? This does not mean I support their terror 
attacks' (Interview, Anton Medan, 7 November 2008). 
He also claims to be an advisor to the Islamic Defenders' Front (FPI, Front Pembela 
Islam) and regrets that the FPl Chief, Rizieq Shihab has been sentenced for two years, 
after his involvement in the MONAS incident, involving a clash between the hardline 
Muslim group and an alliance of organisations that support the freedom of faith.9 In 2008, 
') 1vION1-\S incident was an FPI attack on ff1embers of the National ,.:\J!iance f.Jr Freeaorn of Religion and Faith 
(AKKBB, Aliansj Kebangsaan Untuk Kebebasr.n Beragama clan Be-rkeyaklnan) who raHied in the National 
Monurnent_, J\10N:\S in June 2008. i\KKBS is a progressive social and religious coalition that promotes religious 
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at an Islamic study session in Cirebon to celebrate the Islamic New Year, he openly 
criticised the well-known liberal-minded NU leader, KH Maman lmanulhaq, a speaker at 
the same event. Claiming to be a friend of another leader of FPI, Munarman, he blamed 
Maman Imanulhaq for supporting AKKBB (Alliance for Freedom of Religion and Faith) 
and urged the latter to repent ('tobat'). He even suggested the audience disperse and not 
listen to Maman Imanulhaq (Wahid Institute 2009:1). While in the 2009 elections, 
endorsing the struggle for an Islamic state, he associated himself with the Crescent Star 
Party (PBB, Partai Bulan Bintang), a conservative Islamic party. 
[t can be argued that as a reformed criminal with little religious education background, 
his affiliation with conservative Islamic organisations is a way of legitimising his Islamic 
identity among the broader Muslim community. By proclaiming conservative Islamic 
viewpoints and criticizing progressive Muslims, Anton Medan is trying to prove his 
sincerity as a pious Muslim and demonstrate his credentials as a preacher. However, as I 
have discussed before, Anton Medan also has his inclusive and tolerant side he 
involves in inter-faith activities and supports the establishment of a casino in Indonesian 
to reduce illegal gambling. Such complex and situational religiosity is not an exceptional 
case, but shared by many Muslims, especially Chinese converts. As 1 will argue in 
chapter 7, the inconsistent religiosity of converts does not imply hypocrisy, but reflects 
their flexible piety, in which a convert can manifest different aspects of their religiosities 
when dealing with different situations and interacting with different audiences. 
Lampio11: The Sound of Chinese Muslims 
The preaching of Chinese Muslims goes beyond public presentations and television 
shows to the use of singing. Lampion, literally means Chinese lantern, is the first and 
only Chinese Muslim nasyid (Islamic music) group in Indonesia. 10 Like other nasyid 
groups in Southeast Asia, Lampion adapts global trends in popular music and uses new 
technology, media, and marketing strategies; while engaging with Islamic identities, 
through musical texts, musical elements, video imagery, and costumes (Tan 2007). 
freedom and sympathises with Ahmadiyah. Meanwhile, FPI urged the lndonesian government to crack down 
Ahrnadiyah activities, considered ~deviant', according to FPL 
w The term na:.yid originates from the ;-\rabic word nashada meaning 'to recite, to sing'. 1'oday, nasyid refers to a 
lype of lslamic devotional song with texts praising the glory of 1-\Uah, preaching the teachings of the Prophet, and 
incorporating other religious theraes, such as ur.iversai Jove, morality or bHHherhood in islam. For more 
d1scussion of nasyid in Indonesia and i\1alaysia, see Barendregt (2008), Kahn (2003) and 'fan (2007). 
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Mimicking the successful Malaysian nasyid group, Raihan, some of Lampion's songs 
also feature Malay frame drums such as rebana, which are traditionally used to 
accompany some Islamic genres of music. What makes Lampion different is its use of 
Chinese cultural elements in its name, appearance and lyrics. If pop nasyid is for 
younger Muslims to reconcile their religious beliefs with modernity and pop music (Tan 
2007), Lampion use it to show that Islamic religiosity and Chinese ethnicity are not 
mutually exclusive. 
Lampion was established in 1997 by a group of young males in Lautze Mosque and 
consists of eleven members. The majority of them were Chinese Muslims. Lam pion set 
up independently from Lautze Mosque in 2000 and launched their first album, Baiknya 
Tuhan (The Goodness of God) in 2005. Members of Lampion have changed over time, 
except three siblings who form the backbone of the group. There are Adrian Agatha, 
Andrew lrfan and Kelvin lkhwan, who were born into a Chinese convert's family. Their 
father, Syarif Tanudjaja is a prominent leader of MUSTIKA and PITI in Jakarta. The 
eldest brother, Adrian Agatha, passed away in 2007 through illness. However, his 
younger brothers kept Lampi on alive and in 2010, there were 5 members in the group. 
According to Kelvin lkhwan, born 1979, the key figure in the group, Lampion seeks to 
provide a new variant into Indonesian Islamic ans and culture, through its Chineseness. 
As Kelvin puts in, 'We chose Lampion or Chinese lantern as our group's name to 
manifest our Chinese identity. Furthermore, we hope our songs can play the role of a 
lantern, guiding the path to Allah. Through nasyid, we hope we can bring our audiences 
closer to the God' (Interview, Kelvin lkhwan, 9 June 2008). Kelvin added, this did not 
mean Lampion was exclusive because it has non-Chinese members and many of its 
audiences are non-Chinese Muslim Indonesians. 
Besides its name, Lampion also expresses its Chinese identity through other means. On 
the cover ofLampion's first album Baiknya Tuhan (2005 edition), against a background 
of an old pagoda-like mosque in Mainland China, its members (including the non-
Chinese) are wearing traditional Chinese dress with Chinese skullcap (see Appendix 6 
for the cover of its 2010 edition). One of Lampion's video clips also portrays the image 
of Cheng Hoo Mosque in Surabaya. Although none of its members speak Mandarin, 
there are two Mandarin songs in the album - Islam Te Chin Can (Islam is growing) and 
Yong Ai (Great Love), the other songs are sung in Indonesian. Kelvin told me that the 
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idea of singing Mandarin songs was inspired by Raihan. '' He said, 'We asked our 
Chinese friend to translate the lyrics from Indonesia to Mandarin. We sing the songs 
based on pinyin (Romanised Chinese pronunciation). ' 12 Indeed, like Koko Liem and Tan 
Mei Hwa, the Chineseness of Lam pion is largely symbolic··· it manifests not in everyday 
practices but in the Chinese expression it presents to the public. 
Compared to its symbolic Chineseness, for the members of Lampion, Islamic practices 
are part of their daily life and Islamic piety is an ultimate aim. Recently rebranded 
'Chinese Muslim edutainment', Lampion emphasises its difference from other popular 
singers and musical groups in contemporary Indonesia, who have recorded Islamic-
themed albums, such as UNGU and Opick. As Kelvin put it, 
'We position ourselves as preachers, not celebrities. Some people use !slam to seek 
popularity and material gain. But, we use music to spread Islamic messages. 
Through music, we bring our audiences and ourselves closer to Allah and the 
Prophet Muhammad. We also want to show that !slam is Chinese-friendly. We 
cooperate with Chinese Muslim organisations, such as PlTI to preach Islam among 
Chinese Indonesians' (Interview, Kelvin Jkhwan, 9 June 2008). 
Besides being involved in Lampion, Kelvin is also a freelance designer and illustrator for 
a few Islamic children's magazines. Meanwhile his brother, Andrew, runs a restaurant 
that serves halal Chinese food. Both of them are activists in Al-Arqam and most of the 
Lampion's musical texts arc derived from the writings or speeches of the founder of Al· 
Arqam, Ashaari Muhammad.13 In other words, for Lampion, Islamic preaching is the 
priority, while Chineseness is the public image and music is the medium of dakwah. 
These subtle forms of dakwah are called 'cultural approaches' (pendekatan budaya) by 
Lam pion and some other Chinese Muslim leaders. 
11 Raihan is a popular Ma!aywi\.1uslim na!>yid grqup in Malaysia. Raihan's 2003 album, Gema Alam (Echces for 
the World) included a l\.1andarin song, Ching Ai Citing Ai {Love for Gcd), 1\ccording to Raihan, it has supporters 
among Muslims. in China and Chinest converts in Malaysia (Hew 2005). 
12 The Chinese pronunciation of Larnpion is not clear and as a Mandarin speaker, J have difficulty understar.dlng 
whal they were singi;1g in !\.1a;idarin. I find myself more comfortable listening to their lndonesian songs. 
13 AJM1\rqan1 ls an Islamic religious movement, originating In !\.1alaysia. 'fhe movement was banned by the 
Malaysian federal government on 1994 and its leader t\shaari :V1ubamrnad was arrested under ihe Internal 
Security .t\ct (ISA). Al.~Arqam has been renamed Rufaqa and then Global lkhwan. It has a school and activity 
complex in Sentul, in the outskirts of Jakarta. l!s founder As!Jaari Muhan1mad passed away in ~1ay 2010. 
;\ccording to Nagara (2004), Al-Arqarn was inspired by a rare n1ix of global Sufi and strict sharia traditions, 
many of 1,.vhose members were organized into residential com11n1nes and institutions promoting economic 
!nGependence, mutual support, social servlce and extensive mission. 
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Despite rejecting fame as celebrities, Lampion is one of the popular nasyid groups in 
contemporary Indonesia. Lampion performs, not only in Jakarta, but also in other cities 
in Indonesia. Lampion is frequently invited to sing at events such as wedding ceremonies, 
Islamic celebrations, musical concerts, television programs and public seminars. In their 
performances, they are wearing either Chinese traditional clothing with Chinese skullcap 
or koko shirt with peci. Paradoxically, although Lampion aims to spread Islamic message 
to Chinese Indonesian, most of its audience are non-Chinese Muslims. >text, I will locate 
the popularity of Chinese preachers in the broader discussion of ethnic interaction and 
religious pluralism in Indonesia today. 
"From Taboo to Commodity: Celebrating Inclusive Chineseness? 
During the long years of Suharto's New Order regime, Chinese culture was taboo. The 
government even banned the Mandarin translation of the Qur'an. However, in 
contemporary democratising Indonesia, Chinese culture has become a marketable 
commodity, as the country faces both globalisation and the demands for internal cultural 
diversity (Budianta 2007). Chinese lion and dragon dances have become fashionable 
entertainment, oriental appearance is desirable in Indonesian serial dramas, and 
Mandarin courses have sprung up anticipating China as the emerging economic force in 
the region. Interestingly, Chineseness is not only consumed by ethnic Chinese 
themselves, but also by non-Chinese Indonesians. For example, about eighty percent of 
the members of lion dance groups in Surabaya are either Javanese or Madurese (Field 
nore, 12 September 2008), and Taiwanese popular culture (such as F4's Meteor Garden) 
is popular among non-Chinese youth (Ida 2008). 
The popularity of Chinese preachers among non-Chinese Muslims is a further illustration 
of this appeal. Today, Chinese Muslim preachers are desirable and recognised by many 
non-Chinese Muslims. In fact, most of the congregation of Chinese Muslim preachers 
are non-Chinese Muslims, given the small number of Chinese Muslims in Indonesia. Not 
only receiving religious messages and spiritual advice, many non-Chinese Muslims are 
in certain ways, also 'consuming' preachers' Chinese appearance and cultural symbols, 
their experiences of conversion, and their creative preaching styles. During the New 
Order period, to some Chinese Indonesians, Chineseness represents a 'curse' rather than 
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a 'blessing' (Thung, 2000:183). Today, for some Chinese preachers, their Chineseness is 
a 'blessing', not a 'burden of identity' or a 'curse'. 
The new celebrity status of Chinese preachers may help to improve the image of Chinese 
Indonesians among the broader Indonesian population, and shows that Chinese and 
Muslim Indonesians need not be mutually exclusive. When hundreds of .Javanese 
Muslims listen to the sermon of a Chinese preacher, they are crossing ethnic boundaries 
in some sense. At the same time, Chinese identity is also given a more complex 
representation - Chinese Indonesians are not just 'economic animals', but can also be 
religious teachers. Some of the preachers also use Islamic texts to promote cultural 
diversity and inter-ethnic tolerance. 
Chinese Indonesians are often accused of being 'exclusive' and of refusing to mix. These 
feelings have traditionally been strongest in devout Muslim circles, and in Muslim 
organisations - right back to the early years of the twentieth century when Indonesia's 
first truly mass organisation, Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union), was set up to campaign 
against the influence of Chinese businesses (Arya 1994; Mackie 2008:191). Now, as I 
will discuss in the next chapter, not only moderate Muslim organisations (such as NU 
and Muhammadiyah), but also conservative groups (like the Islamic Defenders' Front, 
FPI, and the Prosperous Justice Party, PKS) are enthusiastic about recruiting Chinese 
Muslims, both as members and leaders. They do so to prove that they practise 
'multiculturalism', and also to hold up Chinese converts as models of devout behaviour 
to non-practising Muslims. 
However, as Hoon (2009) observed, the increase in consumption of Chinese culture by 
non-Chinese should not be naively read as a full acceptance of ethnic Chinese, just as 
one can enjoy food at McDonald's yet still disapprove of the United States. It would be 
also too simplistic to suggest that the popularity of Chinese preachers among non-
Chinese Muslims can lead to the erosion of ethnic boundaries and suspicions. On the 
contrary, some Chinese Muslim preachers strategically use stereotypes and symbols of 
Chinese culture (for example, Koko Liem's traditional Chinese attire and Anton 
Medan's Chinese-style mosque) to attract audiences and promote the universality of 
Islam. To a certain extent, this stereotypical representation of Chinese Indonesians might 
imply that Chinese. culture is always attached to the ethnic Chinese, no matter how far 
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they go to adapt to the Muslim mainstream, and that the distinction between 'Chinese' 
and 'indigenous' Indonesians is something that cannot be totally erased. 
As indicated by Heryanto (2004. 2008), the symbolic celebration of Chineseness has a 
strong tendency to 'essentialise' Chineseness as a set of fixed characteristics and 
traditions; therefore does not reflect the complex realities of life for many Chinese 
Indonesians. Indeed, many Chinese preachers l have described have little or no Chinese 
language ability and do not practise Chinese culture in daily life. Yet, they use visible 
markers of Chinese identity to catch media attention. This takes the form of wearing 
certain types of dress, using Chinese names, emphasising the role of Cheng Ho and so on. 
These acts then become the markers by which Chineseness is identified among non-
Chinese audiences. In doing so, I would argue that a Chinese stereotype, alheit not a 
negative one, is re-consolidated. 
Yet, cultural essentialism does not always necessarily imply social exclusivity (Kahn 
2006:166). Indeed, together with the establishment of Chinese-style mosques, such as 
the Surabaya Cheng Hoo Mosque, the popularity of Chinese preachers is another 
example suggests that the celebration of Chinese culrural expression does not equal to 
the promotion of social exclusivity. As I have discussed in preceding chapter, although 
the mosque was built in a Chinese style and managed by Chinese Muslims, it is an 
inclusive socio-religious space where both Muslims and non-Muslims from different 
ethnic groups get together. We may call it 'inclusive Chineseness', in which the 
expression of Chinese culture is no longer a sign of ethnic exclusivity, instead it can be a 
common heritage shared by all Indonesians, as well as a part of the 'pop Islam' industry. 
Besides, not all Chinese Muslim preachers utilise Chinese cultural symbols for their 
preaching. For Irena Handoko and Syafii Antonio, who respectively focus on lslam-
Chrislianity religious comparison and Islamic economy, their Chinese identities do not 
constitute a crucial element in their religious careers. In addition, the popularity of 
Chinese Muslim preachers is not by any means, a new phenomenon in Indonesia. Some 
have even traced the existence of Chinese preachers back to the early period of Java's 
Islamisation and claims that parts of the Walisongo have Chinese descent. During the 
New Order regime, although not using Chinese cultural symbols in preaching, a few 
Chinese Muslim preachers stitl became popular (Syukur 1996), because of their srntus as 
new converts. To that we now turn. 
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From Mualaf to Mubaligh: Pluralising the Islamic Market? 
Among the preaching themes in the fasting month, topics such as 'Why I chose Islam' 
(Kenapa Aku lvfemilih Islam) are always popular. Indeed, stories of conversion and 
religious experience are important element<; of many Chinese Muslims' preaching 
contents. Always dominated by indigenous and Arabic-descent Muslims, the dakwah 
activities of Chinese diversify the Indonesian Islamic market, not only the preachers 
themselves, but also the audiences - the attempt to reach out the non-Muslim Chinese 
(although is not very significant). Dakwah, for Chinese preachers, has two aims. First, it 
means to make a Muslim, especially the nominal one, a better Muslim. Second, it tries to 
spread Islamic messages to non-Muslims with the hope they will convert to Islam. 
For many Chinese Muslim preachers, propagating Islam to non-Muslim Chinese is not 
an easy task. Instead of converting Chinese to Islam, most of them focus on 'preaching 
through example' to eliminate negative perceptions of ethnic Chinese towards Islam. 
The acknowledgement of Chinese identity and the using of Chinese cultural symbols 
among well-regarded Chinese-descent Muslims show that Islamic teaching is not 
contradictory with Chinese culture. Meanwhile, their achievement in religious business 
proves that Islam is not identical with backwardness or economic disadvantage. As some 
Chinese preachers put it, 'blame the followers, not Islam'. Their messages to non-
Muslim Chinese are clear and simple -'Islam is a universal Islam, rather than a religion 
for the native Indonesians. Islam is a modern and tolerant religion, instead of a backward 
and radical religion.' 
As well as preaching the universality of Islam, Chinese preachers offer an attractive, 
alternative image of Islam in Indonesia. Muslims use not only Arabic names and 
Indonesian names, but also Chinese names. Muslim preachers wear not only peci with 
baju koko, or long robe with turban, but also Chinese clothing with Chinese skullcap. To 
a certain extent, this hybrid form of Islamic expression is an antidote to rising puritanism 
that is hostile to local cultural traditions. It also shows that rising Islamic religiosity does 
not necessarily undermine cultural and ethnic diversity in Indonesia. 
Islamic thought and organisations in broader Indonesian Muslim society influence most 
Chinese preachers. Conversion experience, religious education, social participation and 
local settings vary the impact of such Islamic influence. However, most preachers play 
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down their <rffiliation to any particular Islamic group in their preaching, so that they can 
reach out to wider Muslim crowds, regardless their religious affiliations and orientations. 
For example, Anton Medan argues that he tries to combine the characteristics of 
different religious groups in order to be a better Muslim. He put it this way, 'I will get 
lessons on interpersonal relationships from NU, structural organisation skills from 
Muhammadiyah and the purer understanding of Islam from Persis (Persatuan Islam, 
Islamic Association)' (Interview, Anton Medan, 7 November 2008). 
Yet, the using of cultural symbols and the attempt to approach broader audiences do not 
lead Chinese preachers to contribute greater diversity to Islamic discourses. As shown in 
the previous case studies, the preaching of Chinese Muslims takes varying forms, and 
has different audiences and messages. However, these plural forms of preaching 
strategies do not necessarily contribute to a more critical understanding of Islam. Instead 
of challenging some \videly conservative viewpoints, many preachers choose to conform 
to them to avoid controversy. In other words, Chinese Muslim preachers may diversify 
the appearance of preaching - simply because they look Chinese - but they do not 
necessarily add greater pluralism to the substance of religious belief and practice. 
Indeed, many Chinese Muslim preachers are rather conservative on religious and social 
matters, especially when preaching in public. 14 Irena Handono is the extreme case: her 
constant criticism of Christianity in her preaching not only alarms non-Muslims, but also 
alienates her from moderate Muslim audiences. Meanwhile, Anton Medan has shown his 
support for the implementation of sharia in lndonesia. Other Chinese Muslim preachers 
avoid controversial issues, and focus on how best to apply Islamic values in daily life. 
They are moderate and tolerant in their preaching, yet sometimes restrict themselves to 
certain orthodox interpretations of Islamic teaching. Like other celebrity preachers in 
contemporary Indonesia, many Chinese preachers tend to embrace 'a socially 
conservative Islam, albeit with a light touch' and do not 'provide the tools for critical 
thinking and nuanced religious interpretation' (Howell 2008:59). For example, Syafii 
Antonio, Tan Mei Hwa and Koko Liem respectively once told their audiences that 
'Muslims should avoid wishing 'Merry Christmas' to their Christian friends'; that 
--------··-·--
14 l Co aware the convenient dichotomy between conservative and progres$Jve ivlus!!n1 is highly problematic and 
inadequrite to captute the complexity of Muslim religiosity in contempcrary st•cieties. I use such terms here not to 
judge the religiosity of the preachers, but to describe their altitud;;s on certain social and religious issues. ft 1s also 
important to r:ote that while I mention a preacher hold certain 'ccnservative' viewpnin!, it does not mean I see 
him or her as a 'conservative' preacher, indeed, a preacher con have "conservative' view on one issue, but hold 
'progressive' stand on ano!her matter. 
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'women are not suited to become leaders'; and that 'Muslims cannot celebrate 
Valentine's Day'. For converts, subscribing to a rather conservative understanding of 
Islam is not surprising, as this is a way of proving the sincerity of one's conversion, and 
demonstrating one's credentials as a preacher. 
The Paradox of Hybrid Performance 
The diverse styles and content of preaching among Chinese Muslim preachers make 
comprehensive analysis almost impossible. With no intention of simplifying such 
complex realities, I end this chapter with a few general points regarding the identity 
consumption and performance of Chinese preachers in Indonesia today. First, there is a 
little correlation between their 'commodified' identity performances in public and their 
everyday practised identities, in which some preachers 'sell Chineseness, but do not live 
Chineseness'. As 1 have illustrated, the three preachers discussed in this chapter, Tan 
Mei Hwa, Koko Liem and Anton Medan, are consciously using both their Chinese 
ethnicity and Islamic religiosity to attract audiences and media attention. The 
combination of Chinese and Islamic elements as preaching and marketing strategies can 
be seen as a form of 'hybrid performance'. Such intentional mixing does not necessarily 
reflect the everyday living identities of Chinese preachers. In other words, instead of 
perfom1ing who they are, they perform to create a public persona. 
In order to establish their preaching credentials, some Chinese preachers studied in this 
chapter had to present themselves as 'more Muslim than other Muslim Indonesians', and 
'more Chinese than non-Muslim Chinese Indonesians'. For example, Koko Liem who 
does not observe Chinese culture in his daily life wears Chinese traditional attire to 
signal his Chineseness. Similarly, Tan Mei Hwa who does not usually wear Islamic attire 
put on an Islamic headscarf after she started preaching. In other words, Chinese clothing 
authenticates Koko Liem's Chinese identity and Islamic dress gives Tan Mei Hwa 
religious credibility. Indeed, they are learning to appear as 'authentic Chinese' and 
'pious Muslim'. This search for authenticity often leads to the essentialisation of Chinese 
cultural identity and the subscription lo an uncritical understanding of Islam. 
Furthermore, such hybrid performances do not reflect the flexible and fluid identities of 
many ordinary Chinese Muslims. 
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Creatively, the hybrid performance of Chinese Muslim preachers brings the perceived 
incompatible elements (Islam and Chincseness) together and makes Islamic expression 
more colourful. But, at the same time, it is rather encompassed by ethnic stereotype and 
religious conservatism, To a certain extent, the popularity of Chinese preachers reflects a 
paradox of commodification of Chineseness and Islam in contemporary Indonesia. 
Diversity of styles is not always accompanied by a plurality of discourses. Thus, while 
the appearance of a Chinese preacher in Chinese traditional costume in a religious 
program on television may help to promote a positive image of ethnic Chinese among 
non-Chinese audiences and diversify the face of Islamic preaching, it does not necessary 
break down ethnic stereotypes and pluralise the substance of religion, 
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Chapter 5 
Strategic Solidarity, Internal Dynamics and Diverse Participation: 
The Social and Political Involvement of Chinese lWuslims 
In general, Chinese Muslims in Indonesia are linked to PIT! or the Indonesian Chinese 
Muslim Association (Persatuan Islam Tionghoa Indonesia). For many Indonesians, both 
Chinese and Muslims, PITI is synonymous with Chinese Muslims, and Chinese Muslims 
equal PITI. Although only a few Chinese Muslims are members of PIT!, many 
Indonesians assume PITI represents the majority of Chinese Muslims in Indonesia. 
Many studies on Chinese Muslims in Indonesia have focused on PIT! and its leaders 
(Dickson 2008; Muzakki 2009a; Perdana 2008; Rubadi 1999); often the voices of 
Chinese Muslims outside PITI have been overlooked. Yet, like many other ethnic and 
religious groups, 'Chinese Muslim' is not a homogenous, bounded entity. Therefore, in 
order to provide a more balanced view, the study of Chinese Muslim identities should go 
beyond PITI and give more attention to the strategic solidarity, internal dynamics and 
diverse social participation of Chiuese Muslims. 
This chapter examines Chinese Muslims' diverse social and political involvement, 
including in PIT!, but importantly going beyond that association to others in 
contemporary Indonesia. It begins with a brief discussion of democratisation and the 
political opportunities for various identity groups to emerge in post-New Order 
Indonesia. The resurgence of both Islamic and Chinese identities has given the 
opportunity for some Chinese Muslims to organise and mobilise their hybrid identities. I 
then discuss the histories, objectives, activities and membership of four Chinese Muslim 
associations to explore their identity formation and contestation. These four 
organisations are: the Indonesian Chinese Muslim Association (PIT!); the Karim Oei 
Foundation (Yayasan Karim Oei); the Chinese Muslim and Families (MUSTIKA, 
Muslim Tionghoa dan Keluarga) and the Cheng Hoo Foundation (YMHCHI, Y ayasan 
Haji Muhammad Cheng Hoo Indonesia). 
Despite their focus on Chinese Muslims, none of lhese organisations is exclusive in 
terms of their membership and activities. While the leaders of these organisations share 
the aim of manifesting a unique image of Chinese Muslim identity, they do so for 
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different reasons and in different ways. Some of them focus on preaching (dakwah-
oriented); 1 some emphasise empowering ethnic Chinese through social intermingling 
(pembauran-oriented); 2 others pursue their personal political or economic interests. In 
spite of these diverse motivations, I will argue that the dominant discourse among 
Chinese Muslim leaders today is 'spreading Islam by using cultural approaches' (dakwah 
pendekatan budaya). This is a significant change from 'assimilation of ethnic Chinese 
through Islam' (asimilasi fewat Islam) that prevailed during the New Order period. 
Leaders of these Chinese Muslim associations pronounce on behalf of all Chinese 
Muslims in the public; however, they do not represent the diverse backgrounds and 
experiences of their larger communities. Indeed, not all Chinese Muslims identify 
themselves v.~th these specific organisations. Therefore, in the third part of this chapter, I 
discuss their activism beyond Chinese-Muslim realms. By illustrating various case 
studies, I also explore the dialectical interaction between identity formation and social 
participation among Chinese Muslims. On one hand, the identity of an individual 
Chinese Muslim influences his or her religious and social participation; on the other 
hand, social involvement can change the identification of a Chinese Muslim. Lastly, l 
examine the engagements of some Chinese Muslims in electoral politics in post-1998 
Indonesia, which are mainly influenced by their religious affiliations and understanding, 
as well as the dynamics of local Muslim politics. 
Identity, Politics and Groups 
Identity politics generates debates in academic circles, between its defenders and its 
critics (Calhoun 1994; Eriksen 2002; Fraser 2000; MacDonald 2004). The former see the 
political mobilisations of ethnic, cultural, and religious identiiies as a form of 
empowerment for the weak and powerless, while the latter view it as a form of 
exclusivity and possible suppression of internal differences. Instead of seeing identity 
politics as good or bad political action, scholars have recently explored how and in what 
11Jak'1>ah, is an Arabic terrr;, literally meaning 'call' or 'invitation', It has broader meaning than proselytizing. 
Dakwah can aim at both Mu;;lirns and non~Muslin1s. v.·hich can involve consolidating the faith of :\1usli:ns. as 
we!! as, inviting non-Muslims to Islani. For many Chinese Muslirn orgaoisa\ions, their dukwah is preaching 
ls!;1n1ic messages to non-Muslim Chinese Indonesians and slrengthenir.g the Isb:i1ic commitn:ent of convens. 
~ Pen1bauran is an Indonesian term. In general,. it n1ear_s intermingling Jr blending, In the context uf Chinese 
Indonesians, it means their mixing with other local ethnic groups. During the Nev" Order, pe1nbauran in1plled 
assimilation of the ethriic C~inese into local communities. ln post-Ne\¥ Order Indonesia, pe1nba11ran is still used 
by son1e Chinese iv1uslims, but in different way, a~ one of my informants says, one can rnembnnr or blend well 
\.V!lh J0caJ commLnilj' \Vi\hOt.:t losing :liS Of her (:hinese CU!turn! identity. 
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conditions, identity politics can co-exist with democratic participation and social 
inclusivity (Gutmann 2003). According to Castells (1997), there are three different forms 
of identity building: legitimising identity, resistance identity and project identity; and no 
identity is, per se, progressive or regressive, outside its historical and political contexts. 
Therefore, I would suggest that the critics of identity politics should take greater account 
into the historical context and local conditions in which identity claims take place; while 
the proponents of identity movements should acknowledge the importance of providing 
space for appreciating the multiple and flexible meanings of such identities. 
As Bhabha (1994, 1996b) points out, identity affiliation is ambivalent; solidarity is 
strategic; and commonality is often negotiated through the 'contingency' of social 
interests and political claims. Indeed, identity groupings are a product of contingency, 
rather than a long-term destiny. Furthermore, it is not only identity awareness that 
creates identity-based movements, but the movement itself also creates identity 
consciousness. By reifying groups and treating them as substantial entities, ethno-
political entrepreneurs can, as Bourdieu notes, 'contribute to producing what they 
apparently describe or designate' (Bourdieu 1991 :220). Many of these grouping projects 
also promote identity solidarity that 'disguises their composite multiplicity under a 
semblance of unity ... [in order to] transcend internal cultural, political and gendered 
differences' (Werbner 1997b:238). 
Meanwhile, Brubaker (2004, 2009) suggested we study how ethnicity works in political 
and social life without automatically taking ethnic groups as the unit of analysis. As he 
proposed, the study of ethnicity should go beyond 'groupism' and shift towards a focus 
on 'practical categories, situated actions, cultural idioms, commonsense knowledge, 
organisational routines and resources, discursive frames, institutionalised forms, political 
projects, contingent events and variable groupness' (Brubaker 2004:27). Inspired by 
Brubaker's approach, this chapter examines how identity works in Chinese Muslims' 
political and social lives, by exploring their contingent solidarity, organisational 
dynamics and different forms of social participation. 
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Emergence of 'New' Ethno-religious Groups in Democratising Indonesia 
As I discussed in chapter 1, the broadening of democratic space after the fall of President 
Suharto allowed various ethnic, religious, gender and cultural groups to have much more 
freedom to express their identities in the public domain. These emergences of identity 
politics, on the one hand, are celebnited as a reflection of political openness in 
democratising Indonesia and an empowerment for marginalised groups, 3 but on the 
other hand, are criticised for promoting social exclusivity and generating political 
tension:' Central to my research are the phenomena of 'Chinese euphoria' and 'Islamic 
resurgence', which refer to the rising of Chinese and Islamic identities in Indonesia 
today. Both the Chinese and Muslims have used the political openness of the post-
Suharto period to express their identity through various political parties and social 
organisations. 
Ethnic Chinese have formed various organisations, to promote Chinese culture and 
liberate their Jong-suppressed identity, and fight against discrimination (Budianta 2007; 
Giblin 2003; Hoon 2008; Suryadinata 2001). The Indonesian Chinese Clan Association 
(PSMTI, Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa Indonesia) and the Chinese Indonesian 
Association (INTI, Perhimpunan Indonesia Keturunan Tionghoa) are the two biggest 
Chinese organisations established in the post-Suharto period, dominated by older 
Chinese businessmen, who aim to promote Chinese cultural identities, as well as 
solidarity between Chinese and non-Chinese Indonesians. At the same time, younger 
Chinese Indonesians have involved themselves in more politically inclined organisations 
to fight against discrimination. These organisations are mostly non-ethnic based and 
integrated into broader Indonesia reform activities, including the Indonesian Anti-
Discrimination Movement (GANDI, Gerakan Perjuangan Anti Diskriminasi Indonesia) 
and the Solidarity for Nation (SNB, Solidaritas Nusa Bangsa). The unity of ethnic 
Chinese under PSMTI and INTI is also challenged by various kinds of smaller Chinese 
organisations that represent different localities, religious affiliations and dialect. 
Concurrently, Muslims have formed Islamic parties and NGOs to promote different 
variants of Islam, from liheral to radical; and in certain regions, local political authorities 
-'Among socioi organisations, which promote the rigl11s of rr.inoritie-S are women's organisations (see Budianta 
2003-) and gay activist groups (see Oetcmo 2001). 
4 For discussions of identity politics and conflicts in post-1998 Indonesia, see Bertrand (2004), Nordholt (2008) 
and Side! (2006). 
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have implemented sharia-influenced by-laws and regulations (Bruinessen 2002; Bubalo 
& Fealy 2005; Fox 2004; Hefner 2005). After the downfall of the Suharto regime in 
1998, many Islamic parties of both lslamist and non-lslamist Islamic persuasion were 
formed, and contested the 1999 general elections. The major non-lslamist Islamic parties 
were the National Revival Party (PKB, Parlai Kebangkitan Bangsa) and the National 
Mandate Party (PAN, Partai Amanat Nasional). Meanwhile the major Islamist parties, 
committed to greater implementation of sharia, were the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS, 
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) and the United Development Party (PPP, Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan).5 With regard to social organisations, while Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and 
Muhammadiyah continue as mass organisations that respectively represent traditionalist 
and modernist Muslims, many smaller groups were established to promote different 
interpretations of Islam. Some of these Muslim groups were considered by many to be 
'radical-conservative', such as the Islamic Defenders' Front (FPI, Front Pembela Islam) 
and Laskar Jihad (Jihad Fighters), while some are considered 'liberal-progressive', such 
as the Liberal Islam Network (JIL, Jaringan Islam Liberal) and the Muhammadiyah 
Young Intellectual Network (JIMM, Jaringan lntelektual Muhammadiyah Muda). 
In addition to ethnic and religious groupings, there are also the intersecting identity 
groupings. These intersecting identities can be a combination of ethnic, religion, gender, 
sexual, class and ideological identities, such as Chinese Muslim, Dayak Islam, liberal 
Islam, leftish Islam and feminist Muslim groups. These intersected groupings always 
consist of two sets of identities that are conventionally viewed as incompatible and thus 
aim to challenge those notions. For example, feminist Muslim groups, such as RAHIMA, 
challenge the notion that Islamic piety is incompatible v.~th gender equality and promote 
women rights within an Islamic framework (Robinson 2008). In relation to Chinese 
Muslims, let me contrast two quotes to illustrate the re-emergence of their identity 
grouping in post-1998 lndonesia. 
'I am a Muslim, an Indonesian, and of Chinese descent. But a person of Chinese 
descent and a Muslim born in Indonesia is an Indonesian. The Muslim community 
of Chinese descent would ultimately become just a 'Muslim community', and not 
a separate Chinese community with a mosque! (Junus Jahja, cited in The 1986:67) 
5 lslamism is used to describe a variety of movernenls that conceive Islc.m as an ideology. H mostly refers to 
political lslan1, in which poHtical activism is informed by Islamic principles, In Indonesia, most fslamists are 
inspired by ideas of Muslim brotherhood. ln general, they aim to see a greater implementation of sharia ir. 
Indonesian society. For rnore- discussion of JsJamis1n in Indonesia, see Bubalo and Fealy (2005: 74-79), 
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'Some Chinese Muslims do not regard themselves as 'Chinese' after conversion. 
But I am different, I publicly say that I am a Chinese and I am a M.uslim. By 
asserting my Chinese identity, I have the capacity to resolve the 'Chinese 
problem', by playing a role as a bridge between indigenous Indonesians and 
Chinese Indonesians. As I share the same religion with the majority Muslim 
population, 1 can convey and fight for the interest of ethnic Chinese more 
effectively.' (Interview, Budi Setyagraha, 12 February 2009) 
Junus Jahja, is a founder of the Karim Oei Foundation and a board member of lCML 
During the New Order period, he was a proponent of the idea of 'assimilation through 
Islam'. He was convinced that the best way to resolve the so-called 'Chinese Problem', 
was by embracing the religion of the majority of the Indonesian population, and that by 
such actions, the differences between Chinese and non-Chinese Indonesians would 
diminish. In his view, Chinese Muslims should ultimately assimilate into the larger 
Indonesian Muslim population. Meanwhile, Budi Setyagraha is a Chinese Muslim 
businessman, a former chairperson of the PIT! Yogyakarta' s division and a former PA"I 
representative member in the Yogyakarta Provincial Legislative Assembly (DPRD, 
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah). In my interview with him, he echoed Junus Jahja's 
view that conversion to Islam provided a solution lo the 'Chinese Problem'. Bul he 
rejected the notion of 'total assimilation' and suggested that Chinese Muslims should 
maintain their 'Chineseness', so that they can become 'middle persons' between non-
Chinese and Chinese Indonesians. I would argue that for him, after conversion to Islam, 
a Chinese become 'more Indonesian, but no less Chinese'. 
Individual socio-economic backgrounds may shape these different viewpoints, but the 
collapse of the New Order regime and the openness of post-1998 governments towards 
the expression of Chineseness have been the major political changes switching the 
discourse from one of 'assimilation' to one of 'integration' among Chinese Muslims in 
particular, but also among Chinese Indonesians in general. 6 Some Chinese Muslim 
leaders used this political openness to revive PlTI, which had previously been stripped of 
1
' After Indonesian independence, there were two nmjor approaches among Chinese Jndonesian for dealing \Vith 
their citizenship zmd status in lr:donesia. The integrationists advocated that rhe Chinese minority should retain 
their ci;ltural traditions, .and that Indonesian .5hou!d be a a1uhicult'..lral society in which !he human rights of 
Chinese Indonesians should be prol:ecied. In contn1st, the assimilationists proposed that Chinese lndone$ian give 
up their ethnic identity and completely assimilate to the local majority. During the New Order period, 
·assimilation' became the doGlinant approach; while today, 'integration' or 'muJticultura!isr.i' ls the n1ore 
favoured discourse. For further discussion abcut assimllatlon and integration debates among Chinese Indonesians, 
see Purdey (2003). 
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its Chinese characteristic during the Suharto period. They renamed the organisation, took 
key executive positions and established new branches across Indonesia. 
This change of identity expression through grouping is not peculiar to Chinese Muslims, 
but has also been found in other minority Muslim communities in Indonesia. For 
example, before 1998, in West Kalimantan, ethnic 'Dayak' (mostly animist or Christian) 
who converted to Islam always self identified themselves and also considered by others, 
as ethnic 'Malay'. However, after the downfall of Suharto, the implementation of 
regional autonomy has empowered Dayak political identity. As a result, more and more 
Dayaks who are Muslims identified themselves 'Dayak Muslims', rather than 'Malay' 
(Pasti 2003). In 1998, some Dayak Muslim leaders established The Union of Dayak 
Muslim Families (IKDI, lkatan Keluarga Dayak Islam) to promote Dayak Muslim 
identity and challenge the perception that 'a Dayak will tum into a Malay after 
converting to Islam'. As one of the Dayak Muslim leaders put it, 'Changing a religion 
would not change your ethnicity, as Dayak blood still exists in your body'. 
Strategic Solidarity: Chinese Muslim Organisations and Identity Formation 
As I have discussed elsewhere in this thesis, 'Chinese Muslim' is not a fixed ethno-
religious group. Some within this 'group' do not even see themselves as 'Chinese 
Muslim', while many others intermarry with non-Chinese and lose their Chinese identity 
after more than one generation. Chinese Muslim organisations, therefore, play an 
important role in 'stabilising' this unstable identity category, for different reasons. Here, 
I will discuss briefly the histories, objectives, activities and membership of four Chinese 
Muslim associations in Indonesia today. They are the Indonesian Chinese Muslim 
A<;sociation (PIT!), the Karim Oei Foundation, the Chinese Muslim and Families 
(MC STIKA) and the Cheng Hoo Foundation (YMHCHI). 
Persatuan Islam Tionghoa Indonesia (PITI) 
PITI was established in Jakarta on 14 April 1961, co-founded by Abdul Karim Oei, 
Abdusomad Yap A Siong and Kho Goan Tjin. PIT! was probably the first nationwide 
association of Chinese Muslims in Indonesia. Its establishment was supported by the 
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then Muhammadiyah Chairman Ibrahim, because according to him, 'the preaching of 
Islam among ethnic Chinese should be done by Chinese Muslims themselves' (Tanudjaja 
2008). According to an introductory article about PIT! written by Syarif Tanudjaja, the 
Chairman of Jakarta PIT! (2008-2013), the organisation's vision is to promote Islam as a 
religion that blesses all (rahmatan Iii alamin), in accordance with its effort to diminish 
negative perceptions of Islam among Chinese Indonesians that 'Islam is identical with 
backwardness, laziness, stupidity, dirtiness, intolerance and violence· (Tanudjaja 2008). 
PITl's mission is ambitious, as it not only aims to unite Chinese Muslims in Indonesia, 
but also to bridge the divide between Chinese and Muslim Indonesians. PIT! asserts that 
a person can be an Indonesian, Muslim and Chinese at the same time; and sees itself as 
playing a role in promoting national unity in Indonesia. PIT! is also a social-religious 
preaching organisation which program is to preach Islam among ethnic Chinese, as well 
as provide religious guidance and social support to new converts. 
As I discussed in chapter 2, PIT! underwent a 'dark period' during the New Order period, 
because of the regime's intervention in its leadership and pressure to downplay its 
Chineseness. In 1972, the government prohibited the use of 'Tionghoa' (Chinese) in the 
name of the PIT!, as it could be perceived as a marker of 'exclusivity'. Therefore, the 
organisation changed its name to Pembina Iman Tauhid Islam (Islamic Faith Cultivator 
Association, the acronym remained PIT!). At the same time, the request by some PIT! 
leaders for the publication and distribution of the Qur' an in Mandarin was not approved. 
PIT! was forced to have ethnically mixed leadership and was dominated by non-Chinese 
Muslim military officers. However, some PIT! branches outside Jakarta, such as those in 
Yogyakarta and Surabaya, experienced less interference and operated relatively freely, 
especially during the late New Order period. 
The collapse of the Suharto regime has broadened the democratic space for various 
Chinese organisations to re-emerge. Chinese Mnslim leaders in Jakarta regained control 
of P!TI's leadership from New Order appointed military leaders, reclaimed its Chinese 
identity and revived its branches throughout the archipelago. Yet, there were some 
debates around the usage of its name in Indonesian language, whether PIT! should revert 
to 'Persatuan Islam Tionghoa Indonesia' or remain 'Pembina Iman Tauhid Islam'. Some 
objected the usage of 'Tionghoa' as it may have implied exclusivity; others preferred 
keeping 'Tionghoa' as it reflected P!Tl's unique identity. As one said, 'we do not need to 
be ashamed (nwlu-malii) and should be proud of our unique Chinese Muslim identity' 
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(Field note, 16 July 2008). At its national meeting in 2005, PIT! leadership came to a 
compromise decision by accommodating both names, 'Pembina Iman Tauhid Islam d/h 
(formerly) Persatua.n Islam Tionghoa Indonesia'. 
Some Chinese Muslim leaders have tried to reconcile these divergent views, maintaining 
that manifestation of 'Chinescness' is a preaching strategy and does not necessarily 
imply exclusivity. Syarif Tanudjaja, for example, insists that the membership and 
leadership of PlTl was never intended to be exclusively for Chinese Muslims, but rather 
a mixture including non-Chinese Muslims. He uses the metaphor of a human body for 
PITI, which has a 'face that is a Chinese Muslim, yet other parts are Muslim Indonesian' 
(Tanudjaja 2008). He suggests however, that the main leaders of PIT! should be ethnic 
Chinese to build a connecting point (' bena11g merah ') with non-Muslim Chinese 
Indonesians. In fact, many leaders from Muslim organisations are in favour of PIT! 
being led by Chinese Muslims. According to them, it is more effective for Chinese 
Muslims to preach Islamic messages among ethnic Chinese as they share similar cultural 
backgrounds and religious experiences (Interview, Rubaidi, 15 November 2008; Syafiq 
Mughni, 18 September 2008). Nowadays, most the top-ranking leaders of PIT! are older 
Chinese businessmen, with some mid-ranked leaders who are Chinese preachers, 
religious teachers and activists. Very few younger, female and lower-class Chinese 
Muslims are involved in the leadership of PIT!. 
Although identifying itself as a preaching organisation, PITI is more than a religious 
association. It also offers opportunities for social integration, ethnic empowerment, 
political advancement, business networking and even match-making. Since Chinese 
Muslims share religion with most Indonesians, PIT! views itself as having extra capacity 
to promote social integration and unity between ethnic Chinese and Muslim Indonesians. 
A few PITI leaders converted to Islam and used their religious affiliation to fight 
discrimination and prejudice towards ethnic Chinese. Although Pfl'I does not align itself 
with any political party, some of its leaders are actively involved in politics. Also, many 
suspect some Chinese businessmen became Muslims and joined PIT! for economic 
reasons, such as establishing closer relationships with government officials for licenses, 
building business networks with Islamic organisations and ensuring the security of their 
properties. Nevertheless, Syarif Tanudjaja, the current Chairman of PIT! Jakarta does not 
see these diverse reasons for joining PIT! as a major problem. He says, 'II is normal for 
people to join PITI for certain purposes. Yet, the important thing is after he or she 
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becomes a PIT! member, his or her intention should be corrected with Islamic education 
(diluruskan dengan Tarbiya)' (Interview, Syarif Tanudjaja, 9 June 2008). 
Today, PIT! has branches in at least 17 provinces in Indonesia, from North Sumatra to 
South Sulawesi.7 Although PIT! is a nationwide association, its leadership and activities 
are localised and personalised. Some are more active; others exist in name only, most 
depend on the initiative of leaders who are often the combination of local Chinese 
Muslim businessmen (sometimes politicians too) and religious teachers. Unlike other 
Muslim organisation, such as NU and Muhammadiyah in which religious scholars 
constitute the leadership, in most PIT! branches, businessmen occupy higher positions 
than religious teachers. In terms of activities, besides holding weekly or monthly Islamic 
study sessions and celebrating Islamic events, many PIT! branches are involved in 
charity. Some local PIT! offices, such as those in Surabaya and Yogyakarta, hold 
Chinese New Year celebrations. 
Despite focusing on Chinese Muslims, PIT! has close relationships with many other 
Muslim associations through organisational and individual connections. This includes 
NG, Muhamaddiyah, ICMI, MUI and various Islamic parties. As I observed, PIT! 
always has closer affiliations with influential local Muslim organisations. It is not 
surprising that PIT! leaders in Semarang and Surabaya are closer to NU, while those in 
Jakarta and Yogyakarta are closer to Muhammadiyah. In addition, many PlTI branches 
also interact with Chinese organisations, such as INTI, PSMTI and various local Chinese 
associations. In terms of political affiliation, PIT! chose to be neutral. As one leader says, 
'PIT! should be in everywhere, yet PITI s~ould not affiliate itself to any particular group 
[PIT! harus berada di mana-mana, PlT! jangan diajak ke mana-manaj' (Interview, 
Abdul Chalim, 3 October 2008). It means PIT! as an organisation, should have good 
relationships with various social organisations and political parties, but not directly 
involve itself in real politics. Nevertheless, PIT! members ano leaders could become 
involved in political parties on their own. Indeed, quite a few PIT! leaders, including 
Abdul Chalim himself, have contested elections for different political parties. 
7 Except in Surabaya, there is no forrnal figure tor the membership numbers of PlTI. As esllrnaled by Informants, 
there are about 100 members in Yogyakarta, 200 in f'aien1bang, 300 in Jakar!a and 600 ln Surabay:.L Nol oll PfTI 
me1nbers are Chinese ~1uslims. For example, about one third of PlTl members In Surabaya are non-('hinese. 
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YayasanKarim Oei 
Yayasan Karim Oei or the Karim Oei Foundation was established in 1991 by Junus 
Jahya and other Chinese Muslim leaders, with the support of various Muslim 
organisations and leaders. The foundation honours the memory of Abdul Karim Oei, 
who was a model Chinese convert and described by Jahja (2005) as a '3 in 1' figure 
'Indonesian Nationalist, Faithful Muslim and Successful Entrepreneur' (Nasionalist 
Indonesia, 11-fuslim Taat dan Pengusaha Sukses), Despite heing a successful businessman, 
Karim Oei was also a Muhammadiyah leader, a Masyumi Member of Parliament and a 
co-founder of PIT!. 
The Karim Oei Foundation has three visions, two of which are derived from Qur'anic 
verses and another one based on a statement by Karim Oei. Qur'anic texts are quoted to 
promote interaction between ethnic groups and brotherhood among Muslims, 8 
meanwhile Karim Oei's words are - 'a true Muslim should love their motherland and 
native people' (Orang yang benar-benar Muslim harus cinta tanah air dan cinta 
pribumi). These visions are in line with Junus Jahya's view, that converting to Islam is a 
way of intermingling and promoting better relations with indigenous Indonesians during 
the New Order period. However, there is a reverse trend today, in which some Chinese 
Muslim activists in the Karim Oei foundation use 'cultural' approaches (i.e. the use of 
Chinese cultural practices and symbols) to preach !slam among Chinese Indonesians. 
Although key leaders are Chinese, the leadership of the Karim Oei Foundation is 
ethnically mixed. While the foundation focuses on assisting ethnic Chinese gather 
information on Islam, its activities are open for all Muslims. The foundation also 
identifies itself as an Islamic centre for ethnic Chinese that facilitates conversion 
ceremonies, organises religious classes and provides social support for converts. 
Although the foundation has branches in other cities such as Bandung and Surabaya, 
Jakarta remains the most active, Its mosque, Lautze Mosque, despite small in size, has 
always been referred to as a home for Chinese Muslims in Jakarta. The open social space 
of a mosque and the less hierarchical structure of the foundation have made its activities 
more attractive to Chinese converts in Jakarta, compared to PITI Jakarta. 
!'.The quoted verses arc 'People, We created you al! from a single man and a single woman, and made you in{o 
races and tribes so that you should recognise one another. In God's eyes, the most honoured of you are ones most 
mindfu~ of tlim: God is all knowing, all aware' (Chapter Al-Hujurat verse 13); and 'The believers are brothers, so 
make peace between t\vo brothers and be mindfu! of (Jod, so that you may be given mercy' (Chapter .r\l-Hujurat 
verse 10). This translation ts based on Abdel Haleern 2005 ). 
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The busiest days in Lautze Mosque are every Friday and Sunday. Hundreds of Muslims 
who work in the centre of town come to the mosque lo perform Friday prayer sessions, 
yet very few of them are Chinese Muslims, because most Chinese Muslims associated 
with the foundation live and work outside of Central Jakarta. Most preachers or religious 
teachers who lead Friday prayers and give sermons are non-Chinese Muslims from 
various Islamic affiliations, only a few are Chinese Muslims. Most Chinese Muslims 
come to the mosque on Sunday for religious classes and social gatherings. During my 
fieldwork, most Sunday mornings. there were Qur' anic study sessions led by Chinese 
Muslim ustaz and mostly attended by non-Chinese Muslim women living nearby. After 
luncb, there are religious guidance classes for new converts, facilitated by a Javanese 
Muslim who is also a PKS activist. Sometimes, conversion and wedding ceremonies are 
also held. In addition, there are informal discussions among Chinese converts on 
religious interpretation, Islamic practice and current affairs. It provides an opportunity 
for converts to share their experiences and family problems, as well as seek religious 
guidance and social support. Lautze Mosque is also a place for match-making, where 
some Chinese Muslims go to find a partner who shares the same religion and ethnicity. 
Indeed, there are quite a few Chinese Muslim couples, who met each other through 
mosque activities. In front of the mosque, there is a noodle stall run by a Chinese 
Muslim. Some also conduct business activities, such as selling clothes and books. 
Although the main leaders of the foundation are Muhammadiyah members and some 
PKS sympathisers, the foundation remains neutral and maintains good relationships with 
all other major M.uslim organisations. The chairman of the foundation. Ali Kaream Oei 
even claimed that the mosque is one of the few 'neutral' (neither affiliated to NU nor 
Muhammadiyah) mosques in Jakarta. He says, 'this has been acknowledged by the visit 
of Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2006 to resolve a conflict 
between different Muslim organisations in Jakarta' (Interview, Ali Karim Oei, 22 
December 2008). Kevertheless, despite its professed neutrality, the mosque is a space of 
contestation of Islamic interpretations, in which some Chinese Muslims who are active 
in other religious organisations try to promote their religious understandings. Compared 
to PIT!, Chinese converts in Lautze Mosque are more evenly distributed in terms of 
gender, ages and social classes, including a few of converts in their 20s and 30s who are 
not businessmen. Their religiosities are extremely diverse, ranging from NU members, 
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Muhammadiyah followers, PKS supporters, a Jemaah Tabligh follower, to a salafist 
proponent .9 The only commonality that bonds them together is their Chinese heritage. 
Muslim Tionghoa dan Keluarga (MU STIKA) 
Muslim Tionghoa dan Keluarga (MUSTIKA, Chinese Muslim and Families) was 
established in 1997 by Syarif Tanudjaja's family and other Chinese Muslims. Its 
activities are mostly based in Jakarta and surroundings. Syarif Tanudjaja is a notary and 
a Chinese Muslim activist. His religious background is impressive in its breadth; he is a 
follower of NU traditions, a Muhammadiyah member, a former Justice Party (PK, Partai 
Keadilan) election candidate, a former leader of the Karim Oei Foundation, and currently 
also the chairman for PIT! Jakarta, while his sons are activists in Al-Arqam. 
As stated on its website, MU STIKA is an education and friendship space ( wadah 
pendidikan dan silaturahim) for Chinese Muslims and their family members. Its website 
header proclaims "Islam is beautiful and easy, I am proud to be a Muslim" (Islam itu 
indah dan mudah, aku bangga menjadi Muslim). rn According to Syarif Tanudjaja, 
MUSTIKA is more like a religious gathering and study group (majelis taklim), rather 
than a formal organisation. Thus, 'MUSTIKA does not overlap, but supplements the role 
of PIT!' (Interview, Syarif Tanudjaja, 9 June 2008). As he explains, MUSTIKA is a 
more relaxed space for ordinary Chinese Muslims than the more formal PITI. 11 
Compared to PIT! and the Karim Oei Foundation, MUSTIKA's m1ss10n is less 
ambitious and focused on social support and religious education for Chinese Muslims. 
MUSTIKA provides consultation for new converts and their non-Muslim families, as 
well as guidance and cultivation of Islamic knowledge among converts. It is also a place 
where Chinese converts can share their problems, such as family disputes, workplace 
9 Like other Islamic movements and thought, salafism is also a divers\! current. In general, it preaches a return to 
the practices of the Prophet and his companions (salaf means ancestor in Arabic). In Indonesia, salafists use the 
Qur'an and Hadith to justify their rejection of many traditionalist f\.1uslim practices associated with localised 
f<.1usllm cultures, and supposedly corrupting n1odern Western influences. For details about Salafist groups in 
lndonesia, see Bubalo and Fenly (2005:74-79). 
10 See, http://www.rnuslimtionghoa.rom. (Accessed on 15 September 2010). 
11 
.1\s I observed, one of the reasons v.·hy Syarif Tanudjaja established MUSTIKA was hi~ dissatisfaction with the 
PITI leaders in Jakarta then v.bo were mostly businessmen and had less initiative to run religious activities and 
Islamic study groups. In 2008, Syarif Tanudjaja was elected as the cht>irman of Pl1'! Ja;.;arta and ;;.;ince then, he 
has put a lot of efforts into reviving PIT! Jakarta. Syarif Tanudjaja is arguably, the mosr prominent Chlnesc 
Muslim activists in Jakarta concerned about cultivating Islamic religicsity arnong new converts. l-Ie is also often 
inti;rviewed by various media regarding issues of Chinese Muslims. 
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problems and religious challenges after conversion. MUSTIKA. activities include a 
weekly Islamic study group, MUSTIKA KIDS (playgroup and Islamic studies for kids of 
Chinese Muslims), spiritual retreat (wisata rohani) and Islamic consultations. 
According to Syarif Tanudjaja, the usage of "Chinese Muslim' by members of the 
foundation is to facilitate communication with ethnic Chinese. Many Chinese Muslims 
involved in MUSTIKA are intermarried and have mixed-ethnic children. Although not 
against intermarriage, he prefers his own sons to marry Chinese Muslims and build a 
Chinese Muslim family to sustain their identity to demonstrate that Chineseness and 
Islam can co-exist harmoniously (Interview, Syarif Tanudjaja, 9 June 2008). Syarif 
Tanudjaja's other outreach tactics are establishing a Chinese halal restaurant, called 
Lezat and a Chinese nasyid group, called Lampion. As l noted, Syarif Tanudjaja's family 
do not speak ~Mandarin or Chinese dialects in their everyday lives. They mix well with 
broader Muslim communities. Therefore, it can be argued that the cultivation of Islamic 
faith is the essence of MUSTIKA, while the expression of Chinese cultural identity is 
more a symbolic strategy to ease the spread of Islam among Chinese Indonesians. 
Yayasan llaji Muhammad Cheng Hoo Indonesia (YHJfClII) 
Yayasan Haji Muhammad Cheng Hoo Indonesia (YHMCHI, Muhammad Cheng Hoo 
Foundation) was established in 1995 by Bambang Sujanto, with other Chinese Muslim 
leaders, who are mostly businessmen and some preachers. Its major purpose is collect 
funds to support PIT! activities, especially in East Java and Surabaya. Bambang Sujanto 
is a prominent Chinese Muslim businessman and PIT! leader in Surabaya. YHMCHI 
played a crucial role in the establishment of the Surabaya Cheng Hoo Mosque, through 
the sales of Juz Amma (a convert guidance, with most commonly referred sections of the 
Qur'an), personal contributions of Chinese Muslim leaders and public donations. It is 
understood that more than half of the fund came from non-Muslim Chinese businessmen, 
as they believe their contribution will guarantee better security. YHMCHI also earns 
money through renting space in the mosque compound for sports and weddings. Apart 
from coordination of activities and fund raising, the foundation leaves most of the 
operational activities in the Cheng Hoo Mosque to its committee and PITI Surabaya. 
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There are 85 committee members of YHMCHI, according to a booklet about the 
Surabaya Cheng Hoo Mosque (YHMCHI 2008). Most members are listed by their 
Indonesian or Muslim names, followed by their Chinese names, as an indication of their 
Chinese ethnicity. In addition, a few prominent Muslim leaders (such as the chairman of 
NU and Muhammadiyah in East Java) and non-Muslim Chinese businessmen have been 
listed as advisors. Also, the foundation is well connected to local Chinese social 
organisations, religious scholars, military leaders and government officials. 
Bambang Sujanto, one of the founders of YHMCHI, rejects hearsay in the mosque that 
he converted lo Islam for economic reasons, though he concedes that his Muslim identity 
has helped his business. He claims that his involvement in the foundation and PITI is '99 
percent for Allah and 1 percent for the ethnic Chinese' (Interview, Bambang Sujanto, 27 
November 2008); yet in reality, he and fellow YHMCHI businessmen seem lo have 
spent more time on the achievement of the 'l percent' target than on the preaching. As I 
have discussed in previous chapters, various efforts have been made by YHMCHI to 
promote the role of the Chinese in lslamisation, such as publishing books, organising 
conferences and sponsoring local Muslim leaders to visit Muslim communities in 
mainland China. Some YHMCHl leaders are 'nominal' converts, which means they do 
not practice Jslam everyday, except lo attend Friday prayers in the mosque. Therefore, it 
can be argued that in contrast to MUSTIKA, a group that focuses on Islamic faith 
cultivation; YHMCHI concerns itself with improvements for Chinese Indonesians, while 
their Islamic conversion is a strategy to get further recognition from Muslim Indonesians. 
Internal Dynamics: Chinese Muslim Organisations and Identity Contestation 
What are the contestalions within and between the Chinese Muslim organisations that I 
have discussed? As indicated earlier, such organisations share commonality in 
manifesting Chinese Muslim identities in Indonesia, yet they do it for different reasons 
and in different ways. The two main concerns of such organisations are dakwah (Islamic 
preaching) and pembauran (ethnic intermingling). It is quite clear that MUSTlKA in 
Jakarta is more 'dakwah-oriented' and YHMCHI based in Surabaya is more 
'pembauran"oriented'. Generally speaking, PITI and Karim Oei Foundation see both 
Islamic preaching and ethnic intermingling as equally important and not mutually 
exclusive; though the priority might vary depending on the location, historical period and 
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individuals. PIT! and Karim Oei Foundation are also more dynamic and complex 
because of their larger membership and longer history. Based on fieldwork in Jakarta 
and Surabaya, l would like to compare these two major Chinese Muslim organisations. 
Businessmen and Preachers: Uniting Space, Diverse Intentions 
On the one hand, Chinese Muslim organisations, such as PIT!, help in forging a united 
identity. On the other hand, this solidarity is contingent and there are competing interests 
and internal diversity among those who participate in the organisations. As I mentioned 
earlier, businessmen and preachers lead many branches of PlTL In general, businessmen 
tend to more be 'pembauran-oriented', while preachers tend to be more 'dakwah-
oriented'. Yet, this simplified dichotomy excludes some businessmen who are also pious 
Muslim and preachers who preach for financial not spiritual reasons, While many 
Chinese Muslims see no contradiction between pembauran and dakwah, there are always 
debates between those who want PIT! to focus on Islamic education and those who those 
who wish ethnic intermingling emphasised. 
Sometimes too, preachers criticise businessmen for their lack of religious commitment, 
while businessmen criticise some religious teachers for their conservative outlooks. 
Nevertheless, such differences of opinion do not generate major tensions between them. 
In fact, in terms of the overall effect, they complement each other • preachers need 
money to run their activities, while businessmen need preachers to provide religious 
credentials to PIT!. Meanwhile, many ordinary Chinese Muslims in PIT! see it as a space 
where they can meet converts who share similar religious experience, cultural 
background and social problems, For some younger converts, it is also a place for match~ 
making, Besides, some lower class converts also come to PIT! for financial support 
Fram Pembauran to Dakwah: Preachi11g Islam via Cultural Approaches 
Chinese Muslim organisations' dominant discourse during the New Order era was 
'intermingling' (pembaaran) with the local majority. After Suharto's demise, however, 
the focus of these organisations shifted from 'pembauran' to 'dakwah', This change is 
obvious in the Karim Oei Foundation in Jakarta, During the Suharto regime, when Junus 
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Jahya formed the foundation, he put more effort in promoting assimilation through Islam, 
rather than increasing religiosity among converts. One informant told me that Junus 
.I ah ya even discouraged female converts wearing the Islamic headscarf. He said Junus 
Jahya contributed to a better relationship between Chinese and Muslim Indonesians, but 
not towards cultivating Islamic piety among the converts (Field note, 9 June 2008). But 
recent fieldwork observations reveal a change: most activists in the foundation are less 
concerned with 'assimilation' given that most of the younger converts have already been 
more or less 'integrated', if not 'assimilated' into the larger Indonesian society. 
In contrast, parallel with the rising religiosity of Indonesian Muslims, many Chinese 
Muslim activists in Karim Oei Foundation put more focus on strengthening the Islamic 
commitment of new converts. Some of them also use Chinese cultural symbols as a 
means to convey Islamic messages. Such approaches, however, as I will discuss in the 
next chapter are not without controversy; a few more puritanical converts argue that 
practising Chinese traditions is violating Islamic teaching. Generally speaking, the 
dominating discourse among many Chinese Muslim activists has changed from 
'assimilation through Islam' (asimi/asi lewat Islam) to 'preaching Islam through cultural 
approaches' (dakwah pendekatan budaya). In other words, during the New Order period, 
conversion to Islam was a way for some Chinese to assimilate with mainstream 
Indonesians; while in contemporary Indonesia, usage of Chineseness is a strategy to 
preach Islam among ethnic Chinese. 
Comparing Jakarta with Surabaya: Translocal Connections, Local Dynamics 
Although Chinese Muslim organisations, especially PIT! are nationwide, having 
branches throughout the archipelago, their leadership and activities are localised. The 
translocal connection is manifest in the effort of various PIT! branches to replicate 
Cheng Hoo Mosque in other cities. Meanwhile, we can examine the localised dynamics 
of PIT! through their organisational focus, activities and interactions with other 
organisations. PIT! in Surabaya and Jakarta make an interesting comparison. PIT! in 
Jakarta is less active, as it has been burdened by the interference of the Suharto regime. 
It also suffered from the conflicting opinions among its leaders, ranging from religious 
interpretations, political affiliations, ethnic identifications and personal interests. 
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In contrast, East Java PITI is a more active branch, followed by PIT! Yogyakarta and 
Palembang, East Java PlTI's office is located in Surabaya and has been active since its 
establishment in the 1980s under the leadership of a few Chinese Muslim businessmen 
willing to contribute financial support. Among the reasons that contribute to the success 
of PIT! East Java are: its distance from Jakarta which meant that it was less under the 
control of the state, especially during the New Order regime; its location in smaller city 
that make communication easier; its close relationship with Nahdlatul Ulama that 
favours the preservation of cultural traditions and its Chinese-speaking leaders who 
prefer keeping Chinese identity. The Chinese-cultured and NU-inclined background of 
such leadership also explain why the first Chinese-style mosque in Indonesia was 
established in Surabaya, and not Jakarta, 
Becoming Chinese 1\fuslim and 1Vlultiple Affiliations 
It is not only that identity awareness leads to the creation of identity grouping, but social 
involvement itself also creates identity consciousness, Indeed, for some Chinese 
Muslims, it is not their sense of ethnic belonging that draws them to PIT!, but their 
participation in PIT! that makes them feel being ethnic Chinese. For example, a Chinese 
ustaz said that despite his Chinese appearance, he did not practise Chinese culture or 
speak any Chinese language, He joined PIT! as a way of preaching Islam, After joining 
PIT!, though, he began to study some Chinese words and philosophical texts to 
incorporate in his preaching, He was in fact, learning to be an ethnic Chinese after 
conversion to Islam (Interview, Sholihin Sani, 11 January 2009), This case shows not 
only that the identity of an individual Chinese Muslim can influence his or her social 
participation; but also that social involvement can shift ethnic identification, Such 
changes in identifications are not uncommon and not limited to ethnicity, Another 
example is a female convert who previously did not wear a headscarf, but began to don 
the veil after she joined religious study sessions in PIT! (Field note, 16 November 2008). 
In addition, many Chinese Muslims have multiple social or religious affiliations. For 
example, a PIT! leader can be a Muhammadiyah member and a PKS supporter at the 
same time. In the Karim Oei foundation, most followers have other religious affiliations, 
ranging from NU, Muhammadiyah, PKS, Jemaah Tabligh to FPL Some of them have 
bigger commitments to those Islamic groups and their involvement in Chinese Muslim 
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organisations is to preach their religious understandings among new converts. This 
shows that the solidarity of Chinese Muslims in PITI and the Karim Oei Foundation is 
contingent and strategic. 
Beyond PITI: Diverse Social and Religious Participation 
Having reviewed the contingent solidarity and internal dynamics of Chinese Muslim 
organisations, now I tum to look at the social and religious participation of Chinese 
Muslims beyond such organisations. Indeed, many Chinese Muslims engage with 
broader Chinese and Islamic groups; some prefer to join non-identity-based activities; 
while others do not relate themselves to any organisation. In the following parts of this 
chapter, I categorise their social participation into Chinese organisations; Islamic 
activisms; and affiliations beyond those groups. By exploring a few cases, I discuss the 
interaction between ethnic identification, religious orientation, cultural experience, 
personal interest and social involvement of Chinese Muslims in Indonesia today. 
Involvement in Chinese Organisations 
After the collapse of the New Order regime, together with their non-Muslim counterparts, 
some prominent Chinese Muslims took part in the regrouping of Chinese identity politics 
in Indonesia. A few of them became committee members of nationwide Chinese 
organisations, such as INTI and PSMTI, while others joined various local Chinese 
organisations, such as Paguyuban Bhakti Putra (Putra Charity A%ociation) in 
Yogyakarta, Paguyuban Tionghoa Surabaya (Surabaya Chinese Association), and 
Perkumpulan Masyarakat Surakarta (Surakarta Social Assembly). Most of the Chinese 
Muslims who are active in Chinese organisations are older businessmen who can speak 
Mandarin, as well as 'pembauran-oriented' PITI leaders who see their Islamic identity as 
a niche to promote the interest' of Chinese Indonesians. The involvement of younger and 
female Chinese Muslims in Chinese-related associations is very limited. 
One of the prominent Chinese Muslims who is involved in Chinese organisations is Jos 
Soetomo, the owner of Sumber Mas Group that runs businesses related to timbers and 
hotels in Kalimantan and Java. Born into a Chinese Buddhist family in East Kalimantan 
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in 1945, Jos Soetomo converted to Islam in 1972. He is a multilingual speaker, as he can 
converse in Mandarin, Hokkien, Hakka, Indonesian, Javanese and Banjar. He was the 
chairman of PIT! and the co-founder for Yayasan Cheng Hoo Surabaya, He was also the 
co-founder of PSMTI and currently is the chairman for the organisation's branch in East 
Java. He said his involvement in Chinese organisations is not a form of social exclusivity, 
but a means of showing his commitment to Indonesian nationalism. Through Chinese 
organisations, he believes he can promote better ethnic relationships, and encourage 
more Chinese Indonesians to contribute to Indonesian development beyond simply 
providing financial support 
In 2008, Jos Soetomo built a library that contains collections of artefact and books about 
Admiral Cheng Ho. This library, named the Cheng Ho Library is located in the Chinese 
Indonesian Cultural Park at the compound of TMll (Beautiful Indonesia Miniature Park) 
in Jakarta. He supported the establishment of the Chinese Indonesian Cultural Park, by 
saying, 'Different from other ethnic groups such as Javanese and Madurese, there is no 
special locality for ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. Therefore, we need to build an 'island' 
for Chinese Indonesians in TTMI to show that the we are one of the recognised ethnic 
groups in Indonesia' (Interview, Jos Soetomo, 24 October 2008). He also claims to be a 
follower of the spirit of Cheng Ho who emphasises tolerance and inclusivity, He does 
not force his children to convert to Islam and gives them freedom to choose their religion. 
Only four of his twelve children are Muslims. It is quite fair to say that promoting 
Chinese interests is a more important priority for him, compared to spreading Islam. 
Involvement in Muslim Activism 
While 'pembauran-oriented' Chinese Muslim leaders tend to have close relations with 
Chinese organisations, many 'religious-focused' Chinese Muslims involve themselves in 
broader Muslim circles. Some of them share the agenda of certain religious groups; 
while many others join Islamic organisations to search for a sense of belonging because 
they have been sidelined by their families and friends since conversion, At the same time, 
many Muslim organisations are enthusiastic about recruiting Chinese Muslims, both as 
members and leaders, These organisations wish to demonstrate their commitment to 
cultural diversity, and to hold up Chinese converts as models of devout behaviour to 
non-practising Muslims. 
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Locality, religious experience and Islamic understanding determine Chinese Muslims' 
affiliation to Muslim organisations. Not surprisingly, many Chinese Muslims in Jakarta 
and Yogyakarta join Muhammadiyah members, and those in Surabaya and Semarang 
join l\u. Conversion experiences, religious education and social encounters with 
religious teachers, .\-1uslim families and friends also shape the converts' Islamic 
understanding and determine the Muslim organisation to which they will later affiliate. 
Chinese Muslim involvement in Islamic organisations goes beyond the mainstream NU 
and Muhammadiyah. During fieldwork, I encountered some Chinese Muslims who are 
members or supporters of FPI, HT! (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia), Persis (Persatuan Islam, 
Islamic Association), Al-Arqam, Jemaah Tabligh and also JIL. In addition to these 
diverse religious affiliations, some Chinese Muslim preachers or religious teachers have 
established their own smaller Islamic institutions, for example, Anton Medan Center 
(Anton Medan), Irena Center (Irena Handoko ), Takzia Islamic School (Syafii Antonio) 
and Az Zahra Islamic chanting group (Tan Mei Hwa). 
Here, I will illustrate the participation of two Chinese Muslims, Abdul Chalim Lee who 
joined NC and Sholihin Sani in FPL Abdul Chalim Lee (1946-2010), was born into a 
Chinese Confucian family in Surabaya and converted into Islam at age 28, was a 
businessman, a champion wrestler, a PITI leader and a PKB election candidate. He can 
speak Mandarin, Indonesian and Javanese. Since he converted to Islam, he has been 
involved in NC and followed the practices of the traditionalist Muslim organisation. He 
had also served as vice chairman of the economy bureau of NU and a leader of PKB, a 
political party closely linked to NU. He had a close relationship with former NU 
chairman, Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) and has served as his bodyguard. He said he 
was the one who recommended that Gus Dur include a lion dance performance to 
celebrate the launching of PKB in 1999 and claimed that was the first public 
performance oflion dance in Indonesia since the dmvnfall of Suharto. 
Vihen asked whether ethnic intermingling or Islamic preaching is a higher priority for 
him, using the example of Cheng Hoo Mosque in Surabaya, he said, 'Pembauran and 
dakwah are two sides of a coin. There is no contradiction between them. The mosque is a 
place where Chinese and non-Chinese get together. It also preaches Islamic messages to 
non-Muslims' (Interview, Abdul Chalim, 3 October 2008). During !du! Fitri 2008, he 
organised an open house at his home, called 'Lebaran bernuansa budaya Tionghoa' 
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(Celebration of Idul Fitri with Chinese cultural features). He contends that the inclusion 
of Chinese cultural elements is important in the Islamic outreach. 
In contrast to Abdul Chalim, Sholilin Sani who is a FPI supporter suggests that many 
Chinese cultural practices, such as Chinese New Year celebration and ancestor worship 
are un-lslamic and should be avoided. Nevertheless, he has adopted some Chinese 
idioms and philosophical texts in his preaching to show the commonality between 
Islamic teaching and Chinese philosophy. Sholihin Sani, born 1952 who converted to 
Islam after high school, is a marketing director and a part-time religious teacher. He 
speaks fluent Indonesian and Arabic, but has very little literacy in Mandarin. He is a 
religious teacher in Islamic study sessions organised by PIT! and gives lessons on Islam 
in various religious organisations and private companies. 
Sholilin Sani is also a co-founder and a former leader of a local branch of PKS 
(Prosperous Justice Party) in Jakarta. Like many other PKS members, be supports the 
greater implementation of sharia in Indonesia. Different from Abdul Chalim who is a 
close ally of Gus Dur, Sholilin Sani accused Gus Dur for being 'too liberal and pro-
Westem'. Sholilin Sani is a supporter for FPI (the Islamic Defenders' Front). According 
to him, FPl is the only 'genuine' Islamic group, brave enough to fight for Muslims' 
interests. However, he disagrees with the widespread perceptions that FPI is a radical, 
violent and 'anti-Chinese' group. On the contrary, he claims FPI is a 'tolerant' and 
'multi-ethnic' organisation, because it welcomes Chinese Muslims as members. He also 
told me a story of FPI helping non-Muslim Chinese, 
'A few years ago, a non-Muslim Chinese woman asked FPI for help closing down 
an illegal gambling centre in Central Jakarta. The women said she has been worried 
about her son who has frequently visited the gambling spot. She has reported this 
illegal centre to the police several times, but no action has been taken. Therefore, 
she reported to FPI and FPl acted against the illegal gambling centre. Violence is 
the last resort for FPL We have to crack down the venue because the police were 
corrupt' (Interview, Sholihin Sani, 11 January 2009). 
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Involvement Beyond Chinese and Muslim Organisations 
Not all Chinese Muslims feel comfortable affiliating with Chinese or Muslim 
organisations. Some Chinese Muslims, especially those who are younger, non-Chinese 
speaking, non-upper class and more flexible in their religious practices prefer to join 
non-ethnic and non-religious groups, such as human rights organisations and 
neighbourhood associations. Some of them view Chinese Muslim organisations, such as 
PIT!, as dominated by rich businessmen or conservative religious teachers which they 
dislike. They are more preoccupied with broader issues, such as gender rights, poverty, 
political freedom and anti-discrimination. One of them is Andy Yentriyani, who is a 
researcher and activist in KOMNAS Perempuan (Komisi National Perempuan, 
Indonesian National Commission for Women). 
Andy Yentriyani, born 1978, into a mixed-religious family in Pontianak, West 
Kalimaman and recorded as a Muslim on her identity card, is a graduate in International 
Relations from the University of Indonesia. She cannot speak Mandarin and rarely 
practises Chinese culture in her everyday life, yet she is aware that she will always be 
treated as an ethnic Chinese because of her appearance. She noted, the 1998 'anti-
Chinese' incident in Jakarta escalated her identity as a female Chinese. She was a 
volunteer in helping the victims of rape and since then began her activism in various 
gender organisations to fight discrimination against women ·and minority groups. In 
terms of religiosity, she has sufficient Islamic knowledge as she went through Islamic 
classes during high school, yet she does not see herself as a 'pious' Muslim, as she does 
not pray five times a day, does not wear an Islamic headscarf and sometimes drinks 
alcohol. Nevertheless, she has no intention of changing her religion, as she still has a 
belief in Islamic principles. Andy also views her Islamic identity as a strategic 
positioning in her daily life and social activism, especially when she has to deal with 
Muslims. She shared a work experience with me: when she was chairing a discussion 
regarding women and conflicts in Indonesia, some participants questioned her 
credentials being an ethnic Chinese and a woman. However, after she quoted Qur'anic 
verses and revealed that she was a Muslim, she felt respected by most participants who 
were Muslims (Interview, Andy Yentriyani, 19 June 2008). This shows Andy has 
creatively negotiated her Chinese, Islamic and gender identities in her activism. 
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Another young Chinese Muslim, Muhammad Gatot, born 1978, is currently a researcher 
in Legal Aid Institute (LBH, Lembaga Bantuan Hukum). Like Andy Yentriyani, he 
disassociates himself from Chinese Muslim organisations, such as PITI and Karim Oei 
Foundation, as he views the former as Jed by rich and conservative businessmen, while 
the latter as full of 'fanatical' young Muslim converts. He is also a member of a young 
Chinese Indonesians network, called Jaringan Tionghoa Muda (JTM). Gato! said he has 
no interest in joining Chinese organisations that are mostly dominated by elderly 
businessmen, but is keen to be a part of the loose network that discusses various issues 
related to Chinese Indonesians. Given that most of the members in JTM are not Muslim, 
he said he may be able to contribute different opinions to the group discussion (Interview, 
Muhammad Gatot, 4 April 2008). 
Chinese Muslims Politicians: Identity, Interests and Political Involvement 
Departing from social organisations, this section focuses on the participation of Chinese 
Muslims in electoral politics. After the collapse of the New Order regime, many Chinese 
Indonesians stood as candidates in the elections. Some were successful, not only as 
legislative members at both local and national level, but also as regency heads (bupati) 
and high-profile ministers. At the same time, many political panics, including Islamic 
parties expressed their interest in having ethnic Chinese as party leaders and election 
candidates. They do so to show their commitment to multiculturalism, as well as to 
attract Chinese votes and financial support from Chinese businessmen. PKS, for instance, 
has fielded a couple of Chinese Muslims as election candidates to show its inclusivity 
and establish connections with ethnic Chinese. Non-lslamist Muslim based parties such 
as PKB and PAN have even fielded some non-Muslim Chinese as candidates. For 
example, Alvin Lee who was a legislative member in national parliament for PAN, was 
always mistaken as a Muslim convert, whereas he is a Christian. 
Within such contexts, a few Chinese Muslims find themselves an opportunity to involve 
in politics. Some of them have contested both national and local elections, for seats in 
the DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, People's Representative Council or the national 
parliament) or the DPRD (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, Regional People's 
Representative Council), mostly representing Islamic and lslamist parties, and some with 
nationalist parties. There have been some successful candidates, mostly elected as 
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representative members in regional assemblies on behalf of PKB or PAN , such as 
Gautama Setiadi in DPRD Semarang, Central Java (PKB, 1999-2004), Eddy Susanto in 
DPRD Mojokerto, East Java (PKB, 2009-2014) and Budi Setyagraha in DPRD 
Yogyakarta (PAN, 1999-2004). These local Chinese Muslim politicians have something 
in common - they are businessmen and PITI leaders. In addition, they are members of 
the Muslim organisation dominant in their localities (NU for those in East Java and 
Central Java; Muhammadiyah for those in Yogyakarta) and joined the parties which 
represent their affiliated organisations (PKB for NU and PAN for Muhammadiyah). 
Besides PAN and PKB, some Chinese Muslims have also stood as candidates in 
elections under the banner of the Islamist party, PKS, such as Iskandar Abdurrahman 
(DPRD candidate in Salatiga, 2004), Syarif Tanudjaja (DPR candidate for Jakarta, 1999) 
and Surya Madya (DPR candidate for East Kalimantan, 2004), but none has been elected. 
As I have learnt, during the 2009 elections, PKS has tried to establish good relations 
with both Chinese Muslim organisations and individual; for example, appointing the 
chairman of Karim Oei Foundation, Ali Karim Oei as one of its advisors, visiting the 
PIT! office and approaching prominent Chinese Muslim, Syafii Antonio to stand as a 
election candidate (he turned down the offer). 
In general, local Muslim politics influence the involvement of Chinese Muslims in 
political parties, thus it stands to reason that most Chinese Muslim politicians are PKS 
members in Jakarta, PAN members in Yogyakarta and PKB members in Surabaya and 
Semarang. As an ethnic minority, Chinese Muslim affiliations with mainstream political 
players not only guarantee their social security, but also give them greater political 
opportunities. Religious background and understanding also play an important role in 
Chinese Muslims' political participation. As expected, those more secular-minded see 
themselves more comfortable in nationalist parties or non-Islamist Islamic parties, while 
a Chinese Muslim who supports the Islamic causes is most likely to become involved in 
lslamist parties, such as PKS. Next, 1 will illustrate the interplay of identity, interest and 
political involvement of three Chinese Muslims in Indonesia today. 
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Anda Hakim in PIB, a Nationalist Party 
Anda Hakim, who was born into a Chinese Buddhist family in Medan in 1960 and 
converted to Islam in 1994, is a practising lawyer and the former chairman of PITI, 
Jakarta. He is a multilingual speaker, and can converse in Mandarin, Cantonese, 
Indonesian, Javanese and some Arabic. Besides being a member in the advisory council 
for MUI and ICM!, he is actively involved in many Chinese-related organisations in 
Jakarta. To name a few, he is a vice chairman of PSMTI, a co-founder of KOMTAK 
(Komunitas Tionghoa Anti Korupsi, Chinese Community for Anti-Corruption), the 
Chairman of the law bureau for ICBC (Indonesia China Business Council), and even an 
advisor for the Indonesian Tao Council (Majelis Tao Indonesia). 
Anda Hakim grew up in a politically-active family. His father, Lukmanul Hakim was a 
Golkar DPRD member for Jakarta during the New Order period. Anda Hakim is 
currently the chairperson of PIB (Partai Perjuangan Indonesia Baru, Party of Struggle for 
New Indonesia), a small secular-nationalist party in Jakarta. He promotes the concept of 
'New Indonesia', which according to him, is a fight for justice, democracy and pluralism. 
He said, 'In the past, Chinese Indonesians have been seen as 'economic animals' that 
exploit the richness of this nation. By participating in politics and promoting social 
improvement for all Indonesians, I would like to diminish this perception' (Interview, 
Anda Hakim, 7 January 2009). As a Muslim, he said he has a niche to establish closer 
connections with religious leaders and government officials despite maintaining good 
relations with non-Muslim Chinese. Yet, he has a flexible attitude toward Islamic 
practices and does not endorse an Islamic agenda in Indonesian politics. His 'secular-
inclined' religious viewpoints have been criticised by some activists in PIT!. 
Budi Setyagraha in PAN, a Muslim-based Parly 
Budi Setyagraha, born in Solo in 1943, converted to Islam in Yogyakarta in 1983 and is 
a former chairman of PITT, Yogyakarta. He speaks fluent Mandarin, Indonesian and 
Javanese. He is a successful businessman who owns a hardware store, a local taxi service 
company and a few sharia credit finance programs. He says his conversion to Islam was 
not driven by economic considerations, but does not deny that his Muslim identity has 
helped his business grow faster. For example, according to Budi, after the 2006 
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earthquake in Yogyakarta, the Islamic universities bought equipment from his shop, 
instead of other Chinese-owned hardware shops, because he shares their religion and has 
close relationships with them. After conversion to Islam, he has been involved in many 
Islam-related social activities. He is a leader of PIT!, and a member of Muhammadiyah. 
When Amien Rais created PAN in 1998, Budi Setyagraha joined the party's local branch, 
ran in the 1999 election as a P A,'\I candidate and was elected as a member for the DPRD 
Yogyakarta. In 2009, he participated in the election again as a PAN candidate for the 
national parliament. Although he gained enough votes to be elected, he failed to make it 
to parliament due to the electoral \hreshold. Budi told me that one of his motivations to 
be a legislative member was to represent the interests of ethnic Chinese. Seeing himself 
as a bridge between ethnic Chinese and Muslim Indonesians, he said 'As I share the 
same religion with the majority Muslim population, I can convey and fight for the 
interests of ethnic Chinese more effectively' (Interview, Budi Setyagraha, 12 February 
2009). For example, given that ethnic Chinese are not allowed to own land in 
Yogyakarta, Budi claimed that he was fighting for land ownership's rights for ethnic 
Chinese in the special district in Java.12 However, an informant revealed another story to 
me: An officer had approved Budi's purchase of a piece of land because he was Muslim, 
however, after Budi paid for the land, another officer claimed that Pak Budi could not 
own the land because he is Chinese. To challenge the decision, he brought a law suit to 
the district and central court (Field note, 15 February 2009). This means that his 
intention to 'defend ethnic Chinese rights' is in fact also a concern stemming from 
personal interest. 
Although Budi used Islamic symbols in election campaigns, such as wearing peci in his 
poster and using Islamic greetings in his speech, he did not endorse the Islamist agenda 
in Indonesian politics. His election motto is rather nationalistic 'Selamatklm Indonesia' 
(Save Indonesia) and his election leaflets focus on his commitment to improve social 
welfare in Indonesia. Although he has contributed to !he establishment of local mosques 
and Islamic credit finance, instead of an 'Islamic state', he suggested that 'Pancasila' 
ideology is more suitable for multi-ethnic and multi-religious Indonesia. 
n On 5 ~larch, the special region of Yogyakarta pro1nuigated a Governor's instruction (No.K898/l/A/1975) on 
the policy of granting land rights to ncn-indigenous Indonesians. According to the decree. the Yogyakarta 
regional govern_ment does not grant land ov•lnership rights to non-indigenous lndonesians. For a detailed 
di.:-cussion of this issue, see Susanto (2008: 136-143). 
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Surya ll-fadya in PKS, an Islamist Parties 
Surya Madya, born 1963 in Samarinda, East Kalimantan, is a manager of a fertilizer 
company. He speaks fluent Indonesian, Javanese and Banjar, but rarely converses in 
Mandarin or any other Chinese dialects. Despite his oriental appearance, he does not 
practise Chinese culture in daily life and views himself more as an 'Indonesian Muslim' 
than a 'Chinese Muslim'. Married to a Javanese Muslim, he said he had little interaction 
with Chinese Indonesians until he became involved in the Karim Oei Foundation. He is a 
Muhammadiyah member and was a leader of PBB before he joined PKS in 2004. He 
was an active PKS member and has participated in the party cadre training programs. He 
told me, he was impressed with the strict discipline, uncorrupted practices and Islamic 
commitment of the party cadres. Although he is less active in PKS now because of his 
busy schedule, he is still a loyal supporter of the Islamist party. Surya Madya supports 
the further lslamisation of Indonesian society, yet he contends that the Islamic agenda 
should be implemented in the democratic and non-violent way. 
Surya Madya is also the founder and the leader of a non-Chinese based convert 
organisation, Amma Foundation (Yayasan Amma). According to him, there are some 
Muslim organisations that focus on ethnic Chinese, yet very few associations that 
provide specific help to non-Chinese converts. In addition, Chinese converts have been 
more easily identified in the mosque because of their physical appearance. He said, 'If I 
visit a mosque, although I have been a convert for 20 years, some Muslims will come 
and greet me, express their welcome and offer guidance to me. But non-Chinese converts, 
such as Javanese and Balak Muslims do not receive such attention' (Interview, Surya 
Madya, 7 January 2009). Therefore, he initiated the Amma Foundation to run Islamic 
study sessions for new Muslims from various ethnic groups. This engagement shows his 
commitment to preach Islam through religious activism and education. 
Conclusion 
'Identity politics' of certain groups has been variously criticised for being exclusive, 
eliminating internal differences, and sometimes generating conflict. Yet, as shown by 
this study of the identity construction of Chinese Muslims in contemporary Indonesia, it 
can also be inclusive and accommodate internal diversity. Although trying to stabilise 
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the unstable Chinese Muslim identities and manifest a unique image of their identity, 
Chinese Muslim organisations are not exclusive and demanding of conformity, as they 
allow multiple affiliations, internal diversity and tolerance of both inter and intra-group 
differences. Furthermore, individuals enjoy freedom to engage in Chinese Muslim 
organisations for many different reasons, or participate in other organisations. Such 
contingent solidarity gives voice to the minority without reducing it to a fixed entity and 
does not undermine the multiplicity of individual identities. 
To conclude this chapter, let me restate three inter-related main arguments on the 
strategic solidarity, organisational dynamics and diverse social participation of Chinese 
Muslims in contemporary Indonesia. First, the grouping of 'Chinese Muslim' forms a 
strategic solidarity through the contingency of social interests and political claims. 
Businessmen and religious leaders lead most Chinese Muslim organisations. They share 
the aim of promoting Chinese Muslim identity, yet for different reasons - the former 
focus on ethnic intermingling (pembauran ), while the latter focus on Islamic preaching 
(dakwah). The debate over which is more important: pembauran or dakwah is an 
ongoing one, and varies depending on historical period, location and individual leaders. 
While the notion of 'assimilation through Islam' is no longer popular, many Chinese 
Muslim leaders, especially those in PIT! still find their Islamic affinity gives them a 
niche in promoting better relations between Chinese and Muslim Indonesians. In other 
organisations, such as the Karim Oei Foundation, there is a shift of focus from 
'intermingling through Islam' to 'preaching using cultural approaches', in which Islamic 
preaching is the priority and Chinese expression is the strategy. 
Second, Chinese Muslim organisations are inclusive and allow internal diversity. Both 
their membership and activities are open to all ~luslims regardless of ethnic background. 
In addition, there are diverse religious orientations and cultural outlooks among Chinese 
Muslim leaders themselves. Some argue for more religious lessons for new converts to 
consolidate their beliefs, others are more flexible in their religious observance; some are 
enthusiastic in organising Chinese cultural activities, others worry if such events violate 
Islamic teachings. Finally, many of them have multiple affiliations beyond Chinese 
Muslim organisations; while some prefer to join organisations that are not limited to 
converts. Some Chinese Muslims also participate in different social and political spheres. 
Such involvement reflects and influences their ethnic identifications and religious 
understandings, which are often interwoven with personal interest and social concerns. 
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Chapter6 
Cultural Dakwah, Religious Debates and Everyday Practices: 
Chinese New Year Celebrations 
'I visit the Chinese temple in Glodok, Jakarta with my non-Muslim Chinese 
friends during Chinese New Year. It is just an ethnic tradition. I want to show 
respect to my ancestor's culture. Those who claim that visiting temple is haram 
are either intolerant or have insufficient knowledge of Chinese culture and Islamic 
teachings. For me, to be a good Muslim does not mean one has to be Jess of a 
Chinese.' (Interview, Kimman, 23 March 2008). 
'As Muslims, we can only celebrate two festivals - ldul Fitri and ldul Adha. 
Chinese New Year is not mentioned in the Qur'anic text, therefore it is haram and 
l avoid celebrating it. In fact, some traditional rituals practised by Indonesian 
Muslims, such as ziarah, slametan and tahlilan, are also improper inventions. I am 
not a fanatic. I just want to distance myself from un-Islamic practices' (Interview, 
Kapao, 24 October 2008). 
Kimman, born 1979 in Palembang, converted to Islam during high school and learnt 
Islam from an NU religious teacher. Since 2003, he works in Jakarta and visits Lautze 
Mosque on Sundays. He disagrees with some Chinese Muslim activists in the mosque 
who propose that visiting Chinese temples is haram. According to Kimman, Islam is a 
religion that appreciates ethnic traditions. Kapao, born 1966 in Surabaya, makes an 
interesting contrast with Kimman. In 2004, Kapao converted from Christianity to Islam 
after marrying a Javanese Muslim, yet in the beginning, he still went to church and 
persuaded his wife to become a Christian. Recently, a business failure and life crisis 
changed his religious views. He became a practising Muslim and studied Islam in a 
mosque nearby his neighbourhood. A religious teacher in the mosque told Kapao that 
Chinese New Year celebrations and some other local Muslims practise were haram. 
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The two cases above show the different attitudes of Chinese Muslims towards the 
celebration of Chinese New Year (also known as 'Imlek' in Indonesia)1• This chapter 
examines how and under what conditions, Chinese Muslims understand, practise and 
give meaning to Chinese New Year celebrations; and then relate those to the broader 
issues of religious pluralism in Indonesia today. I will first illustrate Chinese Muslims' 
Chinese New Year celebrations in mosques and the media; and how they re-appropriate 
such celebrations according to Islamic teachings. By distinguishing culture (Chinese) 
from religion (Islam), some Chinese Muslim leaders justify using Chinese cultural 
traditions as a means of spreading Islamic messages among ethnic Chinese, a practice 
they call 'dakwah pendekatan budaya' (preaching using cultural approaches). 
Secondly, l will examine the religious dehate over whether Chinese New Year is halal or 
ha ram (permitted or prohibited according to Islamic principles) -· how Muslim leaders 
make their fatwa (religious opinion) by referring to religious texts and what social 
contexts support their decision-making2• In general, be it a commitment of embracing 
cultural diversity and religious pluralism, or a strategy of attracting Chinese political and 
financial support in post-1998 Indonesia, many Muslim leaders suggest Chinese New 
Year celebrations are halal, as long as, they do not involve customary rituals such as 
deity worship and the consumption of haram food, such as pork. Lastly, I wHI discuss 
the everyday practices of Chinese cultural traditions among Chinese Muslims, which 
reflect their religiosity, ethnicity and experiences. Through this examination of Chinese 
New Year celebrations among Chinese Muslims in Indonesia, I end this chapter by 
suggesting that religious hybridisation is a contested process between the interactions of 
religious texts, social contexts and everyday practices. 
Islam and Religious Hybridisation 
Like many other world religions, Islamic practices often have local manifestations, either 
blended with or influenced by various local cultural traditions and religious beliefa. 
1 lmlck, is a Hokkien term (Y1'nli, in !Y1andarin), \Vhich n1eans Chinese lunar calendar. ln lndonesia, it also used to 
refer to Chinese New Ye8r. I will use imlek and Chi:lese New Year interchangeably in this chapter. 
2 Fatwa, means a religious opinion, or lslarnic !egai advice, that given by a Muslim scholar, addressing various 
issues faced by Muslims, from religious observance, political participation, to lhe usage of onUne social ne!work. 
Fatwas are not legally binding in Indonesia, and it is possible to have many fanvas on one issue. ~1UI, NU and 
~1uhammadiyah are three main Muslim organisations that often issue ffltwa; yet different organisations mighl 
have different fanvas, and sometimes_, even different branches of each organisation could issue different fatwas 
covering one case. For more discussion of fattt'a. in Indonesia, .see Hosen (2003). 
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Concepts such as 'religious syncretism· (Cople 1997; Geertz 1960; Stewart & Shaw 
1994) have been used to analyse such religious mixings, and sometimes to defend 
contentious religious practices. Yet, the concept of 'religious syncretism' is problematic, 
as it often implies the mixing is harmonious and overlooks the challenges of religious 
orthodoxy (Robinson 2009). Furthermore, for charges of 'religious syncretism', one 
might have to assume that there is a 'pure· and 'authentic' form of religion (Yeoh 2009). 
Also, the concept of syncretism does not take into account some emerging factors such 
as the influence of mass media and religious commodification (Kitiarsa 2005). Therefore, 
this chapter will use 'religious hybridisation' (Kitiarsa 2005) instead of 'syncretism' to 
examine the interactions across cultural and religious boundaries, as an ongoing and 
contested process, rather as a harmonious outcome.3 
As Roy (2004) points out, globalised Islam is often hostile to the preservation of ethnic 
cultural traditions. This phenomenon is especially obvious among the second and third 
generation of Muslim immigrants in the West Many 'neo-fundamentalist' Muslims who 
see cultural expression as an innovation that could distort the true tenets of Islam share 
this disassociation of Islam from ethnic cultures, called 'deculturation' (Roy 2004:258). 
For Roy (2004:232), ·neo-fundamentalism' is 'not a structural movement articulated 
around a coherent doctrine, but to a form of religiosity that has spread among different 
milieus', and shared by various Muslim groups, including salafists,' Tablighis,5 and 
Hizbut Tahrir.6 Neo-fundamentalists, as Roy (2004) suggests, hold a strict and literalist 
reading of the Qur'an and the Hadith. They stress the absolute unity of God (tauhid), and 
oppose any sort of innovation (bid'ah), polytheism (syirik) and strict following of 
classical Islamic practices (taklid). 
:>For rnorc discussion and criticism of religious syncretism in Asian contexts and its critics, see Goh 2009. 
4 Like other Islamic rnovcment and thought, salafism is also a diverse current. In general~ it preaches :;i return to 
the practices of the Prophet and his companions (salaf 1neans ancestor in Arabic), Salafists often use the Our' an 
and Hadith to justify their rejection of rnany lrnd!\iona!ist tv1oslim practjces associated with localised Ntuslim 
cultures, and supposedly corrupting modern Western influences. While some of the salafists, such as those ln 
Laskar Jihad involved in violence action, many Indonesian salafists focus on peaceful religiosity and missionary 
activities. For details about Sa!afist gro~ps in Indonesia, see Buba\o and Fealy (2005:74-79) and Has;in (2007), 
Meunwhile, fslamism is used tc describe a variety of movements that conceive Islam as a po!itk411 ideology. It 
mostly refers to political Islam, in which politicill activism is informed by lsJamjc principles. In general, they aim 
to sec a greater implementation of shnria in fvtuslin1 society. Like salafists, mar::y Is!amists tend to be religiously 
conservative and less tolerant of 'impule' religious practices. Ye!, d:ffe-rent frorn sa!afi::;ts, Js1an1ists in general 
engage iwith Western political ideas and education, as well as, participate in ekL1ion processes. For more 
discussion of Js.lamism in fndonesia, see Bubalo and Fealy (2005:66-74), 
5 Tablighi Jamaat (Jemaah Tabligh, JT) is a transnationnl religious moven1ent which \vas founded in 1926 by 
Muhumrriad Iiyas in fndia. The 1noveinent primarily :-iims to bring f\.-1'.Jsiims closer to the practices of Prophet 
Muhammad. For discussions about Tabligh1 moven)ent in Southeast Asia in general and Jndonesio in pzu:ticular, 
see Noor (2007, 2009), 
6 Hizbut Tahrir (trr, iiteraHy means Party of Liberation) is an transnationnl Islamic organisation which goal is for 
all !\1uslim C\)cntries to unify as an Islamic state or caliphi:ite ruled by Islan1ic law and with a caliph he<1d of state 
elected by Muslinis. For ctisc~Jssions of f-l"f in Indonesia, see Mohamed Osinan (201D) and Bt.rhanuddin (2009). 
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In Indonesia, Muslim practices generally accommodate local customs. Nevertheless, the 
purification movement is not new. In the past, tensions between localised Islam and 
puritan Islam were seen as the conflicts between adat (customary law and culture) and 
Islam (Ellen 1983; Taufik Abdullah 1966). Today, such polarisations are between 
Muslims who are in favour of 'purification' or 'Arabisation' (Ghoshal 2010; Fakhraie 
2008; Rahim 2006) of Islam and Muslims who support 'indigenisation' (pribumisasi) 
(Wahid 2007; Rahmat 2003) or the 'lndonesianness' (keindonesiaan) (Madjid 1987. 
2003) of Islam. The former tends to, embrace a 'generic transnational Islamic identity' 
(Bubalo & Fealy 2005: viii), reject local customs and adopt Arabic-influenced 
expressions of Islam. The latter aims to challenge the 'purification' of Islam, advocate 
religious pluralism and promote 'vernacular' Islam that is grounded in local contexts 
(Rahmat 2003). 
As noted by many scholars (Bowen 2003; Fox 2004; Ricklefs 2008), Indonesian Islam is 
not a singular entity, but involves debates over proper practices. Different Muslim 
organisations, scholars and individuals have different opinions of the role of local 
customs in everyday Muslim practices. These differences in general can be reflected in 
the divergent religious viewpoints of traditionalist, modernist and salafist Muslims. 
Traditionalist Muslims accept local traditions and cultures as long as they do not harm 
the essence of Islam. The intermingling of Islamic practices, based on their interpretation 
of Islamic texts in particular way, is to preserve ethnic cultures and cultivate Islamic 
religiosity at the same time. They suggest that it is common for Muslims to communicate 
their religious teachings with their own cultural traditions. Meanwhile, the modernist 
movement aims to purify Islam from any external cultural and religious influences, and 
fight against any changes, bid 'ah (innovation) and heretic practices. Salafist groups are a 
highly puritanical version of modernist Islam. They strive to replicate the Islamic 
practices of the time of the Prophet. They also reject local rituals and other traditions, 
which according to them do not have roots in Islam, such as Maulid (the birthday 
celebration of Prophet), slametan (communal feast), tah/ilan (Qur'anic recitation for a 
dead body) and ziarah (visiting tombs of Muslim saints). 
In the past, such contestation was represented by NU (traditionalist) and Muhammadiyah 
(modernist). Yet, over the years, many Muhammadiyah leaders in general have more 
relaxed attitudes in accommodating local cultural traditions when attempting to reform 
180 
religious practices (Daniels 2009; Hadi 2007; Hidayat 2005). There are also crossings, 
interactions and competitions of religious views between and within NU and 
Muhammadiyah. Post-1998 democratisation, together with the influences of consumer 
culture, urbanisation, social mobility, transnational t1ows and local dynamics, have made 
Muslim religiosities more diverse and the dichotomy between modernist and 
traditionalist Muslims no longer reflects this increasingly complex reality. At the same 
time, there is also a growing influence of transnational 'neo-fundamentalist' Islamic 
movement among Indonesian Muslims. Generally speaking, compared to NU and 
Muhammadiyah, transnational Islamic groups such as Tablighi Jamaal and Hizbut Tahrir 
Indonesia (HTI) are more hostile towards local manifestations of Islam. 
However, various Muslim practices and beliefs are not clearly separable and cannot be 
analysed along the lines of organisational affiliations only. Indeed, varying by different 
political economies and social contexts, there is a broad spectrum of individual religious 
opinions that shifts and combines on different issues (Fox 2004; Rickflet 2008). 
Furthermore, individual Muslims may have different religious affiliations at different 
phases of their lives, or even at the same time (Ellen 1983). Therefore, it is important in 
studying 'ordinary Muslims' (Peletz 1997), or 'everyday Islam' (Alam 2007), to 
examine the inconsistency and ambivalence of Muslim practices, and to reveal a range of 
subjectivities and negotiations among them. 
According to Geertz (1973:125), the anthropological study of religion should include 'an 
analysis of the systems of meaning embodied in the symbols which make up the religion 
proper' and 'the relating of these systems to social-structural and psychological 
processes'. Similarly, seeing Islam as a discursive tradition, Asad (1986) proposes us to 
emphasise both the agency of the interpreters within certain material circumstances a11d 
the power of religious discourse iLself. Informed by such propositions, this chapter 
considers both textual and contextual spheres in examining the debates of Chinese New 
Year celebrations among Chinese Muslims. The 'textual sphere' refers to the 
interpretation of the religious texts, while the 'contextual sphere' refers to the socio-
economic conditions and individual life experiences in which such interpretations take 
place. 
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Chinese New Year as a Contested Tradition in Contemporary Indonesia 
Before discussing Chinese Muslims' responses to Chinese New Year celebrations, it is 
important to provide some general information about Irnlek (Chinese New Year) in post· 
1998 Indonesia. During the New Order period, the public celebration of Chinese New 
Year was not allowed. After the downfall of the Suharto regime, Chinese Indonesians 
were given the freedom to celebrate Chinese New Year publicly. In January 2001, 
President Abdurrahman Wahid announced lmlek as an optional holiday and a year later, 
Megawati government declared lmlek a national holiday. Since then, during Chinese 
New Year, decorations and ornaments in red, symbolising Chineseness, along with 
Chinese cultural performances, such as lion dances have become popular, not only 
among ethnic Chinese, but also non-Chinese Indonesians. 
The Chinese New Year festivily has different significance in Indonesia today. For post· 
1998 governments, it reflects their commitment to end discrimination against the 
Chinese minority. For many politicians, it is a way of accessing Chinese electoral 
support and funding7• For some Muslim leaders, it reaffirms the plurality and inclusivity 
of Indonesian Islam. 8 For vendors, it is an opportunity to package and promote their 
products.9 Meanwhile, for Chinese Indonesians, it gives a sense of belonging, despite 
having little knowledge of Chinese culture and languages. However, as Hoon (2009) has 
discussed in detail, the lmlek celebration is not without controversy • whether it is a 
cultural tradition or a religious festival; whether it promotes Chineseness shared by all 
Indonesians or reinforces the 'exclusivity' of Chinese Indonesians. 
7 ln 2008, during my fieldwork in Jakarta, f attended two public celebrations of C:hinese New '(ear launched by 
Indonesian President; Susilo Bamba11g Yudhoyono, one ls organised by MAT,'\KIN (Majei!s Tinggi .<\gama 
Khonghucu Indonesia, The Supreme Councit for Confucian Religion in Indonesia) and another is co~organlsed by 
W,l\LUBJ (Pep,vakilan Urnat Buddba Indonesia, The Indonesian I3uddhis1 C.ouncil Association). ln 2009, when f 
was in Palembang during the Chinese New Year period, which was just a couple of months before nations! 
parliamentary elections, I saw many election banners sending greetings to ethnic Chinese. 
"Jt was during the presidency of Abrlurrahman Wahid who was also a former NU and PKB leader, Chinese 
Indonesians \Vere given greater freedom to celebrate Chinese New Year pubHcly. In addition, funner 
f\.1uhammadiyah and PAN leader Am}cn Rais during his ca1npaign for presidential election in 2004? appeared on 
TV in a Chinese outfit in front of a C:hinese temple, sending ·Gong Xi Fa (~ai' greetbgs to the audience 
(Budianta, 2008: 174). Since both of thern are also politicians1 their endorsemenr of Chinese New Year festivities 
is not only a way of promoting the tolerance of lsb1nic teaching, but also a means of gaining Chinese electoral 
support and funding. 
9 A striking example that I observed during fieldwork in 2008 is the promotion package by a mobile 
telecommunication company, HP Esia. During Chinese New Year, the telecommuuication cnmpany introduced 
'HP Esia Fu (Prosperity)', a phone service that fealuredfengshui (Chinese geomantic ornen}, Chinese horoscope 
and Chinese calendar. :Meanwhile, during Ramadan, HP Esia launched another special package, entitled 'HP Esia 
Hidayah Syiar and Plus', which include Islamic contents, such as Qur'an!c verses, azan (call to prayer) and 
Islamic advice. 
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Around the world, ethnic Chinese see Chinese New Year as a cultural celebration, yet, 
some Chinese Indonesians view it as a religious festival re.lated to Confucianism. Since 
the early 20'h century, Confucianism, which Chinese elsewhere generally understand as 
an ethical framework or philosophy, has evolved into an institutional religion in 
Indonesia (Coppel 2002). Consequently, Confucians co-opt lmlek as a religious festival -
they claim it is a sacred day commemorating the birth of Confucius, just like Christmas 
celebrates the birth of Jesus Christ, and Maulid celebrates the birth of Prophet 
Muhammad. For MATAK!N (Majelis Tinggi Agama Khonghucu Indonesia, The 
Supreme Council for Confucian Religion in Indonesia), the recognition of Chinese New 
Year is also closely linked to the recognition of Confucianism as an official religion in 
post 1998- lndonesiaw Furthermore, lmlek was first declared a national holiday in post-
New Order Indonesia on the basis of its religious rather than ethnic or cultural character, 
because only festivals of officially recognised religions can be observed as national 
holidays in Indonesia (Hoon 2009). Nevertheless, not all Chinese Indonesians endorse 
the connection between Chinese New Year festival and Confucianismn 
Despite the claims of the Confucians, Chinese from other religious backgrounds, such as 
Buddhists, Christians and even Muslims also celebrate lmlek, either in private or 
publicly. In these other cases, however, they regard it as an ethnic and cultural festival, 
and not a religious celebration. For them, Chinese New Year is a festival that welcome a 
new year based on the Chinese lunar calendar, an event in which they pay respect to their 
ancestors and get together with families, and a celebration that give them a sense of 
cultural belonging. By distinguishing religious rituals from cultural traditions, some of 
them even hold Chinese New Year celebration in churches and mosques, as a way of 
preserving Chinese traditions and spreading religious messages. As Hoon (2009) noted, 
in Jakarta, lmlek is celebrated at Sunday mass in a Catholic church with performances of 
Chinese songs and dances, as well as red decorations. Meanwhile, in Y ogyakarta, 
Chinese Muslims held lmlek prayer sessions in mosques. To that we now turn. 
w In '1965, Confuciaoisrr. was officially recognised as a religion together \Vith ls!am, C' ..atholicisrn, Protestantism. 
Buddhism and Hinduism, yet in 197~\ the ~1in}stry of Religion declared Confucianism was not a religion. 1-\fter 
the G'DlJapse of New Order regiine, in 2000, President Abdurrahma;i Wahid revoked Suharto's 1967 Presidential 
lnstructioI1, which banned open celebration of Chinese religion, belief ~'Ind cusiomnry prncticcs, ln 2006, under 
the government of Susilo Bamhang '{udhoyonc, Conf-ticianism WJS again officlally rccog:i!sed as ooe of the 
formal religions of Indonesia (Pausacker 2007), For n1ore Cet::iil on the devdopmc'!t of Confucianisn1 in 
!~donesia 1 see Coppel (2002) and Suryadinnta (1998_). 
"The claim th<Jl Ch!nese Ne\v Year is related to the birth of Confudan is problematic, as ii rnreiy appears among 
Chine5e out~ide of Indonesia. As a Chi~ese Mala):siar.:, l have never heard about suc:i linkage in Malaysia. Also, 
not all Chinese Indonesians agree with such clalm. As Hoon (2009) poi~ted out, for m11ny non.Confucian Chinese 
{ndon:.':sians, Jmlek only became a Confucian fcslival due :o strategic conslderaticn in order to be recognised as 
an official holiday, like other religious holidays in Indonesia; not because it is historically a religious holiday. Fot 
more discussion about how Confucinns claim Imlek os a religious festival, see Hoon (2009), 
183 
Imlek Celebrations in Mosques: Hybrid Islam 
Along with Chinese-style mosques and Chinese preachers, the Imlek celebration in 
mosques, Yogyakarta is another form of identity performance, which combines both 
Islamic messages and Chinese cultural symbols forging a hybrid Chinese-Muslim 
identity, It provides a new understanding of the relationship between ethnicity and 
religion, especially between Chineseness and Islam in Indonesia. The Imlek celebrations 
in mosques have various meanings. For Muslim Indonesians, it suggests another 
possibility of hybrid Islam along with other local Muslim streams such as 'Javanese 
Islam'. For Chinese Indonesians, it shows there is another way of expressing 
Chineseness, that the celebration of Imlek is not limited to Confucian and Buddhist 
temples, but also churches and even mosques. For Chinese Muslims, it is a way of 
spreading Islamic messages by using Chinese cultural expression. 
The Imlek celebrations in mosques are not without controversy, as some puritan 
Muslims see it as un-Islamic. However, by differentiating religious rituals from cultural 
traditions, PIT! Y ogyakarta successfully convinced many local Muslim leaders that the 
celebration of Chinese New Year is not violating lslamk'principles. Through enactment 
of rituals and abandonment of 'un-Islamic' practices, Chinese Muslim leaders show that 
lmlek celebration is not only compatible, but also complementary to Islamic values. 
During the lmlek ceremony in mosques, Chinese Muslims did not worship deities, bum 
incense and indulgence in any other rituals related to Chinese folk beliefs. Instead, they 
undertook Islamic prayers. Chinese Muslim leaders endorsed activities such as visiting 
family, relatives and friends as a form of 'silaturahim' (maintaining good relationships). 
At the same time, they retained Chinese cultural symbols such as red decorations and 
ornaments, but avoided 'un-Islamic' practices, such as the consumption of haram food 
and gamblingn Such juxtaposition of Chineseness and Islam, on the one hand, Islamise 
Chinese cultural traditions; and on the other hand, give Islamic religiosity a touch of 
Chinese culture. 
The lmlek ceremony of Chinese Muslims in Yogyakarta was first held in 2003 and the 
celebrations became more lively in the following years. In 2003, despite protests from 
some conservative Muslim individuals and groups, about two hundred Muslims from 
12 Pork ls one of the main dishes during Chinese Ne-v.' Year dinner, while ga1ubling is one of the leisure activltles 
for some Chinese during the festival. Yet, for Mu~!ims, both pork cons~mprion and gambling are haranz. 
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Chinese and non-Chinese backgrounds, participated in the inaugural lmlek ceremony in 
Syuhada Mosque in Yogyakarta, This celebration was organised by Indonesian Chinese 
Muslim Association (PIT!), Yogyakarta and attended by local figures from MUI, NU, 
Muhammadiyah and the provincial administration, As the main organiser of the event, 
Budi Setyagraha pointed out, the lmlek celebration in the mosque was modest and its 
rituals had been modified to suit Islamic teachings, which includes a pengajian (Islamic 
studies session), sholat hajat (a blessing prayer for a prosperous and healthy year); and 
sujud syukur (a prayer to express gratitude to God), Fruits, such as apple and Mandarin, 
which respectively symbolising peace and prosperity in Chinese cultural tradition, were 
also served during the ceremony, PIT! chose the Syuhada Mosque in Kotabaru for this 
unprecedented event for its historical significance, as a remembrance of the struggle of 
Yogyakarta Muslims for Indonesian independence (Interview, Budi Setyagraha, 12 
February 2009). 
Before the inaugural Chinese New Year celebration in the mosque, some conservative 
Muslims condemned it as bid'ah (improper innovation) and haram, and even threatened 
to disturb the event The celebration went off peacefully, after P!Tl won the support of 
mainstream Muslim figures and organisations, including a fatwa from MUI Y ogyakarta 
that approved the celebration of lmlek in the mosque. According to a news report, MUI 
Yogyakarta had studied various materials and books about lmlek and reached the 
conclusion that the celebration of lmlek is not necessarily associated with Buddhist or 
Confucian religious rituals. 13 Therefore, Chinese Muslims could observe Chinese New 
Year as long as festivities do not involve 'un-lslamic' practices. 
When delivering his sennon during the 2003 lmlek ceremony in Syuhada Mosque, 
Syafri Sairin, the dean of the school of social science at the University of Gadjah Mada 
(UGM, Universitas Gadjah Mada), stressed it was a mistake to think lmlek was 
incompatible with Islam, because lmlek was a cullural rather than religious festival, He 
argued that if Javanese Muslims can celebrate the Javanese New Year in mosques, there 
is no reason why Chinese Muslims cannot celebrate their New Year in mosques. 
Referring to local hybridised Islamic traditions, he supported the lmlek celebration in 
Syuhada Mosque saying, ·Javanese Muslims use their cultural attributes and ornaments 
to celebrate their New Year and !du! Fitri, while those in North Sumatra used candles to 
1
-
1 See ';\.fUJ Izinkan bnlek di Masjid' {NICI allowed I:nlek in r-.losque1, Pikiran Rakyat, 15 February 2003. 
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mark important events.' He continued, 'therefore, local Muslims should not oppose the 
use of red paper lanterns and other red-coloured ornaments in the mosques. We should 
adopt multiculturalism in disseminating Islam to all ethnic groups with different cultural 
backgrounds' (Sudiarno 2003). 
Encouraged by the success of the 2003 Chinese New Year celebrations, PITI continued 
to hold them in the following years. In 2004, PITI organised the Imlek ceremony in the 
Syuhada Mosque in a more obvious way, with the decoration of red lanterns (Susanto & 
Sudiamo 2004). The 2004 lmlek celebration began with lsya evening prayer led by the 
chairman of Yogyakarta MUI, Taha Abdurrahman, and followed by an informal 
discussion (sarasehan) moderated by an anthropologist from UGM, Heddy Shri Ahimsa. 
During the discussion, Heddy described the 'Islamised' Imlek celebration as a positive 
and creative cultural innovation reflecting the inclusivity and intellectualism of Islam. 
Given that non-Chinese Muslims were also actively participating in the Imlek ceremony, 
he proposed this acculturation as 'lmlek gaya Yogya' (Yogya-style Imlek) which could 
promote better relationships among Muslims, as well as between Chinese and non-
Chinese Indonesians. After the discussion, there were social activities such as the 
distribution of traditional Chinese New Year Cake (kue keranjang) and the giving of ang 
pao (money in red envelopes) from older people to younger ones. The celebration ended 
with sujud syukur, a prayer session for Muslims to express their gratitude to God. 14 
The 2005 PIT! lmlek celebration of PIT! was a very lively affair with lion dance 
performances outside the Syuhada Mosque. While in 2006, the lmlek ceremony moved 
to An Nadzar Mosque and a special pengajian was conducted to celebrate both Chinese 
New Year and Islamic New Year (Hijrah) which were very close that year. One of the 
preachers, Toha Abdurrahman, the Chairman of Yogyakarta MUI. spoke of the similar 
meanings of Chinese and Islamic >!ew Year; both signifying a positive transformation. 
Chinese New Year celebrates the changing seasons from winter to spring; while the 
Islamic New Year signifies the migration of Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Madina 
for broader Islamic propagation. He also stated that these similarities strengthened the 
relationships between Indonesians from different cultural and religious backgrounds 
(Perdami 2008:66). In 2007 after the earthquake in Yogyakarta, PIT! and other local 
Chinese organisations arranged 'Festival lmlek Bantu! 2007' (2007 Bantu! lmlek festival) 
14 See 'lmlek di ]vfasjid Syuhada: !noi.'asi Cerdas dan bitelekt11al' [Jrnlek in Syuhada Mosque: Creative and 
iotelleclual Innovation], Kedaulatan Rakyat, 2 February 2004. 
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with the theme 'Imlek for Bantu! recovery'. One of its aims was to promote the localised 
lmlck celebrations as a cultural attraction in Bantu!. The localised lmlek celebrations, 
according to the brochure, shows the accommodation of both Chinese and Javanese 
culture, represented by lion dances and shadow puppet shows. 
The celebrations of Imlek in mosques would not be successful without the contribution 
to Budi Setyagraha, who initiated and then implemented the idea. Budi Setyagraha, a 
prominent Chinese-speaking businessman, is a former chairperson of PIT! Yogyakarta 
(1983-2002) and husband of Lie Sioe Fen, current chairperson of PITI Yogyakarta. A5 
described by Perdana (2008), PIT! Yogyakarta has been consistent in preaching Islam 
through 'cul!ural approaches' and promoting ethnic integration through 'religious 
approaches'. Budi Setyagraha· is also a member of Muhammadiyah, and a former local 
legislature member of PAN (1999-2004). His strong connections to MUI, as well as 
other Muslim figures and organisations, help gain their endorsements of celebrating 
contentious Imlck ceremony in mosques. 
According to Budi Setyagraha, 'Islamised' Imlek ceremony aims to preserve Chinese 
cultural traditions, spread Islamic messages to ethnic Chinese, and show that Chinese 
Indonesians are not exclusive. He reirnrates, 'Chinese New Year is a cultural festival. It 
does not belong to any particular religion'. Therefore, he argues, 'there is nothing wrong 
with Chinese Muslims praying and expressing their gratitude in welcoming the New 
Year in mosques' (Interview, Budi Se!yagraha, 12 February 2009). In order to allay the 
fears of certain Muslim groups, PIT! consulted MUI, NU and Muhammadiyah in 
advance of the celebration for their supports. Bu di Setyagraha has given many reference 
books and articles about Chinese '.'{ew Year festivity to MUI. In addition, PITI has held a 
few seminars, inviting university lecturers and Muslim scholars to confirm Imlek is a 
cultural festival and its celebration does not violate Islamic laws. One of the seminars 
held in 2003 was entitled, Hari Raya lmlek Dalam Perspektif Buda ya, Filsafat Tionghoa 
dan Syariat Islam (Imlek in Cultural Perspective, Chinese Philosophy and Islamic Law). 
Among the speakers were lrwan Abdullah, executive director of Religious and Cross-
Cultural Studies, and H.Lasiyo, a professor of Chinese Philosophy at the UGM (Susanto 
& Sudiamo 2004). 
Yet, not all Muslims agree that lmlek celebration in mosques is a good idea. Not only 
did conservative Muslim groups disapprove, some Chinese Muslims did too. Some of 
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them disapproved of the celebration of Chinese New Year on religious grounds (which I 
will discuss later), while others questioned the necessity of Chinese Muslims celebrating 
lmlek in public since they converted to Islam and are supposed to have assimilated into 
the wider Indonesian community. Junus Jahja, an advocate of assimilation, disagreed 
with the public celebration of Imlek, by both Muslim and non-Muslim Chinese 
Indonesians. He worries that the Imlek celebrations stress differences, and might lead to 
the re-emergence of 'anti-Chinese sentiments' among the 'indigenous' Indonesians if it 
is too conspicuous. As he said, 'I have no problem if we observe Imlek at home, but we 
should be modest. We should not over celebrate it.' (Interview, Junus Jahya, 25 
December 2008). 15 Most Chinese Muslim leaders I met do not share the concerns of 
Junus Jahya, but they also think that celebrating lmlek in mosques could be too 
controversial .. as not all Indonesian Muslims agree with it. Instead of holding Imlek 
ceremony in mosques, Surabaya PIT!, for instance, holds a Chinese New Year Gala 
Dinner in a hotel attended by local Muslim and Chinese leaders; while Chinese Muslim 
individuals in Jakarta, Solo, Semarang and Palembang join their non-Muslim 
counterparts in organising various Chinese New Year events. 
Media Depictions of Imlek: Symbolic Chineseness 
In post-1998 Indonesia, Chinese New Year celebrations have been widely reported in 
various print and electronic media. How do Chinese Muslims engage with the media 
coverage on the Imlek festivites? As I observed during fieldwork, some Chinese 
Muslims in Jakarta, including those who could not speak any Chinese language, had 
been Christians and previously did not observe lmlek, now publicly endorsed the 
Chinese New Year celebrations to manifest their Chineseness to media audiences. For 
them, that is a symbolic gesture to show that a Chinese does not lost his or her cultural 
heritage after becoming a Muslim. Syarif Tanudjaja, a Chinese Muslim leader, who has 
been frequently interviewed by journalists regarding Imlek celebrations, argued that 
media appearances are a form of' dakwah'. As he said, 
15 Some non-Muslim Chinese leaders share Jahya's caution about <in exuberant celebration of finlek. For example, 
in 2004, a prominent Catholic Chinese, Harry 1]an Silalahi, expressed his concern that the celebration of lmlek 
might have gone "over the limit', as it could 'disturb' the feelings of Indonesians living in poverty, For rnore 
discussion about these worries, see Hoon (2009). 
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'I used to observe Chinese New Year when I was a kid, but stopped since my 
parents passed away and after I became a Christian. Furthermore, my wife is a 
Dutch-educated Peranakan Chinese. Therefore, I did not observe lmlek at home, 
and only spent time visiting relatives and catching up with schoolmates. However, 
since the downfall of Suharto, everyone celebrates lmlek. Even the churches have 
their lmlek ceremonies. Many journalists ask me if Chinese Muslims could 
celebrate lmlek. I say that Chinese Muslims can and some of us still celebrate 
Chinese New Year, as long as we do not eat pork and worship deities. Visiting 
parents, relatives and friends during the festival is a form of silaturahim encouraged 
by Islamic teachings. If we want to wear red clothes or give ang pao, why not? 
Becoming a Muslim does not imply one has to lose his or her family connections 
and culmral roots' (Interview, Syarif Tanudjaja, 9 June 2009). 
In 2008 a week before Chinese New Year, a group of Chinese Muslims led by Syarif 
Tanudjaja, attended a recording session for an interactive survey television show, 
PadaMu Negeri. The theme of the show was 'Menelusuri Jejak Naga di Bumi 
Nusamara' (Searching for the Heritage of Dragon in Indonesia) and a few Chinese 
associations were invited to give their opinions. Besides PIT!, other guests included 
representatives from the Women's Branch of INTI (PINT!, Perempuan INTI), members 
from MATAKIN and students (mostly non-Chinese) from the Department of Chinese 
Literature in University of Indonesia. One of the questions thrown to the floor is whether 
Chinese New Year is a cultural or religious phenomenon ~Adakah Imlek Fenomena 
Budaya atau Agama ?). As expected, the audiences were divided: representatives from 
MATAKIN and PINT! insisted that lmlek is a Confucian religious festival; while PIT! 
and students from UI viewed lmlek as a cultural tradition (Field note,, 31 January 2008). 
lt is interesting to note the preparation of Chinese Muslims for their appearances in the 
TV show. Given that ii is on a working day, they have difficulties finding Chinese 
Muslims to join the program. Some new converts who embrace Islam without informing 
their parents were also reluetant to appear on television. As a solution, a Chinese Muslim 
proposed that some non-Chinese Muslims who have fairer skin and slanted eyes could 
participate in the show to substitute the 'real' Chinese Muslims. In order to differentiate 
themselves from non-Muslim Chinese from MATAKIN and PINT!, one of them also 
suggested they wear Islamic clothing to manifest their Muslim identities, baju koko and 
peci for male; jilbab or kerudung for female. Also in 2008, some Chinese Muslims from 
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PITI participated in another lmlek talk show during the Chinese New Year eve. On that 
occasion, a few female Chinese Muslims dressed in red to show their Chineseness to the 
public. To a certain extent, the media coverage has made the Imlek festival a cultural 
expression for Chinese Muslims, even though some of them do not observe it personally. 
Imlek as Cultural Dakwah: Distinguishing Religion from Culture 
The celebration of Chinese New Year among Chinese Muslims is contentious practice 
because many puritan Muslims see it as violating Islamic teachings. 1 have indicated 
earlier that some Chinese Muslim leaders defend the Imlek ceremonies in mosques by 
differentiating Chinese 'cultural' traditions from 'religious' rituals. Such a notion is not a 
new one, as Tschacher (2009) noted, it is becoming more common for some Muslims to 
justify their contentious practices by removing them from the sphere of 'religion' to that 
of 'culture'. For example, Tamil Muslims in Malaysia and Singapore defend their 
controversial flag raising ceremony, by pointing out that such practice is simply not 
religious at all, but 'cultural'. Since no other religion is involved, there can be no 
question of polytheism (syirik) or other 'religious' sins in such practice (Tschacher 2009: 
71). In a similar way, Chinese Muslims argue that their lmlek ceremonies held in 
mosques are not haram. They see Chinese New Year celebrations as a form of 'budaya' 
(culture), and sometimes, 'adat' (custom) or 'tradisi' (tradition), not a religious festival. 
Furthermore, they have removed the Chinese customary rituals, and replaced them with 
Islamic prayers to welcome a new year. 
Statements such as, 'lmlek is not a religious practice. It is a Chinese custom' (Interview, 
Rudiansyah, 16 February 2009); 'lmlek does not belong to any religion, It is a cultural 
event shared by all Chinese' (Interview, Merry Effendi, 8 February 2009); and so on; are 
commonly used by my informants to justify their celebrations of Chinese New Year. In 
an Imlek TV program in 2008, the secretary of PIT!, Willy Pangestu elaborates in detail, 
'The celebration of Imlek is a cultural tradition to welcome a new year and the 
changing of seasons from winter to spring, Over the years, its celebration has 
included some Chinese customary rituals, such deity worship; yet such rituals are 
not essential parts of Imlek. Today, Chinese Indonesians from different religions 
backgrounds celebrate lmlek in different ways, Confucians visit klenteng (Chinese 
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temple) and Buddhists visit vihara (Buddhist temple) to pray and express their 
gratitude to Tian (God). In Jakarta, some Catholic churches organised special mass 
to thank God during Chinese New Year. In Yogyakarta, Chinese Muslims have 
Islamic prayers in mosques to welcome lmlek. In short, lmlek itself has no religious 
connotation.' (Field note, 31 January 2008). 
Seeing no contradiction between Chinese culture and Islamic religiosity, some Chinese 
Muslims active in accommodating Chinese cultural elements in their Islamic preaching, 
call it 'dakwah pendekatan budaya' (dakwah through cultural approaches). Such a 
notion is quite similar to 'cultural dakwah' (dakwah kultural), a concept that emerged 
within Muhammadiyah circles over the last few years, as a change in the way of the 
modernist organisation reaches non-practising Muslims (Daniels 2009: 107). In the past, 
Muhammadiyah has distanced itself from local cultural traditions. Yet, under the notion 
of 'cultural dakwah ', some Muhammadiyah activists strive to accommodate local 
traditions, when attempting to reform religious practices. As noted by Daniels 
(2009: 108), such stances do not mean that they are going to accept practices that 
contradict their understandings of Islam, but rather that they are going to increase their 
involvement in cultural activities, often with the intention of 'Jslamising' them. 16 Jn this 
chapter, I use 'cultural dakwah' in a broad sense, referring to the efforts of Islamic 
outreach using Chinese cultural symbols. The 'cultural dakwah' of Chinese Muslims is 
not only about giving Chinese traditions an Islamic meaning, as exemplified in the Imlek 
ceremony in mosques; but also giving Islamic celebrations a touch of Chineseness. 
For example, during ldul Fitri 2008, a Chinese Muslim leader in Surabaya, Abdul 
Chalim Lee, organised an open house, called 'Lebaran bemuansa budaya Tionghoa' 
(Celebration of ldul Fitri with Chinese cultural features). He decorated his home with red 
Chinese lanterns, ornaments and calligraphy. As well as Indonesian cuisine, he also 
served both halal Chinese food, such as mee sua (long noodle, symbolises long life) and 
Arabic dates, to suggest that Islamic teachings and Chinese culture are compatible. 
Beyond the festivities, Chinese-style mosques, Chinese nasyid group and Chinese halal 
restaurants, that combine both Chinese cultural symbols with Islamic messages, are other 
creative forms of 'cultural dakwah'. 
11
' i)iscu.ssions of 'cultural dakwah' began in Muhammadiyah's congress in 1995, but it was in mecling in 2002 
and 2003 rhat ii: was debated and shaped as a discourse within the Muhammadiyah moven1ent. Yet such notion is 
r.ot without {..,'O!Hestatio:l. For rnore :ilscussior., see Dar.iels (2009: 107-113), Hadi (2007) and Syarnsu ! (2005). 
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In Yogyakarta, PIT! under the leadership of Budi Setyagraha and his wife, Lie Sioe Fen, 
has been consistent in preaching Islam through 'cultural approaches'. Perdana (2008:61) 
notes two cases of Budi Setyagraha accommodating Chinese cultural traditions in the 
spread of Islam. The first one was to do with the burial of a Chinese convert, Sutanto, 
who passed away after recently converting to Islam. There was a dispute whether he 
should be buried in a Chinese cemetery or a Muslim graveyard. Budi helped to resolve 
this problem by consulting the opinions of religious scholars. Ulama (religious scholars) 
from Muhammadiyah and NU had different viewpoints, with the former arguing Sutanto 
should be buried in an Islamic grave; meanwhile the latter approved burial in a Chinese 
cemetery using Islamic rituals. PIT! Yogyakarta chose the NU solution thinking it would 
reduce the worries of ethnic Chinese to convert to Islam. The other case was of a 
Chinese woman, Nurhayati who was interested in Islam but was reluctant to convert 
after hearing that Islam prohibited mourning for a loved one according to Chinese 
traditions. PIT! explained to her that there was no such prohibition in Islam and Budi 
himself practised mourning when his parents passed away. 
Appreciation of ethnic cultural practices is not new to Indonesian Islam. In fact, the 
'cultural dakwah' of Chinese Muslims is reminiscent of the early efforts of Muslim 
saints who appropriated the Javanese traditions to disseminate Islamic messages (Dijk 
1998; Woodward 1989). Today, not only the traditionalist NU, but also modernist 
Muhammadiyah has a more relaxed attitude towards local cultural traditions (Daniels 
2009; Syamsul 2005). Yet, the different cultural manifestations of Islam are not without 
critics, as many 'neo-fundamentalist' and salafist Muslims see such practices as 
improper innovations, thus un-Islamic. Meanwhile, less puritanical Indonesian Muslims 
welcome lmlek celebrations in mosques as promoting Islamic pluralism, and reasserting 
the religious diversity that has existed in Indonesia for centuries. 
As 1 illustrated earlier, the 'lslamised' lmlek ceremony in mosques reveals how some 
Chinese Muslim leaders differentiate 'ethnic practices' from 'religious ritual' to preserve 
their cultural traditions, but not at the expense of Islamic principles. However, such 
'culture-religion' distinction has limitations and can be problematic, especially when it 
comes to defending contentious practices (Tschacher 2009). First, in some cases, the 
difference between 'culture' and 'religion' is not clear-cut, given that how to define a 
practice as being aspects of 'culture' or 'religion' is always open to debate. For example, 
Hamish (2006) described such ambiguity in his observations of a festival in Lombok. 
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The festival, in which both Hindu Balinese and Muslim Sasak participate, is perceived as 
a 'religious' affair by the Balinese, yet as a 'cultural' tradition by the Sasak, who justify 
their participation on different grounds (Harnish 2006:6-7). This resembled the case of 
lmlek celebrations in Indonesia, in which Confucians claims it as their religious festival, 
while Muslims and Christians celebrate it as a cultural event. Second, the 'culture-
religion' distinction discourages Muslims from defending their controversial practices 
through progressive interpretations of Islamic scriptures and legal traditions. The 
'culture-religion' distinction, to a certain extent, also caught in the notion of religious 
purification because it still rejects practices, be they cultural or religious, that contradict 
Islamic understandings of orthodox Muslims. Furthermore, it fall shorts of addressing 
the interactions between Islam and other religions, as well as the different opinions 
within Islam. The notion of a 'culture-religion' distinction might be convincing enough 
to justify the Chinese New Year 'cultural' celebration, yet it is inadequate to defend 
Muslims wishing a 'Merry Christmas' to Christians, and to protect Muslims who follow 
'deviance' sects, such as those in Ahmadiyah. I will return to these issues when I discuss 
the possibilities and limitations of Islamic pluralism in contemporary Indonesia later. 
Imlek as Religious Debate: Halal or Haram 
Having discussed how some Chinese Muslims employ the ·culture-religion' distinction 
to justify their Chinese New Year celebrations, it is now important to look at how 
Muslims, both Chinese and non-Chinese, debate lmlek by referring to religious texts. I 
begin this section with part of a dialogue between two Chinese Muslims, Syarif 
Tanudjaja, a PIT! leader and Hadi Tham, a convert, which l noted during a MUSTIK.t\ 
Islamic study session in a mosque in Serpong, Tangerang. This conversation happened a 
week before the Chinese New Year in 2008 (Field note, 3 February 2008). During the 
pengajian, a Betawi Muslim usraz, Ahmad, reminds attendants that converts should not 
practise their former religious traditions, because those practices are violating Islamic 
principles. 
Hadi Tham then raises a question, 
'Can a Chinese Muslim celebrate lmlek?' 
\Vhen Ahmad tries to explain, Syarif Tanudjaja interrupts and says, 
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'Let me explain lmlek celebration, as non-Chinese always have misperceptions of 
it. lmlek is a cultural festival that signifies a new year according to Chinese lunar 
calendar. Yet sometimes, Imlek celebrations involve customary rituals and un-
Jslamic practices, such as gambling. Therefore, a Chinese Muslim should avoid 
Imlek. It does not mean that we want to forget our traditions, but I worry we might 
infringe Islamic teachings. Even some Christians do not celebrate lmlek. And for 
Muslims, local traditions such as slametan and tahlilan are not essential.' 
Hadi asked, 
'Does that mean we can't visit our family members during lmlek?' 
Using various Islamic terminologies, Syarif Tanudjaja explains, 
'When I said I discourage the celebration of Imlek, l did not mean that it is haram. 
But it is also not wajib (compulsory). If a Chinese Muslim wants to celebrate 
lmlek with families, si/akan (please do so), as long as, you do not follow the 
rituals and eat pork. We can celebrate it in Islamic ways. It also depends on niat 
(intention). For example, if we celebrate lmlek for syiar (preaching), that is fine. If 
we visit our relatives for silaturahim, that is good too.' 
Hadi asks another question, 
'I have heard that MUI prohibits Muslims wishing Christians 'Merry Christmas', 
how about 'Gong Xi Fa Cai'?' 
Syarif Tanudjaja replies, 
'We have to understand the meaning of such greetings. 'Merry Christmas' means 
the appreciation of the birth of Jesus Christ, who is understood as the son of God 
according to Christianity. If we wish Christians 'Merry Christmas', that implies 
that we agree with the concept of trinity which is incompatible with our belief in 
tauhid. 'Gong Xi Fa Cai' wishes prosperity and has no religious meaning, 
therefore it is allowed. We can also give or receive angpao (money in a red 
envelope). Islam is a religion that values cultural diversity.' 
It is noted that Syarif Tanudjaja has been consistent with his opinion that lmlek is 
allowed (diperbolehkan) with conditions, yet he has different emphasises for different 
occasions. On TV, he says that Chinese Muslims are allowed to celebrate Imlek, as a 
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way of Islamic outreach. However, duringpengajian, he discourages Chinese converts lo 
celebrate lmlek, as a means to cultivate their faiths and to avoid them from observing 
'un-lslamic' practices. The audiences on Metro TV are mostly non-Muslim Chinese, 
while the pengajian are addressing both Chinese converts and non-Chinese Muslims. 
How do Indonesian Muslim scholars view lmlek celebrations? ls lmlek ceremony 
religiously permitted or not~ To answer this question, it is important to locate it within 
the broader religious debates regarding the role of local or ethnic cultural traditions in 
everyday Muslim practices. ln terms of theology, the acceptance of non-Islamic cultural 
and religious practices among Muslims is based on their interpretations towards fiqh 
(Islamic jurisprudence) and Hadith (Prophetic Traditions). Islamic jurisprudence places 
all human actions within five categories: wajib (obligatory acts like daily prayer and 
fasting), mandub (commendable but not required acts like performing extra prayers), 
mubah (acts towards which Islam is indifferent, like eating foods that are not forbidden), 
makruh (reprehensible but not forbidden acts like divorce) and haram (forbidden acts 
like adul!ery and theft). Meanwhile according to Prophetic Traditions, 'innovation' 
(bid 'ah, refer to practices not mentioned in Islamic texts) can be classified as good 
(hasana) and praiseworthy (mahmuda) or bad (sayyia) and blameworthy (madhmuma) 
(Vik0r 2005). Both frameworks provide space for debate on contentious practices in 
Muslim societies. Traditionalist and liberal Muslims tend to view 'innovation' neutrally 
or positively, thinking such practices at least do not violate, indeed may complement 
Islamic teachings; while modernist and salafist Muslims tend to see 'innovation' 
negatively, thinking such practices could undermine their faith and lead them to tm-
lslamic behaviours. 
Similarly, there are divergent religious viewpoints over whether Chinese New Year 
celebration is halal or haram. I will contrast two different opinions of lmlek among 
lv1uslims in Indonesia. First, is that of the national MUI Fatwa and second, is in an 
article, written by a HTl activist. Both of them refer to Qur' anic texts for their reasoning, 
yet end with different viewpoints; the former argues that Imlek celebration is not haram 
and the latter strongly condemns it. I will also discuss a response of a Chinese Muslim 
activist in Lautze Mosque, who takes a middle position. 
As I have mentioned before, MUI Yogyakarta issued a fatwa, allowing the celebration of 
Chinese New Year in mosques in 2003. According to a feature report by Nurani 
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magazine in 2008, entitled 'Fatwa MUI: Boleh Rayakan lmlek di Masjid ·[MUI Fatwa: 
Can Celebrate lmlek in Mosque], the national board of MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 
Indonesian Council of Ulama) has also issued a Fatwa that the lmlek celebration is 
permissible (diperbolehkan) as long as it does not contain customary rituals.17 According 
to Makruf Amin, Head of the MUI Fatwa Commission, the fatwa decision was based on 
Qur'anic texts. To support his argument that Islam acknowledges cultural and ethnic 
differences, Makruf Amin first quoted a Qur'anic Verse from Chapter Al-Hujurat, 
'People, We created you all from a single man and a single woman, and made you into 
races and tribes so that you should recognise one another. Jn God's eyes, the most 
honoured of you are ones most mindful of Him: God is all knowing, all aware' rn 
He then describes Qur'anic verses 26-30 from Chapter Al-Zukhruf, which state that 
Islam strongly prohibits idolatry and polytheism (syirik), associating God \vith other 
human inventions. According to Makruf Amin, the Chinese New Year tradition is not a 
religious ideology, but a social and cultural tradition; therefore there is nothing wrong 
with Chinese Muslims celebrating lmlek in mosques to show their gratitude to Allah and 
to welcome a new year. He says the Imlek ceremony is only haram if it involves non-
lslamic praying rituals, such as deity worship and consumption of forbidden food, such 
as pork. He further equates Chinese New Year to the Islamic New Year, thus it does not 
violate sharia. He quotes Qur' anic verses from Chapter Al-Asr supporting the reflection 
of the passing of time during Chinese New Year as a good tradition that Muslims should 
appreciate. He stresses that Islam is not hostile to cultural traditions, and views cultural 
expression of Islam as a form of syiar. 
lchwan Syam, the secretary of MUI, who was also interviewed in the same report, 
echoes Makruf Amin's viewpoint.1Y He contends that Islam allows cultural practices that 
are not idolatrous and polytheist. For him, Chinese New Year is a cultural festival and 
does not necessarily contain religious elements. He explains his endorsement for Imlek 
celebration in mosques, by arguing that mosques are preaching centres of Islam. He 
contends, the Imlek ceremony in mosques is Islamic as it includes prayers for gratitude, 
Islamic chanting, Islamic study sessions and contributions to orphans, all of which are 
t
7 See 'Rayakan I ml ck di mo.sjid, why not?' [Celebrating lmlek in mosque, why not?J, l'lurani, February 2008 
18 The Indonesian translation, quoted in Nuranfs report is 'Allah menciptakan ~1anusla dari seorang laki·laki dan 
perempuan, dan menjadikan manusia berbangsa-bangsa dan bersuku,·suku supaya kan1u sal!ng mengenaL 
Sesungguhnya yang paling mu\ia di sisi /\llah adalah manusia yang bertakwa'. The English translation I used 
here ls quoted from Abdel Haleem (2005)_ 
19 See 'Perayaan lm!ek Bo/eh di Mnsjid' [ fmlek Celebration is Allowed i:i t\1osque], l./urani, Februnry 2008 
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encouraged by Islamic teachings. He concludes by promoting Islam as a religion that 
blesses all (rahmat lil-alamin), including non-Muslims. 
Although MUI justifies the celebration of Chinese New Year in terms of Qur' anic texts, 
the 'culture-religion' distinction is the main reason MUI gives the green light to lmlek 
celebrations in mosques. The input of Chinese Muslim leaders is crucial in such fatwa-
making. Leaders, such as Budi Setyagraha in Yogyakarta and Syarif Tanudjaja have 
close relations with religious scholars in MUI and Muslim leaders in NU and 
Muhammadiyah. Syarif Tanudjaja himself is also an advisory member of MUI. By 
sharing information and lobbying, Chinese Muslim leaders have convinced Muslim 
scholars that lmlek is not a religious festival. 
In general, MUl's viewpoint on lmlek is shared by many mainstream Muslim leaders 
from both NU and Muhammadiyah. It is not a surprise that former NU leader 
Abdurrahman Wahid who endorsed religious pluralism and sometimes claimed himself 
have Chinese descent, throws his support behind these lmlek celebrations among 
Chinese Muslims (Interview, Abdurrahman Wahid, 10 January 2009). During his 
campaign for president in 2004, former Muhammadiyah leader Amien Rais sent 'Gong 
Xi Fa Cai' greetings to Chinese Indonesians on a TV program (Budianta, 2008:174). A 
few Muslim leaders from both organisations, who I met during fieldwork, also thought 
Imlek celebrations are not haram. 
Yet, not all Muslims agree with the MUI fatwa and those who are salafist-inclined even 
argue that Chinese New Year celebration is haram. Such opinion is well represented in 
an article entitled, 'Imlek adalaJ1 hari raya agama kafir bukan sekedar tradisi Tionghoa: 
Haram atas Muslim turut merayakannya' (lmlek is not only a Chinese tradition, but also 
a non-believer religious festival: Muslims are not allowed to celebrate it], written by a 
HT! activist, M. Shiddiq Al-Jawi (2007). Referring to a book, entitled 'Mengenal Hari 
Raya Konfusiani' [Understanding Confucian Festival] (Winarso 2003), Al-Jawi 
concludes that the Chinese New Year is an integral part of Confucian teachings and 
therefore is not only cultural. He cites Winarso's book which argues lmlek signifies the 
birth of Confucian and is an important day to pray for Tian (God), to support his opinion 
that Chinese New Year festival has religious connotation. 
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Al-Jawi (2007) also quotes Qur'anic verses to disapprove of lmlek celebrations. Insisting 
that the Qur'an and the Hadith are the only true standard references for Muslims, he 
rejects the 'culture-religion' distinction in determining the permission of a contentious 
practice. He uses the example of 'free sex' to repudiate the logic of 'culture-religion' 
distinction: he claims that 'free sex' is a 'western tradition' and not a part of Christianity; 
then he says Muslims cannot practice 'free sex', even though it is a 'culture' and not a 
'religion'. Therefore, quoting Qur'anic verses from Chapter Al-A'raaf and Chapter Al-
Baqarah,20 he contends that the reason a practice is permitted or not for Muslims, is not 
based on whether the practice is a cultural tradition or a religious ritual, but on whether it 
is stated in the religious scriptures or not. Like other neo-fundamentalist Muslims, he 
views practices not mentioned in the texts as improper innovations. Thus, according to 
him, the Chinese New Year celebration is violating Islamic principles, even though it 
does not involve 'un-lslamic' rituals. The HTI activist even goes so far as to propose that 
sending 'Gong Xi Fa Cai' greetings, using red paper lanterns as decoration and lion 
dances are all haram. Compare with mainstream NU and Muhammadiyah, HTI is a 
small organisation in Indonesia. Except from ultra-puritan sections, majority Muslims in 
Indonesia do not endorse AJ-Jawi's viewpoint. 
Which religious opinions do Chinese Muslims prefer? Overall, except those who are 
highly puritanical, most Chinese Muslims support the MUI fatwa, that Imlek 
celebrations are not haram as Jong as they do not involve non-Islamic rituals. I will 
illustrate more Chinese Muslims' responses and their everyday practices in the second 
last section of this chapter. Here, 1 discuss the view of a young Chinese Muslim activist, 
Nugroho Laison, who suggested that Imlek was not haram, but should be avoided, 
because its celebrations often lead to 'un-Islamic' practices. 
Nugroho Laison, educated in a Muhammadiyah high school in Jakarta, has written a long 
and comprehensive article, entitled 'Imlek: antara Buda ya dan Aqidah' [Imlek: between 
Culture and Faith] on his blog to discuss whether a Chinese convert should celebrate 
Chinese New Year (Laison 2008). He shares similar viewpoints of Syarif Tanudjaja, 
which 1 have discussed earlier. He agrees that Imlek was merely a cultural tradition in 
beginning, yet over time, its celebrations have been mixed with mystical beliefs and 
2
" Among the Qur'anic verses that he quoted are 'Follow wha! has been sent down to you from your Lord; do not 
follow other masters beside Him. How seldom yoL, take heed!' from Chapter Al-A'raf (verse 3); and 'You ·.vho 
believe, enter wholehear!edly into subn1issioo to God and do no! follow Satan's foolsteps, for he is yc:ur sworn 
enemy' frorn Chapter ,'\!-Baqara (verse 208). 
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superstitious rituals, such as incense burning, which according to him, are 'un-Jslamic". 
While approving practices such mutual visiting and angpau giving that are compatible to 
Islamic values, he worries celebrating Imlek might lead a convert to practise habits such 
as eating pork, drinking alcohol, following horoscope and gambling; all haram activities. 
In order to distance converts from such 'un-Islamic' activities, in another article, 
'tvfua/laf menyikapi tradisi' [Convert responding to tradition], Laison (2009) proposes 
Chinese Muslims if possible, should avoid lmlek celebrations; or only celebrate it with a 
good intentions, such as to preach Islam and to express gratitude to God. He emphasises 
that religion is more important than ethnicity, therefore 'a Muslim should not place 
culture in front of Islam'. He stresses if a convert chose to observe Chinese New Year, 
he or she should celebrate with activities that are Islamic and stay away from all 
suspicious practices. He also defends the MUI Fatwa on Christmas celebrations and 
claims that the prohibition of wishing 'Merry Christmas' does not mean to exclude 
Muslims from Christians, but to preserve Muslims' belief in tauhid (the oneness of God), 
especially among new converts. 
By examining the debate over Jmlek celebration among Muslims, I do not mean that 
there is no controversy about Imlek celebration among the followers of other religions. 
Some Christian groups and individuals in Indonesia also discourage Chinese Christians 
from cdebrating Chinese New Year. For instance, a protestant pastor in Jakarta, Rev. 
Markus Tan's book, entitled 'Imlek dan Al-Kitab' (Imlek and the Bible) questions 
Chinese customary rituals observed during lmlek celebrations and expresses worry that 
Chinese Christians may return to their syncretised religious belief if celebrating Imiek 
(Tan 2008). In contrast to Protestantism, Catholicism in Indonesia has a more flexible 
attitude towards external practices and traditions. For example, there are Chinese New 
Year masses in Catholic churches in Jakarta, Yogyakarta and Pontianak (Hoon 2009). 
Not surprisingly, some of my informants equalises Catholic to NU; and Protestant to 
Muhammadiyah in Indonesia. 
Contextualising Fatwa: The Possibilities and Limitations oflslamic Pluralism 
Jn the previous section, I discussed MUI fatwa on Chinese New Year celebration and 
here I will locate the discussion in the larger debate on Islamic pluralism in Indonesia. 
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The MUI fatwa that allowed the celebration of lmlek was a surprise for some people, as 
the conservative-inclined council had previously issued fatwas against religious 
pluralism. For example, in 1981, MUI issued a fatwa proposing it was haram for 
Muslims to attend the celebrations of Christmas, and some Muslim leaders even argued 
that Muslims should avoid wishing 'Merry Christmas' to Christians. In 2005, MU! 
issued a fatwa suggesting that pluralism, secularism and liberalism are 'un-Islamic' 
(Gillespie 2007). In 2009, West Java MUI issued another fatwa that prohibited Muslims 
from celebrating Valentine's Day.21 Makruf Amin, Head of the MUI Fatwa Commission, 
who thinks Imlek celebrations are not haram, also told Muslims that they should avoid 
celebrating Valentine's Day.22 For sure, not all Muslim leaders and scholars agree with 
MUI fatwas on the above-mentioned matters. Here, I will not discuss those debates in 
detail, but focus on examining the reasons behind the divergent MUI's fatwa regarding 
the celebration of Christmas and Chinese New Year. 
The 'culture-religion' distinction is one of the major reasons why MUI have different 
attitudes toward Chinese New Year and Christmas. MUI views lmlek as a cultural 
tradition, but treats Christmas as a religious celebration that incompatible with Islamic 
theology. Some Muslim leaders argue that the prohibition of wishing 'Merry Christmas' 
is not to imply religious exclusivity, but to protect their faith in Islam. They contend that 
by using the greeting 'Merry Christmas', they are agreeing that the birth of Jesus as son 
of God, and accepting the trinity concept in Christianity, which is violating their belief in 
'rauhid' (the oneness of God). A similar argument is made by MUI to declare that 
celebration of Valentine's Day as forbidden according to Islam. Amidhan, Head of MUI 
said, 'We have to ban Valentine's Day because we are celebrating another religion's 
holiday. Santo Valentine was a Christian, therefore Valentine's Day is no! allowed in 
Islam. People who celebrate Valentine's Day are in fact, spreading Christian beliefs.' 23 
To summarise the stand of Muslims towards both Imlek and Christmas, at least there are 
four possible outcomes: 
1. Both Imlek and Christmas celebration are haram 
2. lmlek celebration is halal with conditions, but Christmas celebration is haram 
2
: See 'MUI Jabar Hararnkan Peringatan Valentine Day' [MUI West Java Disapprove Vak:rHine's Celebration], 
Kompas, 14 February 2009. 
22 See 'Ketua Komisi Fatwa MUI.· Perayaan Valentine Haram '·[Head of Fatwa Com1nissior. of f\t1UJ: Valentine's 
(:elebration Haram], Kompas, 13 February 2008, 
23 Sec 'Indonesian Oerics Slap a ban on Vaientir.e's Day', The JaktJrta Globe, 12 February 2010. 
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3. Both lmlek and Christmas celebration are halal with conditions 
4. Both lmlek and Christmas celebration are halal 
The first viewpoint is shared by most salafist and neo-fundamentalist Muslims, who 
insist that Muslims can only celebrate !du! fitri and ldul Adha. Many of them even reject 
the Maulid celebration and local Muslim rituals such as tahlilan and slametan, as they 
view those practices as improper innovations. Most Indonesian Muslims adhere 
themselves to the second or third viewpoints. Muslims who are puritan-inclined allow 
the practice of cultural traditions in Islamic ways, but prohibit the celebration of other 
religious festivals for Muslims. Meanwhile Muslims who are less orthodox see no 
problem with Muslims celebrating Chinese New Year and wishing Christians a 'Merry 
Christmas' as long as no religious rituals are involved. The fourth stand held by Muslims 
who think that their visiting to temples or churches for celebrations will not affect their 
belief in Islam. Of course, such generalisations are rather simplified and used only for 
analytical purposes, and do not reflect the complexity and fluidity of Muslim religiosities, 
which l will discuss in next chapter. 
Although interpretations of religious texts are important in accepting or rejecting 
contentious practices, one should not overlook the social contexts that constrain the 
religious debates. for example, Gillispie {2007) and Rosen {2003) have demonstrated 
how political situations and government policies influenced fatwa-making in Indonesia. 
Indeed, in analysing the issue of certain fatwa, both textual and contextual spheres have 
to be considered. Textual spheres refer to the interpretation of religious scriptures, while 
contextual spheres refer to the socio-economic and political situations in which the 
interpretation takes place. 1 have previously discussed how religious interpretation 
influenced the fatwa-making on lmlek, and now I examine the social contexts 
backgrounding lhe fatwa-making. 
first, the MUI approval of lmlek celebration is a reflection of cultural openness in post-
1998 Indonesia. The issue of whether Imlek was halal or haram would not be raised 
during New Order period, as the public expression of Chinese cultural identity is 
prohibited. In the past, some Muslim leaders were seen as 'anti-Chinese'; today many of 
them are 'Chinese-friendly' to show their commitment to cultural diversity and to 
manifest the tolerant face of Indonesian Islam. Given that many Muslim scholars rn 
Indonesia are involved in politics directly or indirectly {Rosen, 2003:170}, we might also 
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speculate that one of the reasons Muslim scholars chose to allow Imlek celebrations is to 
get on the good side of Chinese Indonesians and obtain their electoral support and 
funding. In addition, the MUI Fatwa allowing lmlek celebrations would not have been 
possible without the lohbying of Chinese Muslim leaders and their involvement in the 
board of MUI. As I mentioned earlier, their clarifications that lmlek is a cultural tradition 
is crucial to influencing the ft1twa-making of MUI. It is also likely for some Muslim 
scholars in MUI who are less orthodox to endorse the Imlek fatwa, as a reaction against 
the anti-pluralism fatwa, a bulwark against narrow Islamism, and a moderation of the 
'conservative' image of MUI public. 
At the same time, the MUI prohibition of the 'Merry Christmas' greeting also should be 
analysed beyond its theological argument, as it reflects the worries some Muslims have 
about the 'Christianisation' of Muslims, and their suspicions of Christian missionaries in 
Indonesia. Generally speaking, relations between Islam and Chrisitianity are more 
troublesome in Indonesia, compared to those between Islam and Confucian or Buddhism. 
There have been conflicts between Muslims and Christians in Maluku and Poso; and 
more recently, the burning of churches in West Java. Besides being interwoven with 
anti-colonial and anti-western sentiments, some conservative Muslim scholars also 
justify their prohibition of Christian-related festival such as Christmas and Valentine's 
Day on moral ground, as they think such celebrations encourage 'immoral' Western 
lifestyles and lead to 'un-Islamic' behaviours, such as 'free sex', night clubbing and 
alcohol consumption.24 
I would like to argue that, to a certain extent, the MUI fatwa allowing Imlek but 
prohibiting Christmas celebrations among Muslims reflects the possibilities and 
limitations of religious pluralism in contemporary Indonesia. Paradoxically, while there 
is an increasing acceptance of cultural diversity among Muslim leaders, there is also a 
rising intolerance towards religious intermingling and intra-religion differences within 
some sections of Indonesian Muslim society. To support such argument, let me compare 
the responses of Indonesian Muslims towards different issues. As I noted, while most 
::.
4 Not directly related to the focus of this chapter, I would like to suggest that contextualised interpretai:ion of 
religious texts does not necessarily lead to a more progressive and inclusive viewpoint~ ns many would assume. 
For example, sorne Muslim scholars disapprove the celebration of Christmas, not based on rellgious grounds, but 
in a context lhat such celebration might lead to immoral behaviour. In Ma!aysta, recently, lhcre has been n 
con1roversy over whether non-1V1usllms could use the tern1 'Allah' lo refer t0 their God. Sorne ft1alay Muslims 
\vho read reiigicus scriptures literally approve the usage of 'Allah' by non~Muslims, ciaimir.g that there ls r.o 
Qur)anic verse prohibits it; while those who disapprove the usage of 'Allah' by non-Muslirns, justify their 
positions by saying that 1t could cause confusion among Muslims and might lead to apostasy. In this case, 
ironically, those Muslim >vho are 'Hteralist' seein to be more i:olerant than those who are ·contextualist', 
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Indonesian Muslim leaders do not have problems with the establishment of Chinese-style 
mosques, some hesitate w endorse Chinese New Year ceremonies in mosques, Many 
Muslims, including the conservatively-inclined MUI allow the celebration of Chinese 
New Year if it does not involve non-Islamic rituals, yet keep themselves always from 
Christmas celebrations. When it comes to Ahmadiyah, fewer Muslim scholars lend thdr 
support to the minority Muslim sect which was deemed 'deviant' according to MUI 
fatwa. Even the government does not take firm actions to protect Ahmadiyah's followers 
from being attacked by conservative- radical Muslim groups.25 
Generally speaking, Chinese Muslims share the religious viewpoints of their Muslim 
counterparts. For example, Chinese preachers, such as Anton Medan and Syafii Antonio, 
do not mind giving angpao during Chinese New Year, but hesitate to visit Chinese 
temples and burn incenses; they are happy to wish 'Gong Xi Fa Cai', yet reluctant to 
greet 'Merry Christmas' (Interview, Anton Medan, 7 November 2008; fnterview, Syafii 
Antonio, 11 January 2009). In other words, many Muslim scholars accept the cultural 
diversity and expression of Islam. Yet, their attitudes different in the realm of religion; 
they hesitate to cross religious boundaries, observe non-Islamic rituals and endorse 
alternative interpretations of Islam. 
Chinese New Year Celebration as Everyday Practice 
How do ordinary Chinese Muslims respond to the religious debate of Chinese New Year 
celebration? How do they view and practise Chinese cultural traditions in their daily 
lives? In general, there are three responses towards lmlek celebration: haram, not haram 
with conditions, and not haram even if involve customary rituals. Most Chinese Muslims 
consider lmlek celebration is not haram, as long as it does not involves rituals such as 
burning incense; some insist that Imlek celebration in all forms should not be observed; 
and others continue the practice of customary rituals to show respect to their ancestors. 
These diverse viewpoints reflect their Islamic affiliations and understandings, as well as 
their social experience, familial interaction and cultural upbringing. 
;:.'i Ahm3diyah is a controversia! Muslim sect, founded in India near the end of the 19th century, has existed in 
Jndonesia since the 'J 920s. In ihe last few years, Ahmadiyah' followers in lndo:iesia have experiei'lced increasing 
tension and ho:;tHity from conservative lslamic groups, For so1T1e f\1uslir.is, the Ahmadiyy;:i moverrient is 
considered against Islamic beliefs especially due to its teJching that its founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is a 
Pl\1phet. For more discussion of i\hn1adiyah in Jndoc.esla, see l\lfiid (2008) and Budlwanli (2009). 
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In terms of cultural upbringing, as expected, Chinese converts who speak Mandarin or 
Chinese dialects and have cl.oser relations with non-Muslim family members tend to take 
Chinese New Year festival seriously, while those who have assimilated seldom relate to 
this Chinese tradition. Others see Imlek as a social and family event during which they 
visit their parents and relatives, wear new clothes and eat nice foods. Regarding 
religiosity, Chinese Muslims who went through Islamic education and have religious 
affiliations tend to have stronger viewpoints on the celebrations of Imlek. During 
fieldwork, I have encountered a few Chinese Muslims who strongly oppose the lmlek 
celebration and other Chinese traditional practices: two of them claim to be salafis, and 
another one is a Tablighi Jamaal follower. For them, there are only two recognised 
celebrations in Islam (ldul Fitri and !du! Adha), while other celebrations including 
Maulid (the birthday celebration of Prophet) are improper innovation. 
On the other hand, there are some Chinese Muslims, especially those who are NU-
inclined, who still practise customary rituals at home or visit temples to celebrate Imlek. 
One of them is Syamsul Ariffin, a part-time practitioner of Chinese medicine in 
Surabaya. He told me that he not only observes Chinese and Islamic festivals, but also 
follows Javanese traditional rituals, kejawen. According to Syamsul, his observance of 
various traditions does not make him feel less a Muslim. He claims, 'I am a Chinese, a 
Muslim, and perhaps, I am also a Javanese.' (Interview, Syamsul Arrifin, 30 October 
2008). Meanwhile, Chinese Muslims who are close to Muhammadiyah and PKS are in 
the middle of the spectrum: they think lmlek is not wajib, but is also not haram, as long 
as no 'un-Islamic' elements are involved. Most of them celebrate lmlek by visiting 
family members and friends to strengthen relationships (silaturahim). At the same time, 
they reject food that is not halal, and avoid rituals such as deity worship. Some of them 
are more cautious. For instance, Nugroho Laison proposes Chinese Muslims avoid Imlek 
celebrations to prevent themselves from practising 'un-Islamic' rituals and habits. 
Beyond religious considerations, some Chinese Muslims practise contentious rituals 
during Chinese festivals for familial reasons. Quite often, they justify such practices by 
comparing Chinese traditional values to Islamic teachings, and suggest that some rituals 
although seen as 'un-lslamic' by puritan Muslims, are in fact complementary to 
universal Islamic principles. For example, in 2008, Marlina who is married to Nugroho 
Laison, went back to her hometown in Bangka Island to celebrate lmlek with her parents. 
She followed rituals such as burning incense and offering food for ancestors and deities. 
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Despite knowing that these practices are contentious, she observed them because she did 
not want to hurt her parents' feelings. She says her actions could be justified in Islam, 
because Qur'anic texts teach Muslims to respect their parents and to maintain good 
relationships with family .members (Interview, Marlina, 2 March 2008). Also in 2008, a 
Chinese Muslim couple, Hadi Tham and Julie who attended pengajian frequently, 
invited me to their home in Jakarta during lmlek. They served me various halal Chinese 
foods, including mee sua (long noodle that symbolises long life) and Mandarin oranges. I 
noticed they had a praying altar with incense and food for one of their parents who had 
passed away. Hadi Tham explains that they are sharing house with non-Muslim relatives 
and they keep the ancestor's altar to show respect. Like Marlina, he says Islam teaches 
him to live harmoniously with non-Muslims and to express filial piety to elders (Field 
note, 18 February 2008). 
Some Chinese Muslims who still observe the rituals of Ceng Beng (Grave-Sweeping 
Day), a festival for ethnic Chinese to pay respect to their ancestors by visiting the 
cemetery and praying with incense and food, state it is to do with Islamic teachings: 
living harmoniously and respecting elders. One of them, Alex Tjiu says he accompanies 
his mother to his father's tomb every year during Ceng Beng. He understands to make an 
offering based on Chinese tradition is an expression of filial piety (Interview, Alex Tjiu, 
6 September 2008). Comparing traditional Chinese beliefs and Islamic principles, he 
argues that maintaining the Chinese virtue of remembering the ancestors is 
complementary to Islamic teachings that urge '.\1uslims to respect elders. Meanwhile, 
Chinese Muslims who are more puritan say they appreciate the values of Ceng Beng, but 
insist that they should distance themselves from observing non-Islamic rituals. Therefore, 
they visit the cemetery and pray in an Islamic way, without burning incense and offering 
food. As l will further discuss in the following chapter, despite the disapprovals of 
orthodox Muslims, some Chinese Muslims continue to observe various controversial 
practices in everyday lives, such as Ida's involvement in slametan rituals, Shamsurs 
participation in kejawen rituals, and Mary's worshipping Buddha at home. 
These everyday practices show that Islamic religiosities are not only constrained by the 
religious texts and their interpretations, but also depend on social interactions and living 
experiences of Muslims. In this sphere of 'everyday Islam' (Alam 2007), or 'practical 
Islam' (Beatty 1999), many '.\1uslims can spontaneously negotiate themselves between 
religious doctrines and social contexts in observing contentious practices. In some cases, 
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as I have discussed, they are aware that such rituals might be considered 'un-Islamic' by 
puritan Muslims, yet they also defend their practices by referring to more universal 
Islamic values. In short, like other Muslims, Chinese Muslims creatively reconcile their 
contentious practices with religious doctrines, by referring to Islamic values. 
Religious Hybridisation: Texts, Contexts and Everyday Practices 
1 began this chapter describing Imlek ceremonies in mosques and I end it here with a 
slameran (communal feast) ritual in a Chinese temple. Ikhsan Tanggok (2005) in his 
description of a slametan in klenreng Sam Poo Kong (Cheng Ho Temple) in Semarang, 
noted that the slametan is co-celebrated by Javanese and Chinese Indonesians, to 
strengthen their relationships and to ask for temple protection. As he illustrated, the 
slameran prayer in the temple is a mixture ofQur'anic verses and Javanese kejawen texts, 
and observed by both Javanese Muslims and Chinese Confucians, to ask for blessing 
from dewa Sam Pao Kong (Cheng Hoo deity). This shows that hybridised religious 
practices continue to exist in Muslims' everyday lives, despite the rise of Islamic 
'purification'. It is not also uncommon for Chinese businessmen to observe slameten 
before the beginning of a new business, by inviting Javanese Muslim scholars to pray for 
blessing reciting Qur'anic texts. Likewise, there are some Muslim students involved in 
Chinese temple processions in Jakarta streets in 2009 (Chan 2010). Together with Imlek 
ceremonies in mosques, such practices offer opportunities for inter-religious cooperation 
and inter-ethnic solidarity, as well as provide space to reclaim religious pluralism in 
Indonesia challenged by some orthodox Muslim groups. 
Religious syncretism has been used to analyse and to defend contentious Muslims' 
practices, yet it is problematic. For charges of religious 'syncretism', one might have to 
assume that there is an 'authentic' form. Similarly, the usage of the 'religion-culture' 
distinction to defend contentious practices is also often caught in the notion of religious 
purification, because it still rejects practices that do not fit with the Islamic 
understandings of puritan Muslims. As I have mentioned, such distinction might be 
convincing enough to justify 'cultural' celebrations like Chinese New Year, yet 
inadequate to address the rising intolerance towards religious intermingling and intra-
religion differences among certain sections of Indonesian Muslim society. What are the 
alternative ways of analysing the encounters of Islam with other cultural and religious 
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practices? Instead of a hannonious outcome, I would like to suggest that it is more useful 
to view religious hybridisation as a contested process, bet•veen the interactions of text 
interpretations, social conditions and everyday practices. 
On the issues of lmlek in mosques, both proponents and opponents have referred to 
Qur'anic texts to justify their stands, which show that individuals and groups with 
diverse interests and orientations may find their own, often conflicting, truths in the very 
same scriptures. While different cultural upbringings and religious experiences influence 
Chinese Muslims' individual receptions to their ethnic traditions; the return of Chinese 
culture in the post-1998 Indonesian public space and the efforts of moderate Muslim 
groups to promote inclusive Islam amidst the rise of religious conservatism, form a 
broader canvas backgrounding the debates of lmlek celebrations among Chinese 
Muslims. However, beyond religious considerations, whether ordinary Chinese Muslims 
celebrate lmlek or not and how they observe it is depends on their life experiences, 
family influences and other everyday practical considerations. Some of them also 
creatively justify their controversial customary practices by referring to more universal 
Islamic values. 
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Chapter7 
Conversion to Islam, Flexible Piety and !Vlultiple Identifications 
'I have three narm:s. My official Indonesian name on my identity card is 'Julia 
Vitha'. Most people I know from schools and workplaces call me 'Vitha'. While 
my parents and family members in Bangka call me 'Lee Woon'. After conversion 
to Islam, I adapted an Islamic name, 'Raihanah'. \\lhen I attend religious activities, 
my Muslim friends use my Islamic name. Since you are a Chinese person, you can 
address me in my Chinese name'' (Interview, 10 June 2008). 
The case of Vitna's multiple names is not exceptional, as many Chinese Muslims have 
more than one name, and sometimes even three names - Indonesian, Chinese and 
Islamic, which allow them to emphasise different dimensions of their identities at 
different times. Such naming practices show not only that different Chinese Muslims 
have different cultural orientations and religious affiliations, but also that an individual 
Chinese Muslim can situationally shift and variously stress their manifold identifications. 
In the previous chapters, I have analysed the emergence of Chinese Muslim cultural 
identities in post-1998 Indonesia, without treating Chinese Muslims as a bounded ethnic-
religious group. I have also hinted at their multifaceted and multilayered identities. 
Focusing on naming practices, female veiling experiences and life stories, this chapter 
further investigates the multiple ways of being 'Chinese Muslim' (and sometimes, also 
escaping from being labelled as 'Chinese Muslim') and reveals a range of subjectivities, 
self-expressions and identity negotiations in everyday lives. 
Drawing on Bourdieu's work (1990) on intertwining relations between structure and 
agency, this chapter argues that identity practices are the outcome of strategic action of 
individuals operating within a constraining, but not determining social context. In other 
words, while being constrained by historical contexts and influenced by social forces, we 
should not overlook the role of personal living strategics in shaping people's identities. 
; Jn previous chaptersr in rnost cases, I use real names for my ir:formants. However, in this chnp!er, far tv.'o 
reasons, mast names used are pseudonyms. First, my informants do not want their names to be quoted when they 
comment on certain contentious issues and 'sensitive' topics. Second, f \vanl to protect the privacy of my 
infonnants, especially •.vhen 1 discuss their "un-lslarnic' habits, such <is gambling anti drinking alcohol. 
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As Karner (2007:4) suggests, identity is a not only a social construction, but also a 
biographically grounded, emotionally charged way of experiencing everyday life 
situations. While for Goffman (1959), everyday life is an arena where the self performs 
in a number of different ways dependent upon time, place, and audience.2 
To study the everyday religiosity of Muslims, scholars have deployed terms, such as 
'practical Islam' (Beatty 1999) and 'everyday Islam' (Alam 2007) to examine Muslim 
religiosity as a negotiation between the areas of normative and non-nomMtive Islam, 
between religious doctrines and everyday living conditions. Also, Pelelz (E997:266) 
proposes that the study of Muslim identities should 'devote greater attention to the 
cultural psychology of ambivalence and its various refractions in different political 
economies and the myriad social contexts they comprise.' Thus, this chapter analyses the 
cultural politics of Chinese Muslims' everyday ethnicity and religiosity, without 
neglecting the importance of socio-economic conditions that constrain their choices. 
I begin this chapter with a brief review of conversion reasons among Chinese Muslims. I 
propose the importance of differentiating conversion motives from conversion narratives 
- wbile conversion motives are personal and private affairs; conversion narratives are 
public stories tailored to suit audiences, therefore, such narratives do not necessarily 
reflect the 'real' conversion reasons. Second, I discuss the 'official' conversion processes 
and 'spiritual' experiences of Chinese Muslims. Becoming 'officially' Muslim does not 
automatically mean someone is also becoming a 'religiously' practisi~g Muslim. 
Furthermore, Islamic conversion, especially 'genuine' ones, often implies not only the 
adoption of a new religious identity, but also transformation of personal practices, 
cultural orientations, social networks and political views. 
Following the discussion of converts' diverse and shifting religiosity, the third part of 
this chapter will consider the flexible piety or everyday religiosity of Chinese Muslims. 
The life experiences and stories of my informants, show that instead of openly 
supporting or resisting the rising of assertive Islam in Indonesia, many converts adjust or 
accommodate their understandings and practices of Islam according to their living 
contexts, which quite often result in an inconsistency of Islamic religiosity, which I call 
'flexible piety'. Although such inconsistent religiosity is more prevalent among converts, 
it can also be applied to many other Muslims in contemporary societies. 
=For a more thc0rctical discussion of identity formation and ncgotiatior:, see chapter L 
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Fourthly, I provide a brief overview of the shifting and diverse ethnic identifications 
among Chinese Muslims after Islamic conversion. By discussing the naming practices of 
a few who switched religion, 1 demonstrate that a Chinese convert can emphasise or 
downplay his or her Chinese identity depending on conditions. 1 conclude this chapter by 
reiterating that both the political economies of religious conversion and shifting ethnicity, 
as well as cultural politics of flexible piety and multiple identification, are important to 
study Chinese Muslim identities, and also Chinese and Muslim identities in general. 
Conversion Reasons and Narratives 
Most Chinese Muslims in Indonesia are not born Muslim, but convert to Islam. These 
new converts are often referred as 'mualaf' in Indonesia. There are various conversion 
factors, including political (escaping from discrimination), economic (seeking business 
opportunities), religious (seeking spiritual truth and meaning in life), as well as cultural 
(intermingling or intermarriage with Muslim Indonesians). Different conversion 
motivations mean that Islam has different meanings for different converts. The 
motivation for conversion is also one of the major factors that determine how seriously a 
Chinese convert learns and observes their new religion, thus intluencing the formation of 
their religious identities. 
In the past, the conversions of Chinese to Islam were mainly 'strategic conversions', 
meaning the adoption of Islam is a response to political and economic incentives, as well 
as for the purpose of intermarriage. Although such perceptions still persists today, the 
increase in both the public displays (such as Chinese-style mosques) and personal 
observances of the faith (such as Chinese religious teachers) indicate that there are an 
increasing number of 'genuine conversions' among Chinese Indonesians in which they 
take their new religion seriously. I will briefly discuss four types of conversion among 
Chinese Indonesians. It must be clarified that these classifications are rather simplified 
and do not fully capture the complex reality. I use the classifications for the analytical 
purpose and do not indicate value judgment. 
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Economic Considerations 
Chinese businessmen are quite often accused of converting to Islam for their business 
careers, in order to get a license from the government, to build networks with security 
officers, to gain support from Islamic leaders and to attract Muslim customers. However, 
very few Chinese business converts openly admit their 'real' motivations. 3 Many of 
these conversions do not involve their spouses and children. While some of them are 
involved in social and religious activities, others take a low profile. A few Chinese 
Muslim businessmen have also performed pilgrimage to Mecca and obtained the title of 
'I!aji' which is respected among Muslims, arguably more as a sign of socio-economic 
status, than a reflection of religious commitment. Some poor Chinese Indonesians also 
see Islamic conversion as a way of gaining economic mobility. During fieldwork, I met 
several Chinese Muslims who converted to Islam to gain financial assistance (e.g. zakat 
or Islamic alms) and employment opportunities from Muslim organisations. 
Political Strategies 
Politically driven conversion to Islam is not a new phenomenon, as documented in the 
conversion of low-caste people in India and African Americans who see Islam as a way 
out of discrimination and oppression (McCloud 1995; Simmons 2006). As I have 
discussed in chapter 2, during the New Order period, some Chinese leaders, such as 
Junus Jahya, suggested that conversion to Islam provides an escape from discrimination, 
as according to them, by embracing the religion of majority population, the difference 
between ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesians may diminish. Not all Chinese 
Muslim leaders agree with this notion of 'assimilation through conversion' and the idea 
is no longer popular in post·1998 Indonesia. Some argue that conversion is a personal 
religious choice and should not be politically motivated; while others suggest that 
conversion would only promote better relationships between Chinese and non-Chinese 
Indonesians, if converts maintain their 'Chineseness'. There are also some Chinese 
business people, especially those living in Muslim-majority areas who convert to Islam 
>Some Chir.ese Mt:slirn businessmen were cautious when they talked to rne. They were happy to discuss \vit'.1 n1e 
general topics and puhlic issues. Yet, they ivere re!ucta:1t to share with me their personal conversion experiences 
and religious journeys. Some of their typjcal answers \Vere 'religion is a persona! raalter' and 'I prefer to discuss 
!slam in a genend sense', 
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to seek security or reduce the possible hostility of local Muslims towards them. Such 
conversions are motivated hy both economic and political interest. 
Intermarriage and Intermingling 
A~ observed during my field research, most Chinese converts (70-80%) practise 'marital 
conversion'; that is, they convert to Islam because of intermarriage. If politically and 
economic driven converts are mostly older Chinese men, those who convert to 
intermarry are mainly younger Chinese, both male and female. Since the enactment of 
the 1974 Marriage Law, which tightened the conditions for legal marriage, many 
Chinese Indonesians become Muslim or at least officially register themselves as 
'Muslim' on their identity cards, in order to marry Muslim Indonesians. Conversion to 
Islam means a Chinese will have greater interaction with Muslim Indonesians, but 
frequent interaction with local Muslims also leads some Chinese to convert. It is not 
uncommon for many Chinese Indonesians to have close interaction with local Muslims 
especially if they live, work or study in Muslim majority neighbourhoods, workplaces or 
schools. Greater exposure to Islamic practices and teachings has inspired some of 
Chinese to learn more about the religion and finally convert to Islam, as well as marry a 
non-Chinese Muslim. The religiosity of these converts is greatly influenced by their 
Muslim spouse, relatives and friends. Some of them remain nominal Muslims; some 
practise Islam seriously; while others see Islam as a form of cultural attachment in which 
they follow localised Islamic traditions, and some see themselves being a 'Javanese' 
more than being a 'Muslim'. 
Religious Interests 
Mystical experiences (e.g. receiving religious messages in a dream), religious encounter 
(e.g. being touched by the call for prayers or azan or inspired by the Qur'anic verses on a 
television program), religious comparison (often of Islam and Christianity), and life 
crises (e.g. search for meanings or encountering a turning point in life) bring some 
Chinese closer to Islam. Compared to the three reasons above, in which conversion is a 
means to an end, these converts have volitionally chosen to acquire a new belief and 
religious identity. Some of them were once Christians and converted to Islam after 
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seriously comparing both religions. They think Islam is more attractive because 'the 
absence of the concept of Trinity makes Islam more logical' and 'lslam is a complete 
religion as it does not separate religion from daily lives'. Such converts are often 
emotionally bounded with the new religion, see it as a way of life and are enthusiastic 
about practising every detail of Islamic precepts. Some also treat Islam as an ideology, 
especially those who are involved in Islamic activism; while others practise Islam 
according to their way of living. 
Conversion Narratives and Motives 
I have earlier indicated that there are limitations to the categorisation of conversion 
factors above and here I would like to make three related points. First, in general, as is 
perhaps not surprising, those who convert for religious and cultural reasons are more 
serious about learning and observing Islam than those who convert for political and 
economic purposes. However, there are always exceptions -· a serious convert can 
become disappointed by his or her new religion and stop practising it. Meanwhile, a 
'utilitarian' convert can become a pious Muslim after being influenced by their Muslim 
friends or as a result of a life crisis. 
Second, in some cases, there are multiple reasons for a conversion, involving any 
combination of the conversion factors I discussed above. For example, a Chinese person 
who has been interested in Islam for a long time might convert after marrying a Muslim, 
a student in a Muslim-majority university might begin to practise Islam both due to the 
social influence of Muslim friends and the religious calling, or a businessman might 
convert to Islam to build up his business network and at the same time promote better 
relationship between Chinese and non-Chinese. And the lists go on. 
Third, and perhaps most important, is the difference between conversion narratives and 
conversion motives, or between 'official' and 'real' conversion reasons_ For example, a 
Chinese Muslim man in Surabaya once revealed to me that he converted to Islam 
because he wanted to be 'blending with the mainstream (Muslim) society' (Field note, 6 
October 2008), but when he was interviewed on a religious program on TV, he claimed 
that he was interested in !slam because he was touched by the azan or call for prayer. It 
is also not unusual for a Chinese Indonesian who converted to Islam for marriage or 
213 
economic purposes to tell the Muslim crowd during a conversion ceremony that his or 
her conversion is genuinely religious motivated. When a convert turns a personal and 
private conversion into a public story, the narrative, whether in verbal or written form, 
might not reflect his or her 'real' conversion motives, but be tailored to suit the audience. 
Therefore, instead of investigating the 'real' conversion reasons of converts, this chapter 
focused on examining under what conditions and how Chinese Muslims narrate their 
conversions, as well as learn and practise Islam. 1 am not here to judge whether a 
Chinese Muslim is a 'genuine' convert, but rather how he or she engages with diverse 
religious discourses and practices in Indonesia. 
As I discussed in Chapter 4, the circulation of convert narratives always constitutes one 
part of Muslims' preaching agenda, towards both non-Muslim and non-practising 
Muslims. A comparison between dominating conversion narratives during New Order 
period and post-1998 period is interesting. In 1988, Usman Effendy, a Chinese Muslim 
journalist, edited a book entitled 'Alv!OI: Aku Meniadi Orang Indonesia' [I am 
Becoming Indonesian] (Effendy 1988). As its title indicates, the book consists of various 
conversion stories that share a similar theme: pembauran (intermingling). While, in 2008, 
Dyayadi, a Muslim writer edited a book entitled 'Mengapa Etnis Tionghoa Memilih 
Islam· [Why Ethnic Chinese Choose Islam J (Dyayadi 2008). The book is a compilation 
of articles about conversion experiences and religious journeys of Chinese Muslims, in 
which many of them describe their challenges in practising Islam and the benefits they 
gain after become a Muslim. Generally speaking, during the New Order period, 
conversion narratives aim to manifest Chinese Muslims' commitment to being part of 
Indonesian majorities through Islamic conversion; while today, conversion narratives 
focus on highlighting Chinese Muslims' religious commitment and illustrate their 
Islamic piety as a role model for born Muslims. This resembles the shifting of the 
dominating discourse, from 'pembauran' to 'dakwah', among Chinese Muslim leaders in 
Indonesia (discussed in chapter 2 and 5). 
Conversion Processes: Becoming Officially Muslim 
In the previous section, I discussed why Chinese Indonesians convert to Islam. Now, I 
will describe the official process of becoming a Muslim. To be a Muslim, religiously 
speaking, is rather simple: one only needs to proclaim syahadat (witness or testimony); 
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that is 'There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is God's messenger'. However, 
conversion to Islam is not merely a personal and private affair in Indonesia. It is also a 
bureaucratic procedure, as official conversion involves visiting government offices and 
changing the stated religion on one's identity card.4 
Let me describe a 'typical' conversion in Indonesia. A person who is interested in 
converting to Islam, first visits a mosque and talks to the ustaz (religious teacher) or 
other staff in the mosque. Sometimes, religious guidance and courses, either in the form 
of individual consultation or group discussion, will be provided in the mosque before or 
after the conversion. The ustaz will arrange a simple ceremony, usually in the mosque, 
which has to be witnessed by two Muslims. Sometimes, the ustaz also suggests that the 
convert adopts an Islamic name. After the ceremony, the convert will be issued with a 
certificate of conversion. With the letter as the proof, the convert can then change their 
religious status at the sub-district office (katztor kecamatan) or village office (kantor 
kelurahan) through the help of the neighbourhood community organisations (Rukun 
Tetangga, RT or Rukun Wi/ayah, RW), then he or she will be officially a Muslim. For a 
convert who is planning to marry, he or she will then go to the Religious Affairs Office 
(Kantor Umsan Agama, KUA) to register the marriage. According to 1974 Indonesian 
Marriage Law, a marriage will be only recognised by the state if both partners share the 
same religion. However, a convert has the choice of leaving the religion after marriage, 
provided he or she gains permission from their sub-district offices. 
Unlike the process in Malaysia, 'official' conversion to, or renouncement of Islam in 
Indonesia is conducted by 'secular' officers and is not regulated by religious authorities. 
Furthermore, the matters of religious conversion (as well as renouncement) are not 
strictly legalised in Indonesia. Thus, there is always some flexibility in the process. For 
an example, a certificate of conversion from the mosque is recommended, but not 
compulsory for changing religion on an identity card. l have encountered a few cases, in 
which converts directly went to the neighbourhood community without a certificate to 
ask for the change in their religious status, because they have a close relationship with 
4 However, in comparison to Jv1alaysia, lslamic conversion in lndonesja is more flexible, Conversion to Islam in 
11aiaysia ts highly controHed by the stale. Jt changes a person's •Jfficial identity to a h1uslim who is bounded hy 
Islamic la\\'S. Converts need to go through jJ bureaucratic procedure at the Heligiou.s Affairs Dcp::irtrrient, 
including a change of nan1e (adop!ion of an ls!Jniic name}. \Vhich is not required by law but always advised by 
the a1nhorities, Jn some states in Malaysin, converts have to take religious lessons and pass a !est befoie being 
issued an 'Islamic card' (Hew 2005), Ont--c converted to !s!arn, given !he irnplementation of strict Islamlc l;nvs, he 
or she has difficulty in ieaving ~he religion officially. Meanwhile in lnCones!a, conversi:Jn to Isl<1m is less 
bureaucratic, the Rdopticn of an lslnmlc name is optional and a convert can chenge hls or her religious status on 
identity card more easily, 
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the officers or were accompanied by local religious figures, such as a kiai or an ustaz. 
One of my informants did not even change the religious status on his identity card, yet 
was able to register his marriage with a Muslim girl in the KUA, as he convinced the 
KUA official that he was a Muslim by showing his religious knowledge. There are also 
some cases in which converts change their religious information, from Islam back to 
their original religion after marriage. The renouncement of Islam may raise social 
pressure from some Muslims, hut is not prohibited by law in Indonesia. 
Piety in the Making: Becoming Spiritually Muslim 
Having reviewed the 'official' conversion procedure, let us tum to the religious 
experiences of Chinese Muslims. As mentioned earlier, conversion reasons are important 
in determining the religious piety of converts. However, religious education after 
conversion, together with other factors such as social encounters and localities also play 
significant roles in shaping one's religiosity. Unlike in Malaysia, there are no state 
religious authorities that offer standard courses for converts and no test is required to be 
recognised officially as a Muslim in Indonesia. Given that Muslim practises and 
discourses in Indonesia are diverse, it is not surprising that Chinese Muslims go through 
different religious journeys and have divergent understandings of their new religion. 
Many converts learn about Islam from mosques. Some mosques offer special religious 
guidance and classes for new converts. Otherwise, converts can learn about their new 
religion from general Islamic study sessions at mosques. Converts also learn about 
Islamic practices from their Muslim spouses, relatives, neighbours and friends. To 
deepen their understanding of Islam, some read books on Islam; listen to cassettes; watch 
religious programs on television; attend Islamic preaching; join Friday sermons; learn to 
read Al-Qur'an; follow a religious teacher; study in a religious school or take course in 
an Islamic university. Given the plurality of Islamic religiosity in Indonesia, which strain 
of Islam do most Chinese Indonesians convert to? I would like to highlight three inter· 
related features of Chinese converts religiosity here - first, there is no singular, locally 
bounded 'Chinese Islam' identity in Indonesia; second, Chinese converts' religiosity is 
not stable; and third, their religiosity is highly diverse. 
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Not a Singular 'Chinese Islam' Identity 
Although there are some public manifestations of a 'Chinese Islam' identity through 
mosques and preaching styles, there is hardly any unique 'Chinese Islam' religious 
practice and understanding in Indonesia. Different from varieties of locally bounded 
Muslim communities in Indonesia, such as Javanese Muslims, Bugis Muslims, Acehnese 
Muslims and Sasak Muslims, Chinese Muslims are not regionally concentrated and 
village-based, but dispersed individuals who are mainly urban dwellers.5 Given that they 
are dispersed minorities and do not constitute a majority in any locality, they do not form 
a specific ethno-local Islamic tradition; therefore 'Chinese Islam' is a problematic 
concept. Chinese Muslims from Sumatra to Sulawesi follow religious practices that are 
dominant in different localities rather than share a common 'Chinese Islam' practice. Put 
in other words, the Islam Chinese Muslims practise has less to do with their 
'Chineseness', and more lo do with their situated locali!ies, together with their 
conversion motivations, religious experiences and what kind of Islam they are exposed 
to from their Musi ims spouses and friends. 
Let me demonstrate the plurality of Chinese Muslim identities by discussing their local 
religious affiliations and transnational religious connections. Regarding local religious 
organisations, some might suggest Chinese Muslims would have preferred the 
traditionalist NU, since NU is in general more tolerant towards local culture and ethnic 
customs. Furthermore, NU's former leader, Abdurrahman Wahid, was well respected by 
Chinese Indonesians for his tolerance and supports of multiculturalism. Indeed, some 
converts who prefer to keep their Chinese traditions say they are more comfortable with 
traditionalist Islam that allows them to pray for their ancestors. However, there are also 
some converts who think that the Islamic practice of Muhammadiyah is more logical, 
simple (involving less rituals than NU) and 'time-saving' (shorter prayer sessions for 
raraweh), They also suggest that the urban-based modernist Muslims have more 
similarities to Chinese converts, who are mostly urban-dwellers and business people. 
Beyond NU and Muhammadiyah, Chinese Muslims are also involved in other Muslim 
5 It is irnportanl to state that "local lslarn' in I~donesia, such as ·Javanese Islam', is not niono!ithic either and can 
also be a problen1atic concept. I only sec Javanese Muslims as a locally bounded Muslim co;nrnunlty in a 
cornp;uative sense, contrasting Chinese Muslin1s who are dispersed rninorities and do not <:onstitttte a majority in 
any locality In Indonesia. In tt!rms of religious practices and understandings, influenced by various transnational 
tlov1s and local dynarnics, lsiam in Java is also a co!Y!plex reality, ruther than a monolithic lradition. For mo1e 
discussion of Islam in Java, see Beatty 1999; Bowen 2003; Daniels 2009; }iefner 2000; Greciz 1960; anG 
\Vood\vard 1989. 
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groups, ranging from the 'progressive' JIL, the 'lslamist' PKS, to the 'radical' FPL As I 
mentioned in chapter 5, C1Jinese Muslim religious affiliations are mostly influenced by 
local Islamic currents. For example, most Chinese Muslims are Muhammadiyah 
members in Yogyakarta, NU members in Surabaya and PKS supporters in Jakarta. 
Conversion to Islam is also often followed by the change of one's world view and 
transnational subjectivity. Many begin to see themselves as a part of an Islamic ummah 
and hope to join the pilgrimage to Mecca; share the plight of suffering Muslims across 
the world, such as those in Palestine, and sometimes the ideology of transnational 
Islamic movements, such as Hizbut Tahrir and the Muslim Brotherhood. A~ an example, 
on a Friday afternoon in January 2009, following the Israeli bombardment that killed 
hundreds of Palestinians, a Chinese Muslim ustaz could not stop himself from crying 
when he was delivering a Friday sermon at a mosque in Jakarta. He urged Indonesian 
Muslims to share the suffering of their Muslim counterparts in Palestine, support their 
struggles and pray for better livelihoods for them. On the same day, thousands of PKS 
supporters clogged the main streets in Central Jakarta after Friday prayers in a show of 
solidarity for Palestinians. A few Chinese Muslims also participated in the rally to show 
their support (Field note, 2 January 2009). The transnational connections of Chinese 
Muslims go beyond Muslims in the Middle East, as some of them also associate 
themselves with the plight of Muslims in mainland China. During the riots involving 
Han Chinese and Uighur Muslims in 2009, a Chinese Muslim in Indonesia, who claimed 
himself to be a spokesperson of P!Tl, criticised China's brutality towards the Uighur 
Muslims, and regretted the silence of Muslim nations on the discrimination and 
persecution of the Uighurs.6 As I discussed in chapter 3, some Chinese Muslim leaders 
also established transnational linkages with Hui Muslims in China, by building Chinese-
style mosques and having mutual-visits. 
Shifting Religiosity 
Generally speaking, there are two common assumptions about religious conversion. The 
first, is that new converts tend to be 'fundamentalist' or 'fanatic', meaning they are more 
likely to subscribe to puritanical and conservative forms of religious understanding as a 
way of asserting their commitment to their newly found 'true' religion (Roy 2004). 
''See 'Muslin Nations Told To Help Uighurs', The Jakarta Post, 10 Juty 2009. 
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Second, is the assumption of stages of conversion, mainly from a more rigid observance 
to a more flexible one; in which many converts tend to be 'fundamentalist' after 
embracing a new religious 'truth', then become disappointed with born Muslim 
behaviour and ideas, before being able to locate their religious understanding in 
everyday life (Nieuwkerk 2006). My study of Chinese Muslim religiosity provides more 
nuances, if not challenges to both these conventional assumptions. Chinese Muslim 
religiosities are divergent and dynamic: not all of tbem convert to Islam for religious 
purposes and take their new religion seriously; while some of them who are only 
'official' Muslims in the beginning transform into 'practising' Muslims. 
As I indicated earlier, there are some non-observant Chinese Muslims who are only 
officially Muslim (mostly for the purpose of marrying a Muslim). During my interviews, 
some of my informants told me that they have friends and family members who have 
converted lo Islam, but did not practise Islam and still eat pork, for instance. Most non-
practising Muslims remain low profile and do not involve themselves in public religious 
activities. Therefore, many of my informants are practising Muslims, or at least partly-
practising Muslims, yet with a wide range of religious orientations. 
As expected, religiously driven converts and 'born-again' Chinese Muslims tend to be 
more serious in observing Islam, and some even more 'rigid' than the born Muslims. 
They are enthusiastic about practising every detail of Islamic precepts. Some of them 
even eschew their cultural practices, such as praying for ancestors, which they see as 
violating Islamic principles and criticise traditionalist Muslims practices, such as tahlilan, 
as un-Islamic. Reborn Chinese Muslims can be divided into two groups. The first one is 
second-generation Chinese Muslims, who are mostly the offspring of inter-marriage 
between Chinese converts and non-Chinese Muslims. In my research, l found a couple of 
Chinese Muslim women whose parents were nominal Muslims, yet they became aware 
of their 'religious duty', such as putting on the veil, after encountering Islamic activists 
from HTI and PKS in universities. The second group are those who initially converted 
for practical reasons, but took their religion seriously later. 
Indeed, some life stories I collected from fieldwork show that religiosity is not fixed and 
can change in different stages of life. One of my informants, Gunawan, a shopkeeper, 
tells me that he initially became a Muslim for the purpose of 'pembauran' (intermingling) 
and did not practise !slam in daily life. A few years after his conversion, his business 
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went bankrupt and this led him to question the direction of his life. He began to study 
Islam seriously and. according to him, he finally found peace and truth in Islam. He is 
now a devout Muslim and a religious activist in a mosque. He also expresses his 
disappointment, that some Chinese Muslim businessmen only practise Islam in public, 
but do not observe the religion at home (Interview, 18 October 2008). Kapao, another 
Chinese Muslim man had a similar religious journey to Gunawan. Kapao, who runs a 
small printing business, officially converted from Christianity to !slam for intermarriage, 
yet in the beginning, he still went to the church and even persuaded his wife to join 
Christianity. According to Kapao, a life crisis made him question his belief in 
Christianity. He read and compared both the Bible and the Qur'an, which led him to 
conclude that Islam is a better religion for him. He says he not only transformed himself 
into a pious Muslim, but convinced his wife to be more 'Islamic' by wearing headscarf 
and abandoning 'un-Islamic' Javanese traditions, such as slametan (Interview, 24 
October 2008). To a certain extent, both Gunawan and Kapao, converted to Islam twice: 
first, they converted to be 'official' Muslims, and later they converted to be 'rigid' and 
'practising' Muslims. 
Vihile Gunawan and Kapao's religious routes are from less pious to more devout, Surya 
and Edi went through the reverse trajectory: they converted to Islam because of religious 
interests, first they were emotionally bounded to their new religion and enthusiastic to 
practise it rigidly, yet later they developed more flexible attitudes towards Islamic 
teachings. Surya converted to Islam from Christianity after seriously comparing both 
religions. He said, 'In the beginning, I was a 'fanatical' Muslim and held conservative 
religious viewpoints. But after engaging with different discourses on Islam, I became a 
'liberal' Muslim' (Interview, 4 April 2008). Once a Muslim student activist, Surya is 
now a human rights campaigner. Meanwhile, Edi, a curator, converted to Islam in high 
school because he was attracted to the philosophy of Islam. However, after he entered a 
local university, his interest in Islam declined as he felt himself alienated by the 
dogmatic and conservative viewpoints of the Muslim activists on the campus. Now, he 
sees himself as a nominal Muslim (as recorded in his identity card) and is married to a 
Christian woman. When I met him in 2009, he told me that he was a supporter of JIL, the 
Liberal Islamic Network and campaigned against the passing of the Anti-Pornography 
Bill (Interview, 7 January 2009). 
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Diverse Religiosity 
Chinese Muslims in Indonesia come from all walks of life: big businessmen, 
shopkeepers, barbers, make-up artists, Islamic preachers, religious teachers, fortune 
tellers, lawyers, lecturers, activists, politicians, public servants, housewives, students and 
so on. Chinese Muslim religiosities also have at least three different aspects as compared 
to other Muslims in Indonesia. First, as I discussed earlier, Chinese Muslims are not 
locally bounded etlrno-religious group but dispersed minorities. Second, Chinese 
Muslims are mostly converts. And last, Chinese Muslims are a religious minority within 
the Chinese 'community'. After conversion to Islam, they might face opposition from 
their non-Muslim family members and friends. They also have to meet the expectations 
of their Muslim counterparts; and need to negotiate daily practices between former 
Chinese cultural traditions (if they still observe these) and their new acquired Islamic 
practices. Therefore, their re!igiosities are more diverse, if not as diverse as other 
Muslims in Indonesia. At the extreme end of each spectrum, l have met a Chinese 
Muslim man who said he is still drinking beer and eating pork at home, while another 
Chinese Muslim woman privately told me that she supports Abu Bakar Basyir, the 
former leader of terrorist group, Jemaah Islamiyah. However, most Chinese Muslims are 
in between of both extremes 
For Chinese Indonesians, Islamic conversion is both a religious experience, as well as an 
ongoing process of social transformation and cultural negotiation. Conversion to Islam 
implies not only the subjective embracing of an alternative set of beliefs, but is also 
likely to involve the changing of personal practices and appearance, such as in diet, dress, 
social networks, cultural identification, political affiliations and the like. In other words, 
Chinese Muslims religiosities go beyond the domain of religious interpretations and 
practices, such as the five daily prayers and fasting during Ramadan. There are many 
other indicators of their diverse religiosities, such as naming practices (the adoption of 
an Islamic name), eating and drinking behaviour (the consumption of halal food), bodily 
practices (dress code and appearance), social networks (relations with family members, 
Chinese and non-Chinese), worldviews and political ideologies (transnational 
connections and viewpoints on the implementation of sharia), economy (the usage of 
Islamic banking), education (school choice for their children) as well as attitudes towards 
Chinese cultural practices, their former religions and local Muslims practices. I have 
discussed some of these aspects in earlier parts of this chapter, as well as in other 
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chapters in this thesis. In the following sections, I will examine the female veiling 
practice, everyday life stories and naming practices of Chinese converts. 
Everyday Religiosity and Flexible Piety 
Many scholars have expressed concern about the rising Islamic conservatism in 
Indonesia; that localised, hybrid and peaceful Islam is giving way to globalised, puritan 
and sometimes radical Islam; while flexible religiosity is heing replaced by assertive 
religiosity (Beatty 1999; Bruinessen 2002; Hefner 2005; Salim 2007). Yet, 'Islamisation' 
in contemporary Indonesia is a multifaceted phenomenon. It involves not only religious 
and political sphere, but also economic activities (Juoro 2008; Sakai 2008) and popular 
culture (Fealy 2008; Beryanto 2010). Therefore, for many ordinary Muslims, their 
support of 'lslamisation' varies and the perceived meanings of 'lslamisalion' are 
multifarious. Aq an example, one may support the 'Islamisation' of consumer culture, yet 
disapprove the implementation of Islamic laws in Indonesia. 
How do Chinese converts situate themselves and respond to 'Islamisation'? Some of 
them contribute directly or indirectly to 'lslamisation' in Indonesia, such as those who 
are involved in lslamic activism, banking and preaching (see chapter 4 and 5). There are 
also a few Chinese Muslims who resist, if not reject 'lslamisation'. Instead of criticising 
'Islamisation' publicly, they choose to react quietly in different ways, either refusing to 
adhere to the 'puritan Islam' or continuing their daily practices which might be seen as 
'un-lslamic'. Some, if possihle, hide their Muslim identities in public; while many others 
still embrace Islam as a part of their identities, but distance themselves from 'political 
Islam'. Between promoting and refusing 'lslamisation', most Chinese Muslims are in the 
middle - accommodating Islamic practices according to their living contexts; and also 
adjusting their daily habits according to their religious understandings. To a certain 
extent, their religiosities have less to do with their interpretations of religious texts, but 
are more influenced by the contingent political, social, cultural and economic 
circumstances of their understanding of Islam. Their religiosities are the outcome of 
ongoing negotiations between expectations of other Muslims and self-identifications, as 
well as accommodations between normative Islam and their everyday struggle. 
Therefore, their religiosities can be selective, inconsistent, ambivalent and fluid. 
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During my fieldwork, I came across a few Chinese converts, who seem to have 
contradicting religiosities, but managed to reconcile, justify or at !east contain such 
inconsistencies. Examples of the contradicting cases I encountered include: a self-
professed salafist Muslim who criticised traditionalist Muslim practices, yet he himself 
was an activist in a Chinese-style mosque; a FPI supporter who condemned Ahmadiyah 
as 'deviant', but was active in mediating possible conflicts between non-Muslims and 
Muslims; a part-time preacher who wore jilbab when giving religious talks in Indonesia, 
but took off her headscarf when gambling in a casino in Malaysia; a businessman who 
delivered a speech in a religious function in morning, yet drank beer in a social gathering 
at night in the same day; a Mandarin-language teacher who first told me that interfaith 
marriage should be avoided, hut later confessed that his wife was a Chinese Christian; 
and on the list goes. 
Such inconsistent religiosities of Chinese converts challenge the simplified dichotomies 
of Muslim religiosity: between abangan (nominal) and santri (observant Muslims), 
modernist and traditionalist (Geertz 1960), radical-conservative and progressive-liberal 
(Anwar 2009), scripturalist and substantialist (Liddle 1996), literal and liberal (Rahim 
2006); for overlooking the complex realities of Islamic identities in contemporary 
societies. These familiar and convenient typologies fail to capture the everyday 
religiosity of many ordinary Muslims, especially the converts. Therefore, I support the 
propositions that Muslim religiosities are a negotiation between normative and non-
norrnative Islam; a zone of compromise, inconsistency and ambivalence (Beatty 1999); 
an ambivalent relationship between Islamic resurgents and 'ordinary' Muslims (Peletz 
1997); or a spontaneous social reality (Alam 2007). To these, I now turn to the example 
being the veiling practices of female converts. 
Female Veilings and Everyday Islam 
The practice of female veiling, which in Indonesia usually means wearing the jilbab, has 
grown rapidly among Muslim women since the 1990s (Brenner 1996). After the collapse 
of the New Order regime, some schools have even made the wearing of jilbab 
compulsory (Parker 2005); while some regional governments have issued regulations 
requiring women to wear the veil in public (Bush 2008; Setyawati 2009; White & 
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Anshor 2008). 7 Recently, there has been a growmg Muslim fashion industry that 
produces fashionable 'Islamic dresses' and stylish jilbabs (Amrullah 2008; Jones 2007). 
Informed by these broader contexts, I will look into female Chinese Muslims and their 
attitudes toward the jilbab (wearing or not wearing, why and when). Generally speaking, 
there are three attitudes: donning jilbab all the time, donning it occasionally and not 
donning it at all. 
Female Chinese Muslims who convert for religious reasons and are active in Islamic 
organisations are more likely to wear the jilbab consistently. They don the jilbab for 
various reasons: to inform others of their new religious identity, to show their 
commitment to practising Islam, and to 'regulate' themselves as 'devout' female 
Muslims. Ritha, born in 1976, converted to Islam when she was 20, after she recovered 
from a serious illness. When she was ill, she questioned the meaning of life and she 
found her answers in Islam. After marrying into a pious Chinese Muslim family in 
Jakarta, she is now an account clerk in an office owned by a Chinese Muslim 
businessman and is also an activist in MUSTIKA. Wearing a jilbab is akin to wearing a 
new identity, she says, 'I wore the jilbab immediately after I converted. I wanted to show 
others that I am Muslim now. So they wil! treat me as a Muslim. They will not serve me 
food that is haram or ask me to go to the Chinese temple.' After wearing the jilbab, her 
parents repelled her and she lost her job in a Chinese business company. She recalls the 
tough time and says, 'These are the challenges of God. With my strong belief, and 
thanks to God, I overcame such difficulties' (Interview, 10 June 2008). 
For Ritha, Islamic dress is not only about wearing jilbab, but also wearing clothes that 
hide the female body shape. As I observed, she always wore a jilbab with loose-fitting 
clothes in plain colours, even at her home and when she swims. She says, 'I have to wear 
the jilbab consistently, because I want to follow Islam fully. Wearing Islamic dress will 
remind me of my identity as a female Muslim and that I have to act modestly.' In other 
words, veiling is not only an act of strengthening her faith and forging her sense of being 
a Muslim woman, hut also a form of self-regulation to 'discipline' herself according to 
her understanding of Islam. It was not a surprise that she supported the implementation 
7 ln Indonesia, kerudung and jilbab both used to refer to women's head coverings. Kenulung is an easlly-
rcmovab!e head.scarf ihat covers the head loosely, which stHI can expose part of one's hair and neck, !'>.1eanwhile. 
jilbab is a longer piece of headscarf rhat cuvers hair, nc\,.'k and ears. but not the face of a female Muslim. 
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of the controversial anti-Pornography Bill and other regulations that control Muslims' 
morality in public,3 
Liliana was born in 1973. She is a nurse and converted to Islam from Christianity and is 
married to a Muslim of Arab descent. Like Ritha, the jilbab is both symbolically and 
religiously important for Liliana. Liliana, once a church activist, says, 'By wearing a 
jilbab, no one will ask me to go to church again. In the church, males ;md females mix 
freely; but in the mosque, there is. a clear moral boundary between genders'. For her, 
'both gender segregation and female veiling is not a form of discrimination, but a 
protection for women' (Interview, 15 November 2008). Jilbab wearing is also important 
for 'born-again' second generation Chinese Muslims to assert their religious piety, 
distinguishing themselves from their parents who are nominal converts. Yani, a HTI 
activist, who born into a mixed Javanese-Chinese family, is one of them. She tells me, 
'My Chinese mother does not wear a jilbab because she converted to Islam to 
marry my father, while my Javanese father is a nominal Muslim. Although I was 
born a Muslim, I was never taught to be a good Muslim in my family. I learnt 
Islam in school and I began to put on the veil after I followed Islamic study 
sessions with my Muslim friends. After I first wore the jilbab, I felt that I was a 
'real' Muslim. I also feel peace of mind. I will never take it off again. I hope my 
mother wiU wear jilbab one day too' (Interview, 29 November 2008). 
Siew Hwa, a make-up artist and Sandy, a women's rights activist hold different attitudes 
towards veiling. Siew Hwa, born in 1980, converted to Islam due to the influence of 
Muslim friends in high school. I first met Siew Hwa at a religious function in the PIT! 
office in Jakarta. She stood out because, compared to other female Muslims, she did not 
wear a jilbab or kerudung. Dressed fashionably with coloured and trendy !iair-style, she 
clarifies, 'I have just come from my workplace. ! am a make-up artist. I have to dress up. 
I! is impractical for me to wear a jilbab because I have to interact with people from 
different backgrounds for my job, including westerners' (Field note, 10 January 2009). 
B In late September 2005, a draft anti~pornograpby bill, that covered both pornography a;id pcrr:ographic 
activities or obscene acts (pornoaksi), was handed to Indonesian parliament for revie\V. The initial bill not only 
proposed tn regulate the produc! ion and distribution of pornography, but also prohibit pornographic acts the scope 
of which wws potentially broad; encompassing such things as traditional ethnic dances and the wearing of 
'irnproper' clothing. It carne under heavy critlcisrn because of fears !hat it would undermine loca! cultural 
traditions, artistic expression and \\'Omen's rights, After undergoing changes, the biH V.'as passed in iate 2008. The 
controversial 'pornographic activities' sec!ion \vas e!imlnatcd <ind provisions banning ethnic dress in the original 
were omitted from the revised bill. Nevertheless, oppositions to Ihe bill remain, especially among human rights 
and 1,vo:nen 's rights activists. See r\llen (2007, 2009) and Salim (2007). 
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When I met her for a short interview in a shopping mall, she told me that some of her 
Muslim friends ask her to veil, but she does not follow their advice. She explains, 'I am 
not ready yet. Veiling cannot be forced. It has to come from the heart. Furthermore, with 
the jilbab, it also come the responsibility, I have to be very careful with my behavior. 
People will have higher moral expectations of me.' (Interview, 16 January 2009). 
Nevertheless, according to her, not donning the jilbab does not make her less of a 
Muslim. She says, 'I try to observe Islam in daily life. I pray if my work is not too busy. 
I fast during Ramadan if I am not travelling. With God's will, I hope I can put on the 
jilbab if I have a new job or after 1 get married.' 
Sandy, born into a mixed religious family, grew up as a Muslim and now is a women's 
rights activist. She shares the opinion of many other liberal-minded Muslims that female 
veiling is not compulsory, but a personal choice. She strongly criticises the anti-
Pornography Bill and some regional regulations that make female veiling obligatory in 
public. Sandy explains why she resists donning the jilbab, 'It will place me under the 
scrutiny of other Muslims. My belief in Islam is my own relationship with God. I do not 
want to be judged by others whether I am a good Muslim or not.' She also tells me an 
experience that her 'Chinese-looking' appearance has saved her from being caught by 
the religious police in Aceh, a province in Indonesia where strict Islamic laws are 
implemented (which includes punishment for Muslim women not wearing a jilbab). She 
says wryly, 'When I was in Aceh for work early this year, no one bothered whether I was 
wearing jilbab or not. That is because I look 'Chinese' and people assume that I am not a 
Muslim. This might be one of the few situations in which I feel that being a Chinese 
woman is a blessing' (Interview, 19 June 2008). 
Departing from two contrasting veiling practices discussed above, most female Chinese 
Muslims I met during fieldwork are in the middle position, in which 'sometimes they put 
a jilbab on, other times they take it off. Many of them don a jilbab during religious 
functions and when meeting Muslims, while putting it aside when interacting with non-
Muslims. Lai Ting, a middle-aged housewife, who converted to Islam to marry, and is 
one of those female converts who are flexible in wearing 'Islamic clothing'. I first met 
Lai Ting donning the jilbab in the Surabaya Cheng Hoo Mosque during an Islamic study 
session. When I met her for second time at her home, she was int-shirt and long trousers, 
without a headscarf. She says, 'I just come back from gym with my Chinese friends. 
Islam teaches me about moderation. I am not going to don jilbab while doing exercise, 
226 
right? Similarly, I will not wear mini-skirt if I visit mosque' (Interview, 16 November 
2008). 
Balancing religious observance and occupational reality, it is also not uncommon for 
younger female Chinese converts to don a jilbab while attending mosque activities, but 
to take it off while working to avoid discrimination, especially for those who work in the 
non-Muslim majority workplaces. Mariana is an English teacher in a primary school, in 
which most teachers and students are non-Muslim Chinese Indonesians. She tells me, 'I 
wear jilbab most of the time, except during work and visiting my parents.' She explains, 
'In the school, I do not want to be treated differently because of my religion. At my 
parents' home, I do not want to make them angry. Islam teaches us to maintain good 
relationships with our family members and friends' (Interview, 2 March 2008). Ella, a 
Chinese Muslim businesswoman, shares similar experience to those of Mariana. She 
owns a computer shop in Mangga Dua Plaza, Jakarta, in which most shops are owned by 
Chinese. I met her a few times during lslamic study sessions and she often wears a jilbab. 
When l talked to Ella at her shop, she says, 
'For the first few years of being a Muslim, I did not wear jilbab in my shop. 
Most of my Chinese friends did not know that I was a Muslim. I worried that I 
might lose my customers. Yet, a month ago, I had a dream that I would die soon, 
although I am not ill. I realised that I should wear jilbab more consistently. Thus, 
I decided to wear jilbab to my shop. I wear colourful and trendy ji/bab, so people 
do not suspect me of being a Muslim. Indeed, for the first few days, instead of 
asking me why I convened to Islam, many customers asked me if I am going for 
a party after work. After a week or so, most of them realised that I was a Muslim. 
Surprisingly, business is going on as usual. Customers are pragmatic. If I provide 
good service, they still come to my shop. Tbey do not really care about my 
religion.' (Interview, 12 January 2009). 
The cases above illustrate the flexibility and pragmatism of Chinese converts' everyday 
Islamic religiosity. Islam is an important, but not a totalising factor that determines their 
daily behaviour. Various practical reasons also inform and constrain bow a female 
convert practices Islam. In other words, converts' understanding of Islam definitely will 
influence their everyday social lives, but their cultural background, working envi.ronment 
and social networks may also influence how they view and practice their new religion. 
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Life Stories and Flexible Piety 
In the earlier part of this chapter, I discussed the shifting religiosities of some converts 
across different stages of their lives. I have also indicated that a convert can 
simultaneously manifest different aspects of their religiosities when dealing with 
different situations and interacting with differellt audiences. Here, I will analyse more 
life stories of Chinese converts that reflect their multifaceted religiosities. My aim is not 
to judge how pious they are nor investigate what is their 'true' religious standpoint, but 
to explore how and under what conditions, they adjust and justify their somewhat 
inconsistent religiosities. I argue that their rather flexible attitudes towards Islam do not 
necessarily mean they are hypocritical or not serious about their new religion, but rather 
that they have to accommodate their religious practices in their everyday s!ruggles. I see 
these ambiguous commitments to religion as a form of 'flexible piety', that 
acknowledges the possibilities of disjuncture between one's understanding of, feeling 
about and practice of Islam, as well as the inconsistency of one's religious opinions and 
practices. Flexible piety, I would suggest, is prevalent, but not limited to converts; as 
many Indonesian Muslims have to respond to the rise of assertive Islam and, in some 
provinces, the implementation of sharia-inspired laws that aim to control the public 
morality of Muslims. As I observed, while many Muslims, including converts, would 
like to live a more religious life, they do not want their religiosities to be regulated by the 
state law and authorities. 
Ibrahim was born in 1949. He is a notary and a Chinese Muslim activist in Jakarta. 
Ibrahim has an impressive religious profile: he is a follower of NU traditions, a 
Muhammadiyah member and a PKS supporter. He sees his multiple religious affiliations 
as complementary, not contradiction, 'I follow zikir (Islamic chanting) to feel closer with 
God, I support PKS to implement Islamic principles in society. Islam is a religion that 
combines both the spiritual and social dimensions of life.' He continues, 'Good relations 
with different Muslim groups also maximises my dakwah efforts' (Interview, 9 June 
2008). Like Ibrahim, Halim adapts to different religious views and practices. Once a 
barber and a part-time baker, Halim is now a religious teacher in the Surabaya Cheng 
Hcio Mosque. Growing up in a Javanese neighbourhood, he speaks fluent Javanese and 
can perform Gamelan and traditional Javanese dance. However, he abandoned Javanese 
cultural practices after he became a Muslim and was influenced by the modernist 
Muhammadiyah. He explains, 'I am not fanatic. It is not about haram or halal. I just feel 
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that cultivating Islamic faith is more important' Although a modernist Muslim himself, 
Halim tells me, he has no problem with other religious teachers in the mosque who 
follow traditionalist Muslim practices, such as slameran. He says, 'After all, we are all 
Muslims. We share the same goal, which is dakwah. · (Interview, 2 November 2008). 
Kamal Lee, born in 1973, an official in a private company, has to deal with a more 
contrasting religious standpoinl. Although rejecting violence, Kamal Lee is a self-
professed salafi and holds a puritan and conservative Islamic understanding. For 
example, he criticises Gus Dur for being a 'western agent', disapproves of local Muslim 
practices such as tahlilan and views Ahmadiyah as 'deviant'. He also keeps his beard to 
demonstrate his commitment to Islam, as the Prophet Muhammad did. Yet, he is an 
activist in Lautze Mosque in Jakarta. He says, ·As a Muslim, Mam is my priority, 
Chinese or not is not important. 1 practise Islam according to the Qur' an and Hadith. I do 
not follow Chinese cultural traditions that are haram, such as ancestor worship.' Then, 
he explains, 'But, I have to compromise. I join the Chinese mosque, so that I can spread 
my understanding of Islam to new converts. If I am not here, Chinese converts might still 
bum incense. I have to rectify such behaviour.' (Interview, 28 March 2008). Asri, a 
young male convert, shares Kamal Lee's experience. Asri graduated in Islamic laws 
from salafist-oriented LIPIA (Lembaga llmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab, Institute for 
Islamic and Arabic Studies) in Jakarta in 2008. Without giving up his aims to promote 
sharia and to purify Muslims practices, he tells me, he joined PIT!, learnt to speak 
Mandarin and observes Chinese New Year celebrations as strategies to preach ·true 
Islam to Chinese converts and non-Muslims (Interview, 27 December 2008). 
While Halim, Kamal and Asri still strongly believe in religious orthodoxy, Ida and Mary 
do not confine their everyday practices to the rigid understandings of Islam. Jda was born 
in 1952. She is an astrologist and a part-time preacher. Married to a Javanese Catholic, 
Ida tells me her husband and she converted to Islam after they met Masagung, a 
prominent Chinese Muslim in 1984 and were convinced by him that Islam is a beautiful 
religion. Ida inherited her grandfather's knowledge of fortune-telling that combines 
Chinese fengshui, Islamic calendar and Javanese astrology. She also offers the service of 
slametan for businessmen and other Javanese rituals at a mystical site, Gunung Kawi in 
East Java. When 1 met Ida at her home, I noticed there was an altar with burning incense 
for her grandfather. She comments, 'Who says Muslims cannot pray for ancestors? 
According to my understanding, Islam teaches us about filial piety.' She then 
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surprisingly reveals to me, 'I have just returned from the casino in Genting Highlands, 
Malaysia, a few days ago. I went with my Javanese friends and I helped them to gamble 
with my mystical knowledge. We do not wear the jilbab. No one in the casino knows 
that we are a Muslim.' However, when she preaches, she wears the jilbab. She tells me 
frankly, 'I only speak in public occasionally. My Islamic knowledge is not deep. What I 
can do is quote a few Qur'anic verses and give general moral advice'. Towards the end 
of interview, I was confused by her religious attitudes. She senses it and tells me before I 
leave, 'I am a Muslim, but I am also a normal human being. Muslims also need to have 
fun, right?' (Interview, 2 November 2008). 
Ida's life story is not exceptional, as a few Chinese converts I met share similar 
experiences. Mary, a middle"aged convert, who became a Muslim to marry, is another 
interesting example. Mary trained in law and is now a businesswoman. She is also a 
committee member for PITI and a Muslim representative in FKUB (Forum Kerukunan 
Umat Beragama, InteHeligious Harmony Forum). East Java. When I first met her at a 
PIT! function, she covered her head with a kerudung, a loose headscarf. When I met her 
at her home for an interview, she was dressed in Western-style office suit without any 
headscarf. She tells me, 'I have just come back from meeting a customer from Japan. It 
is not practical to wear headscarf when 1 do business. Furthermore, Surabaya is very hot 
and sweaty.' Her living room is decorated with a few Javanese shadow puppets and two 
huge Chinese vases. On the wall, there is Islamic calligraphy, a poster of a popular 
Muslim preacher, Aa Gym and a poster of Sai Baba, a popular Indian spiritual figure. 
She says, 'l use to like Aa Gym a lot, but now no more, because he practises polygamy.' 
With regard to Sai Baba, she explains, 'When I was a teenager, l went through a serious 
illness. At that time, l was not yet a Muslim. With the blessing of Sai Baba, Buddha and 
other Chinese deities, I recovered.' Then, she took me to a small room at the upper tloor 
of her house. I was a bit shocked that there were many Buddha statues and Chinese 
deities with candles and incenses inside the room. She defends her deities worship, 
which would be seen as polytheism by orthodox Muslims, 'I know some ustaz will tell 
me that it is un-Islamic. But Islam also teaches us to be grateful. I think that is nothing 
wrong for me to show appreciation to my former religion that helped me a lot when I 
was sick.' She also tells me that she sends her son to a Catholic School, so he can 
interact with people from different religious backgrounds. She adds, 'After school time, 
we hire an ustaz to teach him Islam' (Interview, 17 November 2008). 
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A more extreme case is that of a Chinese Muslim businessman, who manifested 
contrasting facets of his religiosity within the same day, at two different events. Wijaya 
is a successful businessman and also a haji, who has performed pilgrimage to Mecca. 
One morning in 2008, to celebrate the Islamic New Year, Wijaya organised an Islamic 
study sessions at his company. He delivered a sermon in Bahasa Indonesia in front of a 
Muslim-majority crowd one of whom was a former religious minister. He discussed the 
meaning of Islamic New Year and the similarities between Islamic teachings and 
Chinese philosophies. In the evening the same day, I joined him to for a birthday dinner 
at a Chinese restaurant, at which most attendants were Chinese Indonesians. It was not 
surprising that he spoke in Chinese, but he also ate pork and drank beer. One of his 
friends asked, ':'.\!Ir Haji, are you sure you can drink beer?' He responded, 'Just once in a 
while, that is fine.' (Field note, 22 March 2008). 
In contrast to Wijaya, Afat is a relatively poor Chinese convert. Afat was born in 1956 
He converted to Islam to marry a Muslim. He makes his living by selling koko clothes at 
mosques and during religious functions. He often attends Islamic study sessions at PIT!, 
not to learn about Islam, but to seek financial help from richer Chinese Muslims and to 
sell koko clothes. During the 2009 elections, he also campaigned for a Chinese Muslim 
candidate in an Islamist party, PPP, to earn money. Without explaining his reasons, he 
tells me, that he does not have an identity card. Instead, he always carries along with him, 
a certificate of conversion, issued by the lstiqlal Mosque. For instance, when he visits 
government offices, he will show the officials his certificate of conversion. He says, 
'Once they know that I am a Muslim, everything becomes easier. Unlike other Chinese 
Indonesians, I do not have to pay extra money.' (Interview, 20 December 2008). 
Various life experiences I have illustrated above show that Chinese converts from all 
walks of life, be it male or female, upper class or lower class, secular-minded or sharia-
minded, can creatively negotiate their religiosities in everyday lives according to 
different conditions. As mentioned earlier, such complexity and flexibility of one's 
religiosity problematises the often simplified categorisation of Muslim behaviours used 
by many scholars and journalists. 
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Ethnicity in Flux: Shifting Belongings and Multiple ldentilications 
Departing from religiosity, now I turn to another dimension of Chinese Muslim identities: 
ethnicity. The conversion of a Chinese Indonesian to Islam, is not only embracing a new 
religious identity, but also negotiating a new set of ethnic identities, given that the major 
ethnic groups in Indonesian are mostly Muslim. As I have indicated elsewhere in this 
thesis, many Chinese Muslims do not retain their Chinese identity after more than one 
generation, and the act of their conversion often intensifies the adoption of other non-
religious aspects of non-Chinese identity, such as the use of Indonesian (and also 
Javanese for many of my informants) language, names .• rituals and other lifestyle aspects. 
I address two main aspects of ethnic identification of Chinese Muslims: first, their 
shifting sense of belongings and diverse attitudes towards their Chinese identity; and 
second, their naming practices and multiple identifications in everyday lives. 
Varieties ofChineseness among Chinese Muslims 
During the New Order regime, some Chinese leaders saw Islamic convers10n as an 
attempt of assimilation and to overcome discrimination. However, as I discussed in 
chapter 2, such notions of assimilation are no longer popular today. In general, Chinese 
Muslim leaders agree that conversion to Islam will lead to closer relationships between 
Chinese and non-Chinese. But they do not advocate losing their Chineseness in the 
process. They feel that Chinese Muslims can keep their Chinese cultural traditions as 
long as those practices are not violating Islamic teachings. 
However, in everyday reality, responses to the reassertion of Chineseness are diverse and 
complex, mainly influenced by their situated localities, cultural upbringing, economic 
statuses, social interaction and religious understanding. Some Chinese Muslims are 
proud to be Chinese and prefer to have a Muslim partner from the same ethnic 
background. They join Chinese Muslim organisations and visit Chinese-style mosques 
not only for religious purposes, but also for match-making. Meanwhile, most Chinese 
Muslims, especially those who live in Muslim-majority neighbourhoods and those who 
study in state-owned schools, have frequent interactions with non-Chinese Muslims and 
many intermarry, so the mixing of culture is unavoidable. In this sense, Chinese culture 
can be altered, lndonesianised, lslamised, or sometimes discarded. At another extreme, 
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there are also some Chinese Muslims who do not want to be seen as a Cbinese anymore 
after conversion to Islam, and some say they are 'biologically Chinese, but culturally 
Javanese' (Field note, 25 September 2008). 
In fact, as I have discussed in the methodology section, one of my fieldwork limitations 
is that most of my informants are those who still see themselves as 'Chinese' or 'partly 
Chinese' Muslims, however defined. Therefore many assimilated Muslims of Chinese 
descent are left out. Although the openness of post-New Order Indonesia has motivated 
some Chinese Muslim leaders, activists and preachers to reclaim their Chineseness (see 
chapters 4 and 5), many ordinary Muslims, who have Chinese background do not really 
care about their Chinese identity and have integrated if not assimilated into non-Chinese 
Muslim majority. I have also encountered a few second-generation 'Chinese Muslims' 
who have Chinese and non-Chinese mixed parentage. When asked about their ethnic 
identifications, many of them do not see themselves as a 'Chinese person', and say they 
are 'just Indonesian' (orang Indonesia sahaja), 'becoming Javanese' (menjadi Jawa) or 
'mixed' (campuran). 
However, this self identification is not always consistent with how other people may 
identify them. Some Chinese Muslims cannot 'escape' their Chineseness because of their 
physical appearance: they have fairer skin and slanted eyes, distinguishing themselves 
from many other Indonesians. From such physical attributes, preconceived notions of 
how each group behaves might have been already internalised before any kind of 
interactions occur. For example, a mixed Chinese-Malay-Dayak born-Muslim woman 
who does not see herself as a Chinese person, always has been seen as a new convert and 
been treated as a Chinese person by others because she is 'Chinese looking' (Field note, 
29 April 2008). Meanwhile another Chinese Muslim tells me, 'Every time I visit the 
mosque, I attract special attention, although I have been a Muslim for more than twenty 
years.' He continues, 'While non-Chinese converts, such as Batak Muslims are ignored. 
They cannot be easily identified because they share similar facial features and skin 
colour as the Javanese' (Field note, 7 January 2009). 'Chinese-looking' can be both a 
'curse' and a 'blessing'. Some informants told me that although being a Muslim, they 
continue to face discrimination, especially at government offices, because of their 
Chinese appearance. While, for some Chinese preachers, as discussed in chapter 4, 
'Chinese-looking' and other Chinese markers are their trademarks. Yet, there is little 
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correlation between their public performances and their everyday living identities, in 
which many of the preachers 'sell Chineseness, but do not live Chineseness'. 
Here, I will list the various attitudes towards Chinese identity among Chinese Muslims 
or Indonesian Muslims of Chinese descent: a) practise Chinese culture and proud to 
declare themselves as a Chinese person: b) do not practise Chinese culture, but self 
identify as an ethnic Chinese; c) have Chinese appearance, but do not see themselves as 
Chinese person; d) strategically or conditionally emphasise their Chineseness; e) hide 
their Chinese identity to avoid discrimination; f) do not look Chinese, but claim 
themselves as Chinese person; g) indifference or do not care (biasa·biasa saja, tidak 
peduli) and so on. This list is not a categorisation, but various descriptions of how 
Chinese Muslims perceive themselves. In reality, people often cannot be grouped easily 
under just one category; or they might fulfil the criteria of several identifications. I will 
explore such multiple identities through naming practices later. By doing so, I go beyond 
the conventional dichotomy of 'Totok' (pure blood, which also means Chinese-cultured) 
and 'Peranakan' (mixed blood, also implying intermingled into local cultures),9 which 
is insufficient lo capture the complexity and fluidity of their ethnic identifications and 
cultural orientations. During my fieldwork, with the exception of those in Madura, not 
many Chinese Muslims saw themselves or other converts as either 'Torok' or 
'Peranakan' Chinese. 
Apart from cultural upbringing and social interaction, class and gender also play 
significant roles in determining ethnic identification among Chinese Muslims. Upper and 
middle class Chinese Muslims may utilise their identities for business and political 
purposes, yet some Chinese suffer financially after conversion to Islam because their 
non-Muslim Chinese families do not support and recognise them anymore. It is often, 
')Conventionally, scholars divjde Chinese indoocsians. into two main groupst the Chinese-cultured Totok (China~ 
born, pure blood) and the acculturated Peranakan (local-born, mixed blood), in the twentieth century, Totok was 
used to refer to the ne\i,1 Chinese migrants to Indonesia who were foreign born, ti.1eanwhile, Peranakan was used 
to refer to the descendants of mixed marriage, often bet\veen Chinese males and Indonesian females, The totokw 
peranakan distinction based on birthplace becarne unrealistic after the new migrations of Chinese to Indonesia 
were banned and after Indonesian independence. Hencej some scholars adop!ed a socio-cultural account of Totok 
and Peranakan. In this case, a Totok refers to !hose who still practice Chinese cult>.Jre and speak tvlandarin or or:e 
of the Chinese dialects. Sjmi!arly, a !1eranakan refers to those wh0 cannot speak Chinese and use Indonesian or a 
local language in their daily lives. Hov,:evcr, during the Suharto period, Totok Chinese were rapidly 
''pernnakanisea', largely as a resuJt of the state's assln1ilation policy. The consequence was a breakdo\Vn of the 
dichotorny between Totok and Peranakan. ·roday, in post Suharto Indonesia, there \Vas an euphoric ce!ebration of 
'Chineseness', including the 'reclaiming' of Chinese identity among Chinese fndonesiar:. who have previously 
assimilated, if not integrated int0 the n1ajorHy Indonesian population (see Hoon 2008). In short, as Thjin (2002:8) 
nrg11es, such categories are confusing, superficial and mislead!ng, that 'the grand fallacy is to picture Chinese~ 
lndonesian community as divlded inlo these two rnajor groups with dis!inct differences'; while- Budianta (2007: 
186) suggests, 'the process of negotiating the meaning and construction of Chinesencss in Indonesia will not 
reach <i closure'. 
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but not always, richer Chinese Muslims who tend to maintain their Chinese identities, 
while poorer Chinese Muslims are more likely to be assimilated-"' In terms of gender, 
male Chinese Muslims have a higher probability of passing their Chinese identity to next 
generation by maintaining their family names. In chapter 3, I illustrated the contestations 
of ethnic identifications, economic classes and generational differences of Chinese 
Muslims by examining their involvement in the Cheng Hoo Mosque. In the following 
section, 1 will focus on names to explore identity negotiations among Chinese Muslims. 
Multiple Names, 1'rf11ltiple identifications 
Many recent studies have pointed out that identities shift in different situations and can 
be variously stressed (Eriksen 2002; Ong 1993; Song 2003); such multiplication of 
attachments is especially true for Chinese Muslims in Indonesia who have to deal with 
different sets of multifarious identities: Indonesian (also Javanese), Chinese and Muslim. 
Distinctions such as 'front stage-backstage' (Goffman 1959) and 'detached-embedded 
identity' (Tilly 2002) have been used by scholars to study different enactments of an 
individual identities in public and private spheres. Yet, the multifaceted character of 
Chinese Muslim identifications, as I will describe, go beyond the divide between public 
and private identity. Many Chinese converts engage with more than one public setting; 
for example, one can emphasise Chineseness to at!ract audiences to a public sermon, 
while downplaying Chineseness to escape discrimination when dealing with government 
officials. Chinese Muslims also often highlight the different dimension of their identities, 
during their daily interactions with family members, friends and colleagues. For example, 
they can use a 'Chinese name' when talking to a Chinese person, but use an 'Islamic 
name' when talking to a Muslim. Furthermore, quite often, there is no clear distinction 
between their public and private identities. 
l'.1 l visited 1\.1adura for ii few days in 2008. The identity adaption of Peranakan Muslims in Madura Island is 
interesting to review ihe role of dass in identity formation. There are a fevv Peranaknn families in coastal Mndura 
that bave been Muslims for a few generations and still maintain their Peranakan identity today, The-y are mainly 
businessmen and tend to practice endogamy, In \.vhich they m~rrled other Peranaknn or sometimes, nvn~ 
J)era11aka11 Chinese to keep their distinct identity and business lineage. While, others especi?.lly those who are net 
involved in business, have intermarried with et!lnic Madurese and lost their Peranakan heritage. Interestingly, 
many Peranakrm :Y1uslims also participate in Muh-ammadiya~, instead of NU which is dominan! in the ls.land. 
This Peranakan experience ir: I'v1adura shows that organisational affiliations and marriage patterns could help in 
remaining or al!ering one's identity, Zawawi l!nron and A.bdul Hadi Wl\.1 are a1nong the pron1ir:ent Madurese 
poets and writers who claim then1selves as J'eranakan Muslims, however, rare!y noticed by the public, beci:n1se 
they do not look Chinese ar.d do not have Chinese na;nes. 
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Personal names play an important role in reflecting and sometimes determining one's 
identity and cultural affiliation, as well as having broader historical and political 
meanings within a society (Reid & McDonald 2010; Scott, Tehranian & Mathias 2002). 
Seeing the use of personal names as a negotiable identity definer, I illustrate the 
everyday naming practices of Chinese Muslims to reveal their multiple identifications.11 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, although not compulsory, many Chinese converts 
adopt an Islamic name.l2 Also, during the New Order period, the regime forced Chinese 
Indonesians to drop their Chinese names and adopt 'Indonesian-sounding' narnes. 13 
Many Chinese Indonesians, therefore, depending on their religion and locality, adopted 
different types of names, including Western or Christian names, Javanese names, Batak 
names and sometimes, Islamic names. Some of them also use 'Indonesianised' Chinese 
family names, such as Salim for 'Lim', Wijaya for 'Oei', Tanujaya for 'Tan' and so on. 
Like many other Chinese Indonesians, Chinese Muslims that I met during fieldwork, 
adapted a variety of naming forms: be it Javanese (or other local ethnic name), lslamic, 
Chinese, Western, or even Christian names, or a combination of any two of them. Some 
even have three names: Javanese, Chinese and Islamic names, which allowed them to 
use different names to stress different aspects of their identities, depending on situations. 
J.: For a discussion of Chinese Muslims naming practices and their multiple identifications in Malaysia, see tiew 
(2010). 
12 lslamic names often originate from Arabic personal names (also Turkish and Perslan names), which many of 
them are names of prophets or con1panions of the Prophet, such as Muhammad, Ibrahim and Yusuf. Yet~ the 
meaning of "ls1amk: name' is contested, since lslarnic texts do not require Muslims to adopt certain kind of names. 
Moreover, a variety of 'Muslim names' evolved to fit various cultural traditions and local settjngs where Muslims 
reside, Muhammad (2010) even argued that, the concept of an 'Islamic name' has no basis in the Qur"an, and 
questioned whether the so-called [slan1ic names. such as Muhammad, Ali and Khadija are merely Arabic names. 
He adds that the act of changing one's name does not make someone more a Muslim; rather, !t alienates that· 
person from the universality of Islam. During my fieldwork, a couple of Chinese converts do not use an 'Islamic 
name', as one of lhem says, 'I e-onvert to be a &1uslim, not an ethnic Arab. Many Javanese Muslims also keep 
their custon1ary name, so \-vhy I have to use names such as ~1uhammad'l' (Field note, 6 November 2008). 
u 'Indonesian-sounding' na1ne is a probletnatic conceptt sJnce Indonesians from different ethnic and religious 
backgrounds adopt different types of naming_, including Islamic names, Western or Christian namcs1 Javanese 
names, Sundanese names, Batak names and so on. Such naming diversity gives Chinese Indonesians a few 
options to creativeiy adapt 'Indonesian-sounding' names, Some Chinese lndonesians, especially those who are 
Christians or educated in missionary schools use Western or Christian names as their first names~ 1,vith Javanese 
or other local names as their family names, such as Albert Gunawan and Edv,rin Suryalaksana. Those who prefer 
to keep their family or business lineages adopt Javanese or other local names based on phonetics that identical 
with their Chinese surnames. Tiley create 'Indonesianised' Chinese family names and sometimes pass it to their 
children. Chinese businessmen, J..Jem Sioe Liong, for example, became Sudono Salirn, and his family and 
corporation retained 'Salim' as an inherited fan1ily name. Despite using 'Indonesianised' names in legal 
documents; some Chinese Indonesians, especially lhosc who are Chinese~educated also keep giving Chinese 
names to their next generations and sometimes use their (~hlnesc names at home. There are also a few Ch1nese 
Indonesians who choose to keep their Chinese names publicly. For example, Kwik Kian (iee who was finance 
minister during Megawati presidency, despite his commitment to Jndonesian nationalisJn, refuses to change his 
name. Meanwhile, those who do not intend to keep thelr Chinese identity, use fully Javanese or other local 
names. Interestingly~ there are a!so some Chinese ladonesians_, including non~lvJuslims, \Vho adopt Islainic names 
on their identity cards, especially those who reside in Sumatra, Su!awr.sl and Kalimantan, where the local 
majorities adopt Islan1ic names, For example, during my fieldwork in Palembang, many Chinese l\.-1uslims told 
me that they used islan1ic nan1es before their conversion. 
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For some Chinese Muslims, their Chinese names are a point of erasure, to avoid 
discrimination in the workplace, school or government agencies. As an example, 
Subandoyo Laison, who born into a Chinese convert family, did not reveal his Chinese 
ethnicity to his schoolmates in the Islamic school because he was the only ethnic 
Chinese among them and did not want to be treated differently. Suhandoyo recounted his 
experience of being bullied by his classmates for his ethnicity, as they kept calling him 
'Cina' (a derogatory term for Chinese Indonesians) and asking him to give them money, 
as they perceive that Chinese are economically better off. Since then, he has stopped 
using his 'lndonesianised' Chinese family name, Laison, and tried to darken his skin, by 
exposing himself to sun more frequently. He says, 'After [went to high school, no one 
noticed that I was Chinese because I was known as Suhandoyo only'. 
Interestingly, Suhandoyo changed his attitude towards his Chineseness when he was 
studying in the State Islamic University in Jakarta. As one of the student activists during 
the reformasi period, in order to challenge the perception that ethnic Chinese are not 
interested in politics, he reclaimed his Chinese identity by emphasising his Chinese name. 
He told me, 'During a discussion group, a few Muslim students said the anti-Chinese 
violence can be justified as Chinese Indonesians are arrogant and not nationalistic.' He 
disputed this saying, 'Not all Chinese are unpatriotic. Maybe some of you do not aware 
that I am an ethnic Chinese. My full name is Suhandoyo Laison and Laison is my family 
name. My Chinese name is Lai Jia Kit. Do you think I am not nationalistic just because l 
am a Chinese person'!' (Interview, 13 April 2008). Indeed, by hiding bis Chinese name, 
Suhandoyo 'conceals' his Chineseness; and by revealing it, he 'reclaims' his Chinese 
identity. Jn other words, name choice reflects how a Chinese Muslim would like to be 
perceived by others, either to highlight or downplay one's Chineseness. 
Chinese names can also be a feature of attraction, especially in post-1998 Indonesia. As I 
have discussed in Chapter 4, some Chinese Muslim preachers, such as Tan Mei Hwa and 
Koko Liem, use their Chinese names to draw media attention. Ahmad Hariyono Ong, a 
religious teacher in Surabaya, also purposely uses his Chinese surname, Ong during 
Islamic study sessions, to preach the universality of Islam. He was born during the New 
Order regime, and thus, given a Javanese name by his parents, Hariyono, on his identity 
card. His father also gave him a full Chinese name, which he rarely uses and could not 
even remember. After converting to Islam, he adopted an Islamic name, Ahmad. Over 
the last few years, after becoming a religious teacher, he put his Chinese surname along 
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with his Javanese and Islamic name, to show that Chinese ethnicity, Indonesian 
nationality and Islamic religiosity can co-exist. When I talked to Hariyono in 2008, he 
had a new-born son, to whom he gave the name 'Muhammad Relaghtus Al-Fath'. He 
tells me that the Islamic name was chosen by a prominent local Islamic scholar and he 
believes the name is both a form of blessing, as well as a reminder to his son to behave 
according to Islamic teachings. In addition, his son has a full Chinese name, Ong Qiang 
Lin, given by Hariyono's father. He says, 'this is important so my son will not forget his 
Chinese heritage' (Interview, 30 September 2008). 
Occupation also plays an important role in the naming practices of Chinese Muslims. Ki 
Budi or Nurul Fajar is an obvious example. He is a paranormal practitioner and a leader 
of an Islamic chanting group (majelis zikir). He tells me, 'lam Ki Budi, when I practise 
alternative medicine and I am ustaz Nurul Fajar, when I lead an Islamic chanting group! 
(Interview, 23 December 2008). Ki is a Javanese title of respect for learned person; Budi 
is derived from his Javanese name, Budiyono; while Nurul Fajar is his Islamic name. 
Siew Hwa, a make-up artist also has more than one name. She says, 'My name on 
identity card is Dian Christanto. When I converted to Islam, I was given by an ustaz an 
Islamic name, Aisyah. 1 only use it when I attend religious functions.' In her workplace, 
Siew Hwa prefers to use her Chinese name. She tells me, 'Siew Hwa means beautiful 
flower. It suits the nature of my job. I feel uncomfortable to use my Islamic name at 
work because 1 have to interact with a lot of non-Muslims' (Interview, 16 January 2009). 
Like Siew Hwa, Ahmad Naga, a young activist in the Lautze Mosque has three names. 
Ahmad Naga has listed all his personal names on his business card which he gave to me, 
when I first met him. His official Indonesian name is Naga Kunadi, while Ahmad is his 
Islamic name. On the business card, he also lists his Chinese name, both in Romanised 
pinyin and Chinese characters, Chiou Xue Lung. He tells me, 'Different people address 
me by different names. My Muslim friends call me 'Ahmad' and non-Muslims call me 
'Naga'. At home, my parents call me Ah Liong.' (Interview, 11 April 2008). Naga 
(Indonesia), Lung (Mandarin) and Ah Liang (Hokkien) have the same meaning - dragon. 
In short, the multiple names adapted by Chinese Muslims allow them to negotiate their 
identities creatively; as well as cross various borders. 
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Conclusion 
Reflecting on the various life stories I have unravelled above, I think of the elusive 
shapes and colours, of being Chinese Muslim in Indonesia: the flexibilities; the 
inconsistencies and the very different life experiences. These wide ranging and complex 
identities make neat generalisations and comprehensive analysis almost impossible. Not 
only is there a diversity of religious affiliation and cultural orientation between different 
Chinese Muslims, an individual can also stress different dimensions of their identities 
across time and space. Rather than approaching their everyday lives in the hope of 
distinguishing between the authentic and the inauthentic self, or investigating which 
identity is more important for them, this chapter recognises that the Chinese Muslim self 
is the collection of multiple and sometimes, conflicting attachments. As revealed by their 
choice of names, many Chinese Muslims can emphasise or downplay their Chineseness 
depending on conditions. Such multiple identifications are shared by other Chinese 
Indonesians and as Budianta (2007:176) suggests, 'provide a space for understanding 
and appreciating the multiple meanings of Chineseness that arc expressed in the 
'Chinese euphoria" of post-1998 Indonesia. 
To study Islamic identities, understandings and practices among Chinese Muslims, two 
dimensions need to be considered: the political economies of shifting religiosities and 
the cultural politics of flexible piety. Their religiosities not only rely on their 
interpretation of Qur' anic texts and Islamic teachings, but also on the contingent political, 
social, culture and economic circumstances of their understandings of Islam. The diverse 
religiosities reflect the wide range of social and religious interests among Chinese 
Muslims, as well as their very different conversion motivations and religious experiences. 
Given that conversion is an ongoing process of religious transformation, the notion of 
flexible piety implies the multiple, selective and sometimes, inconsistent adaption of 
Islamic religiosity amongst converts according to their living contexts. They 
accommodate Islamic practices in the struggles of their daily lives; and also adjust their 
daily habits according to their religious understandings. 
Such flexible piety is prevalent, but not limited to converts; as many ordinary Indonesian 
Muslims today are in some ways facing the challenges of 'Islamic resurgence' that are 
often associated with legal-formalistic characters and conservative attitudes. Yet, 
negotiating their religious commitments, diverse Islamic understandings and everyday 
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life challenges, Muslims' flexibility in the practices and interpretations of Islam persist 
amid the rise of assertive Islam. Such flexibility is the antithesis of rigid observance of 
the religious doctrines, reasserting that there are multiple ways of being a Muslim in 
Indonesia. Let me end this chapter by recounting my conversation with a Javanese 
Muslim girl, Indah in Surabaya. Indah often wears a colourful and trendy 'Islamic dress' 
and wishes to run an 'Islamic fashion' boutique. When we go out for dinner one day, she 
refuses to eat at a noodle stall run by a Chinese person and says, 'I know he uses chicken 
instead of pork, but I am afraid that he may still use lard when cooking noodles' (Field 
note, 17 September 2008). On another day, at lunchtime during Ramadan, I visit her 
office and she is having pizza. She invites me to join her. She says, 'Don't worry. I am 
hungry and I have to eat so that I can keep doing my jobs.' Refusing to eat noodles that 
may contain lard, yet eating lunch during fasting hours, she explains, 'Islam is a flexible 
religion. We can follow Islamic teachings according to our ability.' She then asks me, 
'When are you going to convert to Islam?' (Field note, 22 September 2008). 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion: The Paradoxes of Chinese l.Vluslim Cultural Identities 
Reflecting on the discussions of my preceding chapters, I think of the often fluid shapes 
and elusive colours, of being Chinese Muslim in post-New Order Indonesia: the 
heterogeneity and multiplicity; the different life experiences; the range of economic, 
political, social and religious interests. My research has shown how and under what 
conditions, their ethnicity and religiosity are performed and negotiated in a variety of 
ways, in the public and private, individually and collectively, unintentionally and 
intentionally. Given the multifarious motivations, processes and outcomes of their 
identity negotiation, it is difficult to make a neat conclusion, but easy to set one's eye on 
one part, incorrectly believing it to represent the whole. Instead of a simple 
generalisation, I will therefore, reiterate a few interrelated paradoxes of identity 
formation and cultural interaction in order to give a broader perspective and more 
nuanced understanding of Chinese Muslim identities. By analysing their cultural 
identities, I will explore the possibilities and limitations of Chinese and Islamic 
cosmopolitanism in contemporary Indonesia. Lastly, I will also point to several 
considerations that might benefit other studies on ethnicity and religiosity, especially 
those concerned with the intersection between these two sources of identity. 
Hybrid Performance, Multiple Identifications and Flexible Piety 
The first paradox is that of collective representation and individual negotiation. As I 
have noted, Chinese Muslim cultural identities have been objectified in symbols (e.g. 
Chinese-style mosques), embodied in organisations (e.g. PlTI), represented in popular 
media (e.g. Chinese preaching), and performed in rituals (e.g. the celebration of Chinese 
New Year) in post-1998 Indonesia. Yet, only a few Chinese Muslims pray at Chinese-
style mosques, join PIT!, listen to Chinese preachers and observe Chinese New Year 
traditions. Instead of sharing a common 'Chinese Islamic' practice, many Chinese 
Muslims visit 'non-Chinese' mosques nearby their homes, participate in social activities 
in their neighbourhood, attend religious talks by non-Chinese preachers, and perform 
various local Muslim rituals. Therefore, I propose that we need to distinguish Chinese 
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Muslim cultural identities as a form of collective representation, and Chinese Muslims as 
individual subjects. Inspired by Brubaker's concept of 'ethnicity without group' (2004), 
this thesis analyses the emergence of Chinese Muslim culture without treating Chinese 
Muslims as a bounded ethno-religious group. This notion allows me to posit that Chinese 
Muslim cultures do not necessarily have to be identical with Chinese Muslim individuals, 
and could be shared hy non-Chinese Muslims. In fact, most of those praying at Chinese-
style mosques and listening to Chinese preachers are non-Chinese. 
The second paradox is both intentional and unintentional hybridity (Bakhtin 1981; 
Werbner 1997a). The former forges the symbolic unity of Chinese Muslims, while the 
latter reflects their fluid identities and myriad boundary crossings in everyday lives. I 
have described the intentional combination of Chinese and Islamic elements as a form of 
'hybrid performance' (chapter 4), and argue that it does not reflect the 'multiple 
identification' and 'flexible piety' of many ordinary Chinese Muslims (chapters 3 and 7). 
The hybrid performance, which manifested in the design of Chinese-style mosques and 
the performance of some Chinese preachers, does not symbolise an existing ethno-
religious reality, but rather brings a new reality into being, by reappropriating Chinese 
traditions and Islamic messages to promote a sense of shared experience that can unify 
Chinese Muslims. The vivid accentuation of their identities is important because Chinese 
Muslim leaders are afraid that their distinctive cultural identities are in danger of 
disappearing. This fear of lost uniqueness has less to do with state policies, and more to 
do with the small and geographically scattered Chinese Muslim population, as well as 
their fluid identification and intense blending with non-Chinese. Chinese Muslims are 
constantly crossing boundaries, not only between Islam and Chinese identities, but also 
diversified Islamic and Chinese traditions. Many of them have frequent interaction with 
local Muslims, adopt their cultural practices and often intermarry with them, which have 
made the perpetuation of their identities across generations difficult. Therefore, the 
construction of Chinese-style mosques is important in manifesting and preserving their 
cultural identities, as the materiality and tangibility of mosques makes Chinese Muslim 
culture unequivocally 'real' and 'enduring', at least symbolically. 
In Indonesia, most Chinese Muslims are converts. Their Islamic conversions imply not 
only their embracing of an alternative set of beliefs, but also their negotiation of a new 
set of ethnic identifications. Not only is there a diversity of religious affiliation and 
cultural orientation between Chinese Muslims, but an individual can also stress different 
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dimensions of their identities across time and space. In terms of ethnic identification, 
some publicly celebrate their Chineseness, some reject the label of being a 'Chinese 
Muslim', while many others are more flexible and can choose to emphasise or downplay 
their Chineseness, depending on conditions, as exemplified in their choice of names 
(chapter 7). Such multiple identifications, I believe, are also shared by many other 
Chinese Indonesians, affirming that there are multiple ways of being a Chinese (and 
sometimes, also escaping being marked as a 'Chinese') in Indonesia. 
Regarding religiosity, the Islamic understanding and practices of Chinese Muslims are 
extremely diverse, ranging from orthodox to heterodox, from sharia-minded to Iiberal-
minded, and from strictly observant to partly-practising, which reflects their very 
different conversion motivations, social experience and religious education. Given that 
conversion is an ongoing process of religious transformation, I deploy the notion of 
flexible piety to analyse the multiple, selective and sometimes, inconsistent adaption of 
Islamic religiosity among Chinese Muslims according to their living contexts (chapter 7). 
They accommodate Islamic practices in the struggles of their daily lives, and also adjust 
their daily habits according to their religious understandings. Although flexible piety is 
more prevalent among converts, it can also be applied to many other Muslims amid the 
rise of assertive Islam in Indonesia today. 
The third paradox is that of public manifestation and private enactment. Through mosque 
architecture, social activities and preaching performance, Chinese Muslim businessmen, 
leaders and preachers publicly manifest their Islamic religiosity and Chinese ethnicity to 
create a unique image of the Chinese Muslim cultural identity. Nonetheless, their public 
expression of identity is not necessarily consistent with their private enactment of self. 
As I discussed in chapter 4, many Chinese preachers have minimal knowledge of 
Chinese language and culture, leaving them with limited ways of presenting their 
Chinese identities in the public. Only through explicit cultural symbols, such as name 
and attire, can they authenticate their Chineseness to attract media attention. Indeed, 
these attractive and exceptional appearances stand out as the trademark of some Chinese 
preachers in tbe crowded Indonesian preaching market. Yet, in everyday life, many 
Chinese preachers neither speak Chinese nor observe Chinese traditions. Many 
intermarry with non-Chinese and follow local Muslim practices. Therefore, to a certain 
extent, they 'sell Chineseness, but do not live Chineseness'. 
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Meanwhile, some Chinese businessmen, although they have performed the hajj and 
regularly wear Muslim attire during Friday prayers in mosques, neglect their Islamic 
obligations at home. In other words, they perform Islamic religiosity in front of other 
Muslims, but do not necessarily follow Islamic principles in daily lives. Such identity 
practices resonate with Ditchev's notion of 'lifestyle nationalism' (2006), in which 
identity is not necessarily linked to belonging, but to emblems. Yet, the use of cultural 
symbols, as argued by Bourdieu (1991), can also influence both self-identification and 
the perception of others. We need more detailed and lengthy research to examine how 
significant are the influences of public manifestations of Chinese Muslim cultural 
identities on their everyday practices. 
The fourth paradox is the strategic solidarity and internal dynamics. Like many other 
Indonesians, Chinese Muslims use the political openness of post·Suharto Indonesia to 
project their identities through organisations, such as PITI. ·while the leaders of these 
organisations share the aim of presenting a unique image of Chinese Muslim identity, 
they do so for different reasons and in different ways. Some of them focus on preaching 
(dakwah·oriented); some emphasise promoting ethnic intermingling (pembauran· 
oriented); others pursue their personal political or economic interests. Despite these 
diverse motivations, I argue that the dominant discourse among Chinese Muslim leaders 
today is 'spreading Islam through cultural approaches' (dakwah pendeka1an budaya). 
This is a significant shift from 'assimilation of ethnic Chinese through Islam' (asimilasi 
[ewat Islam) that prevailed during the Suharto regime. In addition, Chinese Muslim 
organisations, as I mentioned in chapter 5, are not exclusive, as both their membership 
and activities are open to all Muslims regardless of ethnic background. Also, not all 
Chinese Muslims affiliate with organisations like PIT!; rather they feel more comfortable 
engaging with broader Chinese and Islamic groups or joining non-identity-based 
activities. In short, the contingent solidarity of Chinese Muslims gives voice to the 
minority without reducing it to a fixed entity and does not suppress internal diversity. 
The fifth paradox is the historical past and the construction of memory. As I illustrated in 
chapter 2, Chinese Muslim cultural identities are products of historical development, yet 
we should not underestimate the active agency of Chinese Muslim leaders in 
rearticulating their histories too. After the fall of the New Order regime, through various 
'sites of memory' and 'memory industries', such as mosques, libraries and songs, some 
Chinese Muslim leaders are actively rearticulating their past for various present purposes. 
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Though highly disputed, these rearticu!ations proclaim the role of Admiral Cheng Ho in 
spreading Islam and assert that several of the Walisongo were of Chinese descent, as a 
way to show not only that Islam and Chineseness can coexist harmoniously, but also that 
ethnic Chinese had played a significant role in disseminating Islam in Indonesia. As 
Storey (2003:83) points out, 'the profound interaction between memory and identity 
formation does not necessarily depend on the truth, but what is remembered' (Storey 
2003:83). To a certain extent, Chinese Muslim leaders are not only 'consuming' the past, 
but also 'producing' historical memories to give meaning to the present. Such 
rearticulation of history, on the one hand, could empower the minority through selective 
memory; on the other hand, it might simplify their complex past 
The sixth paradox is the transnational connection and local configuration. Not only 
'remembering the past for the present', Chinese Muslim leaders are also 'imaging there 
for here', in which they construct their distinctive Islamic tradition through transnational 
connections with Hui Muslims in mainland China, yet reconfigured to local contexts. 
The idea of 'Chinese Muslim diaspora', albeit premature, adds another scenario to 
transnational Muslim politics which are often seen as hostile to ethnic culture (Roy 2004) 
and linked to Middle East (Mandaville 2001). Through the discussion of the Surabaya 
Cheng Hoo Mosque in chapter 3, I argue that their strategic transnational link with 
Muslims is not a form of desire for return or attachment to China, but an effort to 
manifest their identity and to redefine their minority position in Indonesia. Furthermore, 
there are also efforts by Chinese Muslims to build Chinese-style mosques in other cities 
in Indonesia, which might contribute to the emergence of a rather new transloca! ethno-
religious imagination, as compared to other existing locally bounded Muslim 
communities, such as Javanese Muslims and Acehnese Muslims. 
A closer examination, however, reveals that Chinese Muslims' transnational links are not 
limited to Muslims in China, but also Muslims in other parts of the world, and their daily 
Islamic practices have less to do with their translocal imagination, and more to do their 
situated localities. Indeed, many Chinese Muslims feel themselves to be part of the 
global Muslim ummah, sharing the hope of performing the pilgrimage to Mecca, 
sympathising with the plight of suffering Muslims across the world, such as those in 
Palestine, and sometimes, the ideology of transnational lslamism. Meanwhile, their 
religious affiliations are mostly influenced by local Islamic currents. For example, many 
Chinese Muslims are Muhammadiyah members in Yogyakarta, NU members in 
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Surabaya or PKS supporters in Jakarta. 
Possibilities and Limitations of Inclusive Chineseness and Cosmopolitan Islam 
Now, let us move to the seventh paradox which I would like to recapitulate in greater 
detail: identity assertions and cosmopolitan sensibilities. Pulling the main arguments 
from my chapters, I will seek to address the question I raised in the introduction: whether 
Chinese Muslim cultural identities embrace inclusive Chineseness and cosmopolitan 
Islam. Instead of seeing themselves as a 'double minority' (an ethnic minority within 
Muslim Indonesians and a religious minority within Chinese Indonesians), some Chinese 
Muslim leaders today capitalise their strategic positions as 'bridge builders' between 
non-Muslim Chinese and non-Chinese Muslim Indonesians. They creatively promote the 
universality of Islam, uphold the inclusivity of Chineseness, and reconcile the widely 
held incompatibility between Islam and Chineseness in Indonesia. 
The diverse responses towards the euphoria of Chinese identities in today Indonesia, as 
well as the divergent progressive and conservative tendencies of Indonesian Muslims, 
form a broader canvas for the emergence of Chinese Muslim cultural identities. The 
public celebration of Chineseness reflects the cultural openness of post-New Order 
Indonesian governments and empowers the formerly suppressed minority identity. Yet, it 
was not without criticism and opposition, from both non-Chinese and Chinese 
Indonesians. Dahana (2000) and Tjhin (2004) have questioned whether the symbolic 
celebration of Chineseness could address the real problems faced by many Chinese 
Indonesians, such as the discrimination they face when dealing with officials. Meanwhile, 
Budianta (2007) and Hoon (2009) have pointed to the worries of some Chinese that the 
excessive display of Chineseness might reinforce negative stereotypes of Chinese 
Indonesians as being exclusive and arrogant, as well as deepen the prejudice of non-
Chinese towards them, given that there are social jealousies against those who are seen 
as 'rich Chinese'. Furthermore, as Heryanto (2004, 2008) indicates, there is a growing 
tendency lo essentialise Chineseness as a given reality, reducing the complexity of 
Chinese Indonesian living identities to a set of characteristics and traditions, such as 
speaking Mandarin and wearing Chinese attire. Responding to these critics, many 
Chinese leaders always incorporate national elements, local traditions and Muslim 
leaders during their promotions of Chinese culture, as a way of reconciling their 
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assertion of Chinese identities and their commitments to Indonesian nationalism, 1 while 
many younger Chinese Indonesians are involved in social advocacy beyond ethnicity, 
such as promoting human rights and fostering interethnic solidarity. 
Islam has played an important role in democratising Indonesia as a moral force for social 
justice and clean government. Yet, Indonesian Islam in post-1998 has also been marked 
by negative manifestations, such as the terrorist attacks in Jakarta and Bali, the burning 
of churches and more recently the killing of Ahmadiyah followers in Banten, which have 
challenged the general views about the supposedly peaceful, inclusive and tolerant 
feature of Islam in Indonesia. The conservative turn in Indonesian Islam is also evident 
in events, such as the issue of a MUI fatwa against 'secularism, pluralism and liberalism', 
the passing of the Anti-pornography Bill and the implementation of sharia-influenced 
by-laws in some regions. This trend has worried many Muslims and non-Muslims, who 
see it as undermining Indonesia's inter-religious harmony and inner-religious diversity. 
Human rights, women's rights and arts activists have also expressed their concerns that 
Islamic conservatism might suppress personal freedom, gender equality and artistic 
expression. Nonetheless, amid this growing conservatism, there are various attempts by 
many Muslim groups and leaders to promote Islam that is liberal in interpretations, 
supportive of cultural diversity, valuing local culture and peaceful in approach. For 
example, Islamic feminism has gained momentum in Indonesia. suggesting there is no 
contradiction between Islamic religiosity and gender equality; supported too by the 
promotion of women's rights using an Islamic framework (Robinson 2008). 
Situated in these contexts, some Chinese Muslims have found themselves in a strategic 
position to uphold a Chinese culture that is inclusive and to advocate Islamic religiosity 
that is tolerant. Generally speaking, many Chinese Indonesians support the expression of 
Chinese Muslim cultural identities because it helps to redefine their minority position 
and sketch a better image of ethnic Chinese among local Muslims. Meanwhile, some 
Muslim leaders endorse such ethno-religious cultural manifestation, as a way of 
preaching Islam, promoting religious pluralism, as well as gaining political and financial 
support from Chinese Indonesians. At a first glance, this welcoming of Chinese Muslim 
culture shows that the expression of Chineseness can be grounded in local sensibility and 
1 For example, in 2008, Surabay<}. INTI organised a seminar to coinrnemc:rate the day of Youth Oath (Sun1pah 
Pernuda), an important event for Indonesian nationalism, ln 20JO. JNTI held a Javanc~e shadO\Y puppet show 
(wayang kulit) in Jakana. tv1us!im leaders from both NU and Muhau1madiyah are also frequently invited by 
Chinese 0rganisaiions to participate in their activities. 
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shared by the local ethnic majority who are mainly Muslims, while Islamic preaching 
with Chinese cultural symbols indicates that the assertion of Islamic religiosity can be 
tolerant to cultural diversity and accepted by non-Muslims. 
The Chinese-style mosques are perhaps, the most successful and concrete expression of 
Chinese Muslim culture in Indonesia today. As I argued in chapter 3, the inclusive 
architectural designs and social activities of the Surabaya Cheng Hoo Mosque is a 
notable example proposing that the celebration of Chinese cultural expression not 
equalling the promotion of social exclusivity. Although the mosque was built in a 
Chinese-style and managed by Chinese Muslims. it is a religious space wherein both 
Muslims and non-Muslims from different ethnic groups can mix and interact with each 
other. The explicit expression of Chineseness in the mosque challenges the notion of 
'assimilation through Islam' which was prevalent during the New Order and shows that 
there is a Chinese way of being Muslim, yet this does not necessarily mean the 
abandonment of the idea of ethnicity as flexible and multiple. Indeed, many Chinese 
Muslims who are active in the mosque have frequent interaction with non-Chinese and 
are also involved with religious activities in other mosques. Moreover, most of those 
who perform Friday prayers and attend Islamic study sessions at the mosque are non-
Chinese Muslims. Therefore, the Surabaya Cheng Hoo Mosque in some ways embraced 
'inclusive Chineseness', that the practice of Chinese culture is no longer a sign of ethnic 
exclusivity, but a common heritage that can be shared by all Indonesians. 
The Surabaya Cheng Hoo Mosque also promotes Islam as a localised yet universal 
religion. Its 'temple-like' outlook nudges Indonesian mosques away from their large 
domes, onion-shaped arches and minarets. Some Muslim leaders who support the 
localisation of Islam also see it as a form of resistance against the 'Arabisation' of 
mosque architecture in Indonesia. The adaptation of religious symbols from both 
modernist and traditionalist Muslim groups, and the incorporation of Muslim preachers 
from various religious backgrounds, reflects the openness of Chinese Muslims towards 
various interpretations and practices of Islam. While the avoidance of using loud 
speakers to broadcast morning azan and the collaboration of activities with non-Muslim 
organisations, show that the assertion of Islamic identity does not affect the relation of 
Chinese Muslims to the.if non-Muslim counterparts. To project the cosmopolitan image 
of !slam, the Chinese Muslim leaders have quoted Qur' anic texts to show Islam is a 
religion of 'rahmatan li/ 'alamin' (blessings for the universe) that emphasises 'luiblum 
248 
minal/oohi wa hablum minannaas' (the good relationship with God and also among 
humankind). To some extent, Cheng Hoo Mosque is arguably a 'cosmopolitan [space] 
envisaged in marginality' (Bhabha 1996a), in which minority Chinese Muslims redefine 
their social position, from a 'double minority' to 'intermediate community', by playing a 
significant role in promoting interethnic solidarity and religious harmony. 
The inclusivity of the above-mentioned Chinese Muslim cultural practice affirms the 
notion that there is no necessary contradiction between cosmopolitan visions and identity 
claims, but in fact many cosmopolitan practices may be 'grounded' in the experiences of 
particular cultural groups (Kahn 2008:268; also Appiah 1998, Werbner 2006). However, 
a closer examination on the popularity of Chinese Muslim preachers and the debates of 
Chinese New Year celebrations may caution us about the cosmopolitan potential of their 
cultural identities. As 1 concluded in chapter 4, some Chinese preachers strategically use 
Chinese cultural symbols in their preaching to promote the universality of Islam and to 
perform a hybridised form of Islam. Instead of koko shirt with peci, or long robe with 
turban, some Chinese preachers wear traditional Chinese clothing with a Chinese 
skullcap. Yet, this essentialises the complex and fluid Chineseness into a set of cliched 
and fixed cultural markers, such as Chinese names and attire, thus reconsolidating an 
ethnic Chinese stereotype among broader Indonesian population, albeit not a negative 
one. 
Furthermore, although Chinese preachers create diverse faces of Islam, they do not offer 
a critical understanding of Islam nor pluralise the religious debates in Indonesia. The 
messages of the Chinese preachers can be both cosmopolitan and 'counter-cosmopolitan' 
(Appiah 2006), depending on the preachers and their audiences. While Tan Mei Hwa 
emphasises the inclusivity of Islamic teachings and the applications of Islamic values in 
everyday life, Irena Handono constantly criticises Christianity and questions various 
localised Muslim practices. Other Chinese preachers are in general, moderate and 
tolerant in their preaching, yet sometimes restrict themselves to rather conservative 
religious viewpoints, for example, Anton Medan's support of implementation of Islamic 
laws, Koko Llm's disapproval of Muslims celebrating Valentine's Day, and Syafii 
Antonio's disapproval of Muslims wishing Christians a 'Merry Christmas'. For 
converts-turned-preachers, affirming an orthodox understanding of Islam is not 
surprising, as this is a way of proving their commitments to Islam and demonstrating 
their credentials as a preacher. 
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The controversies and debates around Chinese New Year ceremonies in Yogyakarta 
mosques reveal the diverse religious opinions of Indonesian Muslims, including Chinese 
converts, Some Muslims view lmlek as halal, some say haram and many think it is 
permissible, as long its celebrations do not involve 'un-lslamic' elements, such as deity 
worship and the consumption of haram food. In chapter 6, I analysed how Chinese 
Muslim leaders deploy the 'religion-culture' distinction to defend lmlek celebrations in 
mosques, by arguing that Imlek is merely a Chinese 'cultural' tradition, thus lhere is no 
question of polytheism or other 'religious' sins in such practice. Some Chinese Muslims 
also see this accommodation of Chinese cultural elements in mosques as a form of 
Islamic preaching, part of their 'dakwah pendekatan budaya' (preaching through cultural 
approaches). The 'religion-culture' distinction might be convincing enough to justify 
'cultural' celebration, yet it stops short of defending customary practices which might 
contain 'religious' elements. Despite the disapproval of orthodox Muslims, some 
Chinese Muslims continue to practise 'non-Islamic' rituals in everyday life, such as 
ancestor worship and burning incense. They creatively justify their customary practices 
by referring to more universal Islamic values, such as filial piety and respecting elders. 
By distinguishing the sphere of 'religion' from that of 'culture', MUI has issued a fatwa 
stating the celebration of Chinese New Year is not haram, provided it does not involve 
'non-Islamic' religious rituals. However, MUI has previously also issued fatwas that 
prohibit Muslims from celebrating Valentine's Day and Christmas, as well as calling for 
the banning of the Ahmadiyah, a controversial Muslim sect rejected by many orthodox 
Islamic groups. I propose that the MUI fatwas allowing lmlek but prohibiting Christmas 
celebrations among Muslims, in some ways, reflect the possibilities and limitations of 
Islamic cosmopolitanism in contemporary Indonesia. Paradoxically, while there is an 
increasing acceptance of cultural diversity among Muslim leaders, there is also a rising 
intolerance towards religious intermingling and intra-religion differences within some 
sections of Indonesian Muslims. To support this argument, let me compare the responses 
of Indonesian Muslims towards different issues. While most Muslim scholars do not 
have problems with the establishment of Chinese-style mosques, some hesitate to 
endorse Chinese New Year ceremonies in mosques. Many Muslim leaders, including the 
conservatively inclined MUI, allow the celebration of Chinese New Year, yet disapprove 
of and avoid Christmas celebrations. When it comes to Ahmadiyah, fewer Muslim 
scholars lehd their support to the Muslim sect which was deemed 'deviant' according to 
MUI fatwa. Even the government fails to protect Ahmadiyah's followers from being 
250 
attacked by radical Muslim groups. In other words, many Muslim scholars accept the 
cultural diversity, provided it falls within specified 'orthodox' boundaries; yet they 
hesitate to cross religious boundaries, observe non-Islamic rituals and endorse alternative 
interpretations of Islam. While such Muslim scholars can be seen as 'pluralists' for their 
acceptance of cultural differences, they are far from being 'cosmopolitans' because of 
their unwillingness to cross boundaries. 
Nevertheless, despite the self essentialisation of Chineseness and the subscription to 
conservative religious understanding among some Chinese Muslims, 1 would propose 
that Chinese Muslim cultural identities, especially as manifested in their mosques, 
embrace a limited kind of cosmopolitan Islam and inclusive Chineseness. Without giving 
up their Chinese ethnicity and Islamic religiosity, Chinese-style mosques provide a 
model for multi-ethnic and multi-religious coexistence. Being 'more' Muslim does not 
necessarily mean being inward-looking and losing your cultural traditions. Being 'more' 
Chinese does not necessarily mean being exclusive and losing your local affiliations. In 
other words, one can be 'more Islamic, but no less Chinese', as well as 'more Chinese, 
but no less Indonesian'. While it is premature to claim that the emergence of Chinese 
Muslim cultural identities has pluralised the discourses of Chineseness and Islam, it does 
in some ways provide more complex cultural representations to both Chinese and 
Islamic identity in Indonesia. Furthermore,. Chinese Muslim cultures are shared by both 
Muslims and non-Muslims, Chinese and non-Chinese; and open up more spaces for 
social interactions and boundary crossings. Indeed, Chinese Muslim cultural identities 
are always at risk of disappearance because of the intense interaction and frequent 
intermarriage between Chinese Muslim and non-Chinese. 
Nevertheless, there are three requisites that de.served to be mentioned here. First, the 
inclusivity of Chinese Muslim culture does not necessarily guarantee the decline of class 
differences, racial inequality and religious conservatism. Second, while Chinese Muslim 
cultural identities, in general, embrace cosmopolitan values, not all Chinese Muslims are 
equally 'cosmopolitan'; instead some of them are hostile to both their former religions 
and their cultural traditions. Third, such cosmopolitan practices are not new in Indonesia, 
but can be traced back to the interaction between Islam, Chinese and local cultures 
during the pre-colonial and colonial periods (see chapter 2). 
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Future Research and Comparative Agendas 
Given the heterogeneity of both Chinese and Muslim identities, my research does not 
claim to be a comprehensive ethnography or a detailed historiography of C'hinese 
Muslims in Indonesia. Instead, I investigate how and under what conditions, Chinese 
Muslims negotiate their ethnicity and religiosity in post-1998 Indonesia. There are a few 
aspects of their identities that need to be further examined, such as their Islamic 
conversion and education, their interaction and intermarriage with non-Chinese Muslims, 
the religiosity of female converts, the identification of the second generation Chinese 
Muslims, as well as the experience of Chinese Muslims outside major cities in Java. I 
would also like to suggest a few possibilities for comparative research for deeper 
understanding and further theorisation of identity formation, cultural diversity and 
religious pluralism. I will here only outline some brief and modest suggestions, as more 
serious and in-depth comparisons are needed to compel us to 'see hidden facts, 
problematise taken-for-granted observations, and ask questions that otherwise we would 
not raised had we considered only a single case' (Bayat 2001: 153). 
The first comparison is with other minority Muslim groups in Indonesia. There has been 
much research on ethnic-majority Muslims in Indonesia, such as Javanese Muslims, yet 
only a few studies about minority Muslims, such as Dayak Muslims. A comparative 
analysis between Chinese Muslims and Dayak Muslims could be interesting, as both of 
them are religious minorities within their ethnic groups, and they also share parallel 
development in post-1998 Indonesia. In West Kalimantan, prior to 1998, many Dayaks 
(mainly animists or Christians) who converted to Islam self-identified themselves as 
'Malay', yet since the introduction of regional autonomy in post-New Order period, 
which has empowered Dayak political identity, more and more Dayaks who are Muslims 
consider themselves as 'Dayak Muslims' instead of 'Malay' (Pasti 2003). The Union of 
Dayak Muslim Families (IKDl, Ikatan Keluarga Dayak Islam) has also been established 
to promote Dayak Muslim cultural identities. How do Dayak Muslims reconcile their 
Dayak ethnicity and Islamic religiosity? How do they interact with non-Muslim Dayaks 
and Malay Muslims? The answers to such questions might help us draw a bigger picture 
about the dynamics of various ethno-religious identities in Indonesia. 
The second potential comparison is with other religious adherents of Chinese 
Indonesians, such as Chinese Christians, Chinese Buddhists and Chinese Confucians. 
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While traditional 'Chinese religions' are often associated with Buddhism, Confucianism 
and various folk beliefs, there are steadily increasing numbers of Chinese Indonesians 
who follow Christianity (both Protestant and Catholicism) and Islam, the two largest 
monotheistic world religions. Comparison between Chinese Muslims and Chinese 
Christians can lead us to better understand the transnational linkages and local dynamics 
of religious identities, and the relations between ethnic traditions and religious doctrines. 
On the one hand, there is a rapid grO\vth of transnational Pentecostal-charismatic 
Christianity among Chinese Indonesians; on the other hand, many Chinese Christians 
intermingle with other Christian Indonesians, such as Javanese Christians and Batak 
Christians, in the local schools and churches. While some Catholic churches held Imlek 
celebrations, a Protestant pastor questioned whether a Christian should practice Chinese 
traditions (Hoon 2009). These different viewpoints towards celebrating lmlek among 
Christians are in some ways resemble the divergent attitudes of modernist, traditionalist 
and salafisl Muslims toward local culture and ethnic traditions. 
The third useful comparison is with Chinese Muslims in Malaysia. By comparing 
Chinese Muslims in Indonesia and )ifalaysia, both Muslim majority countries with 
sizable Chinese minorities, we can analyse how the cultural politics of Chineseness and 
Islam in both countries have enabled and constrained the formation of Chinese Muslim 
cultural identities. While there are lively debates about Islamic expression and discourse 
in Indonesia; such discussions are to a certain extent regulated by the powerful religious 
authorities, and distorted by ethnicised !slam in Malaysia, in which Islam is 
constitutionally, politically and culturally interwoven with ethnic Malay. While there is a 
continuity of Chinese cultural. identities in Malaysia, albeit with state constraints and 
local adjustment; in Indonesia, Chineseness was suppressed for three decades during the 
New Order period and now is in the process of 'rediscovering' and 'reinventing'. A 
comparison between Chinese Muslims in both countries not only could tell us how 
possibly cosmopolitan practices are negotiated and contested in different social contexts, 
but might also hint us to the possible translocal connections of Chinese Muslims beyond 
the state borders. 
The fourth comparison is a rather ambitious one, which is with Muslim minorities in 
non-Muslim majority countries, such as those in China and in the western countries. As 
Roy (2004) points out, Islam is more and more often becoming disconnected from a 
specific culture, as evidenced by the growing number of young Muslims in the West who 
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define their identities primarily or merely as Muslim, instead of identifying themselves 
according to their ethnic groups. Meanwhile, in certain parts of China, there is also an 
'Arabisation' tendency among Hui Muslims, as shown by the shifting style of their 
mosque architecture, from a traditional Chinese style to a pan-Islamic one (Gillette 2000). 
Nonetheless, amid this trend of 'deculturation' (Roy 2004), I believe, there are still many 
Muslims who prefer to maintain their cultural identities. Just like in Indonesia, while 
transnational Jslamism is on the rise (Bubalo & Fealy 2005), there are also growing 
numbers of visitors to loeal Islamic pilgrimage sites (Quinn 2008). Indeed, we need more 
in-depth study to examine the intersection between religiosity and ethnicity, as well as 
the relations between transnational and localised religiosities in this globalising world. 
Also, in the last few years, there have been heated debates in various European countries 
about the banning of various visible symbols of Islam, such as the minarets in 
Switzerland and the headscarfs in France. Such prohibitions of Islamic symbols are 
possibly made with the assumption that the public expression of Islamic religiosity is 
rather divisive and bigoted; overlooking the possibilities of cosmopolitanism and 
inclusivity within religious practices. At the same time, we witness contrasting 
developments in Malaysia and Indonesia. Some Islamic departments in Malaysia insist 
dome and minarets are essential components of new mosques, while several local 
governments in Indonesia make female veiling compulsory. The former suppresses the 
creativity and diversity of Islamic expression, and the latter undermines the personal 
freedom of female Muslims. I am not here to suggest that we should limit, regulate or 
enforce Islamic symbols or any kind of identity expressions; instead I strongly believe 
that we should allow more spaces for expressing diverse identities and fostering the 
'cosmopolitan' potential of identity manifestation. This proposition leads us to another 
important question: how and under what circumstances, can identity claims and 
cosmopolitan visions coexist? The answer to this question is not only a philosophical 
one, but also a historical and political one. Therefore, we might not find a standard 
prescription for these cosmopolitan dilemmas, but instead may have to engage with the 
cosmopolitan possibilities of particular identity practices within the social and historical 
settings that constrain and enable them. 
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Appendix 1: List of Interviewees 
l/Na~e/ Gender/ Age i Occupation/ Position I I (as oflnterview date) I (as oflnterview date) 
·lfA·H~(M,51) I Noodl.-e-s·e-1-le-r·----·-
2 I Abdul Chalim Lee i Businessman, politician, 
' I (~1, 54) I former chairman of East 
I I 1 Java PIT! 
I Interview 
' i Date 
! 
I 
' 19/12/08 
03/10/08 
20/12/08 I 3 l Abdul Hadi, \,V/v1 :
1
 Lectu. rer, writer 
' I (M, 62) ' 
l'.-4 I ~~2~edia=~n--· I Jakarta PffI office~----+--1 5 I Ahmad Affandi ""t Businessman, 
27/12/08 
07/02/09 
I (M, 50+) chairman of Southern 
Sumatra PITI 
Location ""' i 
l 
Jakarta I 
' 
Surabaya I 
i 
Jakarta -~ i 
Jakarta_j 
Palembang I 
! 
! !----+---------·+-----··--·------+-----+-------'{ 
1 6 Ahmad Beben (M,35) Perfume seller 16/01109 Jakar~ta '
7 Ahmad Liu (M,34) Office worker, Lautze 28/03/08 Jakarta 
!----+-----· ___ __,!,.cMcc.9sque activist 
8 I Alex Tjiu (rYl,44) : Shop owner, Treasurer of 06/09/08 Surabaya JI 
·-·-·+------·---.. -·-·-'_Surabaya PIT! I .. 11_Ja_k_a-rt-a--··· ', 9 Ali Karim Oei (M,52) Businessman, chairman of 1 22112108 
Karim Oei Foundation i 
------1--------r--···-----i 
10 Ali Muktamar (M, 58) 
1 
Rel~15ious teacher . 18/11/08 Surabaya 1· 
11 Amin (M,52) Clothes seller ~~0/12/08 Jakarta 
12 Anda Hakim (M,49) I La;y~r, politician, foi~)~r 07/01/09 Jaka-rt_a __ _,! 
' chanman of Jakarta PITI , i ! ID -Andy Yentriyani Women's rights activist ! 19/06/08 Jakarta ., 
L-- i (F,311_ --· .. ·---------t-----t--· 
14 i Anton Medan (M,52) Preacher, businessman L(l7/11/08 Bogor 
15 Bagong Suyanto I Lecturer ""' I 25/09/08 Surabaya 
1 
16 ! ~:~~~ng Sujan-to---:-B-us-i-ne_s_s_m_a_n_, -chairman of 127/ll_/_0,-8-,"s_u_r-abaya -j 
L_J (M,62) ._jJ;:heng Hoo Foundatio_n ___ _... ____ +----c--·~ I 171 Budi Setyagraha ! Businessm~n, politician, ; 12/02/09 Yogyakarta I (M,56) i former chairman of j 
, i Y~gyakartaPITI --+-i----+-------< I 18 Dekky Hermanto I Office worker i 31/10/08 Surabaya 
I (M,25 .. i i 
19 Djoko Slamet l-1 Businessman ..... ------i-2-1-il_l_/OS--1-S-u-r-ab_a_y_a, ·-
M, 50+ . . ___ .,_i ____ .. _ .. 
20 Donny Salim (M, 56) l Businessman I 14/l 1/08 Surabaya I 
21 Edwin Suryalaksana tBusinessman, chal;man of i 22;11/0S : Surabava i 
· ITM, 
5
0+) -·· EC.alo~1thJea'Svas.epJ!1e1r"l ···-- . +07/0.2/'09 /' -~ 
22 ~~ly Pangestu (F,35) __ _ ... --~! _Ja_k_·a_rt~----j 
23 I Enin Supriyanto Curator, artist 07/01/09 I Jakarta 1 
I (M,47) - J ! J 
24 I Erni Tantajaya (F,42) Shop owner I 08/02/09 I Palembang I 
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25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
---·---·-----------~-· ! 10/01/08 Jakarta . 
i 
Felix Siaw (M,25) Marketing manager, HTI 
activist 
! 04/04/08 Jakarta Muhammad Gatot Human rights activist 
M,30) I I 
·-··· 
Gunawan Hidayat Shop owner, religious 11/10/08 Surabaya 
(M,53) teacher 
--'--~-'-----+~~~~~~.--'~--·-+10/01/09 IJaka-ra-ta----i 
22/06/08 Jakarta 
Gusdur/ Abdurrahman Leader of NU, former 
Wa~jd M,69 Indonesian President 
Hadi Bun (M,30) , Counsellor, Lautze Mosque 
I activist 
Hadi Tham (M,38) I Sh~p. owner, MUSTIKA 
act1v1st 
Hariyono Ong (M,35) I Imam of Surabaya Cheng 
i Hoo Mosgue 
01/03/08 
30/09/08 
J Jakarta 
I 
l Surabayi 
Hartono ".\fat (M,43) Motor-taxi driver 
____ _,_o_S_/_12_/_08_+'· ~~rabaya 
17/10/08 ! Surabaya 
I 
Hassan Chandra University student 
(M,24 
Henny Rachmawati Marketing officer 26/10/08 
24/10/08 
F,34 I 
Herman Halim (M,55) ! Bank Director, leader of 
I Chen Hoo Foundation 
Surabaya 
36 Herwansyah (M,39) Lecturer, religious teacher 07/02/09 1 Palembang 
I 37 Ibnu Suaidi (M, 60+) Businessman 03/12/08 'Madura 
I 38 !iv Febriana (F,25) Government officer, HT! 29/11/08 Surabaya 
, activist ! 
39 Indah Er~-aw_a_tl-. (F_,4_1_) i Ins~rance agent 22/10/08 Surabaya ! 
!----+---~--~ --------+ -·------! 
I 40 Iskandar 1 Lecturer, shop owner 13/02/09 
11
, Salatiga _Ji 
I Abd~nahman (M,43) 
--+-----
41 I Jos Soetomo (M,63) Businessman, former 24/10/08 ... __ ,
1
· .. surabaya [
1 chairman of PITI _ 
42 Julie Latif (F,36) Shop owner 12/01/09 , Jakarta 
1----+--.----~-~--t----"- ------
43 1 Junaidi (M,39) , Lecturer 15/04/08 i Jakarta 
48 Kim_rii_':ln (M,29) Vehicle consultant 1 23/03/08 Jakarta 
49 1 Koko Liem (M,29) Preacher, business_m_a_n---+-1 2-6-/-04--/-0_8_,_J_a_k-ar-ta----< 
' 
' .4lV OS!la ,-
54 Linda __ Lcstari (F, 
55 Lukman Tjoe (M 
,._5_0~_K_o_m~al~sari (F,23) University student ____jE_/0_6_/0_8_+-J_ak_a_r_ta~ _ __, 
51 Lee Heap Seng Businessman I 03/12/08 Madura 
(M,70+) I 1--r~~~-----+--~-------..L__---+----li-5_2__,__Li_·li_a_n3._~F,35) ,..N_, _u_rs_e ____ . ____ ,_' _15_/_1 _ll._0_8 __ 1-S_u_r_ab_a_y_a_--; 
53 I 'I R · (F ~ .!:-awyer, businessw.<_>p_a_n_~t--1_7.'-11_1_'-/0_8_+--S_u_ra_b~a~'a_---1 
34) 
1 
Shopkeeper 29/02/09 , ':'. ogyakarta 
,50) Religio-u~s-t-ea_c_h_er___ 02/11/08 Surabaya 
--+------l-
56 Marlina (F, 20+) ..... ~1 English teac~e,r__ ___ ~_02i03_/0_8_~J_ak_a_r_ta __ ~ 
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·-"~ ! 15f01/09 l 57 Max Mulyadi Businessman, Advisor of Jakarta Supangkat (M, 76) PITT 
~·-
Mbah Pringis (M,54) . Semarang i 58 Fortune teller i 18/02/09 
59 Meily Cahaya (F,17) Student I 2311010,s Suraba~ 
.. .. 
60 Merry Effendi (F,44) Housewife I 08/02/09 Palembang I 
-· -··~· -~--"'"~-··~-· 
111108;08 61 Muliawan (M,68) Mandarin teacher I Jakarta ... __j 
62 
1 
Naga Kunadi (M,32) Office worker, Lautze Jakana i 11/04/08 
I 
i Mosque .. aclivist 
i 63 [ Nurul Faj~r/ Ki Budi Paranormal practitioner j 23/12/08 Jakarta 
~(M,40L ·~··---· J_ -----
Putri WongKamFu Astrologist i 02/11/08 Surabaya 
I i (F,56) i 
! 65 Revi Teng (M,37) Mandarin reacher : 31/03/08 Jakarta 
166 Royse Anggela Liu Businesswoman 11/01/09 Jakarta 
I 
! ffA9L 
. ... 
·-t- Rudiansyah (M,40) Shop owner 16/02/09 Solo I 68 Selina Tan (F,31) Account clerk 04/05/08 Jakarta 
-
.-f--.. ·--
69 Sholihin Sani (M,57) Marketing director, religious ! 11/01i09 Jakarta 
teacher, FPI supporter 1 i 
•.. 
70 Sias Saputra (F,65) Business\voman 09/04/08 Jakarta 
-··-~--·--·-~-·- .. 
71 Singgih Santoso Insurance agent 08/12/08 Surabaya 
(M,51) 
72 ; Sonny Wijaya (M,60) Retiree 04/10/08 Surabaya 
----t· - . 
·-· I 13/04/08 731 Suhandoyo Laison Graphic designer Jakarta 
i (M,31) 
I 74 I ~ujanto (M,39) . ·-·--Hairdresser 07/02/09 Palembang 
' 
... 
---i 75 · Su!thony (M,67) Businessman 06/10/08 Surabaya 
···-· I 76 Surya Madya (M,46) Office manager, PKS 07/01/09 Jakarta ! i 
' 
11 :C1J.//010111°o-9s·:-tTSaukr:~a··~btaa"a I 
I 78 Syamsul Arrifin 1 Traditional massager ~ , r-7-9-+-~M-ya-':-i:-)T_a_n_u-dj-ai-·a--~' leader o-f----..il-o9/06/08 I Jaka;rn ~ 
! ' I (M,59) , MUSTIKA, chairl!lan of 1 1 
j PITJ Jakarta i 
80 Syaukanie-o-,-,g----+I, -P-r-ea-c-he~ 
(M,51) 
actn1st 
------· -·--· 
Preacher, businessman 
>----+·-----------
! 77 Syafii Antonio (M,42) 
··~-
81 Tan Gunawan (M,55) Religious teacher 
' • paranormal pract ! 
' itioner 
... 
I 19;11;08 .. -----I Surabaya 
I 
-ioz;oi;o9 I I Jakarta 
I I 
----··--·---·· ---·· 
: 8? 
I - Tan Mei Hwa (F,40) Preacher, busines i 
swoman i 23/11/08 Surabaya 
I 
--·-·-I 83 ·-Thio Poo Ping (F,43) Housewife 16/11/08 Surabaya 
... 
! 84 Titin Sandranaya Social worker 
(F,68) 
26/11/08 Bandung 
-
85 Tjui Mei Hua (F,28) Make-up artist 16/01/09 Jakarta 
86 Tony Hartono Contractor 31/10/08 Surabaya 
nv• "11 . l 
.. 
87 j Trisno Admadjo ' Trading agent 18/10/08 Surabaya 
I (M,5fil 
88 I Vitha (F,32) Office clerk, MUSTIKA 10/06/08 Jakarta 
activist 
+06/lli08 
-· 
89 Willy Pangestu Shop owner, secretary of Surabaya I 
i (M,59) PIT! I 
._.._._._ --~---1 
Winda Agustian I 231111os I 90 Counsellor Surabaya 
-
JF,41) 
···-
i ~ 91 J Yanto Yang (M,60) Retiree 122/11/08 Surabaya 
····-· 
....... 
92 ' Y enci (F,35) Office worker . 22/06/08 Jakarta 
.. _. .. , - . 
93 Yuana Vina (F,24) Office worker, PKS activist I 15/10/08 Surabaya 
~-~,---- -
94 YusofHikam (M,50) Treasurer of Surabaya Surabaya 
Cheng Hoo Mosque 
95 Zawawi lmron Writer, poet i 01/12/08 Madura 
i (M,60+) I 
.. 
* The list above only consists of informants whom I formally interviewed. It does not 
include informants whose stories, narratives and opinions that I recorded in my field 
notes from participation observation and informal conversation. 
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Appendix 2: Interview Guidelines 
INTERVIEW GUIDELINES 
f This form is not a questionnaire for the informant, but an interview guideline for 
researcher's reference. It outlines the general questions that will guide my interviews in 
fieldwork Wording and questions may change according to conditions.] 
Interview Information 
-
w n,tp· 
- -
-
'~Time: 
I - -
-w y 
l::::J Information supplied may attributed to informant's name _- Information supplied may attributed to the use of pseudonym 
Personal Background 
{Informant has the right for not providing information on any item below] 
[N~~~:--- ... .., .. ,._.,. 
! Name before conversion: 
I Islamic name, if any: 
! Chinese name, if anv: 
Ethnicitv/ dialect: 
Current localitv: 
··-·--·--Ori<'inal locality: 
. Gender: 
-- ··-·----A11:e: 
_, 
-
•< ·~1 i,,ion. 
--·-- ··-----
---
.·1e 
-- 11's vear: .. 
Current i"h 
Income: 
Previousi"h- . 
1 Current housin<> area: ' a; - • . 
f Previous housin!! area:(before conversio11) (/;' . •c . . 
i Primarv education: 
!-------- -
·-----I Secondarv education: 
r ·-"""· --~-
' Tertiarv education: 
-Sooken lamrnage/ dialects: 
·······-···-Societal involvement: 
Political involvement: 
Marital status: Marriage's year: 
·-···--· Ethnicity/ religion of spouse: 
Number of Children: ' i 
-
---
---
. 
'\ 
il 
--·---
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Open-ended Questions 
[Informant has the right to decline to answer any question below] 
1. Conversion Experience 
• When did you convert to Islam? Why? 'Where? How9 
• Did you go through any religious organisation or mosque for your conversion? 
• How did you learn about Islam before and/or after conversion? 
• Did you change your religious information on your identity card after conversion? 
• Did you adopt an Islamic name after conversion? What is it? Why? 
• Could you share with me the responses (e.g. Chinese, Muslims, family members, 
friends, colleague, schoolmates, etc) towards your conversion? 
• Could you share with me the changes lo your lifestyle (e.g. attire, food, language, 
job, personal attitude, housing area, social interaction, etc) after conversion? 
• Do you think you gained or lost anything after conversion to Islam? 
2. Identification 
• How do you identify yourself (Chinese/ Indonesian/ Javanese/ Sundanese/ 
Muslim/ Chinese Muslim or others)" 
• What is your ethnicity? \Vhy do you say that? What is the role of your ethnicity 
in your daily life? 
• What is the role of your ethnicity in your daily life? ln what sense, is Islam 
important (e.g. social, economic, belief, identity etc)? 
• Do you think ethnic identity and religious identity contradict each other? 'W'hy? 
Which identity is more important? Why? 
• Did your conversion to Islam make you more 'Indonesian' and more accepted by 
non-Chinese Indonesians? 
• Do you care about who you are in terms of cultural identity? 
• What name do you prefer now? Chinese, Islamic, Indonesian or mixed? 
3. Intermarriage 
• What do you think about mixed-marriage? 
• Have you married? 
If married. 
• Did you marry before/ after conversion? 
• If you converted after marriage, did your spouse and children also convert to 
Islam? 
• Could you tell me about your marriage procedure and wedding ceremony? 
• If you have children, are they Muslim? W'hat kind of names did you give them? 
What kind of school are they attending? 
• Could you share with me details of your intermarriage family life (e.g. language, 
food)? 
If not married., 
• Do you have a partner? What is his/her ethnicity and religion? 
• If no, are ethnicity and religion important factors for you in looking for a partner? 
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4. Islam: Practice, Experience and Perception 
• Are you a member of any other Islamic organisation (e.g. NU, Muhammadiyah)? 
• If yes, to which organisation do you belong? Why? 
• If not, which Islamic organisation do you think best represents your religious 
belief/ practice? 
• Would you consider yourself a pious Muslim? Why? How do you practise Islam? 
• Do you consider yourself as a traditionalist, modernist or other type of Muslim? 
• Which mosque do you often go for Friday prayer? 
• Do you follow any local Muslim custom, such as slametan? 
• Who is your favourite Muslim preacher in Indonesia today? 
• Do you attend any Islamic study group or religious classes? 
• Do you use Islamic banking? Why? 
• Do you wear jilbab or koko dress? Since when? \:Vhy? 
• Do you think Muslim women converts should wear jilbab (headscarf)? Why? 
• Have you performed hajj pilgrimage? Do you intend to do so? 
• As a Muslim convert, have you ever experienced any incident of prejudice or 
discrimination? 
• Do you think Indonesia is an Islamic state? Should Indonesia be an Islamic state? 
Why? What should be the role of Islam in Indonesia? 
• What do you think about the implementation of Islamic Jaw in lndonesia? Do 
you support the implementation of the Anti-Pornography Bill? 
• What do you thinks about Ahmadiyah? Do you think it should be banned? 
• Do you preach Islam to your friends or families? How do you do so? 
• ls there any Muslim leader that you admire? 
5. Chinese: Practice, Experience and Perception 
e Are you a member of any Chlnese organisation (e.g. INTI, PSMTI etc)? If yes, to 
which organisation do you belong? If not, do you know any of them? 
• Would you consider yourself as a Totok, Peranakan or other kind of Chinese? 
• Can you trace your generation (as a Chinese) in Indonesia? Are both your 
parents Chinese? Do they practise any Chinese cultme? Do they celebrate 
Chinese New Year? Can they speak Mandarin or any Chinese dialect? 
• Do you practise any Chinese culture? What Chinese culture do you practise? Do 
you eat Chinese food? Do you celebrate Chinese New Year and Ceng Beng 
(before and after conversion)? Why? 
• Do you have a Chinese name? Can you speak Mandarin or any Chinese dialect? 
Do you watch any Chinese TV programs or read any Chinese newspapers? 
• Can Chinese Muslims practise Chinese culture? Can Chinese Muslims ce!ebn1te 
Chinese New Year? ls it halal or haram? 
• ls Chinese culture incompatible to Islamic teaching? Why? 
• As a Chinese Indonesian, have you ever experienced any incident of prejudice or 
discrimination'? 
• Do you think there is still any discrimination towards Chinese Indonesians'? If 
yes, how do you think the Chinese should fight discrimination? 
• How do you describe the current ethnic relationship between Chinese and non-
Chinese Indonesians? 
• Do you think Chinese Indonesians should assimilate or maintain their identity? 
• Do you follow any Javanese or other local cultural traditions? 
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6. Chinese Muslim: Practice, Experience and Perception 
• Have you heard about Cheng Hoo Mosque? What do you think about it? 
• Have you heard about any Chinese Muslim preachers? How do you think them? 
• Do you know any other Chinese Muslims? 
• Are you a member of about PIT! or Karim Oei foundation? If not, have you 
heard about them and do you intend to join them? 
• Can you describe your interaction with non-Muslim Chinese, as well as non-
Chinese Indonesians? 
• How do you position Chinese Muslims in Indonesia society? What role do you 
think they can play? How do Chinese Muslims contribute to religious pluralism, 
cultural diversity or ethnic interactions in Indonesia? 
• Have you heard anything about Muslims in China? 
• Have you heard anything about the role of Chinese in earlier lslamisation of Java? 
Do you think some of the Walisongo are of Chinese descent? 
• Have you heard about Cheng Ho? What do you think about him? 
7. Political and Social Involvement 
• Do you belong to any political party? 
• If yes, to which party do you belong? Why? What position do you hold? 
• If not, which party do you think best represents your interests? Why? 
• Are you a member of any social organisation or community activity? 
• If yes, to which social organisation do you belong? Why? 
Additional Questions (Depend on conditions, if needed) 
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Appendix 3: Chinese-style Mosques in Post-1998 Indonesia 
The Surabaya Cheng Hoo Mosque · 
The Palembang Cheng Hoo Mosque 
The Tan Kok Liong (Anton Medan) Mosque, Bogor 
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Appendix 4: The Interior Design of the Surabaya Cheng Hoo Mosque 
Drum for calling to prayer 
(NU's influence) 
Eight-sided roof (Chinese cultural influence) 
Podium for Imam to preach 
(Muhammadiyah's design) 
A relief of Admiral Cheng Ho, next to the mosque 
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Appendix 5: Activities in the Surabaya Cheng Hoo Mosque 
Jdul Fitri prayer Conversion ceremony 
Traditional Chinese musical perfonnance Charity work 
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Appendix 6: Chinese Muslim Preachers 
Tan Mei Hwa spoke during an election campaign in Surabaya in 2008. Her preaching 
style is especially popular among women and girls. 
Anton Medan (at the front of the crowd, wearing a black peci cap) visited Amrozi's 
family in Lamongan, before Amrozi was executed for terrorism in 2008. 
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Koko Liem's religious SMS service (2009)/ http://kokoliem.com 
Lampion's CD cover (edition 2010)/ http://nasyidlampion.blogspot.com 
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